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PRINTED ON WHITE CHLORINE FREE PAPER Foreword 
This, the second report on economic and social cohesion in the European Union, 
pulls together a large amount of information, which is the product of considerable 
work carried out by the European Commission services on developments and 
prospects. With my colleagues, Anna Diamantopoulou and Franz Fischler, I hope 
that you will find it useful. 
The first report on cohesion, published by the Commission in 1996, laid the basis 
for a thorough reform of EU regional policy. This was then formalised in Agenda 
2000 and entered into force last year. 
The aim of this second report is no less important. It represents the very first analy 
sis of the situation in the present Member States and regions in relation to eco 
nomic and social cohesion and how this can be expected to change after 
enlargement. 
It also represents a solid basis for discussing the form which regional policy will 
take in an enlarged Union. The need for regional policy will not disappear with en 
largement. On the contrary, given the resultant widening of social and economic 
disparities, there will be additional justification for EU intervention, based on the 
same principles and with the same ambition for both the existing and future Mem 
ber States. 
At this stage, the report does not, of course, attempt to draw any firm conclusions 
on the shape of cohesion policy after 2006. Instead, its aim is to open a debate 
and to suggest clear and detailed proposals and options which need to be 
considered. 
The report also sets out the European Commission's priorities to be addressed in 
this major discussion of solidarity and cohesion in an enlarged Union. In launch 
ing it, we have three principles: 
first, that cohesion policy retains credibility with the appropriate means at its dis 
posal for tackling the unprecedented scale of the challenges which it will face; 
secondly, that it becomes more visible, that it brings home to citizens in the larger 
Union the meaning of cohesion while meeting their expectations, directly or 
indirectly. Foreword 
thirdly, that the policy is pursued with a clearer vision than in the past of the diver 
sity of the different parts of Europe and their different needs. 
To assemble 500 million people in a united Europe   but not a uniform Europe  
represents a tremendous opportunity. Europe must, however, equip itself with a 
policy capable of maintaining cohesion in this context and of bringing genuine 
added value to the resolution of the most serious problems. To achieve this, cohe 
sion policy needs not only a new dimension but also a new direction. This report is 
intended to provide a practical and objective contribution to launching a 
wide ranging debate on this subject. 
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VI Introduction 
The role of the Cohesion Report First analysis of cohesion 
in an enlarged Union 
Article 159 of the Treaty states that every three years 
the Commission should present 'a report on the prog 
ress made towards achieving economic and social 
cohesion and on the manner in which the various 
means (including different Community policies) pro 
vided for in (the) article have contributed to it.' This re 
port is the response to this requirement. Article 45 of 
the General Regulation on the Structural Funds speci 
fies the contents of the report. 
The Commission adopted the First Cohesion Report 
at the end of 1996. This was the basis for the first Co 
hesion Forum held in April 1997 and for the proposals 
contained in 'Agenda 2000   for a stronger and wider 
Union', which led to the reform of cohesion policy 
adopted by the Council in June 1999. 
The Commission has chosen to present the Second 
Report on Economic and Social Cohesion at the be 
ginning of 2001, which falls immediately after the first 
phase of the implementation of the reform of the 
Structural Funds, and after certain key decisions 
have been taken as regards financial allocations and 
geographical eligibility for support. It is, therefore, al 
ready possible at this stage to make a broad ex ante 
assessment of the possible impact of the reform. 
The second Report also contains an updating of the 
regional analysis contained in the Sixth and last Peri 
odic Report on the situation and development of re 
gions published in 1999. Such an updating is more 
necessary than before since the Cohesion Reports 
replace the Periodic Reports which the Commission 
has published since the beginning of the 1980s. 
As the Treaty and the general Regulation on the 
Structural Funds require, the Report analyses the 
changes in cohesion and the factors which contribute 
to it. Without prejudging the timing, the procedures or 
the order of countries entering, the working hypothe 
sis adopted relates to an enlarged Union of 27 Mem 
ber States. 
So far as the data allow, each part of the Report in 
cludes consideration of the situation in an enlarged 
Union. This should be the context for analysis, rather 
than in terms of a more static analysis of the respec 
tive situation in the present 15 Member States and the 
12 countries with which accession negotiations are 
taking place. An analysis of regional features in Tur 
key, the 13
th candidate country with which negotia 
tions have not yet begun, is included separately. This 
will be the subject of a more systematic analysis in fu 
ture reports after negotiations have begun. 
Launching the debate 
The report develops a set of conclusions and recom 
mendations with a view to opening up a debate on the 
future of cohesion policy after 2006 in an enlarged Eu 
ropean Union. The Commission is convinced that, for 
the future, important changes will be required to a 
policy which was designed for the present Member 
States. While enlargement is a major part of the ex 
planation for the need for change, it is not the only one 
in view of the far reaching economic, social and terri 
torial changes affecting the present EU15. These 
changes are also examined in the report. 
VII Introduction 
The debate which will ensue will involve the EU institu 
tions and agencies, Member States and regional and 
local authorities, as well as the relevant economic and 
social interests, non governmental organisations, 
universities and other academic institutions. The 
Commission itself is organising a Cohesion Forum in 
Brussels on 21 and 22 May 2001 to provide an oppor 
tunity for the exchange of ideas and discussion of fu 
ture cohesion policy. The candidate countries will be 
fully involved in this consultation exercise. 
At a later stage, the Commission will set out proposals 
which will then be presented to the European Parlia 
ment and the Council of Ministers for a new cohesion 
policy to take effect from 1 January 2007. 
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x Summary 
Part I: Situation and trends 
A narrowing of income disparities in the EU15 
In the EU today, disparities in income (GDP) per head 
between Member States and, more particularly, be 
tween regions, remain considerable. The average in 
come per head of the 10% of population living in the 
most prosperous regions is, for example, 2.6 times 
greater than the bottom 10%. 
The disparities, however, have narrowed over time. In 
the three least prosperous Member States (Greece, 
Spain and Portugal), average income per head has 
risen from 68% of the EU average in 1988 to 79% in 
1999, a reduction of a third in the initial gap. Dispar 
ities between regions have narrowed by less, partly 
because the gaps have widened between regions 
within certain Member States. 
Lower income per head at regional level is associated 
with lower output per person employed, lower levels 
of education and training   despite significant prog 
ress achieved in recent years   less research and de 
velopment activity and innovation, as well as a slower 
pace of introduction of the new information and com 
munication technologies. On the other hand, there 
has been a marked improvement in relative infra 
structure endowment in less prosperous regions, 
a key factor in their longer term development 
prospects. 
A step change with enlargement 
With the enlargement of the Union, the economic 
landscape is set to change significantly. An analysis 
of the situation as it stands today points to a doubling 
of the income gaps between countries and regions, a 
doubling in the sense that if a Union of 27 existed 
tomorrow: 
  at national level, over one-third of the population 
would live in countries with an income per head 
less than 90 % of the Union average   the current 
threshold for eligibility for aid under the Cohesion 
Fund   compared to one-sixth in the present 
EU15. 
  at regional level, the average income per head for 
the bottom 10% of population, living in the least 
prosperous regions in EU27, would be only 31% 
of the EU27 average. In the EU15 today, the in 
come per head of the bottom 10% of population 
equates to 61% of the average. 
At national level, in a Union of 27 the countries sepa 
rate into three main groups. The most prosperous 
group comprises 12 of the current Member States of 
the Union   all except Greece, Spain and Portugal  
where income is above average. This is followed by 
an intermediate group of Greece, Spain and Portugal, 
together with Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and the Czech 
Republic, where income per head is around 80% of 
the EU27 average, with 13% of the total EU27 popula 
tion. The real change compared to the Union of today, 
however, would be the existence of a third group 
comprising the 8 remaining candidate countries 
where income per head is around 40% of the EU27 
average. This is a significant group, accounting for 
around 16% of the population of the EU27. 
As an example, infrastructure in the candidate coun 
tries is inadequate in quantity and often of poor qual 
ity, while evidence suggests that labour force skills 
and the kind of education and training provided do 
not match the needs of a modern market economy. 
As regards transport, the Transport Infrastructure 
XI Summary 
Needs Assessment estimates the total cost of con 
structing trans European networks in these 12 coun 
tries at EUR 90 billion, while several studies put the 
cost of complying with Community environmental 
standards at EUR 50 100 billion, giving an overall 
amount of EUR 15 20 billion a year, for the next 10 
years, for the two sectors. 
In sum, the evidence demonstrates that considerable 
progress has been achieved in the present EU15 in 
reducing income gaps between regions, though on 
past trends it is likely to take another generation be 
fore regional disparities are eliminated. Enlargement 
widens the disparities markedly. Given existing levels 
of income per head in the candidate countries, con 
vergence between regions in the enlarged Union 
would take at least two generations if it occurred at 
the same pace. 
Employment: some signs of progress 
Employment in the EU15 rose by over 2 million during 
the 1990s, but this was not sufficient to significantly 
increase the employment rate   the proportion of the 
population of working age in employment   which re 
mained at just over 60%, well below the ambitious ob 
jective of 70% fixed for 2010 by the Lisbon European 
Council. The average figure, however, conceals sub 
stantial differences across the Union. Only 4 Member 
States had an employment rate in 1999 above 70%, 
while in Greece, it was only around 55% and in Spain 
and Italy, even lower. 10% of the Union's population 
lived in regions where well below half of those of work 
ing age were in employment (44%). 
Despite strong growth of employment of women, 
mostly in part time jobs (one woman in three in the 
Union works part time), their employment rate was 19 
percentage points below that of men in 1999. All of 
the employment growth in the Union over the 1990s 
was in services, the largest increases occurring in the 
most prosperous regions and in high skilled jobs. At 
the same time, because of skill mismatches, labour 
shortages are beginning to emerge in many regions, 
especially in new sectors of activity and particularly in 
information technology. 
The persistence of wide gaps in 
unemployment in the EU15 
Disparities in unemployment remain wide in the Un 
ion. In 1999, Greece, Spain, France, Italy and Finland 
had unemployment rates of more than 10%, at least 
twice the rate in Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria 
and Portugal where the figure in each case was below 
5%. Regional disparities are much more pronounced: 
the 10% of population in the worst affected regions  
mostly regions where development was lagging, but 
some of which were undergoing restructuring   had 
an unemployment rate in 1999 of 23%, nearly 8 times 
the average for those in the least affected regions 
(3%). 
Labour markets in the candidate 
countries: an incomplete transition 
While there are superficial similarities between labour 
markets in the candidate countries and the EU15   in 
1999, unemployment averaged 10.2% in the former 
and 9.3% in the latter, while the average employment 
rate was much the same in the two   there are major 
underlying differences, which are a legacy of the on 
going process of transition. Five key features are 
worth highlighting: 
  women in the candidate countries are continuing 
to withdraw from the labour market, though par 
ticipation rates are still higher than those in most 
parts of the Union; 
  employment in traditional industries remains high 
even after the loss of 25 50% of jobs over the 
1990s; 
  agricultural employment, at 22% of the total, is 5 
times the average for the Fifteen (4.5%), though 
its importance varies markedly between the 
countries; 
  labour productivity remains lower than in the 
EU15; 
  employment in services has grown significantly, 
but at a much higher rate in the capital cities than 
in other parts of the countries. 
In sum, the return of stronger economic growth in the 
second half of the 1990s has generally had favour 
able consequences for employment and unemploy 
ment in the EU15 but the effect in terms of reducing 
regional disparities in income and employment has 
been more limited. In the candidate countries, the 
transition process remains incomplete, with the risk 
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that unemployment could rise in many regions in the 
period ahead. But the outlook for labour markets in an 
enlarged Union will be heavily influenced by demo-
graphic trends. In the EU15, these will lead to an age 
ing of the labour force and could result in it declining 
in number after 2010. In the candidate countries the 
pattern is broadly similar, but an important feature 
here is the expected growth in the number of young 
people aged 20 35. In an enlarged Union, this would 
be an important balancing factor in an otherwise age 
ing population and labour force. 
Social cohesion and the incidence 
of poverty: a persistent problem 
In 1996,18% of the population in the Union, or one in 
six, had income below the poverty level.
1 The coun 
tries where the proportion was lowest, Denmark and 
the Netherlands (11 12%), are also those with income 
per head above the EU average. At the other extreme, 
20 25% of the population in Portugal and Greece had 
income below the poverty line. The contrast is even 
sharper in respect of long term, or persistent, poverty 
which affects only 3% of people in Denmark and the 
Netherlands but 12% in Portugal and 10% in Greece. 
There are many root causes of poverty and particular 
groups are especially at risk, including people with 
low education, old age pensioners, the unemployed 
and others not in work, lone parent families and fami 
lies with large numbers of children. Many poor fami 
lies have more than one of these characteristics. 
While comparable data for the candidate countries 
are not yet available, the evidence suggests that rural 
areas are most affected by poverty. 
The territorial dimension: persistent imbalances 
The most important territorial imbalance in the Union 
today is that between the less developed regions and 
the rest. At the same time, spatial disparities in the 
Union reflect a more complex reality than indicated 
by differences in income and employment between 
regions. This reality has to do with the potential for de 
velopment and is implicit in Article 158 of the Treaty, 
which refers to the need to promote a harmonious de 
velopment of the Union as a whole. 
For the Commission, and for the Member States, this 
was the rationale behind the European Spatial Devel 
opment Perspective (ESDP), which was the first 
coherent effort to clarify the nature of the major territo 
rial imbalances across the Union as a whole. These 
imbalances and the need to address them assume an 
added dimension with enlargement, if only because 
the land area of the Union will have doubled in relation 
to the early 1990s once the candidate countries have 
entered. 
High geographical concentration 
of activity in the Union 
Economic activity is concentrated in a core part of the 
Union situated in the triangle extending from North 
Yorkshire in the UK to Franche Comte in France and 
Hamburg in Germany. While this area accounts for 
only one seventh of the Union's land area, a third of 
the population live there and almost half (47%) of in 
come is produced there. In other comparable econo 
mies, like the US, the pattern of activity is more 
dispersed. 
For the EU, this concentration has negative implica 
tions not only for peripheral regions but also for the 
central regions themselves, particularly in terms of 
traffic congestion and pressure on the environment 
and health, which could in the long term offset the ap 
parent advantages. 
Urban areas: growth centres for 
achieving polycentric development... 
The concentration of population in central areas is re 
flected in a high degree of urbanisation and a dispro 
portionately large share of the highly skilled functions 
associated with the knowledge economy being lo 
cated there: business headquarters, research instal 
lations and the most highly qualified workers. The net 
result is a level of productivity some 2.4 times higher 
than in peripheral areas. The counterpart of this con 
centration is that the Union lacks the kind of 
polycentric pattern of activity which is undoubtedly a 
factor in the territorial cohesion of the US, in its less 
pronounced regional disparities in income and em 
ployment and, perhaps, in its competitiveness. 
... but with pockets of deprivation 
The Union's urban areas, however, are also those 
where social and economic disparities are most 
marked and certain districts have high levels of pov 
erty and exclusion. Differences in unemployment and 
dependency rates, for example, are wider within 
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some cities than between regions in the Union. (The 
Commission's urban audit identified a number of cit 
ies where unemployment varied by a factor of 10 be 
tween districts.) 
Varying circumstances in the rural areas 
The extent of rural areas varies significantly between 
Member States, from the Nordic countries and Ire 
land, where two out of every three people live in such 
areas, to Belgium, Germany and the UK, where only 
one in eight does. 
The population living in rural areas is increasing, if to 
differing degrees, in all Member States and employ 
ment growth is higher there than in the rest of the Un 
ion, reflecting their comparative advantages. Equally, 
however, many remain in difficulty because of their 
many handicaps. 
Border regions: the problems shift eastwards 
Border regions, which are home to one in four Euro 
peans, often suffer from problems of accessibility and 
lack of economic opportunities because of the frac 
ture created by an international frontier. With the cre 
ation of the single market, backed by cross border 
cooperation programmes supported by European 
funds, for the most part existing internal border re 
gions no longer show significant differences in in 
come per head and unemployment compared to the 
Union as a whole. In general, the same applies to 
those regions in the EU15 bordering candidate coun 
tries, although there are important differences be 
tween the regions concerned. For these regions, the 
situation could change in the future, in the sense that 
they are in the frontline in the more competitive cir 
cumstances after enlargement. 
In the candidate countries, a significantly larger pro 
portion of the population live in border regions (6 out 
of every 10 people), than in the Union, the main prob 
lem areas being in the east along frontiers with third 
countries. 
Specific areas 
Islands and archipelagos, mountain and peripheral 
areas   including the 'outermost' regions   are an im 
portant part of the Union and share many common 
physical and geo morphological characteristics and 
economic disadvantages. These regions generally 
suffer accessibility problems which make their eco 
nomic integration with the rest of the Union more of a 
challenge. Accordingly, a large number already re 
ceive EU regional aid   95% of both mountain areas 
and islands are covered by Objective 1 or 2. At the 
same time, their social and economic conditions vary 
widely and two of the most prosperous candidate 
countries are islands (Cyprus and Malta). 
Part II: Contribution of 
Community policies to 
economic and social cohesion 
This part of the Report examines the manner in which 
Community policies have contributed to cohesion, as 
stipulated in the Treaty (Article 159), and the implica 
tions for enlargement of the Union. 
Economic and monetary 
integration policies 
Economic and Monetary Union 
Macroeconomic stability helps 
to achieve economic convergence 
For high rates of economic growth to be sustained in 
lagging regions of the Union, it is important that struc 
tural policies are allied to macroeconomic policies 
which ensure financial stability. The establishment of 
a single currency makes the maintenance of such 
stability easier to achieve. 
Over the 1990s, in the run up to monetary unification, 
inflation was reduced considerably in the cohesion 
countries, especially in Greece and Portugal, from 
well above the EU average to around 2
1/2%. At the 
same time, growth of GDP was above average in all 
four cohesion countries in the second half of the 
1990s. Nominal convergence was, therefore, accom 
panied by real convergence. 
This tendency was particularly marked in Ireland, 
while convergence has occurred more slowly in 
Spain and Portugal and more recently in Greece. 
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The introduction of the Euro makes differences 
more transparent and capital more mobile 
The introduction of the Euro should lead to increased 
competition and, therefore, to greater market effi 
ciency. By reducing transaction costs and interest 
rate differentials, it should lower the price of capital 
and increase its availability in lagging regions. Capi 
tal is likely to flow more easily to areas where the re 
turns are highest, implying that the specific features 
of different regions will assume more weight in the 
competition for finance. The least competitive regions 
will therefore be particularly exposed. 
At the same time, regional variations in labour costs 
will become more transparent, which should help to 
focus attention on underlying differences in produc 
tivity, a major cause of differences in regional 
competitiveness. 
The internal market 
The decisions taken in 1988 and 1992 to strengthen 
the Union's support to regions with structural difficul 
ties were motivated by a recognition that closer eco 
nomic integration would not necessarily permit the 
reduction of regional disparities and could, initially at 
least, lead to them widening. Cohesion policy there 
fore sought to help less developed regions benefit 
from the advantage of European integration and to 
enable the Union as a whole to fully exploit its growth 
potential. 
The progress achieved towards a more integrated 
economy, now extending to the applicant countries 
as well as the present Member States, is reflected, in 
particular, in convergence of prices across the Union, 
expansion of trade and growth of direct investment 
between countries. 
The extent of price convergence 
differs between sectors 
In contrast to the prices of manufactures, which have 
tended to converge across the Union, differences 
persist for most services, which underlines the local 
nature of markets in a number of sectors. Conver 
gence towards EU prices also seems to be occurring 
in the more advanced candidate countries, at least 
for traded industrial goods. 
Significant growth of trade 
The EU economy is becoming more integrated into 
the global economy as well as internally. Closer inte 
gration is being accompanied by growing similarity in 
the composition of trade between Member States. 
Trade flows between the Union and the candidate 
countries have increased markedly during the 1990s, 
reflecting the progressive move towards a free trade 
area planned for 2002. The Union already accounts 
for 60% of total exports of the candidate countries 
while these account for 10% of Union exports. The 
composition of trade between the two suggests that 
they do not compete in the same type of product. 
Growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
FDI is particularly important in some Member States, 
especially Ireland, Sweden and the Benelux coun 
tries. Mergers and acquisitions, which doubled be 
tween 1991 and 1999, account for a significant part of 
this. 
Union direct investment in the applicant countries is 
also growing considerably. Since such flows now 
amount, on average, to around 5% of the GDP of the 
recipient countries and some 20% of investment, they 
have a major impact on their growth and productive 
potential. 
On the other hand, these flows are very small in rela 
tion to Union GDP. They seem to be aimed more at 
supplying the home market than at exporting back to 
the EU and are, therefore, unlikely to have a depress 
ing effect on employment and wages in the Union. 
Tendencies to concentration or dispersion? 
A key question concerns the extent to which eco 
nomic integration is likely to lead to some sectors of 
activity concentrating in a few regions to exploit econ 
omies of scale. In practice, there seems to be a gen 
eral trend towards concentration in manufacturing, 
but the extent varies between industries and is occur 
ring at a very slow pace because of the scale of the in 
vestment required to change the locational 
distribution of activities significantly (Ireland and Fin 
land, for different reasons, are exceptions). The risk 
exists that such a concentration would increase the 
vulnerability of some regions to external shocks 
which affect particular sectors concentrated there. 
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The effects of integration and 
the need for accompanying policies 
The increased competition generated by closer inte 
gration and the diminished possibility of protecting lo 
cal industries are likely to put a premium on technical 
know how and to reduce the demand for low skilled 
workers even further. The response to this should be 
to raise the levels of education and training of the 
work force and to orient training towards the skills re 
quired in growing sectors. Education policy and ac 
tive policies for employment and social development 
therefore have an important role to play in accompa 
nying economic integration. 
At the same time, the candidate countries will need to 
comply with the requirements of the 'acquis' (the 
body of Community law, including directives, regula 
tions as so on) which is likely to add to production 
costs and affect the ability of their businesses to com 
pete with those in the present Member States. 
However according to the studies which have been 
carried out, enlargement of the single market to in 
clude the candidate countries should have generally 
beneficial effects for all parts of the Union, especially 
for those on the two sides of the border between the 
old and new Member States. 
Competition policy 
Competition policy improves 
the functioning of the internal market 
State aids provided by Member States have a poten 
tially important effect on the regional distribution of 
economic activity. In the period 1996 to 1998, they 
accounted for 2
1/2% of total public expenditure in the 
Union or over 1 % of EU GDP (in other words, roughly 
the same size as the Community budget as a whole) 
as compared with 0.45% of GDP allocated to EU 
structural policies. 
The scale of expenditure on them, however, varies 
significantly between Member States. Although the 
gap narrowed in the latter part of the 1990s, it is still 
the case, according to the latest figures, that the more 
prosperous countries spend more than the cohesion 
countries, so offsetting to some extent the effect of EU 
structural policies in the latter. 
In an attempt to reduce this negative effect, more ob 
jective and transparent criteria were established by 
the Commission during the course of 1999 2000 for 
defining eligibility for regional aid. As a result, the pro 
portion of the EU population living in regions qualify 
ing for such aid was reduced from 46.7% to 42.7% 
and assistance has become more concentrated on 
the most disadvantaged areas. Nevertheless, be 
cause of the decisions made by Member States, it 
was not possible to achieve a better correspondence 
between the regions eligible for EU structural support 
and those assisted by State aids. 
The Common Agricultural Policy: 
prices and agricultural markets 
Successive reforms have greatly changed the con 
cept of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the 
way it works. During the 1980s, the CAP was directed 
at reducing official prices of agricultural produce and 
compensating for the effects of this on farmers' in 
come through direct payments (direct aids), the use 
of which was generalised under the 1992 reform. A 
new reform with two important strands was intro 
duced as part of Agenda 2000. First, official prices 
were lowered with the aim of strengthening the com 
petitiveness of the sector while ensuring a reasonable 
standard of living for producers. Secondly, a new 
framework was established for rural development 
policy, which became the second pillar of the CAP. 
Significant changes in the distribution of 
expenditure between countries 
Accordingly, direct aids and support for rural devel 
opment have accounted for a growing share of total 
expenditure on agriculture, while only 29% of spend 
ing under the EAGGF Guarantee went on market 
support and payments to exporters in 1998 as 
against 82% in 1992. 
The CAP, through market support measures and di 
rect aid in particular, involves large transfers between 
Member States as well as between sectors of eco 
nomic activity and between social groups. 
In 1998, as in 1993, net transfers were positive for 
three of the four cohesion countries. Portugal, how 
ever, traditionally a low beneficiary, remained a net 
contributor, despite its share of total agricultural ex 
penditure rising from 0.6% to 1.6%. The change in the 
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scale of net transfers, however, differed between 
Member States. In absolute terms and in relation to 
their agricultural area, three Member States (France, 
Germany and Spain) absorb over half of 
EAGGF Guarantee expenditure. On the other hand, if 
transfers are expressed in relation to agricultural em 
ployment, Denmark and Belgium are the main 
beneficiaries. 
But very different regional effects 
The level of supportto agriculture has increased in re 
lation to the number employed in all regions of the Un 
ion, largely because of a continuing fall in 
employment. Overall, the 1992 reform has not radi 
cally altered the distribution of support between re 
gions, although it has increased the amount going to 
regions producing cereals, oil seed and beef, so to 
many regions in France, Spain and Ireland. Support 
to producers is lower in the least prosperous regions. 
There remains a marked difference between the 
southern and the northern regions in respect of the 
economic size of agricultural holdings. The average 
size of those located in the 20 regions with the small 
est size of holding (all situated in the south) declined 
by just over 2% between 1993 and 1997. At the same 
time, it grew by almost 25% in the 20 regions with the 
largest size of holding, all these being in the north. 
Horizontal policies 
Employment policy and the development of 
human resources 
Although Member States are responsible for devel 
oping and implementing employment policies, there 
is a clear need for coordination, elaboration of com 
mon objectives and exchange of information at the 
Union level. This is the reason why a European Em 
ployment Strategy was launched in the Treaty of Am 
sterdam in 1997, with priority being given to active 
labour market measures. Its most visible component 
is the 'Luxembourg process,' within which the 'em 
ployment guidelines,' adopted by the Council each 
year, are translated into 'National Action Plans' 
(NAPs) in each Member State. These are then evalu 
ated annually in the 'Joint Employment Report,' 
adopted by the Commission and the Council. 
The Luxembourg process 
The Luxembourg process is based on four opera 
tional pillars: employability of the labour force; devel 
opment of entrepreunership; adaptability of 
enterprises and those in employment and support for 
equal opportunities. The objective of policy is 
two fold: to reduce unemployment and increase 
employment, in part to ensure the long term 
sustainability of the European social model. These 
objectives were confirmed by the European Councils 
in Lisbon and Nice. 
In addition, after the Nice European Council, a pro 
cess for the coordination of national plans for social 
inclusion was begun. 
Although it is difficult to identify the specific contribu 
tion of the Employment Strategy, the favourable em 
ployment developments which have occurred in the 
recent past seem to suggest that a virtuous circle has 
been created, in which Member State macroeco 
nomic policies of stability and structural reform play 
an important part. 
Regional disparities in 
employment and unemployment 
Labour market performance continues to vary widely 
between regions, which suggests the need for the de 
velopment of a regional and local employment 
strategy. 
Labour shortages are beginning to appear in a num 
ber of Member States at the same time as unemploy 
ment remains high, reflecting the mismatch between 
the jobs on offer and the labour skills available. This 
requires action both to raise the level of education 
and training and to direct it to towards sectors of ac 
tivity in which the demand for labour is growing, while 
ensuring that priority is given to groups at risk. De 
spite the general increase in levels of education, too 
many young people still leave school without ade 
quate qualifications. There is also a need to reduce 
the risk of exclusion of those with low skills from the 
technological revolution. All the NAPs include spe 
cific measures aimed at target groups for tackling this 
problem. 
Improvements can be identified in the way Member 
States address equal opportunities, especially in 
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Finland and Ireland. Nevertheless, more could be 
done in many countries. 
2002: Evaluation and new proposals 
In the proposed employment guidelines for 2001, the 
Commission has focused on achieving full employ 
ment, the role of the social partners, continuing train 
ing throughout a person's working life and social 
inclusion. An overall evaluation of the results of the 
strategy and of the objectives will be carried out in 
2002. 
Environmental policy 
The pursuit of economic and social cohesion and the 
protection of the environment are complementary ob 
jectives. Even though environmental protection may 
initially increase the costs of production or, more ac 
curately, make them more visible, the effect should 
not be overestimated. The cost of implementing all 
the directives on water and waste treatment as well as 
the measures resulting from the Kyoto conference 
should amount to only around 0.5% of Union GDP. 
Environmental protection should not be regarded 
solely as imposing costs on the economy, but equally 
as a means of improving the quality of life, especially 
in problem urban areas. 
Higher costs, but also advantages 
for least prosperous regions... 
In the case of policies on water and waste, which are 
critical for environmental protection, there needs to 
be considerable investment to tackle problems in the 
cohesion countries and the least prosperous regions. 
The Structural and Cohesion Funds will help cover the 
cost of this in lagging regions and bring standards up 
to those elsewhere. 
... for the weakest social groups... 
The cost of environmental protection, as in the case of 
implementing the framework directive on water, will 
sometimes fall on the weakest members of society, 
because of the transfer of some of the costs involved 
on to users, notably on to households and farmers, 
under the 'polluter pays' principle. 
The measures involved, however, also contribute to 
social cohesion, in respect of public health and in 
terms of the jobs created. Although the likely effect on 
employment seems modest at the Union level, sev 
eral tens of thousands of jobs could, nevertheless, be 
created over the next few years as a result of the 
directives on water and waste treatment. 
... and for the candidate countries 
The candidate countries face the same problems as 
the cohesion countries but to a greater extent, partic 
ularly in respect of waste treatment. The Union is al 
ready helping to finance the investment required 
through ISPA and after accession, this will be one of 
the priorities for the Cohesion Fund. 
Other Community policies 
Research and development 
The Community research and technological develop 
ment policy (RTD) is focused on the pursuit of excel 
lence in order to strengthen the Union's position in 
relation to its international competitors. In terms of ter 
ritorial balance, the establishment of a European Re-
search Area opens up further prospects for 
integrating research and regional development. 
A more even distribution of knowledge ... 
By requiring the involvement of partners from several 
Member States, the Framework Programme helps im 
proving the exchange of knowledge and the joint de 
velopment of technologies. The proportion of projects 
involving at least one participant from an Objective 1 
region has risen from 27% in 1994 to 41% in 1998. In 
the cohesion countries, however, participants tend to 
be located in the centres of excellence in the capital 
cities or most prosperous regions. 
... greater mobility of researchers ... 
The cohesion countries are well represented in 
programmes designed to encourage the mobility of 
researchers, many of whom are given an opportunity 
to spend time in non cohesion countries'. This, how 
ever, should not lead to a brain drain towards central 
areas, where research is already concentrated, 
which could compromise balanced territorial devel 
opment in Europe, a problem which might also arise 
in the candidate countries. 
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... and a need for new approaches 
in disadvantaged regions 
It is important to create in lagging regions the proper 
framework conditions for research and innovation. 
Improvements in the international career opportuni 
ties of young researchers and an increase in RTD re 
sources are not sufficient by themselves to expand 
their innovative capacity. In these regions, it is impor 
tant to create more career opportunities for 
researchers. 
Transport policy 
The objective of the common transport policy is to en 
sure access throughout the Union to suitable trans 
port services which respond to user demand. 
More efficient use of resources 
With the entry of new Member States, there will be an 
even greater need to use Community resources more 
efficiently, which means better assessment of alter 
native projects, increased mobilisation of private 
sources of finance, greater utilisation of existing ca 
pacity, improvements in the quality of service and 
more respect for the environment. On this last point, 
new technologies, like intelligent transport systems 
and intermodal equipment, can radically reduce the 
negative effects of transport. 
The trans-European transport networks 
The trans European transport networks are improv 
ing access to remote peripheral regions and islands, 
opening up border areas through the construction of 
new routes across natural barriers and achieving a 
better balance of activity along the coastline. 
Community measures need to be aimed at ensuring 
the mobilisation of public and private organisations 
and companies to carry out the investment required 
for constructing the network defined in the 1996 
Guidelines.
2 It is also necessary, however, to intro 
duce major modifications to the guidelines. A first 
step has been made in this direction by including 
ports in the plans and other changes are foreseen to 
equip lagging regions and to improve the distribution 
of the major traffic flows in the Union. There is also a 
need to tackle the growth of goods transport by road 
which threatens sensitive areas and already con 
gested routes for long distance haulage, this means 
putting in place a genuine European freight network, 
based so far as possible on rail and waterway. 
The continued construction of high speed lines cou 
pled with a trans European network of airports will 
provide fast international travel which is essential for 
reducing the territorial fragmentation of the Union, 
while the progressive introduction of quality and 
safety standards harmonised at the EU level is also a 
major aim of policy. 
Trans European transport networks, therefore, have 
an important effect on territorial development and re 
gional disparities, as well as on the distribution of ac 
tivity, the functioning of the labour market and trade 
flows, as emphasised by the European Spatial Devel 
opment Perspective (ESDP). 
Energy policy 
Energy: an important factor in 
competitiveness and sustainable development 
There should be no marked differences between re 
gions in the availability of energy and prices. Despite 
the efforts undertaken, however, there is not yet a sin 
gle market for energy in the Union. 
Common rules for environmental protection are still in 
embryonic form and their implementation could have 
positive or negative effects on particular sectors of 
activity and regions. Sustainable development re 
quires an intensification of programmes for increas 
ing energy efficiency   but also an improvement in the 
means for managing and controlling atmospheric 
emissions and the application of market mechanisms 
to encourage this. There is also a need to introduce 
legislation which encourages the use of renewable 
energy sources. 
Dependency and the need for diversification 
The extent of dependence on external sources is a 
constraint on development in the Union as a whole. 
This dependency, which is set to increase if the use of 
renewable sources and more rational energy use are 
not encouraged sufficiently, could well penalise lag 
ging regions the most in the event of a supply shock. 
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Enterprise policy 
The Lisbon European Council set the Union the ob 
jective of becoming the 'most competitive and dy 
namic, knowledge based economy in the world.' To 
attain such a goal, and to support employment cre 
ation, requires entrepreneurship to be encouraged 
and an environment favourable to change and inno 
vation to be developed. 
Enterprise policy is intended to help achieve this ob 
jective for the whole of the Union, without distinguish 
ing a priori between different areas. Nevertheless, 
certain measures address problems which particu 
larly affect lagging regions. These include help in ac 
cessing risk and start up capital (especially for 
SMEs), policies for the diffusion of innovation and en 
trepreneurial best practice, and support for tourism, 
often a key sector for the development of these 
regions. 
Common fisheries policy 
The Common Fisheries Policy is focused on four ma 
jor areas: the conservation of fish stocks, the restruc 
turing of the fleet, the organisation of markets and 
fishing agreements with third countries. While the 
sector is small relative to the EU economy as a whole 
(accounting for only 0.2% of GDP and 0.4% of em 
ployment in 1997), concentration in coastal and pe 
ripheral areas (including the outermost areas) gives it 
a particular importance for regional development. 
These areas are in many cases disadvantaged, 70% 
of fishermen and 60% of total employment in the sec 
tor being located in Objective 1 regions in 1997. 
Because of this concentration, many of the measures 
supported by the Common Fisheries Policy, which 
are intended to strengthen the competitiveness of the 
sector, contribute to economic and social cohesion, 
particularly fishing agreements with third countries as 
well as measures on fish farming and processing. 
The restoration of a sustainable balance between fish 
stocks and fishing will necessitate a significant re 
duction in capacity, catches and the number of fish 
ermen. Accompanying social and economic 
measures to maintain employment in areas depend 
ent on fishing and their viability (restructuring within 
and outside the sector, vocational retraining, and so 
on) will become increasingly necessary. This is the 
aim of the Financial Instrument for fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG). 
Part III: Economic and social 
cohesion policy: the results 
Over the ten years since the reform of the Structural 
Funds, significant progress has been made in terms 
of convergence and cohesion in the Union. 
Impact of structural policy since 1989 
Increased financing 
The finance made available through the Funds almost 
doubled between 1989 and 1999, rising from 0.27% 
of EU GDP to 0.46%. The transfers were most pro 
nounced in the cohesion countries, the main benefi 
ciaries, equivalent to over 10 years to 1.5% of GDP in 
Spain, 3.3% in Portugal and 3.5% in Greece. In 
Greece and Portugal, Community transfers represent 
over 10% of investment. 
Increased financial and 
geographical concentration 
Following the decisions taken by the Berlin Council in 
the perspective of the first stages of enlargement, the 
amount of finance allocated to cohesion policy in the 
present 15 Member States will be reduced by 2006 
back to the level in 1992 0.31% of GDP of the pres 
ent EU15. 
The concentration of finance in lagging regions will, 
nevertheless, enable the average amount of aid per 
head to be maintained for the period 2000 to 2006 at 
the same level as in 1999. Overall, 60% of the total of 
the Structural and Cohesion Funds will be allocated to 
Member States, which, together, account for no more 
than 20% of EU GDP and 70% will be concentrated in 
lagging regions.
3 
The geographical concentration of Structural Fund in 
tervention on the regions most in difficulty has never 
before been as high, only 41 % of the EU15 population 
living in regions eligible under Objective 1 (lagging 
regions) and Objective 2 (regions undergoing re 
structuring) in 2006. Nevertheless, concentration is 
limited, on the one hand, by the high degree of 
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fragmentation of areas eligible under the new Objec 
tive 2 and, on the other, by the lack of coherence with 
the map of national regional aids. 
The impact of structural policies: 
positive but uneven effects 
Between 1988 and 1998, the difference in income per 
head between Objective 1 regions and the EU aver 
age narrowed by one sixth, GDP per head in PPS in 
the former increasing from 63% of the average to 
70%. Within this general trend, a number of regions, 
in particular those in Ireland, the new German Lander 
and Lisbon, have performed better than the average. 
Nevertheless, rates of employment and unemploy 
ment at the regional level have shown little sign of 
converging. 
In the case of Objective 2 and 5b regions, available 
data seem to indicate that employment and unem 
ployment tend to have changed in a more favourable 
way than in the rest of the Union. In particular, the av 
erage unemployment rate in Objective 2 areas de 
clined by 2.2 percentage points over the period as 
compared with 1.3 points in the Union as a whole. 
Over the period 1989 to 1999, structural intervention 
had a significant effect in Greece and Portugal, GDP 
at the end of the period being an estimated 9.9% 
higher in the former and 8.5% higher in the latter as re 
sult of intervention. The effect was less in Ireland 
(3.7%) and Spain (3.1 %), the Structural and Cohesion 
Funds forming a smaller proportion of GDP there. This 
significant contribution to growth was accompanied 
by more limited effects on the level of unemployment 
especially in Ireland and Spain. 
Strengthening factors underlying competitiveness 
The Structural and Cohesion Funds do not only stimu 
late demand by increasing income in the regions as 
sisted. By supporting investment in infrastructure and 
human capital, they also increase their competitive 
ness and productivity and so help to expand income 
over the long term. Structural intervention, therefore, 
tackles the root causes of regional imbalance and is 
aimed at strengthening the factors which provide the 
basis for sustained growth. Improving systems of 
transport, supporting SMEs, RDT and innovative ca 
pacity, strengthening education systems and improv 
ing the environment have, therefore, been the main 
focus of intervention. 
Transport infrastructure has expanded significantly, 
investment co financed by the Structural and Cohe 
sion Funds achieving time savings of, for example, 
20% in Spain, through an improvement in the motor 
way network, and 70% in Portugal in the case of rail 
freight. 
Around a sixth of firms located in Objective 1 regions 
were recipients of support to SMEs, creating over 
300,000 new jobs. In the case of Objective 3, the rate 
of placement of people who had followed a training 
programme varied between 25% and 50% according 
to the country and the groups targeted. 
Improving employability in the Union 
While the human resource measures taken under Ob 
jective 1 have contributed to the development of the 
regions concerned, those taken under Objective 3 
have helped young people, the long term unem 
ployed and those threatened by exclusion to find em 
ployment. However, the modest scale of Community 
funding in relation to national expenditure has often 
weakened the specific targeting of measures in a 
context in which national employment priorities tend 
to take precedence. Although co financed measures 
tend to be more effective the more they are concen 
trated on those who have the greatest difficulty find 
ing employment, targeting on the most vulnerable 
groups has remained limited. Nevertheless, over the 
period 1994 to 1999, the placement rate of recipients 
who participated in training measures increased, the 
rate varying between 30% and 80%. As regards Ob 
jective 4, which had a slow and difficult start, some of 
the evaluations undertaken suggest that the benefits 
were divided between an improvement in the com 
petitiveness of firms and an increase in the skills of 
some categories of worker. 
Community Initiatives: their cross-border 
and transnational nature increases the 
added value for the Community 
Community Initiatives have enabled a common ap 
proach to recurring problems in the Union to be de 
veloped. The development of cross border and 
transnational cooperation, under INTERREG, and the 
strengthening of partnership at local level, which is a 
feature of LEADER and URBAN, are of most signifi 
cance in terms of Community added value. 
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Structural Funds procedures: increased 
efficiency of public intervention 
Medium term strategic programming has had a sig 
nificant influence on national and regional develop 
ment policies. 
The Structural Funds have also helped spread the 
use of evaluation of public intervention and of linking 
the results achieved more clearly to the finance allo 
cated. The advances made in this respect, however, 
vary between Member States. 
Community assistance is an effective means of mobi 
lising private capital as well as loans, especially from 
the European Investment Bank, as witnessed by ma 
jor infrastructure projects in Greece. 
The principle of partnership has enabled local 
elected representatives, social and economic organi 
sations, non government organisations and associa 
tions to be more involved in decision making. 
However, apart from the formal respect for the obliga 
tion, the extent of partnership in practice has differed 
greatly. 
Financial procedures have often proved complex 
and a source of payment delays. 
Prospects for the 2000 2006 
programming period 
A renewed effort to ensure the added-value of 
Community intervention 
With the new regulatory system for the 2000 to 2006 
period, the Commission has attempted to increase 
the added value of Community intervention and to im 
prove its visibility on the ground. Four elements are 
worth highlighting: 
  a better formulation of Union priorities with the 
adoption by the Commission of guidelines for 
Structural Funds intervention, even if these guide 
lines remain 'indicative' at the request of the 
Member States; 
  the obligation, as clearly indicated in the legisla 
tion, to mobilise partnership at different stages of 
the programming process; 
  the formulation and diffusion of ideas on Commu 
nity policy, notably through the establishment of 
the European Spatial Development Perspective 
(ESDP), published in 1999; 
  taking into account the employment strategy, to 
reinforce and to improve job quality. 
Prospects for Objective 1 regions 
Because of the slight reduction in assistance in rela 
tion to the preceding period decided by the Berlin Eu 
ropean Council, the effect of structural intervention on 
economic growth will be smaller than in the past, es 
pecially in Spain, Portugal and, above all, in Ireland. 
The effects on investment, however, will remain sig 
nificant, especially in Portugal and Greece, giving 
rise to long term gains in productivity. 
In other Objective 1 areas, especially the new Ger 
man Lander and the Mezzogiorno, the effect of the 
Structural Funds on the supply side should be signifi 
cant, though smaller than in the previous period. 
A strategy focused on the factors 
underlying competitiveness 
The Community guidelines have made it possible to 
adjust the focus of regional development strategies 
for the 2000 to 2006 period. In general, there is in 
creased emphasis on structural factors underlying 
competitiveness which determine the long term 
growth of Objective 1 regions, in particular, research 
and innovation, information technology and human 
capital. 
Other modifications involve, for example, an im 
proved balance between means of transport in favour 
of rail, a reduction in direct payments to firms and 
greater attention given to environmental consider 
ations and sustainable development in the formula 
tion of policy, to urban areas and to equal 
opportunities. 
The challenge of more effective management 
The role of evaluation was strengthened by the 1999 
reform, especially through the introduction of the per 
formance reserve which will be allocated in 2003 on 
the basis of the results of the mid term evaluation. 
Evaluation has, therefore, become a management in 
strument in its own right. 
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It is premature to draw lessons from the simplification 
resulting from the new regulatory system. Indeed, the 
process of approving programmes by the Commis 
sion has not yet been completed. The Commission's 
role has been refocused on the strategic aspects of 
programming. Accordingly, in the negotiations with 
the Member States and regions concerned, it exam 
ines the priorities proposed particularly carefully 
while decentralising implementation largely to the 
Member States and the relevant administrative 
authorities. 
A first assessment of the effects of decentralisation 
will only be possible after a few years. The focus of 
this should be on verifying whether decentralisation 
has benefited Member States and regions and on 
identifying the measures which need to be taken in or 
der further to increase simplification in programming 
and management. 
1 According to the EUROSTAT definition, which is the proportion of the population with income equal to or below 60% of the median in 
their own country. 
2 Decision 1692/96/CE. 
3 Regions where GDP per head is below 75% of the EU average. Suminary 
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Introduction 
The evidence examined in this report shows that over 
the previous programming periods (1989 93 and 
1994 99) Community cohesion policies have had 
some notable success. This is perhaps most visible in 
the case of the regions where development is lagging 
behind, where there has been a general process of 
catching up in economic and social terms. 
At the same time, looking ahead to the next period of 
Community regional polices, after the end of the cur 
rent planning period in 2006, the analysis in this re 
port suggests the need to take particular account of: 
  the important increase in social, economic and 
territorial disparities resulting from enlargement; 
  the far reaching effects of ongoing social and 
economic trends such as globalisation, the radi 
cal transformation of the European economy to 
wards knowledge based activities, the changing 
structure of population and so on. 
In addition, a future reform of cohesion policies 
should take the opportunity to increase the added 
value and the visibility of Community policy. Ideally, 
reform should be accompanied by a strengthening of 
the effort to ensure that the other Community policies 
contribute to cohesion as much as possible, consis 
tent with the pursuit of the objectives which they are 
principally designed to achieve. 
Drawing on the analysis of the report, the following 
sections attempt to set out the main issues to be ad 
dressed in order to prepare the basis for a debate on 
the future of cohesion policies. Here, it is important to 
place the main issues in their correct logical order. 
Past experience of reforming cohesion policy reveals 
an increasing tendency for discussion at Member 
State (Council) level to concentrate on financial as 
pects. For example, in the negotiations on the finan 
cial perspectives for 2000 to 2006 ('Agenda 2000'), 
discussions on cohesion policy probably focused 
more on the amount and division of funding between 
Member States than on the content of the policy. Ar 
guably, a more logical order would be to begin with 
the content   and, in particular, to identify priorities for 
future cohesion policies   before going on to address 
issues relating to the delivery system and financial 
allocations. 
Promoting the factors 
determining convergence 
To remain credible, Community cohesion policy must 
support those actions that are most likely to contrib 
ute to the reduction of the economic, social and terri 
torial disparities in the Union. A system based simply 
on fiscal transfers is not enough and the Union must 
support the factors that play a decisive role in promot 
ing competitiveness and help to reduce the profound 
imbalances affecting its territory. In short, supporting 
investment in physical and human capital must re 
main the key objective of Community cohesion policy 
before and after enlargement. 
Beyond this broad statement, it is not easy to identify 
the priorities, especially in the longer term perspec 
tive of the period post 2006. For example, a decade 
ago few could have imagined the role and signifi 
cance that the new information technologies would 
assume in today's economy and society. Today, it is 
difficult to imagine an economic and social develop 
ment strategy which would not have the promotion of 
these technologies as a major component. In spite of 
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the difficulties, there are, at the same time, certain 
points of reference for considering future priorities. 
In general, it is evident that the level of productivity is 
a key factor in the process of growth and the conver 
gence, in real terms, of national and regional econo 
mies. Productivity is determined to a major extent by 
the quality of human resources, physical infrastruc 
ture endowment and the capacity for innovation. 
The quality of the labour force is determined, in part, 
by the level of education and, in part, by the updating 
of knowledge and skills throughout working life. The 
evidence suggests that matching the available skills 
of the work force with those required by an economy 
undergoing fundamental change has become a ma 
jor problem. The demographic outlook, and its likely 
consequences in terms of falling numbers in the la 
bour force in the next decade in the EU15, can only 
add to this problem, although the demographic im 
balances are less marked in a Union of 27 in view of 
the rising numbers of young people in the candidate 
countries. Making the best use of all its human re 
sources is clearly a major long term challenge to the 
Union. 
An adequate endowment of physical infrastructure 
of a high standard remains a necessary condition 
for economic development. Within the Union, while 
the regional gaps have closed in certain sectors such 
as telecommunications or road transport, more re 
mains to be done in others (for example, in rail trans 
port, centres of research), especially in the least 
developed regions. In the candidate countries, the in 
formation is incomplete but the assessments avail 
able at present point to major gaps in key economic 
infrastructures. Priority needs to be given to promot 
ing the development of the major trans European net 
works in transport, telecommunications and energy 
and their connection with regional secondary 
networks. 
Investment in knowledge and in new communication 
technologies is likely to continue to be the basis of 
long term growth in Europe. This is a positive factor 
for the Union as a whole, although the new activities 
associated with the knowledge society are tending to 
concentrate in certain urban centres giving rise to a 
dense network which inter connects the economies 
of Europe's central heartland. In order to avoid a wid 
ening of the imbalance between centre and periph 
ery, a long standing feature of the EU15, ongoing 
investment in the new technologies will be needed in 
order to link the peripheral regions into the major Eu 
ropean networks, including the 'new periphery' re 
sulting from enlargement to the East and South. 
Moving to a knowledge based economy and society 
depends also on an integrated approach combining 
the various dimensions of knowledge: education, 
training, research and development, innovation and 
the information society. 
Finally, strengthening the capacity to innovate re 
quires a greater focus on the environment in which 
businesses operate. In particular, there is a need to 
improve the interaction between firms, especially 
small firms, and research centres, universities and 
public bodies. 
A key reference point for future actions: 
environment and sustainable development 
Efforts to raise productivity and promote growth for 
one generation must not, however, be at the expense 
of the next. In other words, the development path fol-
lowed must also be a sustainable one, a general point 
which needs to be reflected in all investment 
decisions. 
A key consideration is that economic development 
can only be secured in the long term by the prudent 
use of natural resources. In this regard, the availabil 
ity and quality of water are particular problems in the 
Mediterranean. Cooperation between countries is 
one way of addressing water problems but certainly 
not the only one. Investment in waste water treatment, 
water pricing, environmental control of emissions into 
the water are others. 
In addition, it is important to encourage investment 
which serves to limit the damage which industry, agri 
culture and households can do to the environment, 
which means, in particular, the construction of facili 
ties for treating wastewater and household and indus 
trial waste. Investment in this area is a priority in the 
candidate countries. 
Identifying priorities for 
economic and social cohesion 
According to the Treaty, the Community must act 'to 
promote overall harmonious development' with the 
particular aim of 'reducing disparities between the 
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levels of development of the various regions and the 
backwardness of the least favoured regions or is 
lands, including rural areas' (Article 158). 
Based on the analyses in the report with regard to the 
long term problems as well as the opportunities, fac 
ing the Union, it is possible to identify certain priorities 
with an economic, social orterritorial dimension for fu 
ture cohesion policy. 
Among the priorities which have an important territo-
rial dimension, the following are suggested for illus 
trative purposes: 
  The least developed regions. These remain the 
principal priority of EU cohesion policy and the 
analysis of the report confirms that there are ma 
jor gaps in income and opportunity between the 
least developed regions and the rest of the Union, 
although a process of gradual convergence is 
discernible within the EU15. With enlargement, 
however, the gaps widen once again. 
  With the reduction of gaps in endowments in 
certain types of infrastructure in the less devel 
oped regions of the EU15, less emphasis will 
need to be placed on basic investment and 
more on raising business competitiveness. 
Basic infrastructure needs remain consider 
able in the candidate countries. 
  The challenge for all of these regions in an en 
larged Union is one of creating an innovative 
environment based around a qualified 
workforce, research and development and the 
information society. 
  Even if the human resource gaps are closing, 
eliminating the weight of the past in terms of 
the low level of qualification of the adult labour 
force is a long term challenge in the EU15. In 
the candidate countries, the challenge is to 
adapt rapidly the workforce to a modern mar 
ket economy. 
The urban question, which is at the heart of eco 
nomic, social and territorial change. Cities are a 
key location for the pursuit of a strategy for cohe 
sion and sustainable development. 
  Many kinds of disparity are concentrated in 
cities, where problem areas in which exclu 
sion and deep poverty prevail are in close 
proximity to areas of high prosperity. 
  It is in the urban areas where the environmen 
tal pressures are the most acute. 
  Cities are economic centres for the develop 
ment of the surrounding suburban and rural 
areas. 
  Networks of large cities can stimulate a more 
balanced and polycentric form of develop 
ment in which medium sized towns and cities 
can play a key role. 
  The diversification of rural areas. These areas 
continue to experience large scale changes. 
Their future depends in large measure on their 
links with other areas, including towns and cities. 
  Agriculture is no longer a major source of em 
ployment though it continues to be the main 
user of rural land as well as the key determi 
nant of the quality of the countryside and the 
environment. 
  The revitalisation of rural areas and the main 
tenance of population depend on the develop 
ment of new activities outside agriculture, 
notably in services. 
  Cohesion policy must play the major role in the 
diversification of the rural economy, comple 
menting rural development policies financed 
by the CAP which is focused on adapting agri 
culture to new economic realities as well as on 
strengthening the competitiveness of rural 
areas. 
  Cross border, transnational and interregional 
cooperation. This is a priority par excellence for 
the Union in order to promote integration and re 
duce the economic and social fragmentation cre 
ated by national borders. The internal market and 
cross border cooperation have enabled border 
regions to become more integrated with the rest 
of the Union. 
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The internal border regions of the EL) 15 have, 
with the support of INTERREG, developed 
new forms of cooperation which the elimina 
tion of frontiers alone would not have been suf 
ficient to create. Their social and economic 
situation has improved significantly over re 
cent years, with closer integration into the in 
ternal market. 
With enlargement, there will be a renewed 
need for cross border measures to promote 
cooperation between the candidate countries 
and the Union, as well to assist the regions 
within the candidate countries that share com 
mon frontiers with third countries to the east 
and to the south, including the Mediterranean 
rim. 
The Union should promote transnational co 
operation areas, within a framework adapted 
to the development of networking between re 
gional and local economies and to new forms 
of administration. 
  Areas with severe geographical or natural hand 
icaps. In certain parts of the Union, efforts to 
achieve full integration with the rest of the Euro 
pean economy run into difficulty because of par 
ticular geographical or natural handicaps. 
  These areas   outermost regions, islands, 
mountain areas, peripheral areas, areas with 
very low population density   are often a key 
component of the Union's environmental and 
cultural heritage. 
  There are often acute difficulties in maintain 
ing population. 
  Additional costs for basic services includ 
ing transport can impede economic 
development. 
Among the priorities under economic and social co 
hesion policy relating to employment and social pol 
icy, which have both a general and regional 
dimension, are: 
Areas undergoing industrial restructuring. The 
return of sustained growth across the European 
continent has to some extent hidden the often se 
rious territorial and regional effects of industrial 
restructuring. 
Job losses are continuing in many industries 
such as textiles, cars, coal and steel produc 
tion, as well as some service sectors. In this re 
gard, the liberalisation of trade in 2005 for 
textile imports represents a particular 
challenge. 
  Where such sectors are concentrated geo 
graphically, there can be severe conse 
quences for the local and regional economy, 
with the need to promote new opportunities 
and the retraining of workers who lose their 
jobs. 
While encouraging economic diversification, 
territorial policy should also take account of 
the distribution of activity across the different 
parts of the Union. 
More and better jobs. The rate of job creation in 
some parts of the Union remains low, while signifi 
cant skill gaps persist, constraining economic 
and social convergence between regions. 
  A more strategic approach to employment 
policy across the EU could provide a valuable 
framework for coordinating Community inter 
vention. Negotiations over current ESF 
programmes have demonstrated the value of 
a strategic dimension as provided by the Eu 
ropean Employment Strategy. 
  Employment policy needs to adopt a 
proactive approach to anticipate the effects of 
industrial change. 
  There needs to be more targeting on the spe 
cific requirements of both individuals and par 
ticular regions, given that a major factor 
underlying disparities in prosperity across the 
Union is the difference in the qualifications 
and skills of the labour force. 
Supporting the New Economy and the Knowl 
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far reaching in terms of both the pace of change 
and its consequences for policy. The dangers of 
an emerging digital divide highlight the need to 
tackle risks of exclusion from the information 
society. 
  Life long learning is an essential response to 
economic change. It is important, however, 
that access to this is not confined to those al 
ready in the most highly qualified jobs. 
  There must be a more affordable access to the 
tools of the information society accompanied 
by ICT literacy. 
  Over the past three decades, the level of edu 
cational attainment in the Union has increased 
markedly, especially in the least developed 
regions. But there remains scope for improve 
ment in their education and training systems to 
reduce the emerging digital divide. This ap 
plies also to the candidate countries where vo 
cational training systems in particular are 
often poorly adapted to the needs of new 
sectors. 
  Promoting social inclusion. The level of poverty 
and social exclusion remains unacceptably high 
in the European Union. Many of the causes can 
be traced directly to the labour market and to the 
failure of policy to address the needs of those 
without the skills necessary to compete for jobs. 
  Better access to the labour market, creation of 
new employment opportunities and skill de 
velopment are of major importance in the fight 
against social exclusion. 
  In order to address the deep seated problem 
of pockets of social exclusion, labour market 
policies are becoming increasingly localised, 
involving broader local partnerships and re 
sponding to specific local needs. Local em 
ployment development, the 'third element' in 
the European Employment Strategy, could be 
strengthened in future Community policy. 
  The concept of policy additionality (extending 
or deepening national policy) must be applied 
to social inclusion policies and could be sup 
plemented with the concept of 'policy 
territoriality
1 aimed at increasing the spatial 
concentration of scarce resources to achieve 
a greater impact. 
  Equality of opportunity. Discrimination in all its 
forms is a waste of talent and resources in a situa 
tion where the evidence points to the growing 
need to make the best use of a work force set to 
decline in the coming years. Equal access to the 
labour market is both a fundamental right and a 
sound economic policy. 
  A strong policy commitment to the creation of 
a labour market open to all is essential to 
cohesion. 
  Policies to promote and support the participa 
tion of women in the labour market are a key 
part of the employment rate targets set at 
Lisbon. 
  The most significant progress will come about 
reducing narrowing the employment gap be 
tween men and women. 
While the above target areas are not entirely new in 
themselves, they represent a difference of approach 
compared to that which has been characteristic of the 
priority 'Objectives' up to now. It is an approach in 
spired to some extent by the experience of certain 
Community Initiatives such as URBAN or LEADER 
which have shown how efforts focused on a clearly 
defined European priority can, if deployed at the right 
level, attract a great deal of interest, generate new 
thinking and activities. An aspect not to be ignored is 
that these actions, where they have been operated 
successfully, have probably done most to create a 
positive image of Union cohesion policy among its 
citizens. 
The priority areas should not be seen as a simple sub 
stitutes for the existing Objectives. Given the rapid 
pace of economic change, and the challenges that it 
poses, the formulation of future policy   and perhaps 
the territorial dimension in particular   needs to take 
account not only existing problems but, more impor 
tantly, to anticipate future ones. Accordingly, there is 
a basic need for a cohesion policy which has a more 
global and longer term vision and which seeks to fol 
low a proactive approach. This would also mean that 
future policy would focus not just on problems but 
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also on opportunities for economic and social cohe 
sion and the reduction of territorial imbalances. 
This was the kind of approach that characterised the 
work undertaken by the Member States and the Com 
mission on the European Spatial Development Per 
spective (adopted in Potsdam in 1999) which had as 
an objective the promotion of more balanced territo 
rial development in Europe. Inspired by this work, the 
Commission could at a later stage propose a strategy 
for territorial development to the other institutions of 
the Union as a basis for future policy in this field. 
In sum, future cohesion policy should be targeted on 
the factors that promote convergence and on a lim 
ited number of priorities of Community interest, in or 
der to achieve concentration of scarce resources. 
How should the delivery system 
for future economic and social 
cohesion policy be organised? 
While Agenda 2000 achieved many advances in im 
proving the delivery system which are set out in the 
report, the new circumstances of enlargement, the re 
shaping of priorities and the need to continue to the 
drive to achieve greater value for money call for fur 
ther reflection on the means by which the policy is de 
livered. At this stage it is only possible to address the 
broad issues and consider options. The third cohe 
sion report in three year's time would have the role of 
specifying more clearly how the next generation of 
cohesion policies should be delivered. 
The principal issues addressed in the following sec 
tions are as follows: 
  the effective targeting ('concentration') of the lim 
ited resources available in an enlarged Union 
  the particular challenge of enlargement in the 
current period 
  cohesion policy in an enlarged Union after 2006, 
including certain financial aspects. 
The effective targeting of the limited 
resources available in an enlarged Union 
The starting point is that a future cohesion policy 
needs to be able to address not only the new Member 
States and regions, but also the regions in the present 
EU15 where the analysis of the report confirm the ex 
istence of often profound regional and territorial 
disparities. 
It is clear, however, that when the next programming 
period begins in 2007, the presence of new Member 
States composed almost entirely of regions with a 
general need for support for economic development, 
will necessitate a massive refocusing of the effort in 
order to achieve a significant catching up within a 
reasonable period. At the same time, the least devel 
oped regions of EU15 will have ongoing needs even if 
they appear less severe in relative terms. 
The basic principle must be the same as in the past 
in that limited resources must be concentrated on a 
limited number of problems of Community interest 
and areas, in order to achieve the necessary criti 
cal mass. 
Maintaining priority support for regions 
where development is lagging behind 
For the less prosperous regions, the maintenance of 
direct zoning (see Box), for reasons of objectivity and 
transparency, represents the most appropriate 
method for concentrating support on regions most in 
difficulty. 
The use of GDP per head (measured in terms of pur 
chasing power standards   PPS) as a criterion and its 
level of application (NUTS 2 regions) still seem to be 
appropriate, as indicated by the comparative analy 
sis presented in the first part of the report. For reasons 
of transparency and efficiency, however, there is a 
need to determine the principles which should apply 
to the definition of statistical territorial units   ie the 
regions. 
How should the threshold for eligibility be set? 
The eligibility threshold (currently set at 75% of the EU 
average GDP per head, see box) needs to be de 
cided on the basis of the following two consider 
ations. First, enlargement will automatically reduce 
the average level of GDP per head in the Union 
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Methods of defining eligible regions and areas 
The different Objectives and Community Initiatives of 
the Structural Funds are currently targeted either verti 
cally (regionally) or horizontally (by theme). 
Horizontal targeting applies to the present Objective 3 
financed by the European Social Fund, which has be 
come the Community instrument for supporting the Eu 
ropean Employment Strategy at national level. 
Following this approach, actions aimed at improving 
national education and training systems can be sup 
ported across the whole of the Union, within the limit of 
the resources available. 
A regional targeting approach begins with the definition 
of a list of eligible regions and areas. Actions can be 
supported only within these localities. In practice, two 
methods have been applied in this respect: 
Direct regional zoning 
The Commission constructs an exclusive list of areas el 
igible for support. These can be defined in cooperation 
with the national authorities, as in the case of the present 
Objective 2, or by the Commission alone on the basis of 
statistical criteria applying to the Community as a whole, 
as for the current Objective 1. 
This method enables intervention to be concentrated in 
eligible areas in a direct and transparent way. In the 
case of Objective 1, the use of the criterion of low GDP 
per head (defined as less than 75% of the EU average), 
expressed in terms of purchasing power standards, 
which is a simple, comparable and relatively robust in 
dicator, has enabled the list of regions receiving 
substantially. On the latest data available (1998), the 
application of a threshold of 75% of GDP per head in a 
Union of 27 Member States would reduce the popula 
tion in the present EU15 eligible for Objective 1 assis 
tance by more than half. This raises the question of 
how to treat regions in EU 15 that have improved in rel-
af/Veterms even if underlying conditions are the same 
as before enlargement. 
Secondly, disparities between lagging regions in the 
enlarged EU would be wider than at present, with some 
regions having a level of GDP per head of three quar 
ters of the EU average and others only around a quar 
ter. The number of regions involved is not only greater, 
they have more profound needs. 
assistance during the 2000 2006 period to be drawn up 
objectively. 
Direct zoning, however, lacks flexibility in the face of 
changing regional circumstances, which, in the case of 
Objective 2, has led to the Commission being directly 
involved in the definition of very detailed maps, a task 
for which its competence and the legitimacy of its in 
volvement are in doubt. In particular, outside the larger, 
least developed regions of the Union, the Commission 
has insufficient statistical and other information neces 
sary to identify problem areas, a difficulty which has 
been compounded by the increasing complexity of the 
problems themselves and their spatial distribution. 
Indirect zoning 
On this method, eligible areas are decided by national 
governments on the basis of a set of parameters estab 
lished by the Commission. This is the approach 
adopted by some Community Initiatives. 
Indirect zoning has the advantage of being flexible and 
can resolve difficulties experienced under Objective 2, 
so long as the resources available attain the critical 
mass needed to be effective (as in the case of URBAN). 
This method can also be applied to horizontally tar 
geted policies, and some Member States have chosen 
on their own initiative to introduce regional targeting of 
intervention under Objective 3. 
Insofar as there is co financing by the State, it is impor 
tant that State aid rules (both geographical and sec 
toral) are respected. 
Four options for determining 
eligibility and temporary support 
In the light of the foregoing, the exercise of Commu 
nity cohesion policy in relation to lagging regions 
could take one of the following four forms: 
  the application of the present threshold of 75% ir 
respective of the number of countries joining the 
Union. This option on its own would eliminate a 
large number of regions in EU15. Their future eli 
gibility for EU support would depend on the priori 
ties and criteria for support outside the least 
developed regions. 
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  the same approach, but where all regions above 
this threshold but currently eligible under Objec 
tive 1 should receive temporary support (phas 
ing out), the level being higher the closer their 
GDP to the eligibility threshold. Two levels of tem 
porary support could be envisaged, one for re 
gions which, because of the extent of their 
convergence at the end of the 2000 2006 period, 
would no longer be regarded as having lagging 
development in an EU15, the other, set at a higher 
level, for those which would have been below the 
75% threshold without enlargement; 
  the setting of a GDP per head threshold higher 
than 75% of the average, at a level which would 
reduce or even eliminate the automatic effect of 
excluding those regions in the EU15 simply be 
cause of the reduction in the average EU GDP per 
head after enlargement. It should also, however, 
be set at a level which excludes those regions 
which would no longer qualify at the end of the 
current programming period in an EU15 without 
enlargement; 
  the fixing of two thresholds of eligibility, one for 
the regions in EU15 and one for the candidate 
countries, and leading de facto to two categories 
of lagging region. This could have a similar result 
to the previous solution in financial terms in a situ 
ation where the aid intensity per head from Union 
funds is related to regional prosperity. 
A further consideration relates to cofinancing rates 
(the ratio of Community to national support). After en 
largement, the prosperity gap within the group of re 
gions defined as least developed would be so large 
that a special maximum co financing rate might be 
need to be set at a relatively high level to reflect the 
lower prosperity, and national budgetary capacity, of 
the very poorest Member States concerned. 
A distribution of finance 
according to objective criteria 
In the light of the needs, it would be difficult to sustain 
the case for a reduction in the resources allocated to 
the lagging regions   including any temporary sup 
port   as a share of the total funds available. 
The essential question is that of how to ensure that the 
distribution of financial resources is as objective as 
possible according to needs. The decisions in this 
field under Agenda 2000 reflect considerable 
progress with regard to the use of objective criteria 
applied across the Community, at least as far as the 
least developed regions are concerned. This was one 
the more significant outcomes of the implementation 
of Agenda 2000. This way of proceeding should be 
maintained in the future, as a major element of the co 
hesion 'acquis.' 
But a number of questions need to be addressed, in 
cluding the following: 
  Should the existing criteria which have been used 
  population, regional and national prosperity 
and unemployment   be extended in the next 
round to include the employment rate, given the 
present prospects for the labour market and the 
conclusions of the Lisbon European Council on 
this? This is a question to consider in the light of 
the way the level of structural unemployment de 
velops in Objective 1 regions over the next few 
years. At present, many of these regions still have 
a very high rate of unemployment. 
  Should the structural gaps between the regions 
and the Community average become part of the 
criteria for allocating funds? 
  Should the performance reserve become a more 
significant part of the Structure Funds? It would 
almost certainly be desirable to strengthen the 
conditionality attached to this instrument to 
achieve the expected results, including in relation 
to the pursuit of good financial management. 
Maintaining the momentum in favour of an objective 
methodology depends heavily on the joint efforts of 
the Commission's statistical office, Eurostat, and na 
tional statistical offices to improve the quality of the 
harmonised data at the Community level. The exten 
sion of data series to cover the candidate countries, 
and to make available data on purchasing power 
standards at regional level, are major priorities for the 
success of future exercises to determine the next list 
of regions in which development is lagging. 
For the rest of the territory: indirect zoning? 
Lagging regions are not the only ones with structural 
problems. Cohesion policy also needs to continue 
providing support to other parts of the Union to en 
courage actions of common interest. But in the light of 
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the greater limitations on resources compared to the 
least developed regions, an appropriate means of 
targeting is essential. 
In the light of the problems that have emerged in the 
direct zoning of aid under Objective 2 for the period 
2000 06, it would seem that the process of concentra 
tion could be more satisfactorily achieved by opting 
for an indirect zoning method. Here, the defining fea 
ture is that the concentration of resources is an inte 
gral part of the programming process (see Box). The 
Commission would no longer set rigid eligibility crite 
ria, only a lower limit on the level of overall public fi 
nancial support   from Community and national 
sources   in order to ensure that the resources mobi 
lised achieve the critical mass to have a real impact 
(as under the URBAN Initiative). 
In such circumstances, the programming of the dif 
ferent priority domains would need to be undertaken 
on the basis of an allocation of resources by Member 
State. There are a number ways in which this could be 
done, but the simplest would probably consist of a 
national allocation according to population (outside 
the least developed regions) adjusted by an appro 
priate indicator, or indicators, of socio economic con 
ditions. On the basis of the national allocation the 
Member States would programme actions at national 
and regional level, drawing from a limited number of 
the priority areas of the sort illustrated above. A strate 
gic vision of the priorities and opportunities drawn up 
by the Commission with regard to the subjects of 
Community interest would play an important role in 
setting the efforts in each Member State in a Commu 
nity context. 
Consideration also needs to be given to the national 
and/or transnational methods of programming, fo 
cusing especially on the role of the Member States 
and the Commission, on the conduct of partnership, 
on the techniques required for territorial analysis and 
on the criteria for guiding Community action. 
Particular cases 
The present border regions in the Union have in gen 
eral reached much the same level of development as 
the rest of the Union, as shown in Part I of this report. 
This fact demonstrates the value of past Community 
intervention in this area. There is therefore a case for 
including cross border cooperation programmes in 
the general programming of the Structural Funds 
("mainstreaming"). 
Border regions with lagging development would, of 
course, be eligible for support in the same way as any 
other region if they comply with the general criteria 
adopted. 
The outermost regions of the Union have particular 
handicaps as result of their distance from the rest of 
the Union and their special position is reflected in the 
Treaty. Article 299(2), as a policy instrument, allows 
the European Union to maintain and reinforce actions 
to promote the integration of the outermost regions 
into the Community , taking account of their unique 
character. To this end, in March 2000 the Commis 
sion established a strategy for sustainable develop 
ment in the outermost regions. It has already 
introduced new initiatives in the fields of State Aids, 
agriculture, the Structural Funds, tax and customs 
policy, as well as promoting the co ordination of the 
Structural Funds and the European Development 
Fund in the areas containing these regions. The Com 
mission has undertaken to consider how their needs 
should be best reflected in future cohesion policies. 
The particular challenge of 
enlargement in the current period 
Since the reform of the Structural Funds in 1988, the 
management of Community cohesion policy in terms 
of monitoring, evaluation and control has been 
steadily reinforced. 
This is the context in which the candidate countries 
are preparing to join the Union. At present, the 
pre accession instruments are assisting their prepa 
rations, while the PHARE programme will in the future 
devote a large part of its resources to Objective 1 type 
programmes, within a medium term planning frame 
work, which although 'indicative' will prepare the way 
for the overall strategic programming of future Com 
munity support from the Structural Funds. 
The Commission must take all necessary steps to en 
sure that, as in the case of the EU15, programmes 
take account of the situation and the specific difficul 
ties in the new Member States. It should aim to help 
the authorities concerned to define their programmes 
in the light of Community priorities. 
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The question of the administrative 
capacity of the candidate countries 
The implementation of regional development policy is 
a new task for the authorities in the candidate coun 
tries, which have limited funds at their disposal. In 
deed, there is no tradition of such a policy, and the 
decentralisation which it implies, in countries used to 
centralised planning arrangements. 
The process of administrative construction (or 'institu 
tional building') is therefore very important, especially 
as compared with previous occasions of Union en 
largement, when all that was required was the simple 
adaptation of policies and national legislation to the 
need to implement the Structural Funds. 
The first objective is to create a policy at the national 
level. This was the subject of a special assistance 
programme (SPP) enabling the candidate countries 
to prepare, with the support of PHARE, for the imple 
mentation of the Structural Funds by establishing a 
competent authority and the necessary procedures, 
particularly for coordination between Ministries. Bud 
getary procedures also need to be put in place to en 
able them to co finance programmes and to manage 
and control the use of Community resources. 
There is a need, in addition, to support decentralisa 
tion, which is related to the general effort to achieve 
three major objectives   the consolidation of democ 
racy, the development of partnership and an increase 
in economic efficiency. 
The second aspect is the definition of an intervention 
strategy aimed at ensuring the effective use of Struc 
tural Fund resources and at reducing development 
disparities in global terms and within countries to 
avoid the risk of excessive concentration. 
The candidate countries also have to build the admin 
istrative capacity to define strategies, prepare 
programmes and manage the corresponding bud 
gets, particularly the funds which come from the 
Community budget, under the same conditions as the 
present Member States. During the accession negoti 
ations, the Commission will examine very closely the 
ability of the candidate countries to meet all the condi 
tions required for them to be able to receive financial 
transfers. 
The financial resources up to the end of 2006 
Given that there will be a number of new Member 
States during the current planning period 2000 06, 
there are certain matters to be considered in relation 
to finance during this period. The first relates to the fi 
nancial perspectives until 2006 decided by the Mem 
ber States at the European Council in Berlin, 
including a package to support both interventions in 
EU15 as well as in the candidate countries for the pe 
riod before and after accession. After the European 
Council in Nice in December 2000, it seems likely that 
the first accessions will take place in 2003 2004. This 
enlargement scenario differs from that which was the 
basis of the Berlin decision. It will therefore be neces 
sary to take account of the effective date of accession 
of new Member States. A phasing in system may be 
necessary for the assisted regions in the future Mem 
ber States, where Structural Funds would be progres 
sively increased over time, in line with their capacity 
to absorb aid, as was indeed the case during the two 
previous planning periods. 
A second matter concerns the distribution of re 
sources between the Cohesion Fund and the Struc 
tural Funds. These funds will, in effect, succeed ISPA, 
in the first case, and PHARE and SAPARD, in the sec 
ond (with a ratio at present of one third and 
two thirds, respectively, in terms of their financial 
weight). Allocating a higher proportion, say one third, 
to the Cohesion Fund seems to be justified by the 
needs of the countries concerned in respect of trans 
port infrastructure and the environment. 
Two other considerations argue for a larger weight 
being accorded initially to the Cohesion Fund in the 
candidate countries in relation to the proportion allo 
cated to the present Member States. First, a manage 
ment by project approach might prove to be more 
suited to the authorities who still lack programming 
experience; secondly, the high rate of co financing 
and the fact that the principle of additionality does not 
apply to the Cohesion Fund would facilitate the ab 
sorption of Community funding. 
The distribution of Structural and Cohesion Fund re 
sources between the new Member States will be de 
termined according to the same principles, methods 
and objective criteria as applied to the present Mem 
ber States. 
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Cohesion policy in an enlarged Union after 2006, 
including certain financial aspects. 
As the report explains, important modifications to the 
different aspects of the management of cohesion pol 
icy were made during the adoption of Agenda 2000. 
These were aimed at increasing decentralisation, 
promoting partnerships and integrating evaluation 
more effectively into the decision making process. 
More rigorous financial management and control, 
based on a clearer and more meaningful division of 
responsibilities between the Member States and the 
Commission, was also introduced. On this last point, 
the objective is to reduce significantly the incidence 
of fraud, but above all of irregularities which represent 
the overwhelming majority of the cases brought to the 
attention of the Commission. 
The new system is only now beginning to be applied. 
The next Cohesion Report will contain a first assess 
ment of results of the changes, but certain elements 
can already be outlined, which need to be further ex 
amined in the context of the preparation of the new 
planning period after 2006. 
In relation to partnership, there has been a growing 
tendency to decentralise decision making as re 
gards national and Community policies. There is a un 
doubtedly a need to strengthen the role of regional 
and local authorities and of those on the ground by, 
for example, programming at the local level when ap 
propriate. In addition, if in the future indirect zoning is 
the method retained for targeting resources, it would 
be essential that it is accompanied by guarantees re 
garding the involvement of regional and local 
authorities. 
Programming of actions could operate in two 
phases. In a first step, the Commission could set out a 
global strategy comprising the different economic, 
social and territorial dimensions in partnership with 
the Member States at national level and transnational 
level with a view to identifying priorities including 
those of particular Community interest. This would 
help to determine how finance is allocated by priority. 
Afterwards, programming would be decentralised to 
the appropriate level, for example at regional, urban 
or transnational level. 
For lagging regions, integrated programming re 
mains a major means of obtaining positive results in 
terms of their economic, social and territorial 
development. 
It is may be possible to make use of a call for tender 
procedure for the implementation of some 
programmes, enabling the best proposals to be se 
lected completely transparently. The selection could 
be made at different levels (regional, national or 
transnational and in cooperation with the Commis 
sion) which would strengthen the links between the 
results achieved and the finance allocated. 
The principle of additionality (requiring Community 
funds to add to, rather than substitute for, national 
funds) was simplified considerably for the period 
2000 06. Experience will confirm if it has become 
more effective as a way of contributing to the added 
value of Community cohesion policy. At the same 
time, it remains a highly aggregate figure in the sense 
that it does not apply to individual programmes, but to 
all programmes under a single Objective in a given 
Member State. 
It is therefore lacking in transparency, and it might be 
worth considering the possibility of calculating 
additionality at the programme level rather than (as at 
present) at the Member State level especially for 
programmes aimed at the less developed regions. At 
the same time, it is important not to underestimate the 
difficulties in terms the availability of data that this 
would imply, a traditional constraint on attempts at im 
provement in this field. The methodology will be eval 
uated in the light of the experiences in the 
implementation of the additionality principle which 
will take place in 2003 and 2005. 
Evaluation has now been firmly established defini 
tively as an integral part of programming procedures. 
The 'performance reserve' is one of the important in 
novations brought about by Agenda 2000. As already 
discussed, the link between the finance allocated 
and the results achieved needs to be strengthened. 
Improving the coherence between the 
Cohesion Fund and the Structural Funds 
The Cohesion Fund, which was established by the 
Treaty is targeted on Member States in which GNP 
per head is less than 90% of the Community average 
and which have established a programme for 
macro economic convergence. As a complement to 
the Structural Funds, it has proved a useful instrument 
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for promoting investment and in helping the cohesion 
countries to catch up. 
Matters for consideration for the future concern the 
amount of financial resources which should be allo 
cated to the Fund in absolute terms and to strengthen 
the coordination of the support provided with that pro 
vided by the Structural Funds. 
The Treaty limits the Cohesion Fund to the financing 
of investment projects in transport networks and the 
environment. While the Cohesion Fund applies at na 
tional level, there would be clear advantages in se 
lecting projects so as not to increase regional 
disparities and to avoid excessive concentration in 
the more prosperous capital cities and surrounding 
regions. 
At present, the share of the Cohesion Fund in total ex 
penditure on structural policies in the Member States 
concerned is around 18%. Whether the same bal 
ance between the Cohesion Fund and the Structural 
Funds is appropriate to the new Member States is a 
matter for further consideration, possibly after a tran 
sition period. 
The allocation of the resources of the Cohesion Fund 
between recipient countries should be decided on 
the basis of purely objective criteria as in the case of 
the Structural Funds at present. The need for objectiv 
ity will become more important for all Member States 
after the accession of new countries. 
In order to strengthen the coordination between ac 
tions supported by the Cohesion Fund and those sup 
ported by the Structural Funds, the two should be 
made part of a unique framework. For cohesion coun 
tries, the Cohesion Fund should become the only 
instrument for financing large transport and environ 
mental projects in lagging regions. 
The financial aspects of cohesion policy 
in an enlarged Union after 2006 
The evidence presented in the report on national, re 
gional and social disparities demonstrate that there is 
an increased need for cohesion policy in an enlarged 
Union. The analysis in Part I of the main report shows 
that economic and social disparities within the Union 
will widen considerably with enlargement. The chal 
lenge of maintaining economic and social cohesion 
will therefore increase. 
Inevitably the bulk of the financial effort would be ad 
dressed to the new Member States. In a real sense, 
the size of the global financial package will determine 
the level of ambition on the part of the Union in tack 
ling problems which persist in the EU15, especially in 
its lagging regions. It is within this framework that dis 
cussion on the budget for cohesion policy has to be 
set. 
While it is premature to put forward budgetary pro 
posals for cohesion policy after 2006   which in any 
event would have to be considered as part of a global 
discussion on future Community policies   it is appro 
priate to recall a few figures and to give a few refer 
ence points to assist debate. 
Between the 1988 reform and 1999, the Union 
strengthened its cohesion policy in terms of the finan 
cial resources devoted to it in absolute terms and rel 
ative to the Community budget as a whole. Under 
Agenda 2000, the Commission initial proposal was to 
maintain the level of financial support reached in 
1999 for the EU15 (0.46% of GDP) throughout the 
2000 2006 period. 
In the event, the European Council in Berlin allocated 
EUR 213 billion to structural measures in the 15 Mem 
ber States for the 2000 2006 period, an average of 
EUR 30 billion a year. The resources given as pre ac 
cession aid (EUR 3 billion) and the sums reserved for 
the countries which join between 2002 and 2006 form 
an additional part of the overall package for cohesion 
policy. Cohesion policy for new Member States after 
accession was set at a progressively increasing fig 
ure reaching EUR 12 billion in 2006. These decisions 
together set the total amount in effect at 0.45% of the 
GDP in the enlarged Union of 21 Member States in 
2006, virtually the same as at the beginning of the pe 
riod for EU15. 
The same percentage does not necessarily need to 
be taken as a reference point for future cohesion 
funding but it must be clear that, in order to remain 
credible, regional and cohesion policy needs to de 
ploy resources commensurate with needs in the cir 
cumstances which prevail. 
Enlargement and the ceiling on transfers 
Under the current rules for the period 2000 06, trans 
fers from the Structural and Cohesion Funds are lim 
ited up to a maximum of 4% of national GDP a year in 
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all Member States. As a figure determined in relation 
to the situation in the present Member States, in an ef 
fort to keep the transfer from the Union to levels that 
can be managed by the recipient administrations, it is 
a ceiling that will have important consequences for 
some of the least prosperous candidate countries 
when they join the Union. 
In the new context, the following constraints must 
therefore be reconciled: 
  Addressing the cohesion objective, especially 
the enormous development needs of the candi 
date countries; 
  Taking proper account of the absorption capacity 
of these countries in economic, financial and ad 
ministrative terms. 
Taking full account of the relative prosperity of the 
countries concerned would give rise to significant 
risks as regards their absorption capacity and the 
balance of public expenditure. Consequently, ad 
dressing the question of the ceiling would only be rel 
evant in exceptional circumstances, such as in the 
case of projects financed by the Cohesion Fund 
which represent a particular Community interest. 
Continuing pre-accession for 
other candidate countries 
Assistance for pre accession, modified if necessary, 
should continue to apply to the candidate countries 
which have not yet joined the Union on the 1 st Janu 
ary, 2007. The amount of finance required should be 
the subject of an objective evaluation in relation to 
needs, the capacity for absorption and the number of 
countries in receipt of the support. 
Increasing the contribution 
of other policies 
Community policies have their own objectives and 
their effect on cohesion is difficult to assess in a num 
ber of cases, but it is necessary, as a complement to a 
stronger geographical and thematic concentration of 
the Funds, to reinforce synergies and the 
complementarity between cohesion and other com 
munity policies. 
Certain community policies contribute indirectly to 
economic and social cohesion by helping to create 
more favourable conditions for development in less 
prosperous Member States and regions. 
This is true of Economic and Monetary Union which 
helps to achieve macroeconomic stability in the co 
hesion countries in particular which, because it is fa 
vourable for investment and economic growth, is a 
necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for real 
convergence. 
The same is true of the internal market, which, to 
gether with structural reforms, has an important influ 
ence on social cohesion across regions. The Union is 
undertaking a major effort to reform product, capital 
and labour markets. The reduction of the disparities 
between regions requires investment aimed at in 
creasing the economic potential of the less devel 
oped regions. 
Faster growth does not automatically lead to closer 
regional integration and reduced income inequali 
ties. Accordingly, further reforms, a reduction in barri 
ers to competition in some markets, especially in 
services, and the support of cohesion policy are 
needed to reap the full benefits from the catch up 
process in some Member States and to reduce exist 
ing inequalities between regions. 
EMU like the internal market needs to be comple 
mented by accompanying policies so that all Member 
States and regions can benefit fully from economic 
and monetary integration. In this respect, maintaining 
structural spending which complements the Struc 
tural Funds, particularly in the fields of education, 
training and employment, as well as research and 
technological development, is essential for the over 
all effectiveness of cohesion policy. 
Competition and cohesion policies are complemen 
tary, since the ceiling imposed on regional State Aids 
benefits the less prosperous countries most of all. 
This thrust of policy needs to be pushed further to es 
tablish more equitable conditions for competition, 
while taking account of the role played by services of 
general interest in territorial cohesion. 
The European Employment Strategy, is necessary for 
cohesion. It should, however, be adapted to different 
regional and local circumstances in order to respond 
better to the very different performances of labour 
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markets. This objective has already been taken into 
account in the measures supported by the Structural 
Funds for the period 2000 to 2006. But national bud 
gets do not identify clearly the way in which strategic 
objectives are translated into financial commitments, 
which makes it difficult to detect such a move. 
Other Community policies have a major 
effect on the territorial structure of the Union 
The Common Agricultural Policy has largely achieved 
the objectives set, which focus on improving the com 
petitiveness of European agriculture. The change in 
the CAP means that it benefits some cohesion coun 
tries today more than before, but its contribution to 
territorial cohesion remains very variable and de 
pends on regional systems of agricultural production. 
The second pillar of the CAP, rural development pol 
icy, needs to be on a quite different scale, especially 
in areas which are affected most by the continuing 
changes in agricultural policy. 
In some small coastal areas, fisheries accounts for a 
significant share of employment. For the Common 
Fisheries Policy, the challenge is to restore a sustain 
able balance between fish stocks and fishing. Since 
activities linked to fishing are concentrated in less fa 
voured areas, accompanying social and economic 
policies are required to enable diversification to take 
place. 
The trans European transport networks are an instru 
ment of territorial development and can have a signifi 
cant effect on regional disparities as highlighted by 
the European Spatial Development Perspective 
(ESDP). There needs, however, to be greater 
complementarity between the policy on large net 
works and Structural Fund programmes and when 
the guidelines for trans European networks are re 
vised, more account should be taken of the cohesion 
objective. 
All the analysis carried out in the Cohesion Report 
shows the importance of research and innovation for 
competitiveness. Despite some progress under the 
5th Framework Programme, research and develop 
ment (RTD) is still concentrated in the most central 
and competitive regions. To make the European Re 
search Area a concrete reality, the emphasis needs 
to be put on the regional dimension of RTD through 
networking and improving the coordination with the 
Structural Funds. The challenge here is to ensure that 
lagging regions become full partners in this area. 
Environmental policy, with economic and social co 
hesion, is one of three pillars of sustainable develop 
ment. The design of this policy should give more 
consideration to territorial disparities and specific 
features as well as to the financial effect on regions of 
the measures envisaged. 
The Community budgetary system and cohesion 
As regards the overall Union Budget, a balance be 
tween contributions and the distribution of expendi 
ture for each Member State is not an objective in itself. 
Individual Member State contributions are, however, 
becoming more proportional to GNP. Union expendi 
ture reflects the content and priorities of Community 
policies, only cohesion spending being inversely re 
lated to regional GDP per head. 
Strengthening the contribution of 
other policies to the cohesion effort 
With enlargement, the globalisation of the economy 
and the development of the knowledge society, the 
Union is facing unprecedented economic and social 
changes. It is, therefore, necessary for other Commu 
nity policies to increase their contribution to eco 
nomic and social cohesion, as foreseen in the Treaty. 
It is important to consider the response to the greater 
need for coherence, complementarity and efficiency 
of Community policies and the instruments necessary 
to make this happen. This consideration forms part of 
the work initiated by the White Paper on Governance. 
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10 Questions for public debate on the future of cohesion policy 
1. What will be the role of cohesion policy in an enlarged Union of nearly 30 Member States in a context 
of rapid economic and social change? How is it possible to further economic convergence and pre 
serve the European model of society? 
2. How should Community policies be made more coherent? How should the contribution of other 
Community policies to the pursuit of cohesion be improved? 
3. How should cohesion policy be modified in preparation for an unprecedented expansion of the Un 
ion? Should cohesion policy also address territorial cohesion in order to take better account of the 
major spatial imbalances in the Union? 
4. How can cohesion policy be focussed on measures which have a high Community added value? 
5. What should be the priorities to bring about balanced and sustainable territorial development in the 
Union? 
6. How should the economic convergence of lagging regions of the Union be encouraged? 
7. What kind of Community intervention is required for other regions? 
8. What methods should be used to determine the division of funds between Member States and be 
tween regions? 
9. What principles should govern the implementation of Community intervention? 
10. What should be the response to increased needs with regard to the economic, social and territorial 
dimensions of cohesion? 
XXXIX Conclusions and recommendations Part I — Situation and trends 
1.1 Economic cohesion 3 
1.2 Social cohesion 13 
1.3 Territorial cohesion: towards a more balanced development 29 
1.4 Factors determining real convergence 37 Part I — Situation and trends 
2 1.1 Economic cohesion 
Overview of the European economy 
The EU economy today is heavily reliant on services, 
which now account for 67% of output and 66% of em 
ployment, in both cases up by 5 percentage points 
from 10 years ago. Correspondingly, the importance 
of manufacturing and agriculture is tending to de 
cline. This shift towards the service sector is likely to 
continue, while agriculture and manufacturing will 
continue to experience consolidation of production in 
higher value added activities and a fall in output and 
employment in others. In most applicant countries, 
output and jobs are still concentrated in agriculture 
and manufacturing, and within these in lower value 
added subsectors, suggesting more restructuring in 
the future. 
Growing trade and foreign direct investment have 
meant a gradual opening up of national economies in 
the EU towards both other Member States and the 
rest of the world. In 1999, exports amounted to 32% of 
EU GDP and imports to 31%. Both figures are the 
highest recorded since statistics began to be col 
lected in the modern era, confirming the long term 
growth in trade in the EU, despite fluctuations over the 
business cycle. Both are forecast to increase further 
in the future. Some 60% of trade was within the EU, il 
lustrating the dependence of EU countries on each 
other, though, at the same time, interdependence 
with the rest of the world is also increasing. 
The EU will continue to experience significant 
changes in the competitive environment over the next 
few years, which will affect the economy in general 
and cohesion in particular: 
  continuing economic pressure from globalisa 
tion, increasing international competition and 
restructuring within particular sectors. Since sec 
tors tend to be concentrated in particular regions 
and to involve particular social groups, restruc 
turing is likely to pose a challenge to both regional 
and social cohesion. In addition, since 
globalisation tends to bring with it more stand 
ardisation and uniformity, it is important for the 
opportunities which it opens up to be balanced 
with the need to maintain cultural identities in dif 
ferent parts of the EU; 
  enlargement and the challenge of integrating the 
applicant countries into the EU. Although en 
largement will in the long term be universally ben 
eficial, it is likely in the short term to bring 
pressure for restructuring, as firms in applicant 
countries face increased competition, in a con 
text where their low income and output already 
pose challenges to cohesion; 
  the information revolution. In a real sense, infor 
mation technology is tending to reduce the physi 
cal isolation of peripheral parts of the Union and 
increase their 'virtual' isolation, insofar as the key 
to development is access to the technology, 
rather than access to markets. The key barriers 
are, therefore, low education and social factors, 
rather than transport costs. Although the change 
is as yet more potential than actual, it is likely to 
become much more of a reality in the coming 
years. It may well have a beneficial effect on re 
gional cohesion, bringing the disadvantaged pe 
riphery closer to the centre, but it could be 
damaging for social cohesion. Education will be 
come increasingly important to avoid a division of 
society between the technologically literate 
'haves' and the technologically illiterate 
'have nots'. 
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Divergence and convergence 
in economic performance 
Disparities between Member States 
remain despite strong convergence 
The present EU can be divided into two groups of 
countries in terms of gross domestic output (see Ta 
ble A.1 in the Annex). There is a clear gap between 
Spain, Greece and Portugal, where GDP per head, 
measured in terms of purchasing power standards to 
indicate relative levels of wealth, is only 67 82% of the 
EU average, and the other Member States, where it is 
similar to or above average. 
This is despite significant convergence achieved by 
these three countries over the past decade. As a 
group, their GDP per head rose from 68% of the EU 
average in 1988 to 79% in 1999. Individually, the gap 
between Spain and Greece and the EU average nar 
rowed by 9 10 percentage points in each case, and 
for Portugal by 17 percentage points. Although the 
overall gap in GDP per head of the three countries 
with the rest of the EU was reduced by a third over this 
period, at this rate of convergence, it would still take 
another 20 30 years for it to be eliminated completely. 
This underlines the long term nature of the conver 
gence process, though whether it takes more or less 
time to achieve complete convergence depends on 
whether and to what extent there is a change in un 
derlying conditions and in the context in which growth 
takes place. 
An encouraging sign in this respect is the strong per 
formance of Ireland, which 10 years ago was in 
cluded in the least prosperous group of countries with 
GDP per head of only 70% of the EU average but now 
has a level 14% above average. 
An important point to emphasise in this context is that 
convergence of GDP per head in terms of PPS de 
pends not only on differential rates of output growth, 
on GDP growing faster in the cohesion countries than 
in other Member States, but also on relative price de 
velopments, which affect the PPS adjustment (see 
Box on GDP and other measures of the regional 
economy). 
Disparities between regions 
have narrowed but by less 
Disparities are even wider between regions in the EU
1 
(Map 1 and Table 1). The 10% of regions with the 
highest GDP per head consist largely of northern 
capital cities and the most prosperous southern Ger 
man and northern Italian regions. Broadening this to 
the top 25% leads to the inclusion of many UK re 
gions, some Austrian, Belgian and Dutch regions and 
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Madrid and Rome (Lazio). The bottom 10% of regions 
consist predominantly of those in Greece and the 
French DOMs and also include some regions in Por 
tugal, Spain and southern Italy, while the bottom 25% 
include many other Spanish and Portuguese regions, 
the remaining part of Southern Italy and Eastern Ger 
many, as well as some peripheral regions in France 
and the UK. 
The contrast between the top and bottom 10% is 
stark. The regions at the top have an average GDP 
per head 60% above the EL) average, or 45% if re 
gions where commuting is important are excluded,
2 
while those at the bottom have a level nearly 40% be 
low. In other words, in the top 10% of regions, GDP 
per head is around 2
1/2 times that in the bottom 10%. 
Similarly, the top 25% of regions have a level twice 
that of the bottom 25% and account for a third of total 
EU GDP as against a sixth in the case of the latter. 
However, there was significant convergence over the 
period 1988 to 1998 (see Map A. 1). In the bottom 10% 
of regions, GDP per head rose from 55% of the EU av 
erage to 60%, though in the bottom 25%, it only rose 
from 66% of average to 68%. (These increases are 
not as dramatic as reported in the 6th Periodic Re 
port, where the top and bottom regions were defined 
merely in terms of numbers of regions instead of the 
population they cover.) 
Again, this underlines the long term nature of conver 
gence, since the gap between the bottom 10% of re 
gions and the EU average narrowed by only 11 % over 
these 10 years. 
Regional disparities within countries 
are large, but may be stabilising 
In addition to regional disparities across the EU as a 
whole, there are in many cases large disparities 
within individual Member States (see Table A.2 and 
Graph 1). The divided economies of Italy and Ger 
many are obvious examples, but in most countries, 
one region, or a few of them, have levels of GDP per 
head far above, or below, the national average. Capi 
tal cities, such as London or Paris (lie de France), 
tend, in particular, to have levels much higher than 
average,
3 while in many remote and rural regions, 
such as Ipeiros in Greece, Calabria in Italy and 
Agores in Portugal, GDP per head is well below that 
elsewhere. This firmly demonstrates the fact that 
countries cannot be treated as homogenous 
Table 1 The most and least prosperous 
regions in the Union, 1988 1998 
GDP per head (PPS) as % of EU average 
Regions  EU15  EU27  Regions 
1988 1998  1998 
10%+ 
10% 
ratio 
25%+ 
25%  
ratio 
155,3 160,9 
55,1 61,0 
2,8 2,6 
134,1 137,1 
66,6 68,3 
2,0 2,0 
176,9 
31,1 
5,7 
152,0 
44,3 
3,4 
10%+and 25%+ :theregions with the highest GDP per head 
(PPS), accounting for 10% and25% respectively ot'totalpop-
ulation in the Union 
10% - and 25% -: the regions with the lowest GDP per head 
(PPS), accounting for 10% and 25% respectively of total pop-
ulation in the Union 
Source: Eurostat, calculations DG REGIO 
economies and that it is important to consider re 
gional as well as national features and trends. 
The tendency observed in the First Cohesion Report, 
for regional disparities in GDP per head to widen over 
time seems still to hold in a significant number of Mem 
ber States but in some others, disparities between re 
gions have narrowed a little (see Table A.3 and Graph 
2). Nevertheless, the recent reduction in disparities 
which has occurred in a few Member States may sim 
ply be cyclical, since lagging regions tend to converge 
more in periods of growth than during recessions.
4 
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Moreover, substantial disparities remain, especially in 
some of the less prosperous Member States. 
Oporto and the Algarve, though disparities have nar 
rowed over the past 10 years. 
For example, while GDP per head does not differ much 
between regions in Greece, a gap has opened up in re 
cent years between the main centres of economic ac 
tivity around Athens and Thessaloniki and the rest of 
the country. Indeed, since the closure of land routes to 
the rest of the EU through the former Yugoslavia, the 
port and airports in Athens are the main entry and exit 
points for trade with the rest of the world. In conse 
quence, the regions in the remote and mountainous in 
terior remain the poorest in the EU mainland. 
In Spain, the second largest country in terms of land 
area in the EU, the pattern of development is also var 
ied. GDP per head remains relatively high in Madrid 
and Cataluha and has risen further over the past de 
cade. Other regions in the north, notably Navarra and 
Pais Vasco, have also performed well, but those in the 
remote north east and underdeveloped south have 
tended to do less well, GDP growing by less than the 
EU average in the former and hardly at all in the latter, 
which are among the least developed parts of the EU. 
Accordingly, regional disparities in Spain have wid 
ened further. 
Migration has been a feature in Sweden and Finland, 
from the sparsely populated, remote regions in the 
north   as well as from the east in the latter   as eco 
nomic recession hit hard in the early 1990s. Outward 
migration has continued since then, despite the par 
tial recovery in GDP per head. 
Disparities are both wide and long standing between 
the north and south of Italy. Despite the economic up 
turn elsewhere, GDP per head in the Mezzogiorno 
has continued to stagnate at around 60 70% of the 
EU average. Only in Basilicata has growth over the 
past decade been significant and even here, GDP 
per head only rose from 63% of the EU average to 
72% between 1988 and 1998. 
GDP per head in terms of PPS in the new German 
Lander, where growth was very rapid in the first few 
years following unification, was also around 68 70% 
of the EU average in 1998. 
Disparities double in scale with 
the inclusion of applicant countries 
Disparities are also wide in Portugal, development 
being concentrated along the coastal strip, in Lisboa, 
It is instructive to examine the disparities which would 
exist in the Union at present if all the applicant 
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countries
5 were considered together with the existing 
15 Member States. However, it is recognised that by 
the time these countries actually enter the Union their 
GDP per head could be higher than at present, de 
pending on their economic performance in the inter 
vening period and the effect of accession itself on 
this. 
It also has to be recognised that there are significant 
differences between the candidate countries, not 
only in terms of GDP per head but also in terms of their 
economic performance since the transition was initi 
ated, which in part reflects the pace and extent of re 
forms during this period (see Box). 
Three groups of countries can be distinguished in the 
EU of 27 in terms of GDP per head instead of the pres 
ent two (Graph 3). The existing EU Member States, 
apart from Spain, Greece and Portugal, form the first 
group with GDP per head 20% above the new aver 
age. These three cohesion countries plus Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia and almost certainly Malta 
(though no PPS figures are available) form the 
second group, with GDP per head between 68% (the 
Czech Republic) and 95% (Spain) of the EU 27 aver 
age, while the remaining 8 applicant countries form 
the third group, with GDP per head below this (and, 
on average, only 40% of the EU27 average, though 
56 58% for Slovakia and Hungary). 
Enlargement will, therefore, pose a challenge to co 
hesion in two ways (Table 2). First, it will more than 
double the population living in regions with GDP per 
head of less than 75% of the present EU average  
EUR 20,213 per head  from 71 million to 174 million, 
or from 19% of the EU 15 total to 36% of the EU27 total 
(or to 26% of the EU27 total if the EU average GDP per 
head is reduced to that of the 27 countries, ie EUR 
16,504). 
Secondly, it will increase the intensity, or scale of dis 
parity. In 1998, GDP per head in the lagging regions 
of the Union averaged 66% of the present EU aver 
age. In lagging regions in the applicant countries, it 
was much less than this (around 37% of the present 
EU average), so that the two groups of regions 
Recent economic developments in the candidate countries 
The long term growth potential of the candidate coun 
tries is substantial and this is likely to benefit the present 
EU Member States in future years. 
The economic performance of the candidate countries 
in Central Europe has, in most cases, improved signifi 
cantly since the mid 1990s, though because of the 
growth of the EU over this period, there has been little 
convergence in terms of GDP per head. At the same 
time, regional disparities within the countries have 
tended to widen, especially between the capital cities 
plus the regions bordering the EU and eastern areas. 
Future policies will need to tackle these disparities. 
While GDP growth in the candidate countries taken to 
gether (but excluding Turkey) was only 2.2% in 1999, 
that is less than in the EU15, in five of them (Slovenia, 
Hungary, Cyprus, Poland and Malta), it exceeded 4%. 
Apart from Romania (and Turkey), inflation has stabi 
lised at around 10% a year or even below, though the 
relatively slow reduction of inflation in Hungary and Po 
land remains a concern. 
While the balance of payments on current account has 
improved in a number of countries, the deficit remains 
significant in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. 
Deficits have been financed to a large extent by capital 
inflows linked to privatisation, but new investment has 
also increased in a number of countries. 
Despite efforts to reduce the budget deficit in most 
countries, public finance sustainability remains a cause 
of concern. 
The privatisation of large enterprises is underway in 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Bulgaria 
and, to a lesser extent, in Latvia. In Poland, the rate of 
privatisation has been sustained but restructuring has 
only just begun in the iron and steel industry and agri 
culture. In banking, privatisation has progressed in the 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Latvia and Slovakia, as well 
as in energy supply and telecommunications. 
The macroeconomic situation in the candidate coun 
tries is mixed, with favourable aspects (growth poten 
tial, FDI, the growth and shift of trade flows and even 
inflation) and others which are weaker (the current ac 
count deficit, unemployment and the budget deficit). 
But the situation in these countries cannot be compared 
directly with that in the present EU Member States, 
given their starting point and the importance of 
restructuring. 1.1 Economic cohesion 
together had a GDP per head of less than half (48%) 
the average. 
On the basis of the present data, the statistical effect 
of including the 12 applicant countries is to reduce 
the EU average GDP per head by 18%. As a result of 
this hypothetical exercise, 27 of the regions in the ex 
isting EU with some 49 million inhabitants are raised 
above 75% of the average of the 27 countries. This, of 
course, does nothing in itself to resolve the develop 
ment problems of the regions concerned, it just signi 
fies that their relative position is improved by the entry 
of regions even worse off than themselves. 
Given the present data and assuming that the EU 
were suddenly expanded by 12 Member States, the 
challenge to cohesion, therefore, in an EU27 can be 
said to be twice as widespread and twice as large in 
scale as at present. The challenge, moreover, is likely 
to persist for a long time. If the applicant countries 
were to experience the same rate of growth as the co 
hesion countries over the past decade, their present 
level of GDP per head implies a convergence pro 
cess lasting for at least two generations. Even with the 
kind of growth experienced in Ireland over the past 
decade, it would take 20 years before they reached 
90% of EU15 GDP per head. 
Regional disparities also 
double with enlargement 
The inclusion of the 12 applicant countries has virtu 
ally no effect on the identity of the regions with the 
highest GDP per head in the Union,
6 but completely 
changes the composition, and relative level of in 
come, of the regions with the lowest level. The bottom 
10% of regions (in terms of population) in an enlarged 
EU consist entirely of those in eastern Poland, Bul 
garia and Romania together with Lithuania and Lat 
via. The 25% of regions with the 
lowest GDP per head comprise 
almost all the regions in the ap 
plicant countries and most of 
those in Greece, Agores and 
Madeira in Portugal and 
Andalucia and Extremadura in 
Spain. 
enlarged Union. It is also noteworthy how much GDP 
per head of the 10% of the bottom regions is reduced, 
falling from 61 % of the EU average at present to only 
31% of the average for an enlarged EU. Whereas at 
present, only Ipeiros in Greece has an income less 
than half the EU average, in an enlarged EU, some 79 
million people would live in regions with GDP per 
head less than in Ipeiros. 
As in the case of disparities between countries, the 
ratio of GDP per head in the top regions to that in the 
bottom in the enlarged Union is around double the ra 
tio for the present EU. The top 25% of regions in an en 
larged EU, therefore, would have an average level of 
GDP per head of 3.3 times that of the bottom 25% as 
against a ratio of 1.9 in the present EU, while the top 
10% of regions after enlargement have a level 5.3 
times the bottom 10% as compared with a ratio of 2.4 
at present. 
Trends towards convergence 
The use of different economic models to explore 
trends in regional development can be helpful both in 
indicating the likely outcome in future years if these 
trends remain the same, and if regional economies 
continue to perform as in the past, and in identifying 
the key factors that need to change if convergence in 
GDP per head is to occur. Three main conclusions 
emerge from these models. 
First, if past trends continue, it will take a number of 
decades for regional disparities in the present EU to 
be eliminated. 
Secondly, there can be no guarantee that such an 
elimination will occur. More specifically, while re 
gional economies might converge over time to their 
own equilibrium level of GDP, given the underlying 
It is noteworthy that very few re 
gions from the current EU ap 
pear in the list of the least 
prosperous regions of an 
Table 2 Summary statistics for regions below 75% of EU 
GDP per head, 1998 
Index used 
Number of regions falling below 75 % 
Population in those regions (millions) 
Population as a proportion of EU 15/26 
Average GDP/head (PPS) of regions 
falling below 75% 
lnEU15 
EU15 = 100 
EUR 20213 
46 
71 
19% 
66 
In EU26 
EU15 = 100 EU26=100 
EUR 20213 EUR 16504 
97 
174 
36% 
48 
70 
125 
26% 
46 
EU26 excludes Malta 
Source: Eurostat, calculations DG REGIO 
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conditions which prevail and their own factor endow 
ments, there is no necessary reason why this process 
in itself should lead to a convergence towards the EU 
level of GDP per head and to a reduction in regional 
disparities in these terms in the Union. The only way to 
be sure of the latter is if there is a change in the under 
lying conditions themselves and in relative factor en 
dowments (in terms of capital of all kinds and different 
labour force skills). The primary objective of regional 
and structural policies is precisely to bring about 
such a change. 
Thirdly, it is of key importance for convergence of re 
gions towards the average EU level of GDP per head 
that disparities in human capital endowment   ie in 
the skills of the labour force   are eliminated, or at 
least significantly reduced. This implies, in turn, a 
need both to improve education and training systems 
in lagging regions and to widen access to these, as 
well as a need for enterprises in these regions to use 
the potential skills available more effectively and to 
adapt more rapidly to changes in technology and in 
the organisation of work. 
GDP and other measures 
of the regional economy 
GDP per head in terms of PPS is the key indicator for 
assessing levels of economic development in re 
gions and disparities in this. Its position is enshrined 
in the Structural Funds regulations and in Article 
87(3)a of the Treaty on competition policy, both of 
which have been unanimously approved by the 
Member States. It is also conventionally used by nu 
merous international institutions (including the 
World Bank, IMF, OECD and UN) as well as universi 
ties and research institutes, central banks and pri 
vate enterprises as the single most useful measure 
of economic performance. The reasons for this in 
clude the following: 
  GDP is, almost by definition, the best measure of 
the output of the regional economy. 
  Leaving aside problems of commuting, which are 
significant only in a few cases, and of income from 
capital, it is a good proxy for regional income be 
fore public and private transfers. For cohesion 
purposes, it is important, at least initially, to mea 
sure the regional income taking account only of 
what is generated locally without including trans 
fers from outside or those going outside. To give 
an obvious example, a region which had a low 
level of production might well have a much higher 
level of final income because of large social secu 
rity transfers, but it would still be a less favoured 
region. 
  GDP per head is statistically robust and is usually 
readily available at regional level for a reasonable 
period of time. 
  Since price levels vary considerably between 
countries at prevailing exchange rates, it is nec 
essary to adjust for this in order to measure the 
real command over goods and services of a given 
sum of money. Expressing GDP in terms of pur 
chasing power standards (PPS) is a means of 
making such a correction. 
At present, the PPS adjustment is calculated on the 
basis of national price levels and, therefore, leaves 
out of account regional differences in prices, which 
can be significant particularly where there are wide 
variations in income between regions. The cost of 
living, for example, is much higher in the north of It 
aly than in the south and, in principle, this should be 
allowed for in the regional GDP per head figures. 
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Despite the usefulness of GDP per head at PPS, it is of 
interest to consider other measures of the regional 
economy (see Table A.4). 
Changes in GDP per head in PPS over time 
It is important to recognise that GDP per head in PPS 
terms can change in one economy relative to another 
not only because of a difference in the rate of GDP 
growth in real terms (so called 'real' convergence) but 
also because of a change in relative price levels. This 
potentially complicates the analysis of changes over 
time insofar as a relative increase in GDP per head 
which arises from a reduction in the relative price level  
or from a re estimation of the PPS adjustment   might 
have slightly different implications than one which re 
sults from a relative growth in real GDP. 
GDP without the PPS adjustment: 
wider disparities, but a similar pattern 
The simplest alternative indicator is to measure GDP 
per head in Euros rather than PPS. This shows the mar 
ket value of output in each region rather than real in 
come levels (see Map A.2). 
Such a measure increases the scale of differences be 
tween regions. Since price levels are positively corre 
lated with the wealth of a region, low GDP per head in 
less prosperous regions tends to be partly offset by a 
lower cost of living. 
The most striking change is for regions with GDP per 
head furthest from the EU average. The level in Portugal 
as whole falls from 76% of the EU average (in PPS 
terms) to just 50%, below that of Greece. Conversely, in 
Sweden and Denmark, where the cost of living is very 
high, GDP per head is markedly higher when measured 
in terms of Euros (23% higher in the latter). 
Extending the comparison to include the applicant coun 
tries, their average GDP per head is reduced from 38% of 
the EU15 average in PPS terms to just 16% in Euro terms. 
The lowest levels of GDP per head are in eastern areas. 
Even in Slovenia, GDP per head in Euros is little more than 
45% of the EU average as opposed to nearly 71 % in PPS 
terms. 
GNP: allowing for income transfers 
As stated above, GDP has the advantage of excluding 
income transfers and so relates more closely to the in 
come generated within an economy. Such transfers, 
however, are not confined to those made for redistri 
butive reasons but also include remissions or receipts 
of income by both individuals and companies, which 
can significantly affect the income available for 
expenditure on goods and services in an economy. Re 
missions from migrant workers have been an important 
source of income for a number of countries and regions 
in the past (such as southern Italy, for example), while 
the repatriation of profits by foreign owned enterprises, 
and the receipt of profits earned abroad, are equally im 
portant in a number of economies at the present time. 
These flows of income to and from abroad are included 
in the measure of gross national product or GNP. 
Unfortunately, data are not available for GNP by region 
in the Union, largely because of the difficulties of mea 
suring income flows at this level. Nevertheless, data for 
GNP at national level are available and these show 
some differences from those for GDP for a few Member 
States. In particular, GNP for Ireland was over 13% less 
than GDP reflecting the importance of profits earned by 
foreign owned enterprises, which are not necessarily 
spent in Ireland (though equally, neither do they neces 
sarily go out of the country). In 1999, therefore, GNP per 
head in Ireland in terms of PPS was below the EU aver 
age whereas GDP per head was well above. 
For similar reasons, GNP in Luxembourg was also sub 
stantially lower than GDP, by almost 10%. In other Mem 
ber States, however, apart from Greece where inflows 
from abroad added just under 3% to income, the differ 
ence between GDP and GNP was around 2% or less. 
Median consumption: an indicator of 
the standard of living of the average household 
Median consumption per head, measured in PPS terms, is 
another useful indicator. This is derived from household 
budget surveys and measures the goods and services 
purchased by households and individuals rather than pro 
duced in the economy. In contrast to GDP, it, therefore, in 
cludes imports and excludes exports, which can be quite 
significant at the regional level. It also implicitly excludes 
income transferred abroad; which as noted above is sig 
nificant in the case of Ireland. 
Since the distribution of incomes is generally quite 
skewed, the median income is less than the mean and 
more indicative of a typical household or person. Be 
cause consumption tends to fall below income by more, 
the higher the growth in the economy, it will usually lag 
behind GDP per head as economies converge. 
The indicator, however, is not available in the EU at a re 
gional level. Nevertheless, national comparisons are in 
teresting. Portugal has the lowest level, with a typical 
consumption of only 58% of the EU average, largely be 
cause of the skewness of income distribution. The other 
two cohesion countries   Greece and Spain   however, 1.1 Economic cohesion 
have very similar levels of median consumption and 
GDP in relation to the rest of the EU. 
Green accounting: closer to implementation, 
but much work remains before it is operational 
A final concept of interest is 'green accounting', the at 
tempt to incorporate environmental costs into economic 
figures. The case for green accounting is that the normal 
measure of GDP, calculated at market prices, leaves out 
of account the depletion of exhaustible resources and 
other costs imposed on the environment by production 
and associated activities.
7 Green accounting is, therefore, 
an attempt to measure the 'true costs' of the loss of scarce 
resources and the environmental damage caused by pro 
duction and to incorporate explicit estimates of these, in 
terms, for example, of the cost of developing alternative 
resources or cleaning up the environment, in the calcula 
tion of GDP. 
The problem of putting monetary values on items which 
are to a large extent intangible is, however, severe and as 
yet no generally accepted estimates have been produced 
of 'green' GDP. A more limited approach is to produce es 
timates of the pollution produced in particular sectors or to 
distinguish environmental expenditure and to list these fig 
ures alongside the relevant part of the national accounts 
as an addendum item. This, however, tends to mean that 
such estimates are viewed as very much subsidiary to the 
GDP figures. The Commission has opted for an intermedi 
ate approach, that of satellite accounts for specific assets, 
such as forests, mineral stocks, water reserves and air 
quality. Where possible, monetary values are calculated 
for specific aspects of each, such as the value of forests, 
in terms of the timber they produce or the recreation they 
provide, or the costs of cleaning up water reserves to a 
particular standard. Otherwise physical values are calcu 
lated, such as for CO2 emissions. 
Collaboration over the past three years between the Re 
gional Policy and Environment DGs and Eurostat in the 
Commission and various national statistical offices
8 has 
begun to yield results and a comprehensive dataset on 
the environment is in the process of being produced and 
categorised by different kind of asset, though there are 
many gaps, especially in respect of monetary values. This 
is generating some surprising results. For instance, for 
ests in the EU (valued at around EUR 400 billion) are worth 
twice as much as total oil and gas reserves (around EUR 
200 billion). This, moreover, counts only their value in 
terms of timber and the figure would be much higher if it in 
cluded their intrinsic or recreational value. 
This is consistent with World Bank estimates
9 that, even 
in rich countries, total natural assets were, on average, 
worth as much as, or more than, total physical assets 
such as buildings or machinery. 
However, there is still much to be done to make the most 
of such estimates. It is planned gradually to produce 
them more systematically and regularly and to generate 
a consistent time series. A regional breakdown, how 
ever, is a long way off. 
In the First Cohesion Report and in the Fifth and Sixth Periodic Reports, the top and bottom 10 and 25 regions were used to measure 
disparities. Since the NUTS regions vary in size, however, this is liable to give misleading results over time if the population covered 
by the regions in question changes significantly. This is all the more the case with the addition of the applicant countries, which 
increases the number of NUTS 2 regions to 260. The figures reported in the text therefore relate to the regions with the highest and 
lowest levels of GDP per head which account for 10% or 25% of population in the EU. 
These are regions which are considered by Eurostat to have relatively high or low GDP per head largely because of commuting, 
which accordingly omits cases where GDP is produced to a significant extent by people living outside the region or where the 
people living in a region derive their income to a significant extent from elsewhere. See Eurostat (2000) 'Statistics in focus', Theme 1, 
1/2000. 
Some of this is due to commuting and the non inclusion of people contributing to GDP in the population figures. 
See the Box in section 1.1 of the 6
th Periodic Report for a fuller explanation of this effect. 
These are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus and 
Malta. 
The notable exception being the inclusion of Prague, where part of the high GDP per head is almost certainly due to commuting. 
For further reading on the theory and practice of green accounts, see World Bank (1996) 'Green national accounts: policy uses and 
empirical experience'. 
See Eurostat (1999) Towards environmental pressure indicators for the EU' and Eurostat (forthcoming) Towards an environmental 
accounting framework for the EU'. 
World Bank (1995) 'Monitoring environmental progress'. 1.2 Social cohesion 
For the past three years, there has been strong em 
ployment growth across the Union, which has both re 
duced unemployment significantly and provided job 
opportunities for people entering the labour market 
for the first time or returning after a spell of inactivity. 
Most of the jobs created have been in services, as in 
previous years, the majority in advanced business 
and communal services   health care, education, 
recreational and cultural activities   many of which 
demand a high level of skill and education from the 
people who perform them. 
At the same time, partly because of the shift towards 
advanced services and high skilled jobs, labour 
shortages have begun to emerge on a significant 
scale in many parts of the economy, even in areas 
where unemployment remains relatively high. These 
shortages are likely to get worse as the recovery pro 
ceeds, particularly in information technology where 
the demand for labour is growing rapidly and where 
already a substantial number of jobs remain unfilled. 
Unless they are effectively addressed, they will tend 
increasingly to slow down the pace of development. 
Nevertheless, there remain substantial disparities in 
levels of employment and rates of unemployment be 
tween different parts of the Union as well as between 
different social groups, which manifest themselves in 
pockets of deprivation and exclusion. 
Employment and unemployment 
Unemployment and the labour market 
Unemployment in the EU is declining at present, re 
flecting the continuing growth of the economy and la 
bour market reforms, which seem to be associated 
with an increased rate of net job creation for a given 
growth in GDP. The rate has, therefore, fallen from 
10.7% in 1997 to 8.3% in August 2000 and is set to fall 
below 8% in 2001, a level last seen before the reces 
sion of the early 1990s. Despite this encouraging 
trend, unemployment remains unacceptably high in 
many parts of the EU, though if economic growth can 
be sustained at its present rate, over the coming de 
cade it could gradually cease to be the major eco 
nomic problem facing the EU, which it has been for 
the past 20 25 years. 
Since the early 1970s, unemployment has increased 
rapidly during recessions but fallen more slowly dur 
ing periods of economic recovery, while regional dis 
parities in levels have remained significant (see 
Graph A. 1 in the Annex). However, over the period of 
recovery since 1994, when unemployment in the EU 
reached a peak of 11.2%, the process of job creation 
has increasingly gained strength. Nevertheless, it is 
too early to be sure whether the cycle of falling unem 
ployment followed by a rebound to a higher level is at 
an end. This depends on both maintaining economic 
4 Growth of employment and GDP in the 
Union, 1975 98 
Annual % change 
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1  1993 1995 1997 
13 1.2 Social cohesion 
growth at around its present level, or preferably 
above, which in itself should result in a high rate of net 
job creation (Graph 4), and increasing the employ 
ment intensity of growth above the long term trend of 
the past 20 years. 
Unemployment combined 
with growing skill shortages 
At the same time as unemployment is falling, labour 
shortages are emerging as an increasingly important 
obstacle to growth right across the EU. This was re 
ported explicitly in the National Action Plans for 2000 
of Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Fin 
land, Sweden and Italy, though in the last, predomi 
nantly in the north of the country. Moreover, recent 
surveys of employers in other Member States have in 
most cases pointed to the difficulty of recruiting staff 
with the requisite skills as a major problem hindering 
expansion. 
The coincidence of relatively high levels of unemploy 
ment and labour shortages ought not to come as a 
surprise. It essentially reflects the highly differenti 
ated nature of the labour market and the lack of co 
herence between the growth of demand for labour 
and the skills on offer among those looking for a job. 
Indeed, recruitment difficulties tend to be reported in 
particular sectors even in periods of recession. As re 
covery gathers pace and as unemployment falls   or, 
more accurately, as the excess supply of labour di 
minishes   it is only to be expected that labour short 
ages, or skill bottlenecks, will become more serious, 
the more so, naturally, in regions where unemploy 
ment is relatively low, but also in other areas where 
the skills of the unemployed do not match the de 
mand of employers. If economic growth at present 
rates is sustained over the longer term, the problem of 
skills imbalance could well be compounded by the 
projected slowdown in labour force growth, or de 
cline in some regions, over the next 10 15 years (see 
the section on demographic trends below). 
Although recruitment difficulties are at present re 
ported in some parts of the Union in all sectors, from 
information technology to agriculture and retailing, it 
is evident that there is a growing shortage of workers 
with IT skills in all Member States. According to the 
Commission report on job opportunities in the Infor 
mation Society, up to 500,000 jobs are currently va 
cant because of the lack of people with the requisite 
skills to fill them. Studies suggest that the problem is 
likely to get worse in the future, as, indeed, is the case 
in other parts of the world, the US especially. In the 
longer term, therefore, this could come to exercise an 
increasing constraint on economic growth and em 
ployment creation in the EU. It is a problem which can 
be tackled both by expanding the number of people 
trained in IT skills and adapting education and train 
ing systems to accomplish this and by encouraging 
the inward migration of those with the necessary 
skills, or the education to acquire them, from other 
countries (an approach at present being followed by 
the US). 
Wide disparities in employment 
remain between Member States ... 
As economic recovery continued in the EU, employ 
ment increased by over 2 million in 1999, or by 1.4%, 
slightly higher than in 1998 (1.3%) and the highest 
growth rate of the 1990s. The number employed in 
1999 was, therefore, for the first time higher than in 
1991 at the start of the recession. The employment 
rate, however   the proportion of those aged 15 to 64 
in work   at 62.1% was still slightly lower than at the 
beginning of the decade. 
Despite a general improvement in labour market con 
ditions, large differences still exist between Member 
States. Between 1997 and 1999, employment growth 
varied from over 3% a year in Ireland and Spain to un 
der 1% a year in Germany, Italy and Austria. In gen 
eral, those Member States with above average GDP 
growth also recorded relatively high growth of 
employment. 
Since 1994, there has only been a slight narrowing of 
disparities in employment rates across the Union, 
stemming partly from relatively large increases in em 
ployment in Ireland and Spain, where the proportion 
of working age population in work is below average. 
This convergence is likely to continue if economic re 
covery is sustained, though above average employ 
ment growth needs to spread to Italy and Greece, in 
particular, if disparities are to be narrowed signifi 
cantly. In 1999, the employment rate was below 60% 
in Spain and Belgium (if only slightly), while it ex 
ceeded 70%, the target set for the EU in 2010 by the 
Lisbon Summit, in Denmark, the Netherlands, Swe 
den and the UK. 
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... but are even wider between regions 
Disparities in employment are even more substantial 
between regions than between countries within the 
EU. In 1999, the employment rate in the top 10% of re 
gions in the EU (defined as those with the highest 
rates accounting for 10% of total population) aver 
aged 77%, whereas the employment rate in the bot 
tom 10% (defined in an equivalent way) averaged 
under 44%. As at the beginning of the decade, most 
of the regions in the top group are located in the UK, 
most of those at the bottom in Italy and Spain (Map 2). 
The extent of regional disparities varies significantly 
between Member States. While they are very narrow 
in some countries (the Netherlands, Austria and Swe 
den), they are extremely wide in others (particularly It 
aly, where the gap between high employment regions 
in the North and low employment regions in the South 
is over 25 percentage points, but also Spain and Por 
tugal   around 15 points). 
There is little sign of any marked reduction in dispari 
ties over the 1990s. While across the EU as a whole, 
they have narrowed since 1997, this followed a wid 
ening over the early 1990s (see Graph A.2). In Italy, 
Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Spain, the gap in re 
gional employment rates appears to have widened 
over the period of recovery. Moreover, in Greece, em 
ployment rates fell in most regions over the 1990s. 
Achieving a more balanced development in terms of 
employment remains one of the biggest challenges 
for the Union in the future and one which is likely to re 
quire continued policy intervention, in developing re 
gions, to help strengthen their economic base, and in 
those undergoing restructuring, to help smooth the 
shift to growing sectors of activity. 
The gender gap in employment remains 
pronounced despite gains made by women 
The number of women in employment has risen 
strongly in the EU over the past ten years. As a result, 
the gap in employment rates between men and 
women narrowed significantly over the 1990s, by 
some 5 percentage points, though in 1999, it was still 
some 19 percentage points. Moreover, it should be 
noted that over 70% of net additional jobs going to 
women between 1994 and 1999 were part time. In the 
latter year, around a third of all women in employment 
in the EU worked part time as opposed to 6% of men. 
The gender gap is even wider in many Member States 
and regions. In regions with a high rate of net job cre 
ation, both men and women tend to benefit by being 
able to find employment, while job shortages in low 
employment regions generally seem to hit women 
harder than men. The gender gap is, therefore, nar 
rowest in the three Nordic countries and the UK and 
widest in Italy, Spain and Greece. 
The small gap in many   but by no means all   parts of 
Northern Europe reflects, on the one hand, a longer 
tradition of gender equality, positive social attitudes 
towards women working and child care provision. On 
the other hand, it also reflects a high proportion of 
part time employment among women (see Map A.3). 
Indeed, the relative number of women with full time 
jobs in lagging regions is not very much lower than in 
the rest of the EU. 
The growth of part time working is closely related to 
the development of the service sector, in which firms 
tend to be more flexible over working hours but in 
which there is also a growing need to employ people 
at weekends and in the evenings. Women therefore 
have more possibility for combining paid employ 
ment and family responsibilities, so increasing their 
ability to pursue working careers. 
Large scale job losses in agriculture 
Employment in agriculture in the EU has declined 
markedly, from 7.6% of the total employed in 1988 to 
5.6% in 1993 and 4.4% in 1999. The largest decline 
between 1993 and 1999 occurred in Ireland (by 4.5 
percentage points) and Greece (4.3 points). 
The importance of multiple jobs has also remained 
much the same, 28.7% of farmers having a paid job 
outside agriculture in 1997. In Sweden, Finland and 
Germany, the figure was over 45%. In the southern 
Member States, where 26% of farmers had multiple 
jobs, almost 63% of the work force was employed 
part time. 
Services are key to employment growth 
Over the past 25 years, all of the rise in employment in 
the EU has occurred in services while jobs in industry 
and agriculture have declined. Over the period of 
1994 to 1999, the share of employment in services 
rose by some 2
1/2 percentage points, continuing a 
long term shift of both employment and output 
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towards this sector, which is evident in all Member 
States. 
Employment growth in services, however, has been 
lower in the EU over the 1990s than in the US and this 
has been combined with more job losses in agriculture 
and industry. Indeed, in the EU, growth of employment 
in industry has been relatively small even over the pe 
riod of economic recovery since 1994, though this is 
partly due to a significant reduction in Germany, where 
the pace of recovery has been modest. 
The development of services has occurred at differ 
ent rates across the Union. In 1999, the general pat 
tern of employment (Map 3) is for the highest 
employment regions   predominantly located in the 
UK, Netherlands and the three Nordic countries   to 
have a large share of jobs in services, and the lowest 
employment regions   largely located in the Mediter 
ranean  to have a high concentration of jobs in agri 
culture. In between, there are regions with a high 
share of employment in industry   predominantly lo 
cated in an arc covering eastern France, parts of Ger 
many and northern Italy. 
Overall, services account for a major part of dispari 
ties in employment rates across the EU. Most of the 
additional jobs which exist in high employment re 
gions as compared with low employment ones are in 
services, though mostly in the more advanced sec 
tors, education, health care, business and financial 
services, where skill and education requirements are 
relatively high. This underlines the importance of a 
well educated work force for boosting employment 
as well as the development of the knowledge based 
economy. 
Regional disparities in unemployment 
remain pronounced 
Unemployment varies substantially between regions 
in the EU (Map 4). Despite economic recovery, unem 
ployment rates were still over 20% in some parts of 
southern Europe in 1999. There were also, however, a 
number of areas in northern Europe undergoing re 
structuring, where rates were well over 15%. 
Regional disparities in unemployment have widened 
over the 1990s, following the reduction which oc 
curred in the high employment growth years of the 
late 1980s. While economic recovery has reduced 
disparities slightly since 1995, it has so far failed to 
offset the widening during the earlier period of reces 
sion. Accordingly, while unemployment in regions 
where rates were lowest (taking those accounting for 
10% of total population) averaged 3% in 1999, much 
the same as in the early 1970s, it averaged 23% in 
those where rates were highest (excluding the French 
DOMs), much higher than 25 years ago. 
The regions with the lowest unemployment in the EU 
were much the same in 1999 as 10 years before, as 
were those where rates were highest. Much the same 
is true in Member States, where regional differences 
are similarly wide (Graph 5). As in the case of employ 
ment rates, differences between regions are greatest 
in Italy, where, in 1999, the rate in those with the high 
est levels (in the south) was almost 25 percentage 
points higher than in those with the lowest (in the 
north). On the other hand, in all regions of Austria, the 
Netherlands and Portugal, unemployment was below 
the EU average. 
Long term unemployment falling 
but still a serious problem 
The fall in unemployment in recentyears has been ac 
companied by a reduction in long term unemploy 
ment. Between 1997 and 1999, the number of people 
who had been out of work for a year or more declined 
by more than overall unemployment, from 49% to 
46% of the total unemployed, suggesting that active 
labour market measures combined with high rates of 
net job creation have improved access to employ 
ment for those most disadvantaged on the labour 
market. 
The rate of long term unemployment in the EU, how 
ever, is still higher than at the beginning of the 1990s. It 
is particularly high in southern Italy, in a number of 
Greek regions and in Belgium, where over 60% of 
those out of work were long term unemployed in 1999. 
By contrast, the proportion was under 20% in a number 
of regions in Austria, the UK and Finland (Map 5). 
Overall, long term unemployment is much higher in 
regions with high overall unemployment and has de 
clined hardly at all over the economic recovery in the 
lagging regions. This reflects the persistence of 
structural problems in these areas, such as mis 
matches between the jobs on offer and the skills avail 
able on the labour market, which are unlikely to be 
resolved simply by higher rates of economic growth 
at the national or EU level, which need to be 
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combined with active measures to improve the em 
ployability of those affected and help them adapt to 
structural change. 
have experienced a fall in unemployment in the most 
lagging regions. 
Unemployment of young people 
declining in EU ... 
Labour market developments 
in the candidate countries 
Rates of unemployment in the EU remain much higher 
for young people under 25 than for older people and 
for women as opposed to men. Young people in the 
labour force are almost twice as likely to be unem 
ployed as those of 25 and over. In Spain, Finland and 
Italy, youth unemployment was over 30% in 1999 and 
in some regions in southern Italy and Spain, over 50% 
(Map 5). 
Despite the fact that most of the net additional jobs 
created over the past 10 years have gone to women, 
job growth has only just kept pace with the rising num 
ber of women joining the labour market. Conse 
quently, unemployment among women is still much 
higher than for men in most parts of the EU, with rates 
for women exceeding 35% in parts of Spain and Italy. 
While unemployment of young people has declined 
by more than for those of 25 and over during the pe 
riod of recovery, the rate for women has fallen by less 
than for men. Unlike in the case of the long term un 
employed, however, both young people and women 
In recent years, the data available on employment 
and related developments in the candidate countries 
have improved significantly with the introduction of la 
bour force surveys in most of them, on the same basis 
and adopting the same conventions as the EU Labour 
Force Survey conducted by Eurostat. However care 
should be taken in interpreting the figures which re 
sult from these surveys because, even though the 
conventions are the same, they reflect a different un 
derlying reality. 
In the candidate countries of Central Europe (CECs), 
employment has fallen significantly since the begin 
ning of the transition as a result of a large fall in output 
as well as restructuring. In the CECs as a whole, the 
number employed is estimated to have fallen by 
15 20% between 1989 and 1997, with the largest fall 
occurring in the early years of transition (1989 to 
1993). By 1994 95, conditions had stabilised and in a 
number of countries, employment began to rise, 
though by not nearly enough to compensate for the 
earlier job losses. In 1998 and 1999, economic 
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growth slowed down again and employment began 
to fall in most countries, most especially in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Estonia. In Hungary, how 
ever, partly because of the earlier implementation of 
economic and labour market reforms than in other 
countries, GDP continued to grow and employment 
increased by around 3% a year between 1997 and 
1999. 
In 1999, the overall employment rate of the candidate 
countries averaged just under 61% of working age 
population, only slightly lower than in the EU. Dispar 
ities in employment rates, however, widened be 
tween countries over the 1990s as employment fell, 
the scale of decline reflecting, on the one hand, the 
success of the transition and, on the other, the extent 
to which jobs remained protected against market 
forces, as well as the extent of employment in subsis 
tence agriculture. In 1999, the employment rate 
ranged from some 54% in Bulgaria to 66% in the 
Czech Republic. 
Regional disparities in employment in the candidate 
countries are narrower than in the EU, but still sub 
stantial. In the top 10% of regions (defined, as above, 
as those with the highest rates accounting for 10% of 
their total working age population), the employment 
rate averaged almost 70%, in the bottom 10%, it was 
under 52%. Disparities are also wide in a number of 
countries, reflecting the difference between the capi 
tal city region and the others (in Slovakia, the gap be 
tween the top and bottom 10% of regions was 17 
percentage points). 
Employment of women in the CECs has, in many 
cases, declined by less than that of men over the tran 
sition period, partly because of the concentration of 
jobs losses in industry, partly because of the growth 
of service activities. Although the employment rate of 
men exceeds that of women in all candidate coun 
tries, the gender gap has remained smaller than in 
most EU Member States. Moreover, many fewer 
women work part time in the former than in the latter 
and the difference between men and women is much 
less pronounced. (Overall, some 8% of all those in 
employment work part time in the candidate coun 
tries as opposed to 18% in the EU and women ac 
count for only 58% of all part timers as against 80% in 
the EU.) 
The changing sectoral pattern of 
employment in candidate countries 
Economic transition in the CECs implies a marked 
shift in the sectoral pattern of employment, though 
comparison of the present structure with that in the 
EU suggests that there is still a long way to go. There 
remain significant differences between regions both 
in the structure of employment and in unemployment 
(see Box). 
Employment in industry is estimated to have fallen by 
between 25 50% in the CECs over the 1990s, but de 
spite this, the proportion of workers employed in de 
clining industries in many regions remains high. 
Many regions with high employment in agriculture 
have also suffered a disproportionate loss of jobs, 
though agricultural employment in most candidate 
countries remains far above the level in the EU. In 
1999, taking the countries together, it accounted for 
almost 22%> of the total as against only 4.5% in the EU, 
indicating that the process of modernisation has still 
to be undertaken and that potentially severe social as 
well as economic problems remain to be tackled in 
the future. 
Employment in services has risen significantly in all 
candidate countries, though by not nearly enough to 
compensate for the job losses in industry and agricul 
ture. Services account for only around 46% of the total 
in work in the region as a whole compared with 66% in 
the EU, which indicates the scale of the change which 
lies ahead. 
Overall, many regions in the CECs have a less diversi 
fied employment structure than their counterparts in 
the EU and, at the same time, have to contend with 
problems of high unemployment, poor infrastructure, 
low investment and lack of enterprise. The objectives 
of future regional policy in the CECs are, therefore, to 
diversify the sectoral pattern of economic activity, to 
strengthen infrastructure and support facilities, to 
identify locational advantages and development po 
tential and to remove obstacles to growth. 
Poverty 
There has been growing concern about the issue of 
social cohesion over the past few years. Disparities 
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Four types of regional labour market developments in the CECs 
Unemployment rates in the CECs were only slightly 
higher than in the EU in 1999 (10.2% on average as 
against 9.3%). Unemployment, however, varie signifi 
cantly from region to region. Overall, fourtypes of region 
in terms of labour market developments can be 
distinguished: 
  The major metropolitan areas (most notably the capi 
tal cities) have experienced a significant rise in em 
ployment in the service sector and benefit from 
favourable geographical location, a high level of in 
vestment, a skilled labour force and better infrastruc 
ture endowment. These regions enjoy lower 
unemployment and higher wage levels compared to 
other regions. Job growth is fuelled mostly by newly 
established private owned small and medium sized 
enterprises and foreign investment. Most prominent 
examples are urban centres such as Prague, 
Bratislava and Budapest which have the lowest un 
employment rates and the highest share of employ 
ment in services in their countries. 
  The Western border regions, in part included in the 
above group, which were in an unfavourable, periph 
eral position during the previous regime, but which 
have benefited from their location since the transition 
began. Proximity to the EU, relatively well developed 
infrastructure, low labour costs combined with labour 
force skills have all contributed to stimulate markets 
and encourage investment. In addition, they have 
benefited from increased trade (such as cross bor 
der retail) and tourism. In Hungary, western regions 
have witnessed falling unemployment in recent years 
and a positive inflow of investment as have those in 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Even Polish re 
gions bordering Germany which have relatively high 
unemployment rates tend to have a more diversified 
industrial structure and more SMEs than other parts of 
the country. Overall, most of the Western border re 
gions show a long term positive trend in employment 
and economic development. 
  The majority of the most disadvantaged regions are 
the rural regions located at the Eastern periphery of 
an enlarged EU. These tend to have relatively poor in 
frastructure, little investment and unfavourable eco 
nomic structure characterised by a predominance of 
agriculture and low educational attainment of the la 
bour force. The partial return to subsistence farming 
and outward migration has slowed down the rise in 
unemployment in some cases. In most of these re 
gions, employment is falling. Structural reforms in ag 
riculture are likely to lead to large scale job losses in 
future years. 
  Old industrial regions have been most adversely 
affected by economic transition. These have been se 
verely affected by privatisation, enterprise restructur 
ing and closures, the reorientation of trade from 
secure markets and the loss of subsidies. The decline 
of heavy industry has played a significant role in wid 
ening disparities in the CECs. These regions have 
failed to create new job opportunities and to attract 
new business or foreign investment. Most of these re 
gions have high rates of unemployment and difficul 
ties of re integrating workers into the labour market 
because of their low and outdated qualifications. The 
most prominent example is the industrial north and 
west of Poland which has experienced large scale 
decline. Many of the regions have yet to undergo sig 
nificant restructuring which remains a major chal 
lenge and could cause serious social and economic 
problems. 
between social groups and the overall dispersion of 
income seem to have widened in the 1980s and early 
1990s, and this is often attributed to economic devel 
opments, in particular, globalisation, increasing com 
petition on world markets, the information revolution 
and the resultant restructuring of the economy, as 
well as demographic trends and changes in society. 
The trend seems to have slowed down or even re 
versed itself since the mid 1990s, but disparities be 
tween social groups remain unacceptably high. 
Social cohesion is not only an important goal in its 
own right, but it is also a key factor contributing to 
economic success. Regions which are unable to mo 
bilise the economic potential of large sections of their 
population are handicapped in the increasingly com 
petitive global market place, while disparities can 
breed social unrest which itself can damage eco 
nomic performance. 
Poverty high, especially 
in the cohesion countries 
There are various definitions of poverty. The UN mil 
lennium summit, for example, defined an absolute 
measure of poverty as a state in which someone has 
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less than $1 a day to live on. Few people if any in the 
EU are in this position, though given price levels and 
the nature of the economy and society in the Union, a 
sum of significantly more than this would be neces 
sary to prevent someone living in absolute poverty 
here. What this sum should be is very difficult to de 
fine. Partly because of this, it has long been decided 
that a relative measure is more relevant for assessing 
poverty in the Union, in the sense that this is more in 
dicative of deprivation in relation to the living stan 
dards of people generally. Accordingly, the focus 
tends to be on the proportion of the population with in 
comes below a certain level relative to the average, 
though again there is scope for disagreement about 
the appropriate level to take.
1 
In practice, the main measure of poverty used in the 
EU at present is the Eurostat definition: the percent 
age of people with an income of 60% or less of the 
median income in the country in which they live.
2 Al 
though this means that the poverty line, in terms of 
absolute values, differs between countries, it is indic 
ative of relative deprivation in the country concerned. 
Using this measure, 18%, or more than one in six, of 
people in the EU had an income below the poverty 
level in 1995. This proportion does not seem to have 
changed much in recent years, though the figures 
which exist on a comparable basis are only for the pe 
riod 1993 to 1995, which is too short to determine 
much about changes. While early indications are that 
the proportion might have declined since 1995, this 
remains to be confirmed. 
The countries in which the proportion of people with 
poverty levels of income is lowest are Denmark, Lux 
embourg, the Netherlands and Austria (and probably 
Finland and Sweden as well, though they did not par 
ticipate in the 1996 European Community Household 
Panel survey on which the figures are based). Not 
only are the poverty rates in these four countries only 
around 11 12%, but this is relative to a national in 
come which is higher than the EU average (Graph 6). 
At the other extreme, the countries where the poverty 
rate is highest are Portugal and Greece, in which 
21 22% of the population have income below the pov 
erty line. This understates the scale of the problem in 
an EU context, since these two countries have the 
lowest level of median income in the Union. A further 
point of interest is the persistence of poverty, as indi 
cated by the proportion of people with income below 
the poverty line in each of the three years for which 
comparable data are available. This is clearly more 
important than the figure for a single year, which may 
reflect only a temporary state of affairs for some of 
those concerned. Persistent poverty in the EU is 
slightly less than half the figure for a single year, 7% of 
the people covered between 1993 and 1995 having 
an income below 60% of the median in each of these 
three years, as opposed to 17% in 1995 (the figure 
being lower than that quoted earlier because not all 
the people were surveyed every year). 
There is some tendency for the persistence of poverty 
to be disproportionately higher in countries with high 
poverty rates in 1995. In Denmark and the Nether 
lands, persistent poverty affected only 3% of the pop 
ulation, only a quarter of the proportion in 1995, which 
means that not only is poverty low in these two coun 
tries, but for most, it is a temporary state of affairs. 
Conversely, in Portugal, which had the highest level 
of poverty in 1995, more than half (12% of the popula 
tion) were affected by persistent poverty, while in 
Greece, the figure was only slightly less (10% of the 
population). The main exception to the general rela 
tionship is the UK, where the proportion with income 
below the poverty line in 1995 was relatively high 
(19%), but where only 7% of people had income be 
low this level in each of the three years. 
For the candidate countries in Central Europe, there 
are no comparable data available. The studies which 
have been undertaken, however, suggest that the fig 
ures might be higherthan in the EU as income disper 
sion has widened over the 1990s due to the reduction 
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in employment and a decline in real wages of the less 
skilled. They also show that poverty in rural areas, on 
which research has been carried out, is a serious 
problem (see Box 'Rural income and poverty in the 
candidate countries'). 
Factors linked to poverty: unemployment, 
low education and one parent families 
The causes of poverty are numerous, but here are a 
few factors which are strongly associated with low 
income, particularly on a persistent basis (see Ta 
ble A.5). In the EU, six categories of people are at par 
ticular risk of having a poverty level of income: the 
unemployed, lone parentfamilies, those with low edu 
cation, those in retirement, families with many chil 
dren and those of working age not in employment 
(because of disability, for example). 
A number of people fall into more than one of these 
groups. For example, a large proportion of the unem 
ployed have low education. The first three character 
istics, however, are the most noteworthy. In the EU as 
a whole   though not necessarily in individual Mem 
ber States   the unemployed and lone parents are 
three times more likely than people generally to fall 
below the poverty line, reflecting in both cases the 
loss of income from employment (a disproportionate 
number of lone parents are not in work). Many of 
these and others with low incomes have low educa 
tional attainment. Moreover, the information revolu 
tion is likely to mean that poor education will become 
a more important determinant of poverty in the future. 
The main characteristics of those with poverty levels 
of income differ between Member States, reflecting 
variations in both social policy and social structure. 
For example, the unemployed are at particular risk in 
the UK, where they are four times more likely to have 
low incomes than people generally, while in Den 
mark, they are only slightly more at risk than average. 
This reflects the more comprehensive and generous 
unemployment benefit system in the latter than the 
former. Nearly half (46%) of lone parents and their 
children have poverty levels of income, largely be 
cause they are not in paid employment, though the 
situation varies markedly from one country to another, 
reflecting, in particular, levels of childcare provision 
and support. The families concerned are most at risk 
in the UK and Ireland, where they are 5 or 6 times 
more likely than average to have income below 60% 
of the median. Conversely, they are at relatively low 
risk in Portugal, Spain, France Belgium and Italy  in 
deed, in Italy (where the risk of poverty is highest for 
large families), they are at no more risk than other 
households. 
Links between education and earnings: 
the implications of a single market 
for graduates for cohesion countries 
The link between education and income levels is of 
particular interest (see Graph A.3). While in all Mem 
ber States, income increases significantly with edu 
cational attainment levels, people with university 
education or the equivalent tend to have similar in 
come levels (adjusted for cost of living) across the 
EU, which suggests perhaps the emergence of a sin 
gle market for graduates. Although many obstacles 
remain, such as a lack of transferability of qualifica 
tions or language difficulties, there are signs of in 
creased international mobility among young 
graduates, in particular. A possible effect of this is a 
trend towards equalisation of graduate pay across 
countries, while earnings of those with lower qualifi 
cations continue to vary . The widening income gap 
which results in the less prosperous countries may 
put increasing pressure on social cohesion. 
An uncertain long term trend 
The factors underlying poverty levels of income give 
mixed messages for long term trends in social cohe 
sion. On the one hand, continued economic growth 
and higher levels of employment may reduce the pro 
portion of people with low income, insofar as the rela 
tive numbers without earnings from work are 
reduced. On the other, social trends mean that the 
number of lone parent families may continue to in 
crease. Moreover, while education levels are rising 
across the EU, especially in the lagging regions, the 
growing dependency on information technology, and 
the high level of general education which is a precon 
dition for being able to use this effectively, threatens 
to put those with low education levels at an increasing 
disadvantage. 
Transfers: an important weapon 
in the fight against social exclusion 
Social transfers (other than pensions), which account 
for 9% of total household income in the EU, make a 
significant contribution to maintaining social 
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cohesion. Over half go to the poorest 20% of the pop 
ulation and make up over half their final income. 
The effect of social transfers is evident if the proportion 
of people below the poverty line is compared with what 
it would be in the absence of transfers (Graph 7 and, in 
Annex, Graph A.4). In most Member States, transfers 
(in this case including pensions, some of which are 
from private sources) reduce the poverty rate by 
30 40%.
3 In Denmark, the figure is higher, while in Italy 
and Greece, and to a lesser extent Portugal, social 
benefits have much smaller effects on the distribution 
of income, reflecting both their smaller scale and less 
targeting on those with the lowest incomes. 
In the UK and Ireland, in both of which social transfers 
reduce poverty rates substantially, the high propor 
tion of people with low income is to a large extent due 
to a wide dispersion of income before transfers, 
which in turn reflects the wide dispersion of wages (as 
revealed, for example, by the Eurostat, Structure of 
Earnings Survey for 1995). 
Despite the contribution of social transfers to maintain 
ing social cohesion, it should be emphasised that, re 
tirement pensions apart, they tend to tackle the 
symptoms rather than the underlying causes of pov 
erty. As such, they do not in themselves provide a 
long term solution to the problem. It is therefore impor 
tant for them to be accompanied by structural mea 
sures aimed at tackling the root causes, in particular, 
unemployment, low education and inadequate skills, a 
lack of child care support facilities and so on, which will 
also help to increase the growth potential of the econ 
omy. 
7 Population with income below the poverty 
line before and after transfers, 1995 
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Rural income and poverty 
in candidate countries 
In most countries, agricultural income has declined 
significantly since the beginning of transition. This 
has been particularly marked in Poland, Slovakia 
and Romania. There are a number of reasons for this 
trend. First, at the beginning of transition, there was 
a sharp adjustment to world market prices, where 
trade was liberalised leading to a reallocation of re 
sources in the agricultural sector. This was associ 
ated with declining terms of trade as input prices 
rose and producer prices fell. In many countries 
farmers reduced intensity of input use and shifted, 
particularly in sectors dominated by small scale 
farming, towards labour intensive production sys 
tems. Low opportunity costs of labour, linked to 
more general economic restructuring and lack of al 
ternative sources of employment in rural areas sup 
ported this tendency. The result has meant that farm 
incomes, which before transition were at or above 
national wage levels, are now in many countries 
considerably lower than national wage levels. 
The picture is, nevertheless, varied across the can 
didate countries. Agricultural income per labour unit 
has remained relatively high in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary and to a lesser extent in Slovakia. In 
contrast, incomes are far lower in the remaining 
countries, particularly in Poland and Romania, re 
flecting very high levels of employment in agricul 
ture combined with low productivity. In all candidate 
countries, current evidence would suggest that ag 
ricultural labour incomes are considerably lower 
than in the European Union, even when adjusted for 
purchasing power. In contrast, income per hectare 
remains relatively high in almost all countries except 
Poland and the Baltic States, particularly when the 
purchasing power of farm income per hectare is 
compared with the EU. It is, therefore, important to 
stress the considerable variations in factor combi 
nations and income potential across the CECs. 
Without major restructuring, the prospects for agri 
cultural labour income in these countries are poor 
for macroeconomic reasons, and in particular, due 
to real exchange rate developments. First, eco 
nomic growth in the CECs, increasing labour costs 
and real appreciation of exchange rates will in 
crease the competitive pressure on agriculture. 
Secondly, these trends will be associated with a rel 
ative fall in purchasing power of agricultural in 
comes. In order to maintain sustainable income 
levels agriculture will require major restructuring. 
On the other hand, an increase in labour opportunity 
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costs in the rest of the economy will provide an incen 
tive for labour to move out of agriculture. This will de 
pend largely on reducing structural impediments to 
labour adjustment. In this context, it is important to 
note that unemployment in many rural areas remains 
high despite satisfactory growth rates in the economy 
as a whole. 
These low levels of agricultural income per labour unit 
translate into significant rural poverty. Recent re 
search from the World Bank suggests that poverty as 
defined by the population below 50% of average in 
come is considerably more concentrated in rural ar 
eas in Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia and Bulgaria 
(Graph 8). Even in Hungary, where agricultural in 
comes are comparatively high, significant rural pov 
erty exists. As the World Bank study shows there are 
many reasons outside the agricultural sector that cre 
ate vulnerability to poverty in rural areas   low levels of 
1 There is scope for debate about whether the level of income taken should be in relation to average income in the EU or individual 
Member States or even regions. In practice, there are various problems with comparisons based on an EU wide average income 
level, since the measure tends to be dominated by the large differences in average income between Member States rather than 
reflecting differences in the dispersion of income within these. In other words, a measure of poverty calculated in relation to average 
income in the EU largely indicates differences in national rather than individual levels of income. At the same time, irrespective of the 
merits or otherwise of measuring poverty on a regional basis, the data are simply not available to do so. 
2 In the First Cohesion Report, the previous definition used by Eurostat was used to determine the poverty line, ie an income per head 
of 50% or less than the mean. In practice, for most countries the two measures give similar results. However, the new definition is 
preferable, especially for making comparisons over time, because the median is a more stable measure of average income than the 
mean in that, since it relates to someone in the middle of the income distribution, it is not affected by extreme values. The figures 
reported in the text are derived from the European Community Household Panel. It should be noted that data for Belgium are at 
present being revised. 
3 It is interesting to compare this with the reduction in regional disparities due to transfers. The First Cohesion Report found that total 
government expenditure, including social spending, reduced interregional disparities in Member States by 10 30%, ie by less than 
the reduction achieved in interpersonal disparities, which are generally more of a focus of national policy. 
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The objective of strengthening cohesion specified in 
Article 158 of the Treaty is aimed primarily at achiev 
ing harmonious development of the Union as a whole. 
This, indeed, was the rationale for the formulation of 
the European Spatial Development Perspective 
(ESDP) by the informal Council of Ministers responsi 
ble for spatial planning and regional policy in 
Potsdam in 1999. The ESDP identified three main 
aims: a polycentric urban development and a new 
relationship between urban and rural areas; equal 
access for all European regions to infrastructure and 
know how and prudent management of the natural 
and cultural heritage. The ESDP
1 sets out policy 
guidelines for all Member States, regions and local 
authorities as well as for the Commission. 
The pursuit of the same objectives, and the general 
aim of achieving coherent and sustainable spatial de 
velopment, underlies cross border, transnational and 
transregional cooperation, financed by the ERDF. 
The enlargement of the EU to the East, which will take 
place over the coming years, following the accession 
of Austria, Finland and Sweden a few years ago, will 
change the Union significantly, more than doubling 
its land area in relation to the early 1990s. This raises 
new challenges for territorial cohesion, given the con 
tinued importance of reducing regional disparities. 
The Union: a very centralised territory 
Historically, economic activity, as well as the capital 
stock and qualified human resources, have, with a 
few exceptions, been concentrated in the most cen 
tral areas of the Union. While regions on the south 
west periphery of the Union have converged in some 
degree towards the rest of the EU, including in terms 
of education levels, this is not yet sufficient   and is 
unlikely to be in the medium term   to undermine the 
validity of the centre periphery model, which, indeed, 
is set to be reinforced with the accession of Central 
European countries. 
Recent studies of the effect of integration on regional 
balance in the EU have emphasised the need for 
accompanying policies to prevent a possible widen 
ing of disparities between the stronger and weaker 
areas.
2 This conclusion is based on the recognition 
that economic location is characterised by important 
externalities, some positive, some negative, and that 
there is no reason to think that market forces alone will 
strike the right balance between positive and nega 
tive effects and so result in balanced economic de 
velopment across the EU as a whole. While the 
concentration of economic activity in the stronger re 
gions may lead to greater efficiency of production in 
the EU in the short term, this may be at the expense of 
the longer term competitiveness of the Union econ 
omy insofar as it damages the productive potential of 
weaker regions and reduces their capacity to exploit 
their comparative advantages. Moreover, the con 
centration of both businesses and people in particu 
lar regions conflicts with the objective of sustainable 
development, not only because of the possible over 
crowding and congestion which it causes in these re 
gions but also because of the rundown and 
depopulation of other areas. 
The evidence suggests that although, in the future, 
three different outcomes from EU integration can be 
imagined   increased concentration of economic ac 
tivity, greater dispersion or little change in the existing 
pattern   over the past 20 30 years, the spatial pattern 
of activity has remained much the same. Accordingly, 
economic activity in the Union remains concentrated 
to a significant extent in a relatively small central area, 
as indicated above. There is no evidence that the 
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increase in costs in the stronger regions resulting 
from greater congestion and higher wages will, by it 
self, correct this imbalance. 
To give practical content to the concept of centre pe 
riphery, an index of accessibility has been devel 
oped, which measures for each region the time 
needed to reach other regions weighted by their eco 
nomic importance. It should be emphasised that this 
index involves a good deal of estimation and that it 
represents the position at the present time rather than 
what it might be in the future, given the current devel 
opment of infrastructure in peripheral regions (partly 
financed by the Structural Funds) and, perhaps more 
importantly, given the implications for the concept of 
accessibility of the development of the information 
society. Nevertheless, the results are instructive. Re 
gions can be divided into three groups in the terms of 
the index (see Map A.4): 
central regions, for which the accessibility index 
is over 50% above the average for the EU plus the 
12 accession countries, situated in the triangle 
North Yorkshire (UK), Franche Comte (France), 
Hamburg (Germany); 
peripheral regions, for which the index is under 
40% of the average, situated in the north of Eu 
rope, in Sweden and Finland; in the north west, in 
northern Scotland and Ireland; in the south, in 
Portugal, Spain, the Mediterranean islands, the 
southern tip of Italy and Greece, and in the east in 
the candidate countries; although the ultra pe 
ripheral regions
3 were not included in the study, 
their accessibility is even less and they have a se 
ries of structural handicaps (as mentioned in Arti 
cle 299§2 of the Treaty); 
regions in between with an index of between 40% 
and 150% of the average. 
The emerging picture is one of a very high concentra 
tion of activities in central regions, which account for 
only 14% of the land area but a third of the population 
and almost half (47%) of the GDP. Population density 
in these regions is 3.7 times higher than in peripheral 
regions. In all but 11 of the 88 central regions (NUTS 2 
level) GDP per head in 1998 was above the EU aver 
age, while all but 23 of the 111 peripheral regions had 
a level below the average. Average GDP per head 
in the central regions was twice as high as in the 
peripheral ones and productivity 2.4 times higher. In 
1997, expenditure on research and development 
amounted to 2.1% of GDP in the former as against 
0.9% in the latter. In 6 of the 7 ultra peripheral regions, 
GDP per head was only around half the EU average. 
The point on RTD is especially pertinent. The struc 
ture of production costs of firms has changed consid 
erably in recent years, with the fixed costs of research 
and development increasing and costs incurred on 
transport declining. Since RTD along with other stra 
tegic, high value added activities, tends to be con 
centrated in central regions where the know how and 
specialist infrastructure are located, this is a factor 
underlying growing polarisation in the EU and the 
concentration of low value added activities in periph 
eral areas. 
The transport system is also more developed in cen 
tral regions. The density of motorways is four times 
greater than in peripheral ones, while there are also 
40% more railway lines and twice the length of dou 
ble track lines. There are signs, however, of the rela 
tive position changing, especially in areas on the 
periphery where the road system is most developed 
and is continuing to expand, which are tending to be 
come important access points, such as Lisbon, 
Andalucia in Spain and Attiki in Greece. 
The sectoral pattern of employment is also very differ 
ent in central as opposed to peripheral regions. Al 
though the share of employment in industry is the 
Table 3 GDP per head in regions grouped according to peripherally, EU27, 1998 
Population (% of total in each group)  Number of regions (% of total in each group) 
GDP p.c. (PPS) GDP p.c. (PPS) 
above average below average 
GDP p.c. (PPS) GDP p.c. (PPS) Total 
above average below average 
Central regions 
Intermediate regions 
Peripheral regions 
88.8 11.2 
70.3 29.7 
18.1 81.9 
77 11 88 
35 24 59 
23 88 111 
Sources: Eurostat, DG  REGIO 
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much the same (around 30% of the total), the share of 
employment in agriculture in peripheral regions is 
seven times larger than in central areas, whereas em 
ployment in services is only 53% of the total as 
against 69%. This, of course, reflects underlying 
competitiveness, which helps explain why the em 
ployment rate in peripheral regions is under 59% 
while in central ones, it is just over 67% (see Table 3 
and Table A.6). 
This concentration of economic activity and popula 
tion in such a restricted area of the Union has adverse 
effects not only on the peripheral regions but also on 
the central ones, where it is responsible for traffic con 
gestion and strong pressure on the environment. 
Whereas transport bottlenecks in peripheral areas 
are a result of the low standard of infrastructure and a 
lack of connections, in central regions, they arise from 
capacity constraints and excessive traffic (see Maps 
A.5 and A.6). 
A consequence of this congestion and the concentra 
tion of economic activity is that toxic emissions in cen 
tral areas are 2.3 times greater than in peripheral 
ones
4 (see Map A.7). 
With the accession of the 12 applicant countries, the 
Union will include many more areas where the level of 
development is well below the average. A new eastern, 
continental periphery will be added to the existing 
southern, maritime one. As a result, economic activity 
would tend to be even more regionally concentrated 
than in the US, where activity is more evenly distrib 
uted, despite its land area being twice as large as an 
enlarged EU and its population being much smaller 
(270 million inhabitants, 44% less than in the EU). 
Four separate areas of global importance in eco 
nomic terms can be distinguished in the US, each 
with over 15 million people and with GDP per head 
above the US average in all the individual States in 
cluded. These areas together account for 28% of the 
total US land area, 49% of the population and 54% of 
Table 4 Centres of economic activity in 
the EU and the US 
% land % % 
area population GDP 
Central regions 
in the EU 
Development 
centres in the US 
13.8 33.0 47.2 
28.1 48.8 53.5 
national GDP and, accordingly, display a much lower 
level of concentration than in the EU, though physica! 
geography is clearly a contributing factor (Table 4, 
Graphs A.5, A.6 and Map A.8). 
Urban areas 
Growth centres for achieving 
polycentric development 
Connections between urban centres, and between 
these and rural areas, are a major force for economic 
development. In the Union, it is the central areas 
which have the highest level of infrastructure endow 
ment and most developed urban networks (see Map 
A.9). 
The studies undertaken for the ESDP divided regions 
into 6 categories: those dominated by a large metro 
politan area; densely populated urban regions with 
polycentric, or dispersed, economic development; 
regions with a high density of population in urban ar 
eas but containing rural areas and with polycentric 
development; rural areas under the influence of a 
metropolitan area; rural areas with small and medium 
sized towns; and remote rural areas. 
Polycentric development can occur at two levels: 
  at the EU level, with development dispersed 
across the Union as a whole in a number of dy 
namic growth centres, in contrast to the tendency 
for economic activity to be concentrated in cen 
tral regions with other areas being peripheral; 
  at a regional level, in areas where there are a 
number of urban centres, often interconnected, 
rather than a single dominant one. In Europe, the 
typical examples are the Randstadt in the Nether 
lands and the Rhine region in Germany, which 
contrast with the Paris region in France or 
south east England where development tends to 
be focused on Paris and London, respectively. 
The central regions of the Union conform very much 
to a polycentric model of development, while in pe 
ripheral regions, rurai areas with small and me 
dium sized towns are much more important 
(accounting for 47% of the population there). In the 
latter, however, the development of urban centres 
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6 Regional types of 
rural urban spatial pattern 
GDR LIBERGEO   EQUIPE P.A.R.I.S. 
Sources : Moriconi   Ebrard, Geopolis, 1994, and Eurostat. 
(*) Regions dominated by a large metropolis 
Polycentric regions with high urban and 
rural densities 
1  Polycentric regions with high urban 
pr^ densities 
Rural areas under metropolitan influence 
o 
Rural areas with small and medium sized 
towns 
Remote rural areas could provide the basis for a more balanced distribu 
tion of economic activity across the Union (Map 6). 
Over 44% of the population of the EU lives in cities 
with over 50,000 inhabitants, but only 22 of these cit 
ies have over a million people.
5 
The most prosperous regions in the Union are virtually 
all urban (see Box)   54 of the 63 NUTS 3 regions
6 with 
GDP per head of over 50% above the EU average. 
Urban areas: significant disparities 
Unemployment in EU urban areas taken together aver 
aged 10.1% in 1999, slightly above the EU average 
(9.2%). Long term and youth unemployment were also 
higher than in the rest of the Union, though the rates 
vary considerably between Member States and seem 
to be affected more by national factors than by factors 
general to cities across the EU (see Tables A.8 A. 10). 
Many European cites have serious problems of pov 
erty and social exclusion in particular districts. Ac 
cording to the Urban Audit, in cities like Hamburg, 
Toulouse, Naples, Genoa, Glasgow or Edinburgh, 
unemployment rates can vary significantly between 
districts, being up to 10 times higher in the worst af 
fected parts than in the least affected. The same is 
true of dependency rates. 
Rural areas 
Over two out of three people in southern Europe and 
Ireland live in rural areas while the figure is under 1 in 
8 in Belgium, the UK, Germany and Italy (see Graph 
A.7). 
Except in Portugal, the population in rural areas is in 
creasing in all Member States, though at differing rates 
(see Graph A.8 and Table A. 11): 
  in Belgium, Germany, Greece and Spain, growth 
is well above the national average; 
  in Italy, the UK and Austria, the rate is similar to 
that in other areas; 
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  in Denmark, France, Ireland, Finland and Swe 
den, growth is below that elsewhere and, in Portu 
gal, population is declining. 
Over the period 1995 to 1999, the growth of employ 
ment in rural areas (1.0% a year) in the Union was 
higher than the overall rate (0.8% a year). The rural 
character of a region is, therefore, not an obstacle to 
job creation. On the contrary, an attractive natural 
and cultural environment, with lower levels of conges 
tion, can be an important factor in encouraging busi 
ness investment. 
At the sectoral level, while rural areas have suffered 
large scale job losses in agriculture, they have also 
experienced job gains in industry   except in Ger 
many and Austria   and, above all, in services, which 
have more than compensated for these. 
Data sources 
The two sources used for the analysis are the EU La 
bour Force Survey and the Urban Audit. 
The LFS enables the data to be broken down into 
three kinds of area according to population density: 
  urban areas: densely populated, made up of con 
tiguous local units, each with a density of over 500 
inhabitants per square km and with a total popula 
tion of at least 50,000; 
  intermediate areas: made up of less densely pop 
ulated contiguous local units, each with a density 
of over 100 inhabitants per square km and with a 
total population of at least 50,000, or of units 
neighbouring a densely populated area; 
  rural areas: made up of sparsely populated local 
units located outside urban or intermediate areas. 
It should be noted that local units with low popula 
tion density but completely encircled by an urban 
or intermediate area are counted as part of this, 
while those situated between an urban and inter 
mediate one are counted as part of the latter. 
The Urban Audit was carried out between 1998 and 
2000 with the aim of measuring the quality of life in 
towns and cities in the Union. The pilot phase, which 
is the basis of the data cited in the text, covered a 
small sample of 58 urban centres, so the results 
need to be interpreted with care. 
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The economic and social features of rural areas vary 
significantly across the Union as well as within indi 
vidual Member States. Three kinds of area can be dis 
tinguished in terms of their links with the rest of the 
national and international economy and their remote 
ness from major centres of activity: 
  rural areas which are integrated into the overall 
economy and which are characterised by eco 
nomic and population growth. These are often 
close to urban centres and have, in general, 
above average income per head. Jobs are pre 
dominantly in industry and services rather than 
agriculture. In some cases, such areas are at risk 
of becoming purely residential areas for people 
working elsewhere, posing a threat to their tradi 
tional environment and their social and cultural 
heritage; others, however, are developing 
independently; 
  intermediate rural areas, often some distance 
away from urban centres, but with good links to 
these and a reasonable level of infrastructure. In 
many such areas, agriculture continues to play a 
significant role, though they tend to be experienc 
ing increasing economic diversity and growing 
activity in, for example, food processing as well 
as services. In a number of Member States, large 
farms are situated in these areas; 
  remote rural areas, usually sparsely populated 
and in many cases located in peripheral parts of 
the Union far from urban centres. Their relative 
isolation is often due to their topography, such as 
their mountainous nature, and they tend to have a 
highly dispersed and ageing population, poor in 
frastructure, inadequate services, low income 
per head, a relatively unskilled work force, weak 
links with the rest of the economy and high em 
ployment in agriculture. 
Border regions 
Border regions
7 cover almost 40% of the EU land area 
and account for 25% of the population. They are even 
more important in the candidate countries, account 
ing for 66% of the land area and 58% of population. 
Enlargement will, therefore, lead to a significant 
growth in their prevalence in the Union. 
In economic terms, the regions with borders internal 
to the EU cannot in general be regarded as having 
more difficulties than other regions, in part due to the 
extent of economic integration in the Union and the 
success of the INTERREG initiatives. In particular, 
their level of GDP per head (15% above the average 
of the enlarged EU of 27 countries) is similar to that of 
non border regions (17% above the enlarged EU av 
erage   see Map A. 10 and Table A. 12). 
Regions with external borders, however, are in a more 
difficult situation, with the notable exception of those 
which border the candidate countries. While those 
with borders with third countries have a level of GDP 
of 5% below the (enlarged) EU average, those bor 
dering the candidate countries have a level which is 
15% above the new average of 27 countries. Never 
theless, some of these regions might well face tempo 
rary difficulties after enlargement. 
There are much more significant differences between 
the regions of the present EU bordering the candi 
date countries and the neighbouring ones in the can 
didate countries themselves. In the latter, GDP per 
head is only 53% of the (enlarged) EU average, ie 
much less than half the level in neighbouring regions 
in the present EU. Nevertheless, they are still better 
off than regions in the candidate countries with east 
ern borders, GDP per head in which averages only 
37% of that of the enlarged EU. 
Areas with specific geographical features 
Mountainous areas, coastal and maritime regions, is 
lands and archipelagos form an important part of the 
Union and are even more significant in some Member 
States. Most of the ultra peripheral regions are islands. 
These, however, do not form a distinct geo morpholog 
ical area as such, but are treated as a group of 7 re 
gions listed in the Treaty and recognised as having a 
number of inherent disadvantages, particularly be 
cause of the problem of accessibility caused by their 
remoteness from other parts of the Union. 
While the regions identified as being entitled to struc 
tural assistance from the Structural Funds are defined 
in terms of administrative and socio economic crite 
ria, the geo morphological areas are distinguished in 
terms of their physical features. These are not always 
easy to define and often there is no commonly ac 
cepted definition (urban, rural and so on). Moreover, 
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the features concerned are not always synonymous 
with structural problems. 
to safety, the environment and conservation of the 
coastline (see Table A. 15). 
The three main types of geo morphological area are 
considered below. 
Mountain areas 
Mountainous areas represent geographical barriers. 
Over time, activities concentrated in the valleys which 
are natural passages, but today many of these have 
become transport bottlenecks and the growth of traffic 
of goods and people involves increasing risks to safety 
and the environment. Areas such as the Alps, Pyre 
nees, Dolomites, the Greek mountains, the Highlands 
of Scotland and Fjallen in Sweden cover approximately 
39% of the EU land area. In many of these areas, eco 
nomic activity is concentrated in agriculture   on the 
land which is usable   tourism and other services. The 
others have very little economic activity at all. While 
some mountainous areas are economically viable and 
integrated into the rest of the EU economy, most have 
problems, as witnessed by the fact that more than 95% 
of them (in terms of land area) are eligible for assis 
tance under Objectives 1 or 2 of the Structural Funds 
(Map 7 and Tables A.13 and A.14). 
Coastal and maritime areas 
Coastal areas are defined as those situated on the strip 
of land around the coasts of the EU, which is of variable 
width depending on geographical features and admin 
istrative boundaries. They include many large cities 
(London, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Helsinki, the 
Hague, Dublin, Lisbon, Barcelona, Marseilles, Rome, 
Naples and Athens) and cover a significant part of the 
EU land area. Many of the areas are densely populated 
with a high level of tourist activity, generating significant 
income but also substantial environmental pressure, 
the reconciliation of which poses a serious challenge. 
Other areas, however, are scarcely populated at all. 
The growth of maritime traffic involves increasing risks 
Islands 
Islands are particularly important in the four southern 
Member States, three of which are cohesion coun 
tries, though there is also a large number of islands in 
France, the UK and the three Nordic countries, many 
of them eligible for Structural Funds support (Tables 
A. 16 and A. 17). Indeed, nearly 95% of the population 
of EU island regions is eligible for such support under 
Objectives 1 or 2. In the case of the smaller islands, 
accessibility is the main problem which makes it diffi 
cult to maintain economic activities which are com 
petitive and a young work force with a high level of 
education. Accessibility is an even greater problem 
for ultra peripheral regions. The largest islands are 
much better integrated into the rest of the EU econ 
omy, even if many are at present reliant on structural 
support to catch up with other parts of the Union. 
The areas identified above have marked differences in 
terms of their economic and social characteristics. Re 
gional policies for furthering their development should 
continue to be aimed at strengthening relations be 
tween different parts of the Union rather than take the 
form of isolated measures specific to individual types of 
area. Nevertheless, such policies should include coop 
eration programmes between areas of the same type, 
which are tailored to their particular geographical fea 
tures and which can bring additional benefit. 
1 In parallel with the development of the ESDP, a programme of studies was launched by the Commission in December 1998, in close 
collaboration with the 15 Member States. As a result of this programme, the basis of a common understanding on territorial analysis 
emerged, an issue which at a Union level had up to then been largely neglected. This part of the report makes use of the results of the 
studies undertaken over a period of 10 years. 
2 See, in particular, 'Integration and the regions of Europe: how the right policies can prevent polarisation', Braunerhjelm et al. 
3 Canary Islands, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane, Reunion, Agores and Madeira. 
4 ESDP study programme. 
5 Approximate figures   source: EUROSTAT GISCO. 
6 GDP per head at NUTS 3 level is not always a reliable measure of income because of commuting. 
7 NUTS 3 regions in the 27 countries eligible for INTERREG lll A or the PHARE CBC programme. 
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Productivity, competitiveness 
and economic performance 
Competitiveness is often viewed as a key indicator of 
the success or failure of policy. The term literally re 
fers to producers competing with each other in the 
same market. However, there is a related concept of 
the economic performance of regions and countries, 
which can also be termed 'competitiveness'. 
Despite the fact that there are competitive and un 
competitive firms in every region, there are common 
features which affect the competitiveness of all firms 
located there. These features include physical and 
social infrastructure, the skills of the work force, an in 
stitutional framework and a culture conducive (or not 
conducive) to innovation and the efficiency of public 
institutions (especially managerial capacity at the re 
gional level). In addition, success breeds success; 
the presence of strongly competitive firms in a region 
tends to stimulate other firms and to encourage fur 
ther investment. 
Over recent years, a standard definition of regional 
and national competitiveness has begun to emerge, 
which relates to the achievement of 'high and rising 
standards of living and high rates of employment on a 
sustainable basis.'
1 Although traditional measures of 
competitiveness tend to focus on GDP per head, 
there are other important factors affecting economic 
performance. The Lisbon summit underlined the cru 
cial link between Europe's economic strength and its 
social model. Effectively targeted social protection 
helps economies adapt to change. By promoting 
greater social cohesion it can help reduce the under 
use of human resources. It is also important to keep in 
mind the contribution of other factors such as the 
quality of the natural environment, quality of 
healthcare, social services and so on. Indicators of 
this type help enrich our understanding of economic 
development, though further work is needed to de 
velop better measures of progress in these areas. 
In practice, GDP per head can be broken down into 
two main components: the employment rate, or the 
proportion of working age population in work, and 
productivity, or GDP per person employed. Since a 
high level of one does not necessarily go with a high 
level of the other, they are considered separately be 
low, both in aggregate and by sector, before examin 
ing investment and other key factors underlying 
productivity. 
Trends in regional economic performance 
For the EU as a whole, economic performance over 
the past 25 years has tended to be stronger in terms 
of productivity and often weak in terms of employ 
ment. This has sometimes led to concerns about 'job 
less growth', though, in practice, employment has 
always increased when GDP growth has been more 
than 2% a year or so. The problem has been maintain 
ing this rate of growth over the long term. Over the de 
cade 1989 to 1999, for example, annual growth 
averaged 1.9%, but because GDP per person em 
ployed rose by 1.4%, employment increased by only 
0.5% a year. In the long term, achieving high employ 
ment growth and high productivity growth are not 
necessarily in conflict with each other. Indeed, to the 
extent that productivity growth increases competi 
tiveness and, therefore, enables higher growth of 
GDP to be achieved, they are complementary. The 
challenge in lagging regions, however, is to develop 
a mix of policies which boost productivity without ad 
versely affecting levels of employment. 
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While in most, but not all, lagging regions, employ 
ment levels are less than in the rest of the EU, in all of 
them, productivity is below average. Two main 
groups can be distinguished: 
  those with employment rates similar to, or in a few 
cases above, the EU average, which need to 
catch up in terms of productivity, measured by 
GDP per person employed. These are mostly in 
Portugal, Greece and the eastern part of Ger 
many, where in the first, productivity is typically 
only around 40% of the EU average and in the 
other two, around 60% of the average. 
  those lagging in terms of both productivity and 
employment. These include most regions in 
Spain and southern Italy, where employment 
rates can be as low as 40% as against an EU av 
erage of over 60%. In these cases, low employ 
ment is, exceptionally, a more important reason 
for low GDP per head than low productivity. 
Sectoral analysis: low productivity in agriculture 
The sectoral structure of economic activity shows an 
interesting pattern, if sectors are divided into agricul 
ture; industry (mainly manufacturing); distribution, 
transport and hotels and catering; business and fi 
nancial services and non market and other services 
(principally health, education and public administra 
tion) (see Table A. 18 and Map 8). Productivity is high 
est in business and financial services, gross 
value added per person employed in the EU being 
over twice the average for the economy as a whole.
2 It 
is slightly above average in industry and just below 
average in distribution, transport and hotels and in 
non market and other services.
3 In agriculture, pro 
ductivity is only around half the average for all 
sectors. 
Poor performance often linked to 
concentration in less productive sectors 
In all three of the cohesion countries, overall employ 
ment rates are low to a large extent because of low 
employment in business and financial services, 
where productivity is relatively high (though this 
should be interpreted with caution because of high 
value added in the protected financial services sec 
tor). On the other hand, the share of employment in 
distribution, transport and hotels and in non market 
and other services is similar to the EU average, as is 
the level of productivity. Employment is much higher 
than elsewhere in agriculture where productivity is 
very low. 
This pattern is reflected at the regional level (Map 9). 
Three sets of regions can be distinguished in the EU 
of 27 Member States (though not all fit the classifica 
tion neatly): 
  lagging regions with a high employment in agri 
culture, often an above average share of employ 
ment in industry and low employment in services. 
These are notably in the southern Member States 
and in Central European countries, except for the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. While 
agricultural employment in the EU is under 5% of 
the total, in some regions in Spain and Portugal, it 
is over 15% and in regions in Greece and the 
most eastern parts of the applicant countries, 
over 20%; 
  regions with high employment in industry. Many 
of these are concentrated in a central arc, stretch 
ing from the West Midlands in England, eastern 
France and northern Spain, through southern 
Germany and northern Italy to the Czech Repub 
lic, Slovakia and Slovenia. Although many of 
these regions are prosperous, many are not, re 
flecting the significant variation in value added 
between manufacturing industries; 
  regions with high employment in services. These 
are regions where the share of employment in this 
sector is 70% or more. Most of these regions are 
prosperous and include a number of capital cities 
in the north of the EU, but the group also includes 
regions in southern France, Spain and Italy, 
which have relatively low levels of GDP per head 
and where employment is concentrated in basic 
services, many of them catering for the tourist 
trade. 
The long term trend towards services and 
the restructuring required in lagging regions 
Over many years, there has been a tendency in the 
Union for employment in agriculture and industry to 
decline   though in the latter, the number employed 
has stabilised in recent years, even if the share has 
continued to fall   and for employment in services to 
expand. This trend, however, as noted above, has 
some way to go in many regions, particularly in 
38 8 GDP per person employed, 1998 
Agriculture  Industry  Services 
Index, EU15 = 100 
<9 
9 39 
39 69 
69 99 
no data 
England: average of NUTS1 regions 
UK: NUTS1 
IRL PL, RO: NUTSO 
Source: Eurostat 
Index, EU15 = 100 
<57.5 
57.5 76.5 
76.5 95.5 
95.5  114.5 
> 114.5 
no data 
Index, EU15 = 100 
England: average of NUTS1 regions 
UK: NUTS1 
IRL, PL, RO: NUTSO 
England: average of NUTS1 regions 
UK: NUTS1 
IRL, PL, RO: NUTSO 
84  100 
100 116 
> 116 
no data 
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries 1.4 Factors determining real convergence 
9 Regions with highest agricultural, industrial or service employment, 1999 
Agriculture (top 10%) 
Agriculture (top 25%) 
Industry (top 10%) 
Industry (top 25%) 
Services (top 10%) 
Services (top 25%) 
Top 10% and 25% of total population 
EL, RO, SK: 1998 
BG, LT, LV: 1997 
D (Sachsen): NUTS1 
Sources: Eurostat and NSI 
0 100 500 km 
i EuroGeographios Association for the administrative boundaries 1.4 Factors determining real convergence 
lagging ones. Indeed, even in the most prosperous 
regions, employment in services is still growing. Be 
tween 1990 and 1999, employment in services in the 
EU increased by some 12 million, while in the rest of 
the economy it declined by 9 million. Most of this de 
cline occurred during the recession years of the early 
1990s, though during the recovery since 1994, agri 
cultural employment has continued to fall (by around 
1.3 million), while employment in industry has re 
mained broadly unchanged. In the lagging regions, 
there will be a continuing shift of employment out of 
agriculture on a substantial scale in future years, 
though not necessarily job losses in industry. Indeed, 
in some regions, employment in manufacturing, es 
pecially where it is still below the EU average, might 
well increase, as it has tended to do in recent years. In 
the central industrial regions, on the other hand, em 
ployment in manufacturing in many cases could de 
cline, at least as a share of the total, though in many of 
these a shift has already occurred to high 
value added activities, as noted below. 
The restructuring of employment in future years is 
likely to be even greater in the candidate countries, 
where jobs in many regions remain concentrated in 
agriculture and/or industry. 
It should be noted in this context (see maps of em 
ployment and productivity by sector) that the shift in 
employment out of industry, and to a lesser degree 
out of agriculture, in the more prosperous regions in 
the EU has not necessarily been accompanied by a 
similar decline in the share of value added generated 
in these sectors. Indeed, in many cases, productivity 
has increased significantly in industry, as employ 
ment has concentrated in high value added activi 
ties. This demonstrates the potential for maintaining a 
small but highly competitive manufacturing sector as 
a key part of the regional economy. 
Shifts of activity within sectors as 
important as shifts between them 
An important aspect of lagging economic develop 
ment in the less prosperous regions in the EU is the 
concentration of activity in low value added sectors 
(though, it should be emphasised, productivity in the 
same sector can vary significantly across the Union). 
This reflects differences in both the efficiency of per 
forming the same activities and the degree of 
concentration in higher or lower value added parts of 
the broad sectors concerned. 
For example, business and financial services have 
relatively high value added per person employed in 
the cohesion countries (as in some of the candidate 
countries), which partly reflects high interest rates 
(which push up value added in financial services) 
and low competition, but also perhaps the under de 
veloped nature of these services in relation to poten 
tial demand. On the other hand, manufacturing, 
which has an above average level of value added per 
person employed in most countries, has relatively low 
productivity in the three cohesion countries (as well 
as in most of the candidate countries). This difference 
in part reflects a tendency for high value added and 
high tech parts of manufacturing to concentrate in 
the more prosperous Member States.
4 
In agriculture, value added per person employed is 
around 80 90% of the EU average for all sectors in the 
more prosperous countries, but only 40% of this in 
Spain, 25% in Greece and just 13% in Portugal (and 
16% in Austria). (In the candidate countries, the figure 
is even lower.) These figures reflect both the need for 
diversification into higher value added activities and 
the long term potential for significant productivity 
growth in the sector. 
Demography and migration 
Population in the EU is set to decline ... 
At the beginning of 2000, the population in the EU 
stood at 376 million, substantially less than in China 
(1.2 billion) or India (1 billion), but significantly more 
than in the US (272 million) or Japan (126 million). As 
suming trends in birth and death rates and in migra 
tion continue, EU population is projected to grow very 
slowly between 2000 and 2005 (by only 0.2% a year) 
and then hardly at all (by under 0.1 % a year) from then 
until 2022, when it is expected to start declining. In 
2010, therefore, population is forecast to reach 385 
million and in 2025 to be only slightly higher (388 mil 
lion). From 2008, population is set show a natural de 
cline but this will be offset for a few years by net 
inward migration. 
Trends in population, however, vary markedly be 
tween different parts of the Union. While population is 
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still growing in most regions even if slowly, in some, 
predominantly in Spain, Italy, Germany and the 
Nordic countries, it is already declining (see Map 
A. 11). Between 2000 and 2010, more regions in Ger 
many and Italy are projected to show a decline, in ad 
dition to some in France, the UK and Austria. On the 
other hand, population is expected to continue in 
creasing at a relatively high rate in a number of re 
gions in southern Spain, the south of France and 
Greece as well as in parts of Germany, the Nether 
lands and the UK. 
By 2025, almost 90 of the 200 or so regions, defined at 
the NUTS 2 level, accounting for half of all the people 
living in the EU, are projected to be experiencing 
population decline, including all those in Italy but also 
a number in virtually all Member States. 
... as it is in the candidate countries 
Demographic trends are even more adverse in the 
candidate countries. While in most of the 12 coun 
tries, population grew at a relatively high rate in the 
1970s and 1980s, due to high fertility rates and in 
creasing life expectancy, in the 1990s, fertility rates 
fell dramatically and life expectancy declined. In ad 
dition, there was significant outward migration, with 
only the Czech Republic, Malta and Cyprus experi 
encing a net inward movement over the period 1990 
to 1999 (see Map A. 12). 
As a result, population growth has already begun to 
fall in most of the countries. In 8 of the 12, population 
declined over the 1990s. Between 1995 and 1997, it 
fell in 32 out of the 52 regions, defined at the NUTS 2 
level and there was net outward migration in 31 of 
them. In the wider European area, therefore, and in 
cluding these countries with the existing EU Member 
States, population decline is likely to occur several 
years earlier than indicated above. (The projections 
for the 12 countries are based on UN forecasts.
5) 
Regions with declining population 
Demographic trends are affected by social and eco 
nomic developments. Migration flows, in particular, 
are related to regional differences in labour market 
conditions, people moving from areas of low job 
growth to ones with more employment opportunities, 
and, over the longer term, such differences can also 
affect birth and death rates. 
Declining regions in the EU are, therefore, character 
ised by low income levels, high unemployment and a 
large proportion of the work force employed in agri 
culture and industry (see Graph A.9). In addition, they 
tend to have a relatively small number of young peo 
ple, reflecting their migration to other areas as well 
as low fertility rates, and a low density of popula 
tion, reflecting the rural nature of many of them. There 
are, however, notable exceptions to the latter, 
since a number of densely populated regions (eg 
Brussels and Attiki, where Athens is located) have 
also experienced a reduction in population in recent 
years. Indeed, a tendency to 'suburbanisation', the 
movement out of city centres to the suburbs and 
neighbouring regions, which is often described as 
'urban sprawl', is evident in many major conurbations 
across Europe. 
Population ageing in the EU will accelerate ... 
Population in the EU is ageing rapidly. With low birth 
rates, the proportion of young people under 15 has 
declined for a number of years and is projected to 
continue to do so in the future, falling from 17% in 
1998 to 14.5% in 2025. By contrast, the proportion of 
those aged 65 and over is rising significantly and is 
set to increase even faster after 2010 as the 
baby boom generation begins to reach this age. Ac 
cordingly, the proportion is projected to increase 
from around 16% of total population in 1998 to 22% by 
2025. Moreover, within this, the relative number of 
people of 80 and older is rising faster still. 
These trends will have important consequences for 
social welfare and taxation systems across the EU. In 
particular, the prospect is for a growing number of 
people above retirement age who will need to be sup 
ported by those in employment. All Member States 
will experience an increase in the old age depend 
ency rate (the number aged 65 and over relative to 
those of working age, taken here as 15 to 64), but the 
extent of this is likely to vary significantly between 
them. The most marked increases are expected to be 
in Italy, Sweden, Finland and Germany and the small 
est in Ireland, Portugal and Luxembourg. 
The trend is likely to be similar, if less pronounced, for 
the overall dependency rate, the total above and be 
low working age in relation to those of working age, 
despite the projected decline in the number of 
children
6 (Map 10). At present, there are some 49 po 
tential dependants in the EU for every 100 people of 
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working age; in 2025, there are expected to be 58. 
The number is projected to be particularly high in 
most regions in France, Sweden and Finland. 
The retirement of 'baby boomers' together with the 
declining number of young people is set to reduce 
working age population in the EU from around 2010 
onwards, and this is projected to fall from around 251 
million now to some 243 million in 2025. At the same 
time, the average age of those of 15 to 64 will 
increase. 
... as it will in the candidate countries 
The pace of population ageing in the enlarged EU, ie 
including the candidate countries as well as the exist 
ing Member States, might be slower, but only slightly. 
In most candidate countries, active policies of en 
couraging population growth during the 1970s and 
1980s were reversed in the 1990s. While the average 
age of their populations is lower than in the EU at 
present, it is likely to increase rapidly over the next 25 
years, as falling fertility rates reduce the relative num 
ber of young people under 15 in all countries apart 
from Malta. By 2025, the proportion of young people 
in total population is, therefore, projected to be even 
less than in the present EU. 
On the other hand, the proportion of people aged 65 
and over in these countries is, on average, less than in 
the EU at present. Accordingly, old age dependency 
rates are also lower and, in many regions, well below 
those in EU Member States, with the exception of Ire 
land (Map 10). 
The relative number of elderly people will also in 
crease substantially, though only in the Czech Re 
public is the number expected to rise above the EU 
average by 2020. Nevertheless, both the average 
old age dependency rate and the average overall de 
pendency rate are expected to be only marginally 
lower in an enlarged EU than indicated above. 
The same is true of the prospective decline in work 
ing age population, which is projected to occur from 
about the same time in the candidate countries as in 
the present EU. The number of people aged 15 to 64 
is expected to rise slightly from the present 72 million 
until 2009 and then to fall to 66 million in 2025. 
Working age population in an enlarged EU is, there 
fore, likely to reach a peak of 328 million in 2010 and 
to decline to 309 million by 2025. As in the EU, the 
average age of those of 15 to 64 in the candidates 
countries will also increase, though at a slightly 
slower rate than in existing Member States. 
The labour force in the EU 
is set to decline and to age ... 
The trends in working age population described 
above will inevitably affect the growth and age struc 
ture of the labour force in the EU, though this will be in 
fluenced as much by changes in participation as by 
demography. These, in turn, will be determined by a 
range of economic and social factors, most espe 
cially by the availability of jobs, but also by education 
developments, social attitudes towards women work 
ing, the availability of child care support, the age of 
retirement, the details of pension schemes, the struc 
ture of households and so on. 
If current demographic and participation trends per 
sist, the labour force is projected to grow in the EU up 
to 2010, when it will reach 183 million.
7 Thereafter, it 
will start to decline, falling to some 175 million by 
2025. The onset of decline, however, is likely to differ 
significantly between regions (Map 11). Neverthe 
less, in almost all regions in the EU, the number of 
economically active people is expected to be falling 
by 2025, though at widely differing rates. The decline 
is projected to be particularly marked in Italy, Ger 
many and Spain, the labour force falling by over 1 mil 
lion in each case. 
Because of demographic trends and possible 
changes in participation, the relative number of peo 
ple of 50 and over in the labour force is expected to in 
crease in all Member States, from an average of 
around 20% of the total now to 30% in the early 2020s. 
In the Nordic countries, where participation is not ex 
pected to change much, the increase in this propor 
tion is likely to be relatively small, while in Italy and 
Spain, where birth rates are low and participation 
rates of women could increase markedly, it might be 
substantial. 
... which could have profound 
economic consequences 
As noted above, these trends could have far reach 
ing economic consequences, especially for the 
sustainability of social protection and health care sys 
tems, which will be put under increasing pressure by 
the growth in the number of elderly people. 
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Accordingly, attention needs to focus on the possibil 
ity of increasing participation among older people as 
well among women, the prime source of labour force 
growth in the future. 
At the same time, such a possibility brings into focus 
the problem of maintaining, updating and extending 
the skills of the people concerned, which is already a 
concern given the ageing of the work force. In many 
countries, the pursuit of early retirement policies up 
until recently have enabled this problem to be ig 
nored. Moreover, the perception that returns to the 
training of older workers are relatively low, whatever 
the reality, means that employers are often reluctant 
to undertake the necessary investment. This reluc 
tance tends to be compounded by the perceived dif 
ficulties of the training process and of older workers 
learning new skills. These difficulties, however, can 
be greatly reduced if the training of such workers be 
comes part of a process of lifelong learning, which in 
turn means that people acquire new skills throughout 
their working lives and are accustomed to doing so. 
This kind of development, which requires a change in 
attitudes as well as in working practices, is essential if 
the potential of older workers is to be effectively 
tapped, which could prove vital for EU producers to 
remain competitive on world markets. 
It is equally important to ensure that women   or in 
deed men   returning to work after a period of ab 
sence due to family reasons have access to the 
training they need to update their skills and learn new 
methods of working, so that they can both find suit 
able jobs and contribute effectively to the develop 
ment of the EU economy. 
The prospective decline in the number of young peo 
ple might have the effect of diminishing youth unem 
ployment, though this in the long term depends more 
on their skills and the rate of job growth than on num 
bers perse. The decline in young people entering the 
labour market has been accompanied by an increase 
in the number remaining in education and initial voca 
tional training longer. In a knowledge based econ 
omy, it is essential that this trend continues. At the 
same time, the growing recognition of the importance 
of workplace training as well as formal tuition means 
that in a number of countries the labour force partici 
pation of young people is increasing as they combine 
paid employment with continued education. 
Whatever measures are taken to increase participa 
tion, the extent to which it increases for women and 
older workers as well as young people, ultimately de 
pends on the rate of job growth, which in turn is likely 
to depend on the pace of economic development. 
(The process, it should be emphasised, is not solely 
one way, since more skilled and enterprising people 
joining the labour market is itself likely to boost com 
petitiveness and economic growth.) This will deter 
mine whether unemployment declines and job 
shortages emerge or whether, despite the falling 
number of people of working age, unemployment in 
the Union increases again. 
The labour force in many parts of northern Italy is, for 
example, projected to decline significantly in future 
years on the basis of past trends and, indeed, labour 
shortages are already beginning to emerge. In the 
longer term, however, if economic growth and net job 
creation can be sustained at high levels, this might 
encourage more people   women in particular whose 
participation is well below the EU average in most 
areas   to join the labour force and ease shortages. 
(Participation of women in northern Italy has 
increased markedly over the past 10 15 years, 
whereas in southern Italy, where job growth has been 
depressed, it has hardly changed.) 
Inward migration could increase but 
it should not be overemphasised ... 
Recent studies conclude that large scale migration 
flows from the candidate countries are unlikely to oc 
cur and should not be overemphasised in the en 
largement agenda. Since, however, convergence of 
income per head in the CECs to EU levels will be a 
long process, migration is almost certain to increase 
once free movement is possible. Estimates are that 
net migration to the EU could amount to some 
335,000 a year immediately after entry barriers are re 
moved, but that this would fall to below 150,000 within 
a decade.
8 At this time, the number of people living in 
the EU from the CECs could reach 2.9 million and an 
other 10 years later, 3.7 million, rising to a peak of 3.9 
million 30 years after the introduction of free move 
ment of labour. This implies a growth in CEC nationals 
resident in the existing EU Member States from 0.2% 
of total population in 1998 to only just over 1% in 30 
years time. On these estimates, concern that mi 
grants from the CECs will swamp EU labour markets 
are, therefore, ill founded. 
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People moving from the CECs are likely to go mainly 
to Germany and Austria, where the numbers are al 
ready high. Estimates are that some 65% will go to the 
former, 12% to the latter, and within these countries, 
primarily to border regions and centres of economic 
activity   in Germany, to southern regions bordering 
the Czech Republic rather than to the new Lander, in 
Austria, to eastern areas. Regions bordering the 
CECs are also likely to experience increased tempo 
rary inward migration and commuting. This concen 
tration could, however, give rise to social tensions in 
the areas concerned. 
... and could ease labour shortages 
Perhaps the most interesting and potentially impor 
tant conclusion from recent studies is that, unlike the 
EU, many CECs are likely to experience a significant 
growth in younger people aged 20 to 35 over the next 
decade or so. This represents an opportunity for the 
enlarged EU, insofar as it gives employers the possi 
bility of taking on young people with high education 
attainment levels. Indeed, if economic recovery con 
tinues at the pace currently expected, then it will also 
be a time when skill shortages are likely to become 
more acute. 
In fact, there is also evidence in the EU of labour 
shortages in less skilled activities in a number of re 
gions, even in some where unemployment is rela 
tively high. Immigrants could potentially help to 
relieve shortages in these areas as well, though it is 
important that adequate measures are introduced at 
the same time to integrate those concerned into the 
local community and prevent them becoming socially 
excluded. 
In this regard, a recent Commission Communication 
on a Community Immigration Policy (COM(2000)757) 
proposed the adoption of a controlled immigration 
policy as one of the responses to the problems im 
plied by demographic trends and pointed to the po 
tential contribution of immigration to the European 
Employment Strategy. 
Although the outflow of young people might tend to 
damage the development potential of the regions 
from which they move in the short to medium term, 
especially as those moving are likely to include a dis 
proportionate number of the most highly educated, 
their subsequent return, with the expertise and 
know how they have acquired, could give a major 
stimulus to development in the CECs. 
Nor is enlargement likely to pose 
serious problems for EU labour markets 
It is unlikely that the free labour movement will have a 
major effect on EU labour markets as a whole, though it 
could affect Member States differentially according to 
the specific circumstances which exist. CECs at pres 
ent are small in economic terms, which means that in 
creased imports from them are likely to affect prices in 
goods markets, and so wages and employment, only 
to a limited extent. According to a recent study, for ex 
ample, immigration averaging some 200,000 a year 
over the next 15 years would reduce earnings by under 
1%.
9 In border regions, however, the effect on labour 
markets could be more significant, as it could be in 
sectors which are most exposed to competition from 
CEC imports, though equally there are potential gains 
from the proximity of new markets. 
Investment 
Investment the key to growth 
in candidate countries 
Indicators of investment are a good barometer of the 
growth potential of an economy
10 (see Graphs A. 10 
and A.11). Investment (as measured by gross fixed 
capital formation) is higher in relation to GDP in the ap 
plicant countries than in current EU Member States  
25% of GDP as against 20% in 1998. It is essential for 
this differential to be maintained or even increased if 
the applicant countries are to achieve the high growth 
rates necessary to catch up with the EU economies. 
High investment per se is no guarantee of success   it 
must be well targeted and coupled with technical prog 
ress (see below)   but it is a necessary condition. 
The level of investment, however, differs significantly 
between applicant countries. In the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Poland, investment is as high as 30% of 
GDP. By contrast, in the countries with the lowest lev 
els of GDP per head, it is generally much less (only 
around 11
1/2% of GDP in Bulgaria in 1998). 
In the Union, Portugal, the country with the second 
lowest level of GDP per head, has the highest invest 
ment in relation to GDP (28%), while in Spain and 
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Greece, as well as Ireland, it is also well above the EU 
average. Sweden, on the other hand, with GDP per 
head around the EU average, has the lowest level 
(17% of GDP). 
The capital stock: lagging economies 
still have much catching up to do 
In judging the effect of capital formation on economic 
performance, it is important to consider not just cur 
rent investment flows, but also the accumulated stock 
of capital which these have built up over time.
11 The 
data on this, however, involve a high degree of esti 
mation and should be regarded as indicative only. 
Nevertheless, some interesting conclusions can be 
drawn. 
The main observation is that more prosperous coun 
tries have a larger stock of capital than less prosper 
ous ones. In the three cohesion countries, capital 
stock in 1999 is estimated at only EUR 33,000 per 
head as opposed to EUR 54,000 in the EU as a whole 
and EUR 75  80,000 in Denmark, Germany and Aus 
tria (see Table A.19 and Graphs A.12 and A.13). The 
cohesion countries, therefore, have only 60% of the 
capital per head available in the EU as a whole. 
Since the capital stock is built up over a great many 
years, it tends to change only slowly and is dominated 
by past investment. This is most clearly so for build 
ings, which can be used effectively for decades, 
though even machinery and equipment can often 
have a useful life of 10 years or more. 
15 
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Nevertheless, because of the higher rate of invest 
ment, the gap between the cohesion countries and 
the rest of the EU is narrowing, if slowly  10 years ago 
capital stock in the former averaged only 54% 
of that in the EU as a whole. However, while the cohe 
sion countries are catching up in relative terms, in 
absolute terms they still spent less than the EU aver 
age on investment per head of population over the 
past decade   EUR 10,000 as opposed to EUR 
13,000. 
Investment in knowledge: 
the basis for long term growth 
While capital expenditure on physical assets is im 
portant, intangible investment in research and devel 
opment, education and information technology is 
becoming even more important for economic devel 
opment in the Union. 
Growth over the long term, therefore, is attributable 
not to just to an increase in the fixed capital stock, but 
more significantly to technical improvements which 
increase the efficiency with which capital   and la 
bour   is used.
12 Moreover, the information revolution 
means that investment in technological advance is 
likely to become even more important in the knowl 
edge based economy of the future. 
It is, therefore, important to review the extent of invest 
ment in knowledge across the EU as well as in fixed as 
sets. This gives rise to somewhat different conclusions, 
since many of the countries with below average rates of 
fixed investment are among the largest 
investors in technology. In particular, 
Sweden, with the lowest fixed invest 
ment rate in the EU, has the highest rate 
of investment in knowledge (Graph 9). 
France, the UK and Finland are similarly 
low investors in physical assets but high 
investors in knowledge. 
On the other hand, the three cohesion 
countries, as well as Ireland, spend 
less than average on investment in 
knowledge. While their high rate of ex 
penditure on fixed capital formation is 
closing the gap in their capital stock 
with the rest of the EU, their low invest 
ment in less tangible assets is not a se 
cure basis for longer term growth in a 
digital age. 
15 
12 
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Infrastructure endowment 
Most public investment in Member States as well as 
that supported by the Structural Funds goes on infra 
structure. An adequate endowment of infrastructure 
is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the 
economic development and competitiveness of a re 
gion, an important factor determining both the loca 
tion of economic activity and the kinds of activity or 
sector which develop. Investment in infrastructure is 
essential for reducing the effect of distance between 
regions, especially between those on the periphery 
and those in the centre. Other conditions, however, 
need to be met in parallel if the increase in accessibil 
ity in peripheral regions is not to become a threat 
rather than an opportunity. 
Transport infrastructure 
Transport infrastructure, in particular, plays an impor 
tant role in reducing regional disparities and improving 
the competitiveness of regions by facilitating trade and 
the movement of labour. Improvements in infrastruc 
ture reduce both the time and the cost of transporting 
goods and so increase productivity and alter the com 
parative advantage of being located in different re 
gions. Equally, they have a similar effect on 'travel to 
work' time, so extending the boundaries of local labour 
markets and increasing effective labour supply. 
Transport infrastructure, however, remains largely 
the responsibility of government and is still an impor 
tant component of structural and regional policy. De 
spite the privatisation of particular means of transport 
over recent years (especially high speed rail and 
motorways), the cost of investment in basic infra 
structure remains too high to be covered by the pri 
vate sector. In addition, when deciding investment in 
new infrastructure, the subsequent recurrent cost of 
maintenance should be taken into account. 
Road transport remains dominant 
Roads are the predominant means of travel. In 1997, 
they accounted for 86% of all journeys made in the EU 
(measuring these in terms of passenger miles) and 
94% of those made by land. Moreover, the transpor 
tation of goods by road is continuing to increase, ac 
counting for 43% of all transport of goods in 1997 
(measured in terms of freight miles) as against 31 % in 
1970. Excluding that carried by air and sea, they ac 
counted for 74% of all freight transported in the EU, 
while only 14% went by rail and 12% by inland water 
way and pipeline. 
The development of motorways has increased the 
density of road transport. Although the scale of the 
road network at Union level has remained broadly un 
changed, the length of motorways increased by 40% 
over the 10 years 1988 to 1998, due notably to growth 
in the 4 cohesion countries, where many roads have 
been converted to motorways. Over this period, the 
density of motorways
13 in these four countries taken 
together rose from below the Union average (43%) to 
around the same level, the largest increase occurring 
in Spain, where the density rose from 63% of the aver 
age to 136%. On the other hand, while there was also 
substantial growth in Ireland and Greece, density is 
still well below the average (12% of the average in Ire 
land in 1998 as against under 2% in 1988, and 17% in 
Greece as opposed to their being no motorways at all 
in 1988). 
At the regional level, growth has followed a similar 
pattern. Although the density of motorways remains 
higher in central or the most developed regions in 
each country than in Objective 1 or peripheral re 
gions, growth has been concentrated in the latter. 
Motorway networks are less developed in the Nordic 
countries (in Finland, density is only 41 % of the EU av 
erage and in Sweden, 65%), especially in the most 
northerly, sparsely populated regions covered by 
Objective 1, reflecting their geographical, and demo 
graphic, features. 
The EU average, however, should not be regarded in 
itself as an objective to be reached in some kind of 
mechanical way. Every region has its own specific 
needs in this regard, in terms of both the overall scale 
of transport networks and particular modes of trans 
port. A minimum level of transport infrastructure is 
necessary for regional competitiveness, but this is not 
necessarily the same level in all regions. Moreover, 
quality and safety may be just as important for devel 
opment (Graphs 10 and 11). 
Reduction in rail transport despite modernisation 
The importance of rail transport in the Union has di 
minished in spite of the modernisation of the network 
in a number of countries. In 1997, rail accounted for 
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6% of all passenger travel in the EU as against 10% in 
1970. The decline in freight transport by rail has been 
even more pronounced, falling from 21% in 1970 to 
8
1/2% in 1997, and between 1990 and 1997, the 
amount of goods carried by rail fell by 7% whereas 
the amount carried by road rose by 29%. 
The decline of traffic has been accompanied by a slight 
decline in the size of the rail network, as measured by 
the miles of track, and little reduction in either national 
or regional disparities in the EU. Indeed, in the cohe 
sion countries, rail density
14 declined from 66% of the 
EU average in 1988 to 61 % in 1998, due in particular to 
the closure of many lines in Spain and Portugal. 
Nevertheless, the rail network has been modernised 
to some extent in the cohesion countries. In 1999, 
24% of lines were double track as against 17% 10 
years earlier and 39% were electrified, up from 32% in 
1988. The rate of modernisation was highest in Spain, 
while in Greece both the length and standard of track 
remained very low (45% of the EU average as regards 
rail density, with only 12% of lines double track and no 
lines at all electrified). This, however, is due in some 
part to the geographical features of the country   the 
large number of islands and the mountainous areas 
(see Graphs A.14 A.16). 
Sea transport: vital for island and coastal regions 
The cost of infrastructure investment for sea transport 
is limited to the construction, maintenance and mod 
ernisation of ports which tends to be much less costly 
than road construction. In addition, although slow, 
sea and inland waterway transport is the least costly 
and most envoronmentally friendly form. Nor is it 
affected by problems of congestion or capacity. 
Sea transport accounted for 70% of the transportation 
of EU visible exports in 1997 and 30% of intra Com 
munity trade. By contrast, only 7% of freight in the EU 
went by inland waterway. 
Sea transport remains particularly important for trans 
portation around the coasts of the EU and between 
the mainland and the many islands, even after the 
construction of several fixed links   the Oresund and 
the Channel Tunnel, in particular. In 1998, it ac 
counted for 41% of all freight transported in the EU, 
both within and between Member States. The UK was 
responsible for 20% of this, Italy for 16% and the four 
cohesion countries together for 22%. 
The volume of traffic going through the main ports in 
creased significantly between 1990 and 1998, espe 
cially through those of medium size, including, in 
particular, Algeciras in Andalucia and Dublin, though 
traffic is still well below that handled by the largest 
ports in northern Europe, Rotterdam (where it is 10 
times larger) and Antwerpen (3 times larger). 
More notably, the growth of container ports has been 
more evenly spread across Europe. Five of the 12 
largest ports in the EU are in the Mediterranean, in 
cluding Giora Tauro in Italy, and these have experi 
enced higher growth than those in northern Europe. 
The bulk of container freight is transported by road 
from and to the ports, except in Belgium and the Neth 
erlands, where more goes by inland waterway. In 
France and Germany, although rivers and canals are 
10 Roads index, 1988 and 1998 
Index EU all regions=100 
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not used to their full potential, there is a relatively high 
use of rail. By contrast, in the cohesion countries, al 
most all container transport is by road (89% to 98%). 
The importance of intermodal transport is still very low 
in the EU as a whole. Only 12% of goods are con 
veyed from ports to inland destinations by means 
other than road (see Table A.20). 
Transport systems in the candidate countries: 
outdated infrastructure developing 
differently than in the EU 
Although the same broad tendencies are apparent in 
the candidate countries as in the Union, in terms of 
shifts between modes of transport, the starting point 
and the overall development of transport there is very 
different. In the first place, the volume of traffic stag 
nated during the 1980s and declined markedly dur 
ing the 1990s, reflecting similar trends in the 
economy and in trade. The volume of freight trans 
ported fell by 22% between 1980 and 1998, whereas 
it grew by 52% in the Union over the same period. 
As in the Union, however, road transport has become 
predominant. Despite the overall decline in the vol 
ume of goods transported, freight going by road in 
creased by 19% between these years, though this is 
still much less than in the Union where it doubled. 
Moreover, in 1998, only 47% of freight went by road 
as against 74% in the Union, while rail transport, 
though in decline, remained important, accounting 
for 42% of the total as against 14% in the Union. In 
deed, most freight still goes by rail in the Baltic States 
and Slovakia, whereas much the larger part goes by 
road in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. 
So far as sea transport is concerned, the main ports in 
the CECs are Constance, in Romania, Ventspils in 
Latvia and Gdansk and Szceczin in Poland. The 
amount of traffic going through these is similar to that 
handled by the medium sized ports in the Mediterra 
nean and only 5 10% of that handled by Antwerpen. 
Nevertheless, the Baltic ports are growing rapidly. 
Inland waterways are of marginal importance except 
in Romania and Slovakia, where they account for over 
10% of all goods transported. 
Transport infrastructure in the candidate countries is 
in overall terms less extensive than in the Union, and 
the rail network, though representing a larger 
proportion of the total, is in a poor state. In an en 
larged Union of 27 countries, the main features of the 
system in the candidate countries are as follow: 
  in the case of roads, all the countries, except Es 
tonia, Lithuania and Poland, have a significantly 
less extensive network than the EU average. In 
Poland, it is similar to that in Ireland, while in Esto 
nia and Lithuania as well as in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, it is more extensive than in three of 
the cohesion countries (see Graph A. 17); 
  there are in general many fewer motorways than 
in either the EU as a whole or the cohesion coun 
tries. While motorway construction over the past 
10 years has increased markedly in the Union, 
and in the cohesion countries, in particular, it was 
minimal in the candidate countries. The density of 
motorways is highest in Slovenia and Lithuania, 
where it exceeds that of Portugal, whereas in Po 
land, which like Ireland is well endowed with 
roads, they are almost non existent; 
  railways are the most developed means of trans 
port. The total length of track is in general greater 
than in the EU and almost double that in the cohe 
sion countries. In the Czech Republic, it is twice 
the EU average and in Hungary, Slovakia, Latvia 
and Poland, 1
1/2 times. Nevertheless, in terms of 
the standard of the network, the comparison is 
much less favourable. The proportion of electri 
fied lines is well below the EU average except in 
Bulgaria and Poland, while, as in the cohesion 
countries, there are also many fewer double track 
and high speed lines. 
The main problems to address, therefore, if transport 
networks are to further territorial balance in an en 
larged EU, are: 
  the ageing of the infrastructure in the candidate 
countries because of lack of investment in the 
1980s and 1990s; 
  the need to integrate networks in the candidate 
countries into the EU transport system as a whole 
as well as in the trans European networks; 
  the need to strengthen the intermodal aspect of 
transport systems, especially as regards links be 
tween ports in peripheral regions and less 
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favoured areas inland. In contrast to the candi 
date countries, infrastructure in the cohesion 
countries tends to be modern and better inte 
grated with that in the rest of the EU, because of 
the large scale investment in the 1990s. Never 
theless, the rail network remains less developed 
than elsewhere and links between different 
modes of transport, which, inter alia, are impor 
tant for internal communication within less fa 
voured regions, are inadequate. 
Energy 
The availability of energy in a region, the flexibility of 
supply in terms of the diversity of different sources 
and a high degree of self sufficiency are important for 
regional development, in that they help define the lim 
its to growth and employment. In addition, the type of 
output produced, the consumption of energy per unit 
of output and the capacity to reduce environmental 
pollution will determine the ability of a region to de 
velop in a sustainable way. 
Over the past 10 years, energy consumption in the 
Union has continued to increase as GDP has grown. 
Energy intensity, measured by the amount of energy 
used per unit of output has declined, though less sig 
nificantly than in the 1980s. Between 1988 and 1998, 
GDP in the EU grew by 25% in real terms while energy 
consumption increased by 6%, a reduction in energy 
intensity. 
Consumption of energy per head of population in the 
Union increased by 1.6% between 1988 and 1998, 
the rise being particularly marked in the cohesion 
countries, which started the period with a level under 
half the EU average but which increased consump 
tion by almost 40% over these 12 years. This increase 
was largely the result of their economic growth and 
the energy intensity of consumption. This was espe 
cially the case in Portugal and Greece, the two coun 
tries with the worst performance in terms of energy 
use. Even though consumption per head in these two 
countries remains well below the EU average, mainly 
because of the their low level of GDP per head, con 
sumption per unit of GDP increased substantially in 
stead of declining as elsewhere. High economic 
growth in Spain was accompanied by an increase of 
over 30% in total consumption of energy and a small 
rise in the energy intensity of consumption. This, nev 
ertheless, remains below the EU average, as it does 
in Ireland, which experienced a significant reduction 
in the energy intensity of consumption (of 33%)(see 
Graph A.18). 
Water and the environment 
For economic development to be maintained over the 
long term it also needs to be sustainable in environ 
mental terms. If the growth of an economy has dam 
aging effects on the environment, this will ultimately 
limit its development. Accordingly, the availability of 
resources and the measures taken to protect the en 
vironment are factors which determine the long run 
performance of regional economies and which, 
therefore, merit special attention. 
Reserves and use of water 
In the EU, estimates of renewable water reserves are 
relatively low   around 3,200 cubic metres per head 
of population a year as compared with an average in 
the world as a whole of 7,300. Nevertheless, the Euro 
pean countries have adequate reserves in overall 
terms, since the annual rate of abstraction is only 
around 660 cubic metres per head. 
The distribution of reserves, however, varies signifi 
cantly between regions. Reserves per head are 5 
times greater than average in Finland and Sweden, 
as well as Norway, and 3
1/2 times greater in Ireland, 
while they are only around half or less of the average 
in Denmark, Belgium and Germany (see Graph A. 19). 
In relation to land area, the variation in reserves is 
wider still. In Norway, they are 60 times larger than in 
Spain, 30 times larger than in Sicily, eastern Greece, 
the central parts of Poland and Hungary and the ar 
eas around the Romanian Bulgarian border.The 
availability of water reserves, however, depends not 
only on their quantity but also on the level of use, 
which depends, in turn, on a number of factors, such 
as the kind of industrial and agricultural production, 
the level of household consumption and the potential 
for treatment and re use of waste water. Across Eu 
rope as a whole (including the candidate countries 
and the European Economic Area as well as the EU), 
the overall rate of abstraction a year is only 16% of 
available reserves. Moreover, since a large part of the 
water abstracted is returned to the original source, 
net final consumption amounts to only 5% of reserves. 
In the EU, the situation is slightly less favourable, the 
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annual rate of abstraction amounting to 21% of re 
serves and the net rate to just under 7%. 
Water use varies significantly between Member 
States. The rate of consumption is relatively high in 
Belgium (43% of reserves) and Germany (35%) be 
cause of population density and high industrial use. 
In the Mediterranean countries, agricultural irrigation 
is responsible for most of the water extracted. In 
Spain, where the annual rate of abstraction is over 
30% of reserves, 60% goes to agriculture, in Portugal, 
52% and in Italy, 50%, while in Greece, the figure is as 
high as 80%. In Greece and Portugal, however, the 
overall rate of abstraction is relatively low (under 10% 
of reserves). 
Nevertheless, it is the extent to which water ab 
stracted is returned to its source which also deter 
mines the relative abundance or scarcity of reserves 
in each country. While more than 80% of water ab 
stracted is returned to source in Belgium and Ger 
many, in Spain and Italy, the figure is only 40% (see 
Graph A.20). 
The treatment of waste water 
and household waste 
Improvements in irrigation techniques in agriculture 
and in the treatment of waste water from industry and 
domestic consumers have increased the efficiency 
with which water reserves are used. In agriculture in 
the Mediterranean, new irrigation methods are en 
abling water to be re used as well as treated, while 
the treatment of salt water is also likely to improve the 
relative situation in southern Europe. 
Given that most of the population in Europe lives in 
towns and cities, it is important to pay as much atten 
tion to the damage that household waste disposal 
can do to the environment, as that caused by industry 
and agriculture. A policy of creating public aware 
ness and of putting in place the necessary infrastruc 
ture to treat water and dispose of waste is essential to 
reduce the pressure on the environment. 
So far as the treatment of domestic water is con 
cerned, 90% of the population in the EU is connected 
to main water supply and 70% to main drainage. 
There are, however, large regional variations. 
Whereas in northern Europe as a whole, 90% of the 
population is connected to a main drainage system 
for treating waste water, in the cohesion countries, the 
proportion varies from 27% in Portugal to 58% in 
Greece (see Graph A.21). Moreover, in Belgium, it is 
only 32%. In the candidate countries, 40% of the pop 
ulation is not connected to a main water supply sys 
tem and only 42% of waste water is treated, and only a 
small proportion of this to the level required by Com 
munity standards. 
Household waste is treated in very different ways in 
different parts of the Union, in terms of whether it is in 
cinerated, recycled, buried or simply dumped. Al 
though the southern Member States tend to produce 
much lower levels of household waste than the rest of 
the EU (see Graph A.22), they also have much less in 
the way of treatment systems. Whereas 60% of 
household waste was recycled in the EU as a whole in 
1995, and 80% in Germany and France, in Greece, 
the figure was only 5%, in Portugal, 30% and in Spain 
45%. 
Although the candidate countries have already intro 
duced recycling of waste on a relatively large scale in 
order to compensate for their shortage of primary re 
sources, nearly all of them are having difficulty meet 
ing the recycling targets set out in the Community 
directive (50% of waste recycled by 2001 for current 
Member States). Recycling installations have not 
been modernised and a number have even had to be 
closed down because of lack of public funds. The 
Czech Republic, for example, currently recycles only 
15% of the packaging waste produced, Slovenia, 
29%, and Hungary, 32%. The situation is likely to de 
teriorate further in the future as the higher rate of eco 
nomic growth, which will probably occur, could 
increase the amount of waste produced (according 
to the European Environmental Agency Report for 
1999). In consequence, the support of structural 
measures in this area is required in order to sustain 
economic development in the enlarged Union. 
Human resource development 
The competitiveness of an economy depends, as 
noted above, not only on its physical capital, but also 
on the knowledge possessed by its entrepreneurs 
and labour force. Effective educational and training 
systems are, therefore, important for raising produc 
tivity and fostering economic growth. There are, how 
ever, striking differences in education and training 
across Europe. 
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Significant variations in educational attainment 
levels between Member States 
Despite the gradual reduction of educational dispari 
ties over the past 30 years, there is still a large gap in 
educational attainment levels between the cohesion 
countries and the rest of the Union. In particular, in the 
former a large proportion of the population aged 25 to 
59 has only a low education level, ie no educational 
qualifications beyond compulsory schooling (1999: 
75% in Portugal, some 65% in Spain and around half 
in Greece and Ireland). The same is true for Italy, 
where more than half of those in this age group have 
low education. 
By contrast, in the three Nordic countries, Belgium 
and the UK, more than a quarter of those aged 25 to 
59 has a high (or tertiary) level of educational attain 
ment (university degree or the equivalent) (Map 12). 
The applicant countries: higher educational needs 
than figures indicate 
In the Central European candidate countries, a large 
proportion of the population aged 25 to 59 has an up 
per secondary level of education, particularly in the 
Czech Republic and Poland, where the figure is over 
70%. 
Recent studies, however, offer a less optimistic as 
sessment and suggest that the high proportion of 
people with educational attainment levels beyond el 
ementary schooling is mainly due to lower vocational 
schools offering a basic form of training: The fact of 
having a relatively high number of workers with edu 
cational attainment above elementary schooling was 
mainly a by product of the presence in these coun 
tries of lower vocational schools offering generally 
one to two years of training in narrowly defined occu 
pations up to the completion of compulsory school 
ing. These lower vocational schools were actually 
part of the basic schools and were indeed not even 
formally considered as part of the secondary system 
of these countries.'
15 In addition, there is a question 
mark over the quality and nature of vocational training 
at upper secondary level, which in many cases 
seems outdated. This underlines the need for devel 
oping appropriate human resources strategies in 
these countries in order to avoid low skills slowing 
down economic and social development. 
Growing number of qualified young people 
Technological advance and continuing globalisation 
are increasing the demand for skilled labour. The ed 
ucational attainment level of young people in the EU 
has been rising continuously for the past 30 years or 
more. In 1999, only 27% of young people aged 25 to 
34 in the EU had no qualifications beyond compul 
sory schooling as compared with 48% in the in the 50 
to 59 age group. Similarly, 49% of those aged 25 to 34 
had upper secondary level education as against only 
35% of the 50 to 59 age group, while 24% of 25 to 34 
year olds had a university degree or equivalent as 
opposed to 17% of those aged 50 to 59. It is expected 
that the number of people enrolled in higher educa 
tion will double in the next ten years and this will strain 
the higher education systems in Europe. 
The increase in educational attainment levels is evi 
dent in all Member States. It is particularly marked in 
the cohesion countries, as well as in Italy, where aver 
age education levels of older people are relatively 
low. The proportion of 25 to 34 year olds in the cohe 
sion countries with an upper secondary level qualifi 
cation in 1999 was twice as high as among those 
aged 50 to 59 and the difference was similar in the 
case of tertiary education (Graph 12). As a result, the 
gap in attainment levels between Member States is 
narrowing. 
At the same time, there is a stronger upward trend in 
the education attainment levels of women than men 
and in almost all Member States women in the youn 
ger age groups have attained a higher level of educa 
tion than their male counterparts. 
Nevertheless, the number of young people who leave 
the education system prematurely with only the most 
basic skills is still substantial; these young people are 
unable to respond adequately to the demand of a 
continuous updating of knowledge and competen 
cies throughout life, which is needed due to the accel 
erating pace of technological, scientific and 
economic evolution of society. 
In the European Union, an average of 22% of young 
people between 18 and 24 years old only acquire 
lower secondary education at most.
16 Some Member 
States lie significantly above this average. Further 
more, there are also alarmingly high rates in certain 
urban or peripheral areas as well as in disadvantaged 
social groups. 
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The problem is most serious in Portugal where over 
45% of 18 to 24 year olds fail to go on from compul 
sory schooling to further education or vocational 
training. 
In the learning society, social stratification is increas 
ingly based on a division between the haves and 
have nots in terms of skills and qualifications. Drop 
ping out from school, therefore, has much more last 
ing consequences than it had in the past, since it can 
mark an individual for life and greatly narrow the 
range of career choices open to them. Schools are at 
the centre of the learning society and life long learn 
ing begins there. 
Failure at school affects all sections of society, but not 
all equally. Surveys show that those dropping out of 
school come predominantly from low income families 
where there is a history of failure. Many come from 
broken homes or from immigrant or refugee families 
which have not integrated successfully. Dropping out 
of school is, therefore, related to a range of social, 
health, family and financial factors. Although it is only 
one element of a cumulative process of social depri 
vation, it is often the critical one which deprives young 
people of the skills, qualifications and social contacts 
required to succeed or even to play a meaningful role 
in society. 
The fight against school failure is at the heart of the 
debate on educational reform; it is essential for sus 
taining a knowledge based economy and for 
12 
40 
35 
30 
25 
15 
10 
Population with university or equivalent 
qualifications by age group, 1999 
% population in age group 
maintaining a cohesive society and a democracy in 
which everyone can participate. 
An increase in education level is also evident in the 
candidate countries. In most of them, the proportion 
of people aged 25 to 34 with upper secondary educa 
tion is significantly higher than among those aged 50 
to 59 years, though the proportion with tertiary level 
education is much the same and remains relatively 
low among young people. Enrolment rates in universi 
ties are, therefore, in general significantly lower than 
intheEU. 
Employment prospects 
rise with level of education 
In almost all EU Member States, the level of education 
is an important determinant of finding employment. 
Except for Greece, and to a lesser extent Portugal, 
unemployment in the EU is much lower among those 
with high educational attainment levels than those 
with lower ones. In 1999, the average rate of unem 
ployment of those aged 25 to 59 with a tertiary level of 
education was 5% as against 8% for those with upper 
secondary level and 12% for those with only basic 
schooling. In some Member States, unemployment 
rates of people with low education were 3 to 4 times 
higher than for those with high education (Graph 13). 
The link between education and employment rates is 
even closer, especially for women. This is because a 
large proportion of women with low education   and a 
significant proportion of men   are not part of the la 
bour force at all. In other words, educa 
tion levels affect not only the chances 
of being unemployed, but also of being 
economically active. 
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A similar pattern is evident in the candi 
date countries. The difference in unem 
ployment rates between those with 
differing levels of education is very 
marked in the Czech Republic, Hun 
gary, Poland and Slovakia, where 
those with a low educational attainment 
level are up to 7 times more likely to be 
unemployed than those with a high 
attainment. 
In Greece, Spain and Italy, in particu 
lar, as well as in most of the candi 
date countries, however, a 
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significant number of young people aged 25 to 34 
with a high level of education have difficulty finding 
a job after completing their studies, which con 
trasts sharply with the position of older people with 
similar qualifications. 
It should also be emphasised that differences in em 
ployment prospects between men and women per 
sist. Women with a given level of education are more 
likely to be unemployed than men with a similar level 
in most parts of the EU. Inequalities are particularly 
marked in Greece, Spain and Italy. By contrast, in 
most of the candidate countries, women seem to be in 
less of an unequal position than in the EU. 
Finally, it should be noted that there is a clear positive 
relationship between levels of educational qualifica 
tions and earnings. In all Member States, those em 
ployed full time with tertiary education earn 
significantly more on average than those with upper 
secondary education. The difference is over 50% in 
Germany, France and Austria, and 100% in Portugal. 
The difference in earnings between those with upper 
secondary and those with lower secondary education 
is much less in most Member States (10 20%), but still 
significant. 
Access to continuing training still varies markedly 
between Member States 
Continuing education and training are essential 
both for the job prospects of individuals and for 
maintaining the competitiveness of a modern 
cate that access to training is almost certainly less 
in the cohesion countries than elsewhere. 
Although it took no account of the quality and rele 
vance of training, a recent OECD survey suggests 
that the duration of job related training also varies sig 
nificantly between the countries covered. Annual 
hours of training undertaken by employees, there 
fore, ranged from 27 in Belgium (Flanders only) to 57 
in the Netherlands.
17 
LFS evidence suggests in addition that younger 
workers tend to receive more training than older ones. 
Whereas only 2.5% of those aged 55 to 59 in the EU 
had participated in training or education in the refer 
ence weeks, the figure for those aged 25 to 29 was 
10% and for those aged 30 to 34,8%. Moreover, there 
seems to be a clear link between educational attain 
ment levels and access to training, in all Member 
States, those with high education having much more 
opportunity to receive training than those with lower 
levels. Greater efforts are, therefore, needed to pre 
vent the problems of people with low initial education 
being compounded by having only limited access to 
continuing training. 
Adaptation of educational systems to ICT has 
started, but still has some way to go 
For students to make a smooth transition into the 
modern labour market, they need to be exposed to in 
formation and communications technology (ICT) in 
school. Although the integration of ICT into the 
economy. While indicators suggest 
that participation in job related train 
ing for those in employment has in 
creased throughout Europe, they 
also show that participation in train 
ing is still relatively low and that there 
are still large disparities between 
Member States. In 1999, only just 
over 10% of employees in the EU cov 
ered in the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) had undertaken any training at 
all during the previous four weeks. 
Participation rates varied from under 
5% in around half the Member States 
to over 20% in Netherlands, Den 
mark, Finland and Sweden. Although 
these figures involve a high degree of 
uncertainty and are not fully compa 
rable between countries, they indi 
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education system is becoming increasingly wide 
spread across the EU, as Member States implement 
the conclusions of the Lisbon Council and the 
eLearning initiative, which called for a strengthening 
of ICT in systems of education, ICT is included in the 
primary and lower secondary curriculum in the major 
ity of EU and candidate countries. The extent of prog 
ress in this area is, however, difficult to assess. While 
national data exist, there are no EU harmonised data 
available. 
A pilot OECD study suggests that access to ICT in edu 
cation, measured by the number of students per com 
puter, varies significantly across the EU.
18 While 
primary schools in Finland, Sweden, and Denmark typ 
ically have between 11 and 14 students per computer, 
the figure in Italy and Portugal ranges from 50 to 150. In 
secondary schools, whereas there are an average of 7 
students per computer in Sweden, Finland and Ireland, 
in Portugal, the figure is 65. In both primary and sec 
ondary schools, access to computers is lower in almost 
all Member States than in the US. 
Innovation and RTD 
Innovation 7s a means by which less favoured regions 
can move immediately alongside the developed re-
gions, not by attempting to imitate what the latter have 
already achieved but by trying to lay the groundwork, 
in accordance with their own features and require-
ments (.,.), for adapting to the conditions of competi-
tiveness in a global economy.'™ 
It is widely accepted today that the ability of regional 
economies to withstand competition and adapt to tech 
nical change is related to their capacity to innovate. 
This, of course, is not new, but the increasing impor 
tance of knowledge (as compared with natural re 
sources, physical capital and labour supply) in 
determining economic performance puts technology 
and innovation high on the regional development 
agenda. 
The Lisbon European Council reiterated the impor 
tance of research and development, and innovation, 
for economic growth, employment creation and so 
cial cohesion. It emphasised the need to create a Eu 
ropean research and innovation area and asked the 
Commission and Member States to carry out a series 
of measures in order to meet the aims set out in the 
Commission Communication, Towards a European 
Research Area.' 
The importance of innovation was highlighted by 
the European Council, which called for, inter alia, a 
challenging programme for enhancing innovation 
and economic reform. The Commission's communi 
cation on 'Innovation Policy in a knowledge driven 
economy'
20 set broad policy guidelines for enhancing 
innovation in the EU. As innovation has come to be 
understood as a key element in economic develop 
ment policy, so the importance of the regional dimen 
sion has been increasingly recognised. Many 
measures are most effectively conceived at a re 
gional level, where the needs of enterprises, and the 
environment in which they operate, can best be 
assessed. 
Understanding of the process by which technology 
and innovation affects regional development has 
evolved overtime. Rather than innovation being seen 
as a linear process from basic research to commer 
cial success, a more interactive model has emerged, 
which recognises the importance of the environment 
in which firms, and SMEs in particular, operate. In 
deed, since SMEs lack the articulation of business 
functions of large firms, they have to rely more on 
making use of capabilities external to the firm. 
Innovation has, therefore, been associated with con 
cepts of network formation and management and of 
clustering. In this respect, it no longer depends solely 
on how firms, universities, research institutes and 
regulators perform, but, increasingly, on how they 
work together, particularly at the regional level. 
In the EU today, the capacity to innovate varies signifi 
cantly from one region to another, both in quantitative 
and qualitative terms. To give an insight into these vari 
ations, the Commission presented in September 
2000
21 a first outline of a European innovation score 
board, which indicates the extent of disparities in this 
area across the EU. Certain Member States, particu 
larly the Nordic ones, scored quite highly, sometimes 
even higher than the US. In terms of the number of indi 
cators with values significantly above the EU average, 
Sweden had the highest score (with 12 out the 16 indi 
cators, 20% or more above average), followed by Fin 
land (8), Denmark and Germany (both 7). 
The following examines, first, the structure of na 
tional scientific and technological systems and, 
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second, how the capacity for innovation varies across 
the EU. 
Though converging, significant 
differences remain at the national level... 
Expenditure on research and technological develop 
ment (RTD) relative to GDP has increased in recent 
years in the cohesion countries, but, Ireland apart, the 
rise has not been enough to close the gap with the 
rest of the Union significantly. The technology gap 
between the cohesion countries and the four Member 
States where expenditure is highest (Germany, 
France, Sweden and Finland) has widened rather 
than narrowed (Table 5). 
Business expenditure on RTD declined relative to 
overall expenditure in Portugal, Greece and 
Spain between 1995 and 1998, as it did in the EU 
as a whole, though it rose in the top four Member 
States, and even more so in Ireland. As a result, 
the gap in innovation between the former three 
cohesion countries and the latter five could widen 
further, which could, in turn, reduce the chances of 
their competitiveness in EU or world markets 
improving. 
Government expenditure also fell in Greece and 
Spain, though this was in line with developments else 
where in the Union, while it remained unchanged in 
Portugal. The increase in overall expenditure in these 
three cohesion countries was, therefore, due to a rise 
in spending on higher education, which can be seen 
as a prerequisite for raising the skills of their labour 
force. 
The significant gap in RTD expenditure which exists 
between the cohesion countries and other Member 
States, especially in terms of business spending, in 
dicates a need for more 
encouragement for firms 
to undertake research ac 
tivities and, accordingly, 
the adaptation of RTD poli 
cies to this end. This 
means taking a broader 
view than simply redistrib 
uting EU expenditure on 
RTD to these countries. In 
lagging regions, in partic 
ular, attempts need to be 
made to increase: the 
capacity of businesses to absorb new technology 
and know how developed elsewhere; the capability 
of the work force to use this technology and adapt to 
new techniques; the entrepreneurial spirit to seek out 
new market opportunities and the availability of risk 
capital for innovation (see Table A.21). 
The few data available on the candidate countries
22 
suggest that since the beginning of the 1990s, the 
funds available for RTD have been reduced (applied 
research more so than science), competition for 
funds has increased and the demand for public RTD 
has fallen markedly. In 1995, RTD intensity in most 
countries was similar to that in the cohesion countries, 
while in Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, 
both public and private expenditure on RTD was 
closer to the EU average. 
The human resource potential in RTD in many of the 
candidate countries is relatively strong, as a legacy of 
the major role accorded to RTD under the socialist 
system, which means that they are well placed to 
catch up with present EU Member States, so long as 
there is a fundamental restructuring of the RTD sys 
tem (see Map A. 13). 
... particularly in terms of human resources 
The quality of human resources is the major factor be 
hind the invention and diffusion of technology and it is 
a precondition for increasing the capacity of a given 
economy to absorb new innovations. The difference 
in this respect between the most advanced countries 
in the EU and the cohesion countries has been re 
duced during the 1990s, but it remains the case that 
the former have around three times as many research 
staff in firms as the latter. 
Table 5 Expenditure on RTD in the cohesion countries and 
the rest of the EU, 1995 98 
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Business expenditure on RTD/ gross  I 1 II Tt 1 T 
expenditure on RTD 
Government expenditure on  U 1 1 1 1 
RTD/gross expenditure on RTD 
Higher education in RTD/gross  t TT T T t 
expenditure on RTD 
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Firms in the most developed regions can count on 
better targeted public assistance schemes 
A third dimension of the 'technology gap' takes the 
form of differences across the Union in the quality and 
quantity of schemes for public assistance. In the case 
of public assistance for innovation, measured in 
terms of state aid to RTD in manufacturing, in the most 
developed Member States the amount provided over 
the period 1995 to 1997 was over 10 times larger rela 
tive to employment than in the lagging countries. In 
Denmark, Finland, France, Austria, Germany and the 
Benelux countries, the figure in each case was above 
the EU average, while in the cohesion countries, it 
was under 60% of the average. In addition, in the lat 
ter a much smaller share of state aids is allocated 
to RTD than in other parts of the Union, even though 
their RTD and innovation needs are greater than 
elsewhere. 
Patent activity reflects differences 
in national innovation systems 
Patent applications have long been used as mea 
sures of innovative activity, the output of RTD and the 
extent of the links between the scientific system and 
the productive sector. This indicator for the cohesion 
countries is well below the EU average, despite some 
convergence over the 1990s. Patent applications in 
Spain, Portugal and Greece amounted to 20% of the 
EU average in 1998 as against 10% in 1989 (Map 13). 
In sum, therefore, the scientific and technological 
systems in cohesion countries are characterised by 
low RTD intensity, over representation of the public 
sector, low involvement of the private sector, weak 
links with business and low levels of technology 
transfer. 
Such differences give rise to problems as regards 
providing support since they suggest that injections 
of aid would bolster the existing (public oriented) sys 
tem, so perpetuating and even reinforcing the struc 
tural problems of the system itself. In consequence, 
regional development policies should focus on 
strengthening the environment in which firms operate 
and, in particular, the link between the scientific sys 
tem and business. 
Technological capacity highly 
concentrated at the regional level... 
The regional distribution of innovative capacity in the 
EU reflects the structure of national scientific and 
technological systems, though regional differences 
within Member States serve to widen disparities even 
further. 
There is a strong concentration of RTD and innovation 
in the most advanced regions of the EU, the top ten 
regions (in Germany, the UK, France and Finland) ac 
counting for around a third of all expenditure in the 
Union. At the same time, 17 of the 25 regions with the 
lowest RTD intensity (less than 25% of the EU aver 
age) are Objective 1 regions. Similar disparities are 
evident for business expenditure, human resources 
and patent applications. 
Interregional differences are particularly large in the 
cohesion countries. In Greece, for example, over half 
of RTD expenditure is incurred in Attiki (where Athens 
is located), which is also responsible for two thirds of 
patent applications. In Spain, over three quarters of 
business RTD is located in just three regions (30% in 
Madrid alone). 
... so affecting the innovative 
nature of economic activity 
High RTD intensity in the private sector and efficient 
links between the scientific sector and businesses 
are key to innovation and, in turn, economic growth. In 
almost all the top 25 regions in terms of employment 
in high tech sectors (over 12% of the total), RTD inten 
sity is also relatively high. In the 25 regions with the 
lowest RTD intensity, employment in high tech sec 
tors (4% or less of the total) is very low. According to 
the preliminary results of the second Community Sur 
vey on Innovation, the former group of regions are 
those with the highest innovation intensity in manu 
facturing, the highest number of enterprises with in 
novation activities and the highest turnover from 
innovative products. Most regions in Greece, Spain 
and Portugal, on the other hand, are at the other 
extreme. 
The importance of the regulatory, 
organisational and institutional environment 
These structural differences in science and technol 
ogy alone cannot explain the weakness of the 
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structure of economic activity in lagging regions. 
There is increasing consensus that the failure of firms 
in the regions concerned to innovate is not due pri 
marily to scientific or technological problems, but to 
shortcomings in the regulatory, institutional and or 
ganisational environment in which firms have to 
operate. 
In the less favoured regions, this environment is often 
characterised by a combination of structural weak 
nesses, such as lack of a dynamic business services 
sector, a poorly developed financial system, weak 
links between the public and private sectors, sectoral 
specialisation in traditional industries with little incli 
nation to innovate, low levels of public support for in 
novation and aid schemes which are poorly adapted 
to the needs of local SMEs. In view of this, a primary 
aim of regional policy should be to help develop new 
forms of organisation and institutional cooperation, 
and so improve the 'structural' competitiveness of 
firms located in lagging regions, and encourage re 
sources to be shifted into more dynamic and innova 
tive areas of economic activity. 
The knowledge economy 
Information and communication technology (ICT) is 
at the base of the knowledge economy. This makes it 
possible to store, process and circulate a growing 
amount of data rapidly and inexpensively and is an in 
creasingly important source of productivity gains. 
The transition towards the information society, how 
ever, is not just about technology. The change in 
volved is potentially the most far reaching since the 
Industrial Revolution and deeply affects the organisa 
tion of both the economy and society. Managing this 
change is one of the main challenges facing the Un 
ion today. 
To this end, the European Commission's 'eEurope  
An Information Society for all' Initiative, endorsed by 
the European Council in Lisbon in March 2000, is 
aimed at increasing the rate of uptake of digital tech 
nologies and at ensuring that everyone has the nec 
essary skills to use them. 
On average, EU countries spend an estimated 6% of 
GDP on ICT (see Graph A.23). Information and com 
munication industries are growing by more than 5 
percentage points faster than other sectors, in real 
terms, effectively driving economic growth in the 
EU.
23 ICT industries accounted for around 4% of em 
ployment in the EU in 1997,
24 and it is estimated that 
one in every four new jobs is created in ICT or related 
sectors.
25 If the attention is widened to encompass 
the so called 'knowledge based sectors' these have 
accounted for around a quarter of employment and 
for most of the growth in jobs in recent years.
26 
Liberalisation of the market combined with increas 
ingly rapid technological innovation is favouring com 
petition in telecommunication provision, bringing 
down costs and enhancing the choice and quality of 
services in most parts of the EU. The price of access 
ing Internet has dropped sharply in the recent past, 
though price remains a barrier to more widespread 
use in some countries. 
The potential is enormous 
Electronic commerce (e commerce) is expanding 
rapidly, forcing firms to rethink their business pro 
cesses and creating, at the same time, new forms of 
organisation, including new types of market and dif 
ferent kinds of business relationships. Internet based 
business to business (B2B) e commerce, the main 
component, estimated at 80% of the total now and 
90% by 2003, is developing fast and it is estimated 
that it will increase by over 90% a year over the period 
1999 2003.
27 
The use of e commerce technologies in B2B relation 
ships can increase efficiency through reducing and 
rationalising business processes. The effects are al 
ready apparent in product design (shortening the de 
sign process and increasing customisation 
possibilities and the standardisation of parts), and 
production and logistics (lower inventory costs, faster 
production, lower supply costs). The spread of B2B 
relationships in the US is estimated to have the poten 
tial for reducing business costs by between 13% and 
23%.
28 While the e commerce market is less devel 
oped in the EU, a reduction in operating costs aver 
aging 18% and in the cost of sales of 15% is expected 
(see Graph A.24). 
How regions adopt and master ICTs 
is key to their economic performance 
ICT penetration, defined as the value of ICT 
expenditure
29 as a share of GDP, is an important 
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measure of a country's transition towards the Informa 
tion Society as well as of its innovative capacity and 
competitiveness. The difference in terms of this mea 
sure between cohesion countries and other EU Mem 
ber States is small and tending to narrow the highest 
rate of growth in expenditure over the period 1991 to 
1999 occurred in Greece, together with Italy. In abso 
lute terms, however, given their low level of GDP, co 
hesion countries will have to invest relatively large 
amounts in ICT in the future in order to catch up. 
Though improvements in the standard of information 
and telecommunication infrastructure is a key deter 
minant of the capacity to participate in the Information 
Society, other factors play an equally, and increas 
ingly, important role, such as public awareness, the 
level of educational attainment, the role played by the 
public sector in promoting the Information Society 
and the organisational and investment capacity of 
firms. 
The telecommunication 
infrastructure gap is closing 
Over the past 20 years, differences between Member 
States in access to a fixed line telephone have nar 
rowed significantly (Graph 14). In most EU countries, 
the proportion of households with a telephone line is 
around the EU average of 92%, but it is still as low as 
69% in Portugal as against 97% in Sweden.
30 While 
the figure in Finland is only 78%, this is compensated 
to a significant extent by the large proportion of 
households with a mobile telephone and no fixed line 
phone (18%, almost five times the EU 
average). The same phenomenon is 
also evident, though to a lesser extent, 
in Portugal (12%) and Ireland (where 
only 84% of households have a 
fixed line phone), but a fifth of Portu 
guese households and a tenth of Irish 
households do not have access to tele 
phone services at home at all as 
against an EU average of just 4%. Nev 
ertheless, there are marked differ 
ences between regions   of over 15 
percentage points   in the proportion 
of households with fixed lines in Ger 
many, France and Italy. 
average, though in both Slovenia and, to a lesser ex 
tent, Estonia, the number is higher.
31 
Mobile phones and cable may 
provide alternative access to Internet... 
Though variations exist in the penetration of mobile 
telephones across the EU, differences do not reflect 
relative levels of prosperity. All the Nordic countries 
have a relatively high rate of penetration as does Italy, 
but in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, the rate is also 
around the EU average or above. Most countries, 
however, including the cohesion countries, which 
have a relatively low ownership of PCs and/or limited 
Internet access, have high levels of telephone use, 
which opens up the possibility of using mobile 
phones to access the Internet in the future. 
It is evident that the high use of mobile phones in the 
Nordic countries is partly a consequence of their geo 
graphical features and the dispersion of population 
over large areas. In the southern Member States, by 
contrast, the rapid growth in use reflects the low qual 
ity, or lack, of fixed lines (see Graph A.25). 
Perhaps unexpectedly, the use of mobile phones is 
somewhat lower in rural areas (39% of households) 
than in urban areas (45%). 
The rate of penetration of mobile phones in the candi 
date countries at the end of the 1990s was only 
around a quarter of the EU average, though increas 
ing rapidly (at 108% a year between 1996 and 1999). 
In the candidate countries, the total 
number of telephone lines per 100 in 
habitants is less than half the EU 
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Technology in this area is developing fast, offering 
new means of access to the Internet   through third 
generation mobile services with greater band width  
as well as ISDN, xDSL, cable and digital TV connec 
tions. Since in the future, the level of broadband ac 
cess is likely to become much more important for 
business and household Internet use, the availability 
of this will be a key issue. 
... but access to the Information 
Society remains uneven 
There are significant differences across the Union in 
the use of PCs at home and in access to the Internet 
(Graph 15). France apart, there seems to be a clear 
North South divide in the rate of internet connection. 
In Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy as well as Ire 
land, the rate is half the EU average of 12%, while in 
the Nordic countries, it is well over 20% (in Sweden, 
51 %). In Greece, Portugal and Ireland, PC ownership 
is also low. 
Business use of the Internet is relatively high in a num 
ber of Member States, especially in the Nordic coun 
tries, though marked variations remain across the EU. 
For example, 76% of SMEs in Sweden are connected 
to the Internet but only 16% in Portugal.
32 While SMEs 
surveyed recently, reported that they were moder 
ately well informed about the potential of the Internet, 
a third did not have access. In cohesion countries, the 
number without access is higher than elsewhere in 
the EU, which is in line with the Commission analysis 
that low awareness of the potential benefits and op 
portunities and a scarcity of ICT skills, along with the 
often weak content of software at present, are the 
main barriers to the development of the Information 
Society. 
The focus of structural policy in this area should, 
therefore, be on strengthening the demand side, and 
in particular, the capacity of firms, institutions and in 
dividuals to use ICT effectively. 
In the candidate countries, the number of PCs per 
100 people has increased steadily. Three groups of 
countries can be distinguished: Slovenia, with a rate 
similar to the EU average; Poland and the Czech Re 
public among others, with rates similar to the cohe 
sion countries; and Romania and Bulgaria, with rates 
of between 10% and 25% of the EU average. 
In the EU, there is also clear evidence of a social di 
vide, with high income households being six times 
more likely to be connected to the Internet than low in 
come ones. In addition, a higher proportion of house 
holds in urban areas (13 15%) is connected to 
Internet than in rural areas (8%). These differences, 
however, seem to arise more from lack of awareness 
about the possibilities offered by the Internet than 
from the cost (45% of EU households without access 
report not being interested and 9% not to know about 
the Internet at all, as against 11 % citing cost as a rea 
son for non connection). 
15 Access to PC equipment and the internet, 
1999 
% population 
PC but not Internet 
Internet 
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European Commission (2000), The competitiveness of European industry'. See also European Commission (1999) The Sixth 
Periodic Report on the Regions' (section 2 on competitiveness), OECD (1996) 'Industrial competitiveness', Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy (1996) 'International competitiveness' Vol. 12, no.3. 
EU13 figure, until the UK and IRL present their statistics. The UK is due in the coming months, IRL may not come at all (presentation of 
these figures is optional and not a regulatory requirement). 
In non market services, the figure for productivity should be interpreted with caution since the public sector does not generate profits 
and, therefore, value added consists entirely of wages and salaries. 
See, for example, Midelfart Knarvik, Overman, Redding and Venables (1999) The location of European industry'. 
These projections do not take account of future EU membership, which could affect the underlying trends, particularly of migration, 
though most of this movement is likely to occur between these countries and the existing EU Member States, but also, in the 
longer term, birth and death rates. 
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6 These rates, it should be noted, are only demographic indicators. While they reflect the problems implied for social welfare and 
taxation systems, there are other equally important factors which need to be taken into account, particularly the number of people of 
working age who are actually in employment and paying taxes and social contributions. 
7 Based on the latest Eurostat regional labour force scenarios, compiled in 1998, which are combined with the population projections 
produced in 1997. The scenarios cover 204 regions NUTS 2 level regions in the EU over the period 1995 to 2025. The baseline 
scenario which is referred to in the text assumes the continuation of most current trends but some reduction in regional imbalances. 
8 European Integration Consortium (DIW/CEPR/FIEF/IAS/IGIER) 2000, The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on employment and labour 
markets in the EU Member States, study for DG Employment and Social Affairs of the European Commission; Berlin/Milan. 
9 Bauer, T. and Zimmermann, K.(1999): Assessment of possible migration pressure and its labour market impact following EU 
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, Study for the UK Department of Education and Employment, IZA and CEPR, 
Bonn/London, Germany/UK. 
10 Gross fixed capital Formation is investment net of disposals. Gross refers to the fact that it does not take into account depreciation or 
consumption of capital. Fixed means that only investment which is used for more than a year is considered. 
11 Gross capital stock is calculated by cumulating past investment and deducting the cumulated value of investment that has been 
retired. Net capital stock includes depreciation and is thus probably the better measure. 
12 eg Abramovitz (1989) Thinking about growth'. 
13 Density is measured by a composite index which indicates a region's endowment in relation to the EU average. Specifically, it is an 
arithmetic average of the number of miles of motorway relative to its land area and population. 
14 Measured in the same way as for roads, by a composite index of the length of track in a region relative to its land area and population 
in relation to the EU average. 
15 See study on 'The impact of eastern enlargement on employment and the labour market in the EU Member States' (part B Strategic 
Report, chapter 3.3). 
16 Eurostat, Labour Market Survey 1998. 
17 See OECD: Education at a glance 2000, p.195ff. 
18 See OECD: Education policy analysis 1999, p.49ff. The study only provides 1997/98 data for the following 10 EU Member States: 
Belgium (Flemish Community), Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, UK. 
19 CEC (1995), 'Green Paper on Innovation', European Commission, Luxembourg. 
20 COM(2000)567 of 20 September 2000. 
21 Innovation policy in a knowledge driven economy   COM (2000) 567 of 20 September 2000. 
22 'Impact of the enlargement of the EU towards the associated Central and Eastern European countries on RTD innovation and 
structural policies', European Communities 1999. 
23 'Job opportunities in the Information Society', CEC 1998, p. 4. 
24 'Measuring the ICT Sector', OECD (2000). The ICT sector is defined on the basis of 11 ISIC classes. For manufacturing, the products 
of an ICT industry must 'be intended to fulfil the function of information processing and communication including transmission and 
display or must use electronic processing to detect, measure and/or record physical phenomena or to control a physical process.' 
For services, the industry 'must be intended to enable the function of information processing and communication by electronic 
means.' 
25 Information Society industries include content industries (eg publishing, audio visual, advertising) and ICT related industries (eg 
computer and software, computer related services, telecomminications equipment and services). 
26 See Employment in Europe, 2000, Chapter 3. 
27 Based on International Data Corporation (IDC) data, Internet Commerce Market Model, 1999. 
28 Goldman Sachs US (1999), 'B2B: 2B or not 2B, e commerce/internet' Goldman Sachs Investment Research. 
29 ICT expenditure includes IT hardware, software and services, telecommunication equipment and telecommunication services, at 
market value. 
30 Gallup Residential Survey (2000). 
31 European Survey of Information Society (ESIS) in Central and Eastern European countries, CEC 1999. 
32 The Gallup survey of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) (2000). 
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Based on the rationale that macroeconomic stability 
is conducive to higher real growth and that Member 
States' economic policies should be consistent within 
a currency area, the EC Treaty defines several criteria 
of economic convergence which need to be met in or 
der to participate in the Euro. Having reached a high 
degree of sustainable convergence regarding price 
stability, the government financial position (deficit 
and debt), exchange rates and long term inter 
est rates, the Council decided in May 1998 that 
11 Member States could adopt the Euro as from 
1 January 1999. Among those 11 Member States 
three are cohesion countries (Spain, Ireland and 
Portugal) and the fourth cohesion country, Greece, 
has joined the Euro area at the beginning of the year 
2001. 
Enhanced stability in the cohesion countries would 
have been more difficult to achieve outside the frame 
work of EMU. This framework is based on coordina 
tion and surveillance of economic policies pursued 
by Member States, which have the main responsibil 
ity for these. The results achieved by the cohesion 
Union (EMU) 
countries in terms of stabilisation since the beginning 
of the 1990s have been impressive, in particular in 
Greece and Portugal where inflation rates in 1990 
were 20% and 13% respectively. The historically 
unique degree of stability in the cohesion countries 
provides improved conditions for private investment, 
which have already contributed to above EU average 
growth rates in recent years. Cohesion countries' per 
formance in terms of nominal convergence, ex 
pressed by low inflation rates, and real convergence, 
expressed in above EU average real GDP growth, 
have occurred in parallel during the second half of the 
1990s (Graphs 16 and 17). This trend has been par 
ticularly strong in the case of Ireland which is a good 
example of how real and nominal convergence go 
hand in hand since the mid 1980s, when a long term 
strategy of a consistent, stability oriented macroeco 
nomic policy mix was started (see Box). Catching up 
was somewhat slower in Spain and Portugal. In 
Greece, important achievements in nominal conver 
gence since the mid 1990s have translated into a 
positive growth differential w's a w'sthe EU which had 
not been the case since the 1970s. 
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In order to ensure that these achievements in terms of 
stabilisation are not merely temporary, procedures of 
multilateral economic surveillance and coordination 
have been reinforced within the EU, which encom 
pass different areas of economic policy, such as bud 
getary policies, employment policies, structural 
reform and macroeconomic dialogue with the social 
partners. Given the achievements in macroeconomic 
stability, more emphasis has now been put on the 
smooth functioning of product, capital and labour 
markets which allow the full benefits of EMU in terms 
of growth and cohesion to be realised. Although tak 
ing place at varying speeds in different Member 
States, the liberalisation of markets and the 
privatisation of public enterprises have not only con 
tributed to budgetary consolidation by reducing the 
need for subsidies, but   even more importantly  
have also improved the overall efficiency and com 
petitiveness of these economies. Without sufficiently 
open and flexible markets, Ireland's high growth rates 
would hardly have been sustainable. The creation of 
more efficient product and capital markets in the 
1990s has enabled the Portuguese economy to move 
rapidly towards macroeconomic stabilisation without 
creating major imbalances. Labour market reforms in 
Spain in the second half of the 1990s have contrib 
uted to higher growth in both employment and GDP. 
Nevertheless, structural reforms in the cohesion 
countries, particularly in Greece, need to be further 
reinforced. 
The introduction of the Euro also benefits growth due 
to increasing market integration through the lower 
transaction costs achieved from eliminating the need 
for currency exchange and the associated risk, as 
well as the costs of comparing prices. An idea of the 
size of the initial regional effects of monetary union 
can be gained from the trade related exchange costs 
estimated for 1994.
1 The estimates were produced by 
multiplying the trade of each region with other 
Euro area countries by the respective bid offer 
spreads between currencies participating in the 
Euro. The results suggest that it is national rather than 
regional characteristics which determine the scale of 
economies and that exchange costs are high in re 
gions where: 
  exchange rate volatility w's a w'sthe stable core of 
the Deutschmark area had been high, which 
means, in particular, for regions in Spain, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Finland; 
  the share of foreign trade with other Euro area 
countries is high, which is especially the case for 
the six founding members of the European 
Community; 
  the share of production of manufacturing goods 
is high, as in the north east of Spain, the east of 
France, the north east of Belgium, the north east 
of Italy and the north of Portugal; by contrast, in 
major cities and peripheral regions, where ser 
vices predominate, exchange cost savings are 
relatively small. 
These initial or static effects of the introduction of the 
Euro will trigger dynamic effects on the structure of 
production as competition increases, economies of 
scale are realised, products become more diversified 
and the pace of innovation and growth is accelerated. 
Accordingly, there are likely to be changes in regional 
markets for goods, capital and labour. Some specific 
effects of monetary union on capital and labour mar 
ket integration are worth mentioning. 
Lower transaction costs are likely to affect the price 
and availability of capital, since interest rate differen 
tials between participating Member States will be re 
duced because of the disappearance of exchange 
rate risk premiums and an increase in the efficiency of 
financial markets which were previously fragmented. 
Since January 1999, financial markets in the Euro 
area all trade in Euros, the most visible sign of mone 
tary union. Capital can more easily be transferred 
within the EU to investment in locations where it yields 
the highest return, which is no longer subject to the 
uncertainty caused by the possibility of exchange 
rate fluctuation. As a result, the specific characteris 
tics of different regions assume more weight in the 
competition for mobile capital. 
A widespread concern regarding the impact of the 
Euro on labour markets is that by making it easier to 
compare wages in participating countries, greater 
transparency could lead to them being equalised. 
However, wage differences between countries reflect 
underlying differences in productivity. Regional com 
petitiveness depends not only on labour costs as 
such, but on costs in relation to labour productivity 
(i.e. on unit labour costs) among many other factors. 
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The Irish experience 
The basis of the recent performance of the Irish econ 
omy was established during the 1980s, though the most 
striking results did not appear until the mid 1990s. In es 
sence, it was the fear of an unsustainable growth in pub 
lic debt and in debt interest   particularly because a 
large part of debt was in foreign hands (over 40% in 
1987)  which sparked a rethink of policy and a move to 
wards budgetary consolidation. 
Budgetary consolidation was achieved mainly by con 
trolling public expenditure which was reduced from 
50% of GDP to around 30%   in part through a reduction 
in debt interest   and which served to transform a bud 
get deficit of over 10% of GDP in 1985 into a surplus. 
At the same time, tax reductions and fiscal reform 
played an important role in the tripartite agreements 
reached between Government, trade unions and em 
ployers (on four occasions since 1988), which enabled 
a growth of labour costs to be achieved which was com 
patible with low inflation and a substantial improvement 
in competitiveness. Moreover, because the growth in 
real terms was well below the growth of productivity, it 
also led to a marked increase in the profitability of in 
vestment. Despite pay restraint, real wages were able to 
grow significantly, especially in the second half of the 
1990s, fuelling a strong increase in private consumption 
and domestic demand. 
Budgetary consolidation and wage moderation en 
abled the Maastricht criteria to be fulfilled and monetary 
conditions to be eased. This, together with conver 
gence of interest rates towards the level required by 
EMU, the strengthening of competitiveness and in 
creased profitability created particularly favourable 
conditions for rapid growth of output and employment 
during the latter part of the 1990s, without endangering 
price stability. 
Because of the improvement in competitiveness, 
growth was export led from the beginning. Moreover, 
investment progressively became a more important 
source of growth as capacity utilisation increased, prof 
itability rose and monetary conditions eased. Between 
1994 and 2000, investment increased by over 13% a 
year, rising from around 16% of GDP to 25%. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI), which remained a key 
objective of development strategy, was important not 
only in expanding the capital stock but also in transfer 
ring technology. This led to clusters of highly competi 
tive and dynamic foreign owned manufacturing 
companies being established, particularly in electron 
ics and pharmaceuticals, and more recently, in interna 
tionally traded services, such as financial services and 
call centres. 
The macroeconomic policies pursued were coupled 
with an active structural policy, including training of the 
work force to avoid high rates of growth being con 
strained by shortages of skilled labour. Growth of the la 
bour force was stimulated by reform of the tax and 
social protection systems as well as by the return of emi 
grants. The employment rate, therefore, increased from 
around 52
1/2% of working age population in 1985 to 
62
1/2% in 1999. 
The other element which deserves emphasis is the con 
tribution of the Structural Funds, which not only in 
creased the net capital inflow into the economy but 
more importantly co financed structural measures for 
regional development, expansion of infrastructure and 
increased training of the work force. Ireland demon 
strates what can be achieved if Structural Funds assis 
tance is integrated into a coherent policy which, in 
particular, maintains healthy macroeconomic condi 
tions and which is supported by social consensus. It is 
an example of 'good practice' of the first order. 
1 Hallet, Martin 1999, The Regional impact of the single currency, in Manfred M. Fischer and Peter Nijkamp (eds.), 'Spatial dynamics of 
European integration   Regional and policy issues at the turn of the century', Springer Verlag: Berlin, pp. 94 109. 11.1 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
72 11.2 Internal market 
Integration and structural policies 
This section examines, first, the extent of economic 
integration in the wider Europe   in both the existing 
EU Member States and the candidate countries   in 
terms of the convergence of price levels, the expan 
sion of trade and the growth of direct investment. Sec 
ondly, it considers whether the structure of economic 
activity, in terms of its distribution between sectors, is 
becoming more or less similar between countries and 
regions, which reflects the extent to which these are 
becoming more or less specialised in the production 
of particular goods and services. Thirdly, it examines 
the possible social effects of closer integration. 
Competing economic theories suggest that, on bal 
ance, closer integration should lead to a narrowing of 
disparities between the economies involved. How 
ever, such convergence is by no means assured and 
where it occurs, it could take a longer time than is so 
cially or politically acceptable. The analysis of the 
previous chapter confirms that differences in income 
(GDP) per head both between Member States and re 
gions appear, in fact, to have been reduced over 
time. 
Within the global trend, there have been significant 
differences of experience, and while catching up has 
been rapid for some parts of the Union, for others, the 
gaps have failed to close. Attributing cause and ef 
fect to these developments is difficult. In effect, they 
have coincided with, on the one hand, moves towards 
economic and monetary union, and, on the other 
hand, the introduction of cohesion policies to in 
crease investment in the weaker parts of the Union 
under the Structural Funds. In Part III of this Report, 
the impact of the latter policies is examined in more 
detail. 
Price differences, 
trade and investment flows 
Narrowing price differences 
As economic integration proceeds, costs of transac 
tions between markets tend to decline so narrowing 
price differences. In the Union, the evidence sug 
gests that prices across the Union are indeed becom 
ing more similar (as shown by a recent study based 
on a Eurostat price survey of 270 product groups
1). 
This is particularly so for manufactured goods, which 
are generally subject to trade, though in some cases 
  motor vehicles, for example   prices still differ mark 
edly between Member States. Price differences con 
tinue to exist, however, for most services, including 
housing, and non traded goods, reflecting the varia 
tion in local market conditions (see Table A.22 in 
Annex). 
Evidence also suggests that prices of industrial 
goods, especially machinery and equipment, in 
some of the more advanced Central European coun 
tries have already become similar to those in the EU, 
which is perhaps to be expected given that a large 
part of the market is supplied by imports from the 
Union. 
Conditions in financial markets in the EU, which were 
already becoming integrated during the 1990s, have 
become increasingly similar since the introduction of 
the Euro. This is particularly evident as regards nomi 
nal long term interest rates, which reflect both expec 
tations of future inflation rates and conditions on 
capital markets, which have converged to much the 
same level (see Graph A.26). 
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Cohesion country trade patterns approaching 
those in the more prosperous Member States 
Trade between EU Member States continued to ex 
pand during the 1990s, the increase being particu 
larly pronounced for Finland and Sweden following 
their accession to the EU. At the same time, there was 
an even stronger increase in the trade of all Member 
States, especially Ireland, with countries outside the 
Union. This reflects two factors: first, the continued 
process of globalisation and the further reduction of 
trade barriers in the context of the Uruguay round, 
secondly, the higher rate of growth of markets in the 
rest of the world, especially the US, than in the EU 
(see Graphs A.27 A.29). The EU economies, there 
fore, seem to be becoming more closely integrated 
into the global economy at the same time as their inte 
gration with each other continues to increase. 
The effects of economic integration can also be seen 
in the changing pattern of trade, which tends to be 
come more similar between countries as they be 
come more interdependent. The evidence on trade 
flows indicates that the extent of intra industry trade 
(which measures the similarity of the composition of 
exports and imports) is high for all EU Member States. 
This index, calculated for the EU12 (ie the euro zone) 
countries' intra EU trade from 1988 to 1998, shows 
that Greece, Ireland and Portugal still have a consid 
erably lower degree of intra industry trade than all 
other countries, which is suggestive of the existence 
of a 'development gap' regarding their productive 
structure. In Portugal, however, intra industry trade 
has increased significantly even though the index is 
still lower than for all other countries except Greece. 
For most other countries, the index has increased, 
with the biggest increase having taken place for 
Spain, which has now a higher level than many other 
Member States (see Graph A.30). 
CECs are not competing in the same sections 
of the market as EU Member States 
Trade between the EU Member States and the 13 
candidate countries (ie including Turkey) expanded 
rapidly over the 1990s, boosted in part by European 
agreements, and the former have become by a long 
way the most important trade partners of the latter. 
Between 1993 and 1999, the value of trade between 
the two groups of country multiplied by almost three 
times, to EUR 210 billion. The candidate countries to 
gether accounted for 13.7% of the total external 
exports of the Eu in 1999. The EU trade surplus with 
them declined significantly in 1999 but still stood at 
EUR 25.8 billion, 45% of it with Poland and 20% with 
Turkey. Both the EU share of CEC exports and the 
share of EU goods in CEC imports have continued to 
increase. The figures are highest in Hungary, where 
the EU share of imports was 64% in 1999, while 76% 
of Hungarian exports went to the EU, and in Estonia, 
where the figures were 65% and 73%, respectively. 
Growth in both these shares is also evident in the 
other countries, even in those, like Latvia and Lithua 
nia, where they were relatively low. 
The provisions on free trade in the European agree 
ments with the 10 CECs have opened the way to their 
economic integration with the EU, and the additional 
agreements on agriculture, recently adopted, will ad 
vance this further. As a result, the proportion of agri 
cultural trade exempt from duty has more than 
doubled from 36% to 81 %, in the case of imports into 
the EU, and from 18% to 39%, in the case of exports to 
the CECs. Moreover, it has been agreed to pursue ne 
gotiations with each of the countries with a view to in 
creasing these figures further. 
In general, all countries are likely to gain from an ex 
pansion of trade, particularly those which have al 
ready established trade relations and close 
interdependencies in certain sectors, which tend to 
be those closest to the EU, on the one hand (Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia), and to the 
CECs, on the other hand (Austria, Germany and the 
Nordic countries)(see Graphs A.31 and A.32). 
The composition of trade between the EU and the 
CECs broadly conforms with expectations, given re 
spective comparative advantages. EU exports are 
more concentrated than CEC exports in high tech 
and advanced manufactures where labour skills are 
important. For most CECs, exports largely consist of 
relatively labour intensive products, especially in the 
case of Romania, Poland and Slovakia, as well as re 
source intensive ones, especially as regards the Bal 
tic States and Bulgaria. On the other hand, the 
composition of exports of Slovenia, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic are more similar to their imports from 
the EU and consist to a larger extent of high tech 
products (engineering goods and vehicles, 
especially). 
Moreover, for the latter countries especially, intra in 
dustry trade has grown relative to inter industry trade 
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over the 1990s. Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of 
the kinds of product traded within commodity groups 
reveals that EU exports are concentrated in higher 
unit value, higher quality section of the market, where 
labour force skills and R&D are important, whereas 
the CECs specialise in the lower price and lower qual 
ity end of the market, producing, for example, compo 
nents which are then exported to the EU for assembly 
into final products. Of the CECs, only Hungary ap 
pears to be moving towards more technology  and 
skill intensive engineering industries. 
The conclusion seems to be that most of the CECs are 
not yet effectively competing in the same sections of 
the market with even the southern EU Member States, 
given the large differences in unit values between the 
exports of the two which exist. This suggests that the 
fear among the latter that enlargement could result in 
a large loss of their export markets is misplaced. 
Trade accompanied by growing 
Foreign Direct Investment in the EU ... 
Economic integration occurs not only through trade 
but through foreign direct investment (FDI), by busi 
nesses setting up branches in other countries, to gain 
access to the market   especially important as re 
gards services   and to take advantage of lower pro 
duction costs. Provisional data from Eurostat (on FDI 
averaged over the years 1998 and 1999) indicate that 
FDI inflows are larger for Ireland, Sweden and the 
Benelux countries relative to GDP than for other Mem 
ber States, though in the case of Ireland and the Neth 
erlands, most of this originates from countries outside 
the EU (see Graphs A.33 and A.34). 
A large part of FDI takes the form of mergers and acqui 
sitions, the number of which almost doubled between 
1991 and 1999 (from 2872 to 5572, most of the in 
crease taking place since the recovery in 1994). The 
number of mergers between EU companies, or be 
tween companies where an EU company is a bidder, 
has risen significantly in recent years, suggesting a 
move towards increased concentration of economic 
activity and a strong desire of companies to become 
larger, perhaps to be able to compete more effectively 
in international markets (see Graph A.35). 
... with important flows into the East 
EU companies are responsible for most of FDI flows 
into CECs, which increased significantly during the 
second half of the 1990s. Although the scale of flows 
is negligible in relation to the GDP of EU Member 
States, it is substantial in relation to the GDP of the re 
cipient countries (annual flows amounting to around 
5% of GDP of CECs) and is responsible for a large 
part of their total capital investment (around 20%). As 
such, FDI has had a major impact on growth and pro 
ductive potential. 
Much of this FDI, however, has been concentrated in 
three countries, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Poland, each of these accounting for 25 30% of the 
total (see Graph A.36). Although FDI figures are not 
reported at the regional level in a comparable way, 
selected data show that capital cities and their sur 
rounding regions and the industrialised regions bor 
dering the EU received a disproportionate share of 
investment (two thirds of FDI to Hungary went to Bu 
dapest, 62% of the total going to Slovakia went to the 
Bratislava region, almost half of flows to Latvia went to 
Riga and the Tallinn area accounted for 80 90 % of 
FDI going to Estonia).
2 
FDI flows unlikely to affect 
employment and wages in the EU 
According to most studies, the main motive for invest 
ing in CECs is to gain access to their markets. The fact 
that over half of investment is in non traded sectors 
demonstrates this, but it also seems to be the case so 
far as investment in traded sectors is concerned. This 
view is also supported by the fact that most FDI takes 
the form of mergers and acquisitions of existing com 
panies rather than investment in 'green field' sites (i.e. 
in new production facilities). Accordingly, it would 
seem that investment in CEC ought not to affect em 
ployment and wages in the EU greatly and that it com 
plements, rather than replaces, exports from the EU. 
The impact of integration: 
concentration or specialisation? 
There is an ongoing debate as to whether closer eco 
nomic integration, and in particular, the introduction of 
a single currency into a Single Market, is likely to in 
crease or reduce the degree of regional specialisation, 
which is important for assessing whether or not regions 
are likely to become more or less vulnerable to sec 
tor specific shocks. The evidence of the US, at least so 
far as manufacturing is concerned, points to speciali 
sation increasing,
3 but it cannot necessarily be as 
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sumed that US experience will be replicated in Europe. 
This uncertainty is reinforced by the fact that studies so 
far have tended to focus on manufacturing industry, 
where the factors giving rise to increased concentra 
tion and agglomeration   in the form of economies of 
scale in production and proximity to suppliers and 
other producers in the same industry   are most evi 
dent. In practice, however, manufacturing is becoming 
less important in the Union in terms of both GDP and 
employment, accounting for only around a quarter of 
the latter, and the future location of economic activity in 
the EU will depend critically on the location pattern of a 
number of key services (the 'new economy'), which will 
not necessarily follow that of manufacturing. 
Differing trends in regional 
concentration of sectors 
Studies confirm that manufacturing activity in the 
Member States is slowly becoming more concen 
trated.
4 The trend is not uniform, however. A number 
of industries that were initially spatially dispersed 
have become more concentrated, mainly unskilled 
labour intensive ones with declining output or slow 
rates of growth (textiles, clothing and footwear, in par 
ticular), which have become more concentrated in 
southern Europe. For the regions dependent on these 
sectors today, there is an increased vulnerability to 
economic shocks similar to that which has provoked 
economic restructuring in the northern regions over 
recent decades. At the same time, around half of me 
dium and high tech industries that were initially spa 
tially concentrated remained so (aircraft, motor 
vehicles, electrical engineering, for example), while 
others with a highly skilled labour force and with rela 
tively high rates of growth (office machinery, radio, TV 
and communications, precision instruments, for ex 
ample) became more dispersed. The latter have typi 
cally spread from the central part of the Union to 
Ireland, Finland and southern Member States (see 
Table A.23). 
Analysis of the forces underlying the changes indi 
cates that resource endowment and market potential 
(proximity to main markets) are of key importance. 
Within the former, endowment of capital, the driving 
force behind the location of capital intensive indus 
tries in the 1970s, seems to have lost importance in 
relation to the availability of an educated labour force, 
which has become key to determining the location of 
skill intensive industries in the 1980s and 1990s. As 
educational attainment levels are likely to become 
more similar across the Union, this should be a factor 
working against increased spatial concentration. At 
the same time, market potential has become increas 
ingly important for the location of industries with 
strong forward and backward linkages, central loca 
tions attracting industries higher up the value added 
chain. On the other hand, the importance of market 
potential for industries with large potential economies 
of scale has declined markedly over the period. 
Services an increasingly important 
but complicating factor 
Analysis at the regional level and the inclusion of ser 
vices in the picture seems to alter the conclusions, 
though so far the analysis conducted has incorpo 
rated only very broad service sectors so that the re 
sults need to be interpreted with caution. Not 
surprisingly, when a few broadly defined service sec 
tors are included, regions appear to have become 
more similar in terms of the sectoral structure of their 
economic activity, since all regions have experi 
enced a shift towards services. Whether this result is 
repeated once services are disaggregated much 
more and once business services, in which job cre 
ation has been especially high, are distinguished, re 
mains to be investigated, although it is perhaps 
significant that the broad category of market ser 
vices, together with financial services, seems at pres 
ent to be relatively highly concentrated. 
Nevertheless, whatever the locational forces at work, 
a general conclusion of the studies carried out is that 
the structure of economic activity tends to be slow to 
change, because of the scale of investment required 
over the long term to alter the pattern markedly. Over 
the past 20 30 years, therefore, the sectoral distribu 
tion of economic activity has not changed greatly in 
most Member States and regions. There are, how 
ever, exceptions, such as Ireland, where growth has 
been more rapid and FDI much higher than else 
where, or Finland, where the decline in GDP in the 
early 1990s and the subsequent restructuring of eco 
nomic activity, caused in part by the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union, have been greater than in other 
parts of the Union. 
The social effects of integration 
While increased specialisation will tend to favour 
those employed in the sectors for which demand is 
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expanding in the different economies   highly skilled 
workers in the more advanced economies, low 
skilled workers in the less advanced ones, where pro 
duction is concentrated in low wage, labour inten 
sive activities   in reality, as seen above, the outcome 
is unlikely to be this simple. Most trade in the EU is of 
an intra industry kind, where similar goods are ex 
changed, and this is likely to become increasingly the 
case in future years. 
In practice, the decline in demand for low skilled 
workers, and the consequent social problems 
caused by their unemployment, tends to result from 
technological advance, which favours the more 
highly skilled, and highly educated, more than from 
trade. This implies that the problem for policy is not to 
seek to slow down the process of integration, but to 
increase the education and skill levels of workers, as 
well as to increase the relevance of what they are 
taught for the jobs for which demand is expanding. 
A recent World Bank study of income distribution in 
80 countries over four decades provides encourag 
ing evidence that there is a close relationship be 
tween overall growth and the average income of the 
poorest 20% of the population, and that this is the 
case irrespective of the degree of openness to for 
eign trade.
5 At the same time, in many countries, the 
relative position of the poorest in society has not im 
proved greatly over this period, and in some it has de 
teriorated. Similarly, the distribution of income is more 
unequal in the US than in Europe and social exclusion 
is no less of a problem (though it seems to arise from 
different sources, from a withdrawal from the work 
force and low rates of pay more than from unemploy 
ment) despite the closer economic integration be 
tween regions. 
This suggests, as in the case of regional conver 
gence, that the policies accompanying closer 
economic integration, in this case social protection 
and active labour market policies, have an important 
role to play in determining the outcome. Closer inte 
gration creates a more favourable environment for a 
reduction in social inequalities, but it does not neces 
sarily ensure that such a reduction is realised. 
Concluding remarks 
The conclusion which seems to emerge from this 
analysis is that the process of economic integration 
tends to favour a general trend towards a narrowing 
of disparities. Nevertheless, economic theory sug 
gests that this is conditional on integration being 
complete whereas partial integration may well have 
adverse effects. European policies to establish eco 
nomic and monetary union and the breaking down of 
barriers appear to have contributed positively to con 
vergence, not least, by promoting greater macroeco 
nomic stability, increased internal trade through 
lowering transaction costs in their widest sense and 
more competition, all of which are favourable to eco 
nomic growth.
6 
At the same time, the impact at the level of individual 
regions is unpredictable, given that faster growth is 
inevitably accompanied by economic restructuring 
and given the multiplicity of factors   social and politi 
cal as well as economic  that contribute to economic 
development. In these circumstances, it seems es 
sential to adopt a wide ranging approach with a num 
ber of different measures aimed at tackling the 
factors which determine competitiveness. This is the 
political conclusion on which the Member States have 
agreed, as reflected in successive generations of 
structural policies that are the subject of analysis in 
Part III of the report. 
1 European Commission, Market integration and differences in price levels between EU Member States, in'The EU Economy 1999 
Review', (European Economy) Brussels/Luxembourg 1999. 
2 Cf. DIW/ EPRC, The Impact of EU Enlargement on Cohesion', draft final report of a study for the Regional Policy DG of the European 
Commission, Berlin and Glasgow 2000, p. 39f. 
3 See Paul R. Krugman, Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU, in Francisco Torres/ Francesco Giavazzi (eds.), 'Adjustment and growth 
in the European Monetary Union', Cambridge 1993, pp. 241 269. 
4 Karen Helene Midelfart Knarvik/ Henry Overman/ Stephen Redding/ Anthony J. Venables, The Location of European Industry'; 
report prepared for the Economic and Financial Affairs DG of the European Commission, Economic Paper No. 142, Brussels 2000. In 
spite of some differences in data and methodology, many of the results have been confirmed by another study carried out for the 
Commission: Karl Aiginger/ Michael Boheim/ Klaus Gugler/ Michael Pfaffermayr/ Yvonne Wolfmayr Schnitzer (WIFO): 
'Specialisation and (Geographic) Concentration of European Manufacturing'; Enterprise DG Working Paper No. 1; Background 
paper for the The Competitiveness of European Industry: 1999 Report', Brussels 1999. 
5 David Dollar /Aart Kraay 2000, 'Growth Is Good for the Poor', The World Bank, Development Research Group, Washington D. C, 
March 2000; (can be downloaded from www.worldbank.org/research). 
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6 While the high costs of accessing markets initially lead firms to be geographically dispersed and to produce for local markets, their 
eventual reduction makes central regions more attractive. The proximity of a large market and the realisation of economies of scale 
can lead to a process of agglomeration. However, full integration which results in the near elimination of transaction costs can make 
peripheral regions, which have maintained their low cost advantage, attractive locations for firms. 
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The provision of State aid is one of the instruments at 
the disposal of national and regional authorities to influ 
ence the spatial distribution of economic activity. The 
results of the Eighth Survey on State aid in the EU
1 show 
that State aid still occupies a central place in the indus 
trial and regional policies of most Member States. Over 
the period 1996 to 1998, the total amount of State aid 
granted in the Union averaged EUR 79.8 billion a year, 
or 2.4% of total government expenditure (though this 
was slightly less than over the period 1994 to 1996  
see Table 6). 
The results of the Survey show that there are signifi 
cant disparities between Member States in the grant 
ing of State aid. In terms of all three indicators 
presented in the table below, the difference between 
the lowest and the highest level is three to one. 
The following features are apparent: 
  expenditure on State aid per person employed 
and per head of population in the four cohesion 
countries in terms of Euros has remained well be 
low the EU average, and well below that in many 
of the more prosperous Member States, such as 
Germany, Italy, France and Belgium, though the 
gap deminished over the period 1994 to 1998; in 
the period 1996 to 1998, the cohesion countries 
accounted for 10.5% of total expenditure on State 
aid in the EU as against 9.5% in the period 1994 to 
1996; 
Table 6 Overall national aid in Member States 1994 1996 and 1996 1998 
% GDP  EUR per person  EUR per head  % Government 
(at 1997 prices)  employed  expenditure 
1994 96 1996 98 1994 96 1996 98 1994 96  1996 98  1994 96 1996 98 
Austria  0.65 0.65  342 353  143  147  1.17 1.23 
Belgium  1.26 1.18 698 677  255  249  2.33 2.26 
Denmark  0.99 0.94  526 513  257  257  1.60 1.59 
Germany  1.97 1.45  1.007 786  430  327  3.96 2.95 
Greece  1.36 1.24 352 334  131  125  2.38 2.25 
Spain  1.14 0.98  367 318  132  120  2.47 2.22 
Finland  0.50 0.47  249 248  96  97  0.85 0.85 
France  1.11 1.13 588 618  225  237  2.02 2.08 
Ireland  0.88 0.99  389 497  137  188  2.12 2.66 
Italy  1.83 1.57 809 712  314  276  3.38 3.04 
Luxembourg  0.99 0.53  624 343  324  188  2.24 1.27 
Netherlands  0.65 0.62  362 349  127  126  1.23 1.24 
Portugal  1.37 1.63  260 323  117  148  2.98 3.44 
Sweden  0.99 0.78  476 388  220  178  1.49 1.24 
UK  0.54 0.52  227 223  99  100  1.17 1.20 
EU15  1.32 1.12 591 526  235  214  2.54 2.35 
Excluding agriculture and Structural Funds exp,  enditure 
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  the volume of State aid has declined in recent 
years, especially in the more prosperous Member 
States, where expenditure per head and per per 
son employed is above the EU average. The main 
exception is France, where in recent years, ex 
penditure increased significantly, in both abso 
lute and relative terms. 
Given its effect on the regional distribution of eco 
nomic activity and income, the control of State aid will 
remain a key instrument of Community cohesion pol 
icy. Allowing high levels of State aid in the most pros 
perous Member States and regions would undermine 
the effectiveness of both Community and national re 
gional policy efforts in support of the weakest regions. 
Financial assistance to support businesses in the lat 
ter is vital to correct regional disparities, and it is im 
portant that the effectiveness of this is not 
compromised by the granting of disproportionate 
State aid elsewhere. Strict control of State aid should, 
therefore, be regarded as an essential complement 
of Structural Funds support for the less favoured 
regions. 
bringing about a sizeable reduction in the coverage 
of aid. In the course of 1999 2000, new regional aid 
maps were established for each Member State. The 
main aims were achieved, in that the new maps were 
defined on the basis of a transparent and objective 
method which ensured equal treatment for all Mem 
ber States. At the same time, the total population in 
the EU covered by regional aid was reduced from 
46.7% to 42.7%. A strict application of the eligibility 
criteria has resulted in a tighter demarcation of the as 
sisted regions, enabling Member States to focus re 
gional assistance on the regions suffering the most 
severe economic problems and so increasing its 
effectiveness. 
A final element to take into account is the role that ser 
vices of general economic interest can play in lag 
ging regions, as stated in Article 16 of the Treaty. 
Regional State aid is by far the largest single category 
of State aid in the EU. Between 1996 and 1998, Mem 
ber States granted EUR 18.8 billion in State aid for re 
gional purposes, which represented 57.6% of all 
State aid granted to industry and services in the Un 
ion. In the 1990s, there was a proliferation of regional 
aid measures throughout the Community, and a grad 
ual extension of the areas qualifying for regional aid, 
giving rise to a real danger of the effectiveness of re 
gional aid being undermined as a means of furthering 
economic and social cohesion. 
At the end of 1997, the Commission adopted new 
Guidelines on national regional aid, with the aim of 
strengthening control over its deployment. These 
consolidated the criteria used to assess the compati 
bility of national regional aid measures and clarified 
the rules for the demarcation of regions qualifying for 
aid under Article 87(3)(a) and (c) of the Treaty. Mem 
ber States were invited to bring their existing regional 
aid systems into line with the new rules by the year 
2000. 
A key element of the exercise was the review of re 
gional aid maps in each country, with a view to 
Commission of the European Communities, Eighth survey on State aid in the European Union, COM(2000)205 Final, 14.4.2000. 
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policies 
Political and budgetary aspects 
Developments, current situation and prospects 
In expenditure terms the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) is the most important policy of the EU. The CAP 
reform of 1992 and the Agenda 2000 reform initiated 
a shift from price support policies to direct payments 
for farmers based on historical yields. 
In July 1997, the publication of Agenda 2000 pre 
sented a new reform of the CAP. A number of key pri 
orities were defined, including securing the 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector, encourag 
ing cultivation methods which contributed towards 
maintaining and improving rural areas and land 
scapes and protecting the sources of farmers' in 
come, while at the same time encouraging the 
development of the rural economy as a whole. The re 
form included two important strands. First, official 
prices were reduced. Secondly, a new framework 
was established for rural development policy, which 
was regarded as the central element in the reform 
and, from then on, as the second pillar of the CAP. 
Budgetary aspects 
In 1998, the Guidance and Guarantee sections of the 
EAGGF, ie the source of the overall financing of the 
two pillars of the CAP, accounted for 54.6% of the Eu 
ropean Union budget, or EUR 43.3 billion. Price and 
market support from the Guarantee section of EAGGF 
alone represented 48.9% of total Community expen 
diture, or EUR 38.7 billion (all the following references 
in this section to the EAGGF are to the Guarantee sec 
tion). The prospects for the period 2000 to 2006 are 
for a broadly unchanged level of overall agricultural 
Policy: price and market 
expenditure but for a reduction in relative terms, to 
EUR 44.8 billion in 2002, 46.8% of total appropria 
tions, and EUR 42.5 billion in 2006,46.0% (Graph 18). 
Since the 1992 reform, direct payments for assis 
tance and, to a lesser extent, the amount going to ru 
ral development, represent growing shares of total 
expenditure on agriculture at the expense of spend 
ing on market support and payments to exports. The 
latter two categories accounted for only 29% of total 
expenditure in 1998 as against 82% in 1992 (see 
Graph A.37 in Annex). 
The substitution of direct aid payments for market 
support has increased the share of subsidies in agri 
cultural income. In 1998, subsidies represented, on 
average, 28.6% of agricultural income in the Union as 
against 15% in 1990 and 5% in 1980. Overall, they 
have contributed to stabilising income. 
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France (23.2%) and, to a lesser extent, Germany 
(14.3%) remain the main beneficiaries of the EAGGF. 
Since 1998, Spain (13.7%) has taken third place ahead 
of Italy. These three countries receive more than half of 
total EAGGF expenditure. For the rest, the share of Por 
tugal, though low, has increased over the past 10 
years, from 0.6% to 1.6% (see Table A.24). 
The ranking of Member States, however, is changed 
considerably if expenditure is related to the numbers 
employed in agriculture. The cohesion countries, ex 
cept for Ireland, are at the bottom of the list because 
of the large numbers employed. Where, as in the 
Mediterranean, a more labour intensive type of pro 
duction predominates (in Greece, Spain, Italy and 
Portugal), some 8
1/2% of employment is in agriculture, 
due in part to smaller average farm size. EAGGF ex 
penditure per person employed, however, has 
tended to increase over the past 10 years, as employ 
ment has declined, and the gap between countries 
receiving the least (Portugal in particular) and the 
most has narrowed (see Table A.25). 
Contribution of agricultural price and 
market support to national cohesion 
The impact of the CAP   or at least the first pillar   on 
cohesion is linked to the large redistribution of income 
among European citizens stemming from transfers 
between social groups, sectors, regions and Member 
States. The current shift from price support to direct 
payments implies a shift in transfer flows. This has 
distributional implications for consumers and taxpay 
ers. With market price support, low income consum 
ers pay a disproportionate share of transfers relative 
to their share of income and they are, therefore, ex 
pected to benefit from reduced domestic price levels. 
The CAP also involves large transfers between Mem 
ber States and regions. The amount of such transfers 
can be calculated from budgetary information together 
with estimates of the effect of international trade.
1 
The patterns of transfers between Member States in 
1998 was very similar to that in 1993: net contributors 
and net beneficiaries were the same (see Table 
A.26). In 1998, net transfers were positive for 5 Mem 
ber States, three of which were cohesion countries 
(Spain, Ireland and Greece). The change in the scale 
of such transfers differs between Member States. The 
amount rose considerably for Spain and France 
between 1993 and 1998, largely because of in 
creases in direct payments (especially to cereal pro 
ducers). The rise was smaller for Ireland and was the 
result of positive trade transfers, high payments to 
beef and veal producers and a small contribution to 
the agricultural budget. The amount of net transfer 
declined for Greece and Denmark, though it re 
mained positive   for Greece, largely because of di 
rect payments and a low budgetary contribution, for 
Denmark, because of positive trade transfers. 
The remaining 10 Member States are net contributors 
to the CAP. Portugal is the only cohesion country for 
which net transfers were negative in 1998 as well as in 
1993, the result of a low level of direct payments re 
ceived and of a high level of protection against im 
ports. Except for the Netherlands, which receives a 
low level of direct payments, the net contribution of all 
these countries declined between 1993 and 1998. 
Contribution of agricultural price and 
market support to regional cohesion 
Regions play an increasingly important role in the op 
eration of the CAP, even if this differs markedly be 
tween Member States. In general, regions are 
responsible, on the one hand, for measures relating 
to rural land use (environmental protection, agri 
tourism and infrastructure, for example) and, on the 
other, for providing support for specific agricultural 
sub sectors. In this regard, differences between 
Member States are large: While Italian regions man 
age around 70% of the agricultural budget in Italy, 
agricultural measures undertaken by French depart 
ments (which are much larger than those undertaken 
by regions) account for only around 2% of the budget 
in France. 
The effect of the 1992 reform 
Producers of cereals, oil seed and meat have bene 
fited from the direct payments introduced under the 
1992 reform. This system provided compensation for 
the loss resulting from the alignment of European to 
world prices and, ipso facto, prevented income from 
agriculture falling in a number of regions and even led 
to an increase in some cases. The regions affected 
most by the new system were the cereal producing 
areas of France (Centre, Poitou Charentes), Ger 
many (Bayern), Spain (Castilla y Leon, Castilla la 
Mancha) and Portugal (Alentejo) as well as the 
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livestock areas of Ireland, the UK (Scotland, Wales, 
South West), France (Basse Normandie) and Ger 
many (Bayern). The result was an increased level of 
support in terms of the amount of aid in relation to ag 
ricultural employment (Map 14). 
Production aids are also used for other products, 
such as olive oil, so providing support to many pro 
ducers in the Mediterranean regions, and cotton, pro 
duced mainly in Greece. There have, in addition, 
been improvements, this time due to market forces, in 
wine growing regions as well as in those producing 
fruit and vegetables: La Rioja and Andalucia in Spain, 
Puglia in Italy, Aquitaine in France as well as many re 
gions in the Netherlands and Baden Wurttemberg in 
Germany. In general, Mediterranean products have 
proved to be relatively competitive on world markets 
and their share in total agricultural output has in 
creased, due partly to the modernisation of distribu 
tion systems in a number of coastal regions. 
Total transfers to agriculture, including indirect as 
well as direct payments, have increased in relation to 
the number employed in all regions of the Union, the 
largest rise occurring in French regions (especially 
those producing cereals) and those in the new 
Lander in Germany. In terms of assistance relative to 
agricultural land area, regions in Greece receive the 
highest level of support in the Union. 
Overall, the reform did not radically alter the distribu 
tion of support between European regions. In 1996, 
as in 1991 92, the regions where the level of support 
per person employed in agriculture is relatively low in 
relation to the gross value added per person em 
ployed are located in the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Italy and Greece (ie they are situated on the 
bottom right hand side of Graph A.38). 
At the same time, the reduction in market price sup 
port most affected the regions with a high level of 
value added per person employed, which led to a 
more equitable distribution of aid between regions. 
Moreover, a number of regions continued to receive 
much the same level of support following the reform, 
direct payments compensating for the reduction in 
market price support, while others experienced a re 
duction. The result is a weakening of the relationship 
between the level of aid to regions and agricultural 
performance. Wine growing regions, for example, 
like those producing fruit and vegetables, succeeded 
in maintaining, or increasing, their agricultural 
income, despite benefiting only to a very limited ex 
tent from direct and indirect aid. 
Although the 1992 reform led to a more equitable dis 
tribution of support across regions, it also became 
more dispersed. The distribution of transfers in rela 
tion to GDP per head (Graph A.39, which shows the 
cumulative proportion of transfers in relation to the 
population of regions ordered by GDP per head) 
shows that: 
  the effect of the CAP is negative in the least pros 
perous regions, which account for around 20% of 
EU population (the graph showing that these re 
ceive less in transfers than their relative level of 
GDP per head); 
  the regions benefiting most are those between 
the 2nd and 6th deciles in terms of GDP per head. 
Contribution of agricultural price and 
market support to social cohesion 
Over the past few years, a number of different models 
of agricultural production have developed, distin 
guished by their structure, methods and aims: 
  a 'productive' model, geared towards interna 
tional markets and increasingly concentrated in a 
few areas in the Union. Taking gross value added 
per annual work unit as a measure of productivity, 
the highest values are found in Denmark, Cham 
pagne Ardenne and Picardie in France and 
Sachsen Anhalt in Germany; 
  an 'adaptive' model, concentrated in particular 
regions and on particular products and targeted 
on local or national markets. This form of agricul 
ture is based on traditional, local produce and is a 
response to an increasing demand for higher 
quality among consumers; 
  a 'transition' model, which is subject to increasing 
constraints and permanent change, with farmers 
continuously changing their methods of produc 
tion and what they produce in response to the 
development of large agricultural markets, in 
creased competition and the ever greater pres 
sure from agri food chains; 
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  a 'marginalisation' model, characterised by struc 
tures of production which are increasingly unsta 
ble and precarious and which, if they are not 
capable of adapting, are set sooner or later to dis 
appear. Taking farms below 4 ESU
2 as an indicator 
of precariousness, the regions in question include 
Centra in Portugal, Valle d'Aosta, Abruzzi, 
Basilicata and Molise in Italy and Galicia in Spain. 
This typology of models is confirmed by an analysis of 
the average economic size of agricultural holdings in 
1997 and the change between 1993 and 1997 for the 
20 regions with the lowest and the highest levels (see 
Table A.27). There is a marked distinction between the 
southern and the northern regions. The 20 regions with 
the smallest size of holding are all situated in Greece, 
Spain, Italy and Portugal, Moreover, the average eco 
nomic size of agricultural holdings declined over the 
4 year period by 2.2%, while it increased in the top 20 
regions, all located in the north, by 24.6%. Furthermore, 
employment in agriculture tends to be higher in the re 
gions with small holdings, such as in Crete, where al 
most 38% of employment was in agriculture in 1997, 
where the average size of holdings was only 4.7 ESU 
and where this declined by 10% over the period. 
inequitable, since support is still fixed on a 'per hect 
are' basis (which means that support increases with 
economic size). Before the reform, the system of sup 
port favoured farms with a certain level of production 
and, c/e facto, of a relatively large size (of 16 ESU and 
over). Although direct payments have become more 
important since the reform, the main beneficiaries re 
main the large holdings (over 40 ESU). The inequality 
of the distribution of support is seen even more 
acutely if account is taken of the fact that 10% of hold 
ings in the EU account for two thirds of the total stan 
dard gross margin and half account for 95%. The 
CAP, therefore, continues to support the develop 
ment of large specialised units at the expense of 
small and medium sized farms, which play a major 
social and economic role in a number of regions 
(Graph 19). 
The enlargement perspective 
The inclusion of the 10 Central European candidate 
countries in the Union (ie leaving aside Cyprus and 
Malta) would lead to: 
Although the 1992 reform reduced expenditure on 
market support in favour of direct payments, the dis 
tribution of support in relation to farm size remains 
an increase of 2.4 times in the number employed 
in agriculture (from 6.9 million in 1998 to 16.6 
million); 
Table 7 Value added and employment in agriculture in the Union and the CECs 
Value added  Employment  Value added  Employment 
EUR mn %  000s %  EUR mn %  000s  % 
Belgium  3233 1.4  95 2.4  Bulgaria  2308 21.1  770  24.4 
Denmark  4449 2.9  90 3.3  Cyprus  356 4.4  30  10.2 
Germany  23724 1.2  1034 2.9  Estonia  294 6.3  54  8.8 
Greece  8813 8.1  704 17.8 Hungary  2323 5.5  263  7.0 
Spain  21897 4.2  1020 7.4  Latvia  235 4.3  172  17.2 
France  39876 3.1  968 4.3  Lithuania  986 10.3  345  21.4 
Ireland  4105 5.4  136 8.5  Malta  85 2.7 
Italy  32167 3.0  1118 5.4  Poland  6735 4.8 2704  18.1 
Luxembourg  117 0.7  3 1.9  Slovak Republic  841 4.6  179  8.1 
Netherlands  10742 3.1  232 3.0  Czech Republic  2277 4.6  250  5.3 
Austria  4354 2.3  229 6.2  Romania  6405 17.4  4851  44.0 
Portugal  3765 3.9  611 12.6 Slovenia  715 4.1  96  10.8 
Finland  4289 3.7  148 6.4 
Sweden 
UK 
EU15 
4538 2.1 
15566 1.2 
181635 2.4 
121 3.0 
421 1.6 
6930 4.5 
Sweden 
UK 
EU15 
4538 2.1 
15566 1.2 
181635 2.4 
121 3.0 
421 1.6 
6930 4.5 
CEC 12/11  23559 6.8  9715  22.0 
Sweden 
UK 
EU15 
4538 2.1 
15566 1.2 
181635 2.4 
121 3.0 
421 1.6 
6930 4.5  EU 27/26  205194 2.6 16645  8.4 
Source: National Accounts; Labour Force  Survey; National Statistical Institutes; calculations DG REGIO 
85 11.4 The Common Agricultural Policy: price and market policies 
an increase of 12.7% in the gross value added of 
the agricultural sector (in Euros); 
an increase of 5.4% in total agricultural imports 
(intra  plus extra Community) and of 4.9% in 
exports. 
In Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, la 
bour productivity is higher reflecting the impor 
tance of large structures and the development 
towards more market oriented farms. In Slovenia 
levels of value added are significantly increased 
by market price support policies. 
With almost 10 million people employed, agriculture 
in the Central European countries is a considerably 
larger source of jobs than in the EU. Productivity, 
measured in terms of valued added per person em 
ployed, is, however, only 9% of the level in the Union. 
Nevertheless, in relative terms, the contribution of ag 
riculture to GDP, as to employment, is much larger in 
the CECs   particularly in Romania and Bulgaria  
than in the EU (Table 7). 
Although data from current Agricultural Eco 
nomic Accounts in the CECs make accurate compari 
sons difficult, it is possible to identify broad 
differences between the candidate countries and the 
Union. 
  In Poland and Romania, very low labour produc 
tivity reflects the large proportion of micro and 
small farms in total production combined with a 
relatively high density of labour per hectare. 
These types of structure, inherited from the 
pre transition period in Poland and to a lesser 
extent Romania, reflect the presence of consider 
able labour intensive and semi subsistence 
agriculture. Bulgaria is perhaps more polar 
ised between small scale labour intensive farm 
ing and large scale extensive cereals 
production. 
  The Baltic States lies somewhere between the 
two groups. Here, recent low levels of productiv 
ity reflect the significant recession and restructur 
ing which have occured in recent years. 
In all cases, low productivity per hectare and per 
labour unit correspond to a high labour/capital ra 
tio in comparison with the European Union and a 
comparatively low level of input use (Graph 20). 
This reflects relative factor costs in the CECs as 
well as barriers to investment. In the Czech Repub 
lic, Poland and Hungary, capital per employee is 
no more than athird of thatin France, if commercial 
holdings alone are taken into account. This falls 
substantially, particularly in Poland, if smaller hold 
ings are included. In these countries, national sta 
tistics suggest that there is perhaps one tractor for 
every 20 agricultural workers. 
Structures and subsistence farming 
A common feature of countries where, before 1989, 
agriculture was largely collective is the gradual clos 
ing of the gap between, on the one hand, large collec 
tive or state owned holdings and, on the other, very 
small private units (like those in mountain areas in Ro 
mania). The average size of remaining state run hold 
ings, including private cooperatives, is declining 
19 Production subsidies per AWU by group of 
farms classified by ESU, 1990 92 and 1995 97 
EUR/AWU at 1985 values 
  1990/92 181995/97 
AWU = Annual Work Unit 
ESU = European Size Unit 
0 <4 4 <8 8 <16 16 <40 40 <100 >=100 All size 
20 Value added in agriculture in Central 
European countries, 1998 
Index, EU=100(in Euros) 
  Value added per hectare of utilised agricultural area 
  Value added per person employed 
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considerably, while that of private holdings is gradu 
ally increasing. 
In Poland and Slovenia, where the private sector was 
already important before the transition in 1989, struc 
tural change is less pronounced. In Poland, the size 
of private holdings is only increasing slightly as the 
land from state owned farms is privatised, though, in 
general, their small size represents a handicap in the 
longer term (see Table A.28). 
Increasingly, this distinction between small private 
holdings and large collective farms is being replaced 
by a dualism between market oriented competitive 
farms and a semi subsistence sector. This latter is a 
factor contributing to low levels of productivity, lack of 
market orientation and resistance to structural 
change in a number of candidate countries. Although 
no standard definition of subsistence farming exists, 
it is generally associated with small holding size, fam 
ily agricultural work as a part time or supporting activ 
ity, high levels of on farm consumption as well as an 
important role in extended family structures. 
Subsistence farming is not a new phenomenon in the 
CECs. Household plots played an important role in 
the pre transition period. However, its scale has in 
creased since transition, reflecting a response to 
economic and social adjustment. The importance of 
subsistence farming varies markedly between coun 
tries remaining significant in Romania, Bulgaria and 
Poland. In contrast, it plays only a small role in Hun 
gary, the Czech Republic and Lithuania. 
Subsistence farming defined in these terms reflects, 
therefore, both historical factors but equally a rational 
response to high levels of rural unemployment, low in 
comes and the nature of social security systems. For 
example, more than a million Polish farmers receive 
an agricultural pension, absorbing the major part of 
the agricultural budget. Such social security transfers 
play an important part in agricultural household in 
come and could easily account for more than half of 
total agricultural household income in some coun 
tries. Subsistence farming can, therefore, play an im 
portant role in overall family welfare and, equally, in 
absorbing labour where alternative sources of em 
ployment are scarce. However, rural poverty remains 
a considerable problem in the CECs (see Box in Part 
I, Social cohesion). 
Market support policies 
In general, data from the OECD suggest that current 
market support policies in the CECs, with the excep 
tion of Slovenia, and to a lesser extent Poland, have 
had little effect on agricultural value added and sec 
toral income. It should be emphasised that due to the 
acknowledged limitations of these data, conclusions 
should be seen as indicative of broad trends. On av 
erage, the CECs have moved from a position of nega 
tive market support over the past years to a situation 
close to neutrality. This, however, may hide implicit 
market support due to significant differences in qual 
ity between domestic production and world markets, 
particularly in the livestock sector. On the other hand, 
it also reflects price competitiveness and (in some 
cases) policy choices to maintain low prices, particu 
larly in the cereals sector. In this respect, cereals and 
oilseed play an important role in final agricultural out 
put, particularly for large producers such as Hungary 
and Romania. Macroeconomic restructuring and ex 
change rates trend play an equally important role, 
particularly in Bulgaria and Romania. The picture in 
most countries is, therefore, of low levels of support 
gradually increasing over time, with the exception of 
Slovenia which has levels of support similar to those 
in the Union. 
When the structure of market price support is exam 
ined by hectare or livestock unit (see Graph A.40), 
levels of support for oilseed and cereals are generally 
low or negative in the candidate countriess with the 
notable exception of wheat in Poland. Despite of con 
siderable policy intervention, price support in the live 
stock sector has not raised domestic prices 
significantly above world prices, although there is an 
implicit transfer due to quality differences particularly 
for beef and pork. The only areas of major .support 
are for sugar and milk. Here, as in the EU, support for 
sugar is relatively concentrated. It is notable that the 
application of EU prices to the CECs would increase 
levels of market price support without raising them to 
EU levels. This reflects lower yields per hectare and 
per livestock unit. 
The effect of current market support policy in the can 
didate countries on national cohesion and farm in 
comes in most countries is relatively small given the 
low level of transfers from consumers to producers, 
with the exception of milk and, perhaps, sugar. How 
ever, there are significant transfers in Slovenia and in 
some sectors in other countries such as Poland. As 
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prices move towards EU levels and production in  alternative employment and reliance on subsistence 
creases, these transfers will also increase, with corre  farming can be contributory causes of rural poverty, 
sponding effects on income, although it is not unclear Nevertheless, subsistence farming can also play an 
how this will affect the semi subsistence sector. important role in maintaining agricultural and rural 
household income and may, in some cases, comple 
Prospects ment social security or, indeed, substitute for labour 
market measures. At the same time, however, subsis 
Enlargement towards to Central Europe gives rise to a tence farming has created a problem of under em 
number of challenges as regards national and re  ployment, which remains to be tackled in the future 
gional disparities in the Union. The overall impact on by attempting to achieve a more balanced and diver 
EU15 growth and employment is likely to be small. sified development of the areas in question. In this 
But achieving productivity gains in the CECs and respect, the creation of alternative sources of em 
dealing with the consequences of such gains in rural ployment and functioning labour markets would ap 
areas, particularly from labour adjustment, is very im  pear as important as improved general skill levels, 
portant. Agricultural and rural development policies 
are particularly significant here, given the important 
role of agriculture in many areas. 
Enlargement will clearly widen disparities in the EU 
between rural areas and between these and urban 
areas. Price convergence between the CECs and the 
EU15 will increase transfers from consumers to pro 
ducers in the CECs, but these positive effects on 
farming income may be offset by a range of factors 
undermining the competitiveness of CEC agriculture 
(eg real exchange rate appreciation). It should be 
noted, however, that these processes reflect broader 
economic adjustment and are already underway in 
the pre accession period. 
Many CECs are characterised by a dualistic structure 
of farms. For the more market oriented farms, the key 
challenge would appear to be the need for better 
functioning factor markets. On the other hand, the 
small size of holdings farm structures and high levels 
of employment in agriculture pose particular chal 
lenges for improving the efficiency of the sector, par 
ticularly since the social costs of so doing appear to 
be high. 
In a number of countries, and particularly in Romania 
and Bulgaria, where employment in agriculture has 
increased in both absolute and relative terms, there 
has been migration from urban to rural areas as eco 
nomic conditions have worsened. Agriculture has, 
therefore, been important in absorbing the shock and 
has enabled essential needs to be met. The small size 
of farms, low labour productivity and incomes, lack of 
1 For preliminary estimates, see 'First Report on Economic and Social Cohesion'. 
2 Economic size is conventionally expressed in terms of the European Size Unit (ESU), corresponding to a standard gross margin 
(SGM)   the difference between gross agricultural output and the costs associated with that output   of EUR 1200. The Farm 
Accountancy Data Network considers 'very small' holdings to be those below 4 ESU. 11.5 Employment, human resource development and 
cohesion 
The European Employment Strategy (EES) was 
launched only a few years ago at the end of 1997 and 
is built on several processes. The Union's role is a co 
ordinating one, the Member States remaining respon 
sible for the design and delivery of employment 
policy. 
A new operational framework, 
particularly in the Luxembourg process ... 
The Luxembourg process embodies a number of ele 
ments which are important for its success: 
  First, it is founded on commonly defined objec 
tives, which are based on shared values among 
the Member States and cover issues which are 
felt to be of common concern for employment 
policy. 
  These objectives are transparent and, therefore, 
open to public scrutiny and criticism. 
  A number of appropriate ways to measure prog 
ress towards the desired outcomes are defined 
either in terms of quantitative or qualitative 
indicators. 
  As the focus is on outcomes at the EU level, the 
definition of the means and conditions under 
which programmes and policies are imple 
mented is left to individual Member States, which 
are responsible for their own employment policy. 
  Peer pressure through annual examination and 
comparative review is used to steer the course of 
policy and enhance the effectiveness of action. 
This method establishes a balance between EU Union 
level coordination in the definition of common objec 
tives and outcomes and Member State responsibilities 
in deciding the detailed content of policy. 
... which represents a new method of coordination 
The European Employment Strategy is based on a 
number of key principles, which distinguishes the 
'Luxembourg' open method of coordination from pre 
vious attempts to develop a credible European ap 
proach to employment policy. These principles are: 
  Subsidiarity. The definition of the means and con 
ditions under which programmes and policies are 
implemented is left to individual Member States. 
  Convergence. Commonly agreed employment 
objectives are pursued through concerted ac 
tion, where each Member State contributes to 
raising the EU average performance. This princi 
ple has been made more concrete still by the Lis 
bon European Council in March 2000, where full 
employment was adopted as an overriding goal 
of the Union, together with the objectives of rais 
ing the overall employment rate in the EU from 
62% to 70% by 2010 and the employment rate of 
women from 52
1/2% to over 60%. 
  Management by objectives. 
  Country monitoring. 
  An integrated approach. The Luxembourg pro 
cess does not involve only Ministries of Labour 
and Employment, but commits national 
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governments as a whole as well as a wide range 
of other interested parties. 
Objectives 
The objectives of the Luxembourg process are given 
operational meaning in the Employment Guidelines' 
four pillars: employability (enhancing the chances of 
individuals to remain in, enter or re enter the labour 
market, providing early assistance to the unem 
ployed, preparing young people for the world of work, 
making the tax benefit and training systems more 
employment friendly), entrepreneurship (developing 
a culture of enterprise, making it easier to start and 
run businesses), adaptability (helping employees 
and enterprises to be more flexible, modernising the 
legal and organisational framework of employment), 
equal opportunities (developing pro active policies 
which will enable more women to take up employ 
ment, at all levels and in all sectors, better reconcile 
work and family life and facilitate a return to work after 
a period of absence). 
The force of Recommendations 
The instrument of Recommendations   first used for 
2000   has demonstrated its value in focusing Mem 
ber State efforts on key challenges. Most Member 
States have taken action to respond to the Recom 
mendations addressed to them. The 52 Recommen 
dations adopted for 2000 referred to youth 
unemployment, long term unemployment, disincen 
tives to employment embodied in the tax or benefit 
systems, the employment potential of the service sec 
tor, social partnership, gender gaps and statistical 
systems. Most of the Recommendations have been 
kept (entirely or in amended form), because their im 
plementation exceeds the timeframe of a single year; 
8 Recommendations were dropped because suffi 
cient progress had been made   as regards services 
(Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy), the administrative 
burden on companies (Spain), statistical systems 
(Germany, UK) and social partnership (France). New 
Recommendations were included, putting additional 
emphasis on two new priority issues, which deserve 
increasing policy attention: achieving a more bal 
anced policy mix across the four pillars through a 
more comprehensive approach and lifelong learning. 
For 2001, the Commission proposes to address the 
Recommendations to Member States (see Table A.29 
in Annex). 
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A learning strategy, reviewing itself... 
It is noteworthy that the Luxembourg process itself is 
subject to critical assessment. In 2000, a 'Mid term 
Review' was carried out in order to identify the im 
provements it initiated and the weaker points where 
further action could be needed. The review identified 
some important changes and successes (in particu 
lar, it brought the employment challenge and the em 
ployment objectives to the forefront of European and 
national debate, linked economic and social policy 
more closely together, created an integrated frame 
work for structural reform, led to increased involve 
ment of a wide range of actors and to greater 
transparency of employment policies and increased 
political accountability), while enabling the Guide 
lines to be refocused on the main Lisbon objectives. 
But it also identified a number of continuing 
challenges. 
Despite overall improvement, regional differences in 
labour market performance remain substantial and 
have increased further in some Member States. 
The regional pattern of employment has changed lit 
tle since 1980, and there appears to be little evidence 
of a more balanced distribution of net job creation be 
tween regions. 
The Employment Guidelines took account of this situ 
ation from the outset and drew attention to the role of 
local and regional authorities in employment policy. 
As noted in the Joint Employment Report 2000, the 
importance of action at local and regional level is in 
creasingly recognised by Member States, but more 
needs to be done to increase cooperation between 
the different levels of government to develop a com 
prehensive regional and local employment strategy; 
regional and local authorities and other local actors 
need to become more involved in the design and im 
plementation of the relevant guidelines, so adding a 
local dimension to the EES. This point is reflected in 
the proposed Guideline 12.
1 
Labour market bottlenecks are emerging in a number 
of Member States. These call for targeted action to 
improve employability, both in general and of people 
at risk of social exclusion, in particular. Education 
systems and continuing training are of crucial 
importance. 11.5 Employment, human resource development and cohesion 
Despite improvements in education systems (often 
supported in Objective 1 regions by the Structural 
Funds), a number of young people still leave educa 
tion too early with too few qualifications. This can lead 
to difficulties adapting to technological change and 
to social exclusion. The cohesion countries face the 
greatest difficulties in this respect. Measures to com 
bat early school leaving feature in all of the National 
Action Plans (NAPs) produced for 2000, except that 
of Spain. Most Member States have broadened sup 
port for young people with learning difficulties. Many 
have introduced specific measures aimed at target 
groups (people with disabilities, ethnic minorities, 
disadvantaged young people) and at areas where 
drop out rates are high. For example, France, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have es 
tablished special educational action zones designed 
to keep young people in education and training , to in 
crease rates of achievement and tackle social 
exclusion. 
The clear benefits from the Information Society repre 
sent a threat for those excluded from the IT revolution. 
The Lisbon Summit highlighted the major efforts 
needed to ensure that all share in these benefits. 
There are a number of examples of efforts in Member 
States (Greece, Portugal) to provide education and 
training for people with learning difficulties through 
ICT and to develop special support to improve ICT 
skills for unskilled workers and for those in specific 
sectors. This should promote social inclusion in the 
Member States concerned. Action, however, is un 
even across the Union and more needs to be done. 
All the NAPs put employment policies for people with 
disabilities firmly on the policy agenda. In many Mem 
ber States, there has been a shift in emphasis away 
from programmes targeted at those with disabilities 
towards a more mainstream approach, which en 
courages them to participate in general active labour 
market programmes. However, there are specific 
measures in a number of Member States. Three of the 
cohesion countries (Portugal, Greece and Spain) 
have set targets for the participation of people with 
disabilities in training and other employability 
measures. 
There is also some evidence from the NAPs for 2000 
to suggest that Member States are taking greater ac 
count of the needs of ethnic minorities in the develop 
ment of employment policy. Nevertheless, there are 
differences between Member States both in the 
interpretation of what is meant by ethnic minorities 
and in the policy mix between promoting direct inte 
gration in the labour market and measures to fight dis 
crimination. Most tend to focus on integration. 
However, a few Member States adopt a mix of the two 
(Denmark, Sweden, UK). In some Member States 
(France and Portugal), there has been a public de 
bate on discrimination at work, reflecting consultation 
undertaken at the EU level by the Commission on the 
implementation of Article 13 of the Treaty. 
The horizontal objective of gender mainstreaming 
has been only partly implemented and policies still 
tend to be presented as gender neutral. 
Over the five years to 1999, almost two thirds of the 
6.8 million net additional jobs in the EU were taken by 
women. However, over 70% of these jobs were 
part time. Other labour market indicators suggest 
that there is still some way to go to achieve greater 
equality of opportunity in the labour market. 
The NAPs confirm that Member States have improved 
their implementation of gender mainstreaming. How 
ever, although there has been some progress in im 
proving the gender impact analysis of policy 
initiatives (particularly in Finland and Ireland), many 
countries appear to lack plans or measures in this 
regard. 
It has not been easy in all cases to coordinate the Lux 
embourg process with the budget process, which 
translates the objectives, commitments and mea 
sures envisaged into (possibly multi annual) budget 
ary allocations. 
Similarly, there remains the challenge of integrating, 
at the national level, the contribution of other instru 
ments, such as the European Structural Funds (and in 
particular, the European Social Fund), into the imple 
mentation of the NAPs. 
The translation of the objectives within the adaptabil 
ity pillar into action is lagging behind. Much of the ac 
tion under this pillar is the responsibility of the social 
partners, who have a major stake in contributing to 
more and better jobs and whose cooperation is 
needed for implementing measures in the workplace. 
Not all Member States make it easy for the social part 
ners to be involved, and many NAPs, through inade 
quate reporting, fail to reflect activity and initiatives 
actually taking place. Nonetheless, the onus is on the 
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social partners to become more active, and more 
transparently so, in this regard. In order to encourage 
progress, the Employment Guidelines 2001 invite the 
social partners to create 'a process within the pro 
cess', ie to be responsible for the development of, 
and reporting on, actions within their remit which are 
consistent with the overall objectives in the Employ 
ment Guidelines. 
combating unemployment, increasing 
employment rates, improving the adaptability of 
the labour force and the responsiveness of labour 
markets, reducing gender gaps and developing 
lifelong learning. 
... adapting to new circumstances ... 
The Commission proposal for the Employment 
Guidelines 2001 has also been influenced by the Lis 
bon Summit conclusions. Overriding strategic priori 
ties have been included in an introductory section. 
The new emphasis put on full employment, the role of 
the social partners, lifelong learning, educational at 
tainment and social inclusion have also been taken 
into account. Some of the Guidelines have been ra 
tionalised (eg lifelong learning is now addressed in 
one instead of several Guidelines) or clarified (eg the 
potential role of local and regional authorities in em 
ployment policy) and more concrete targets have 
been included. New issues, such as labour market 
bottlenecks and undeclared work, have been 
addressed. 
... and preparing for the future 
The Luxembourg process is treaty based (Article 
128) and as such there is no time limit defined. In 
2002, the overall results of the strategy and its objec 
tives will be reviewed and an overall impact evalua 
tion will be carried out to enable policy makers to 
consider strategic options for a revision of the Guide 
lines. This evaluation process will start soon (at Mem 
ber State and EU level) and should provide the 
necessary information for the political decisions 
needed in 2002. Two separate strands need to be 
distinguished in the exercise: 
  policy evaluation, focusing on those areas where 
the Employment Guidelines can be expected to 
have influenced policy choices at national level 
as well as the effect of those choices; 
  macro evaluation, assessing the progress made 
towards achieving the key objectives of the EES  
1 'All actors at the regional and local levels must be mobilised to implement the European Employment Strategy .. Member States will 
encourage local and regional authorities to develop strategies for employment in order to exploit fully the possibilities offered by job 
creation at local level.' 
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Social and economic objectives, including a 
strengthening of cohesion, are not in conflict with en 
vironmental aims but are complementary. There is no 
inherent contradiction between the pursuit, on the 
one hand, of higher economic growth in the weakest 
regions and Member States and, on the other, im 
provements in the environment. Indeed, environmen 
tal quality is a key element of quality of life in any 
region. Environmental improvements can, accord 
ingly, increase the attractiveness of a region for out 
side investors and its economic potential   for the 
growth of tourism, for example. In addition, weaker 
members of society, notably those in inner city areas, 
or lagging regions, in particular, stand to benefit dis 
proportionately from improvements. Growth in the 
lagging regions, moreover, will enhance their willing 
ness and ability to pay for a cleaner environment. 
However, there is an interaction between the two poli 
cies, and this interaction has to be managed to en 
sure there are gains on both fronts.
1 'Improved 
environmental quality... will have to come mostly from 
changes in economic activity and socio-economic 
policies'
2 and it is important to assess these changes, 
in terms not just of environmental benefits but their ef 
fects on cohesion. 
The starting point for analysing the interaction is that 
environmental policy, by necessitating additional in 
vestment to reach higher standards or by imposing 
new taxes on environmentally damaging activities, 
seems to increase costs. In reality, however, it makes 
the costs of environmental damage more visible. Any 
costs, moreover, need to be weighed against the bene 
fits noted above, even if these tend to be more difficult 
to quantify. The costs should not be overstated; esti 
mates tend to show that they are very small relative to 
overall costs of production, especially when implemen 
tation is via market based instruments. For example, 
one of the most ambitious parts of environmental policy 
in the EU is to achieve the Kyoto targets for reducing 
emissions of greenhouse gases. Yet the estimated cost 
of this is around EUR 7.5 billion a year   only 0.09% of 
EU GDP
3   which has to be set against the benefits of 
avoiding the damaging effects of accelerated climate 
change. 
However, while, in overall terms, cost increases tend 
to be relatively small, they can often be concentrated 
in particular regions or sectors or on particular social 
groups. The fact that the long term benefits of envi 
ronmental protection outweigh the costs may not be 
true for everyone in society. Environmental measures 
can, therefore, have significant distributional implica 
tions.
4 
There are, therefore, three main questions to ask in 
analysing the cohesion impact of environmental 
policies: 
  do the costs of implementation fall disproportion 
ately on less prosperous Member States, regions 
or social groups? 
  do the benefits, eg in terms of increased quality of 
life, accrue disproportionately to these? 
  are there gains to employment? 
In some cases, such as in respect of the pursuit of the 
Kyoto targets, it is difficult to identify or quantify signif 
icant differential effects. However, in two key areas of 
environmental policy, waste and water, differential ef 
fects can be identified. 
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European waste policy 
The Fifth Environmental Action Programme Towards 
sustainability', reiterates the priorities for waste man 
agement in the following order of preference:
5 
1 Where possible, the generation of waste should 
be prevented 
2 If this is not possible, it should be reused 
3 Otherwise, it should be recycled 
4 If not, waste should be sent for energy recovery 
5 Only if none of the above are possible, should 
landfill be used as the last resort 
According to a study for the Commission,
6 there are a 
number of elements which are relevant for cohesion. 
First, the production of waste is less in the cohesion 
countries than in the EU as a whole, ranging from 90% 
of the average (Ireland) to only 65% (Greece). Ac 
cordingly, the potential implementation cost of waste 
policy is proportionately lower in cohesion countries 
although, as GDP per head in these countries contin 
ues to converge to the EU average, they may produce 
more waste. 
Secondly, however, the Cohesion Countries lag be 
hind in the treatment of waste. 
This is true both for the most virtuous form of treat 
ment, recycling (Portugal, in particular, recycles only 
4% of total waste as opposed to an EU average of 9%) 
and for the worst form of disposal, landfill (93% of 
Greek waste ends here, as opposed to an EU aver 
age of 66%). Only in Spain is the disposal profile simi 
lar to that in the EU as a whole, and even here, this 
applies much less to the lagging regions 
The cost of meeting the waste management targets 
is, therefore, likely to fall just as (or even more) heavily 
on these countries (except Spain) as it does on the EU 
as whole, despite their lower waste production. All of 
them, except Spain, have, accordingly, been given 
an extension until 2006 to meet the first set of targets. 
In addition, the Cohesion Fund is making a major con 
tribution to costs over EUR 200 million annually, cov 
ering up to 75% of costs, which means the costs 
falling on these countries will be much less than 
elsewhere. 
Moreover, in terms of benefits, they are likely to see a 
relatively large reduction in landfill waste disposal 
and up to 46,000 new jobs created in managing such 
programmes (4,000 in Ireland, 9,000 in Portugal, 
10,000 in Greece and 23,000 in Spain). 
Waste in the CECs 
The situation in the Central European candidate 
countries is similar to that in the cohesion countries. 
The production of municipal waste is low (typically 
70% of the EU average), but growing fast (it is fore 
cast to increase by 50% over the period 1995 to 
2010). Moreover, the proportion disposed of in landfill 
sites is high (typically 80% or more). The problem is 
particularly serious in Poland, where almost 99% of 
waste is disposed of in landfill sites, which cover a to 
tal of 3020 hectares and include the dumping of 1000 
tonnes a year of (incinerated) dangerous medical 
waste. This highlights a typical problem in many can 
didate countries that landfill sites often do not meet 
EU safety standards. 
An additional problem in some countries is the waste 
liability inherited from past activities, both military and 
industrial. For example the production of shale oil in 
Estonia over the past 60 years has left spoil heaps 
over 100 metres high, which not only blight the land 
scape but contaminate the groundwater. The dam 
age being caused by shale oil production represents 
a major challenge for policy given the implications of 
any reduction for regional development and energy 
supply. 
Similar policy conclusions apply as for the cohesion 
countries. Despite producing less waste, candidate 
countries will need to spend as much, if not more, per 
head than the EU average in order to implement the 
acquis, in a context where incomes are much lower. 
The Cohesion Fund and ISPA (the pre accession 
structural instrument) are likely to make a significant 
contribution to this. In terms of employment, the esti 
mates for current Member States suggest that imple 
menting the acquis could create up to 50,000 jobs in 
the CECs. 
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European water policies 
Improvements in water quality are likely to require a 
large part of the EUR 260 billion estimated to be 
needed over a 20 year period for the EU15 to comply 
with the 10 directives on environment. There is, there 
fore, the potential for a significant effect on cohesion. 
One feature of water management conditions this ef 
fect; the role of public authorities in this means, 
among other things, that historically polluters have of 
ten not paid for the damage they cause. As the 'pol 
luter pays principle' is applied more systematically, 
there is likely to be a marked redistribution of costs 
between both social groups and regions. 
According to a study for the Commission,
7 there are, 
in particular, four elements of EU water legislation 
which could have effects on cohesion: 
  the Water Framework Directive 
  the Drinking Water Directive 
  the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive 
  the Nitrate Directive 
These are considered in turn below. 
The Water Framework Directive 
Adopted in 2000 and incorporating many previous di 
rectives, the Water Framework Directive improves the 
coordination of standards and shifts planning from 
administrative entities (such as municipalities) to 'nat 
ural' entities (such as those responsible for river bas 
ins). A key point for cohesion, however, is the 
requirement, in line with the polluter pays principle, 
for increasing the extent to which the costs of water 
services are recovered from users. 
At present, cost recovery is low, especially in the co 
hesion countries and especially as regards agricul 
tural producers. Eliminating the cross subsidy which 
now exists might have a negative effect on cohesion. 
Although the present pattern of cross subsidy be 
tween households, industry and agriculture is compli 
cated and varies from region to region, some general 
conclusions can be drawn. 
Full cost recovery from households would reduce 
their income by an estimated 1.7% in the cohesion 
countries as opposed to only 0.2% on average in 
other Member States. But this is a maximum estimate 
since the Directive only mandates an increase in cost 
recovery, not full cost recovery. The Cohesion Fund 
will cover a large part of the cost of investment in im 
proving water supply main drainage. The shift in 
costs from taxpayers to householders will mean that 
certain user groups will pay more than they do at 
present in taxes, including those on low incomes, 
those with large families and those who are living in 
smaller or remote communities. 
The recovery of the cost of supply from industry is gen 
erally higher than for households already and, in most 
Member States, costs are recovered in full. The cohe 
sion countries, however, are exceptions and none of 
them impose the full cost of supply on industry con 
nected to the network. A move to full cost recovery, 
therefore, is likely to increase the costs of water use by 
industry in these countries, especially in sectors which 
are heavy users, though not enough to affect their com 
petitiveness significantly. 
The recovery of supply costs is at present lowest for 
agricultural users, and very few countries impose the 
full cost on these, especially in respect of public irri 
gation schemes. As a result, the impact on rural areas 
is likely to be substantial, particularly where crops re 
quiring a lot of water are grown. The use of the Cohe 
sion Fund can reduce some of these adverse effects, 
but in deploying this, it is important to maintain incen 
tives to increase the efficiency of water use. 
The Drinking Water Directive 
The main effect of the revision of the Drinking Water 
Directive is to reduce the permissible levels of lead. It 
is generally impossible to meet the new standard if 
water is delivered through lead pipes. These, how 
ever, are not common in the three least prosperous 
Member States, so the implementation costs are 
lower there than elsewhere. 
Within Member States, on the other hand, lead pollu 
tion seems to be relatively high in less favoured re 
gions. If improvements are paid for at national level, 
there is, therefore, a positive effect on regional cohe 
sion. Moreover, there is also a positive effect on social 
cohesion, since health problems from lead dispro 
portionately affect poorer people, partly because 
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they are more sensitive (old people and children are 
most at risk) or simply because they live in poor qual 
ity, older housing close to sources of lead pollution 
and seldom drink bottled or filtered water. 
Meeting the requirements of the Drinking Water Di 
rective is a major challenge for most of the candidate 
countries. In many Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Roma 
nia, and Slovakia, in particular   over 20% of the pop 
ulation is not connected to drinking water supply 
systems. Significant investment is also required to im 
prove the quality of drinking water   nearly 25% of 
people in Hungary, for example, are supplied with 
drinking water that does not meet Community stan 
dards. It is estimated that expenditure of between 
EUR 13 and 17 billion in the candidate countries is 
needed to meet these standards. 
The Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive 
This is by far the most expensive of the directives to 
implement, accounting for some EUR 150 billion of 
the estimated EUR 260 billion of total expenditure for 
the EU15 implied by the ten key environment direc 
tives. This directive also requires the highest level of 
investment in the candidate countries   of EUR 27 33 
billion, according to national studies. The main effect 
on cohesion results from the substantial investment 
required in construction and maintenance of the 
waste water treatment system. 
There are substantial differences in the estimated 
cost of implementation between Member States, re 
flecting their initial positions some being much more 
advanced in the treatment of sewage   and the state 
of their natural environment. The first factor tends to 
push up the costs in the cohesion countries because 
the requirements are higher, while the second tends 
to reduce costs because of the relatively high 
assimilative capacity of the environment. 
Since, however, around a quarter of the necessary in 
vestment in these countries is being financed by the 
Cohesion Fund (and the Structural Funds are making 
a similar contribution in Eastern Germany), the cost 
burden on cohesion countries will be limited. The 
large scale investment required is likely to boost em 
ployment, particularly in construction, where the di 
rect effect
8 is to add 2% to output, implying increased 
employment of up to 200,000. For most of the cohe 
sion countries, however, there is likely to be substan 
tial 'leakage' of such benefits abroad because of the 
small scale of their waste water and eco industries, 
so much of the benefit is likely to accrue to firms in the 
more prosperous Member States. 
In sum, the effect of expenditure on cohesion is likely 
to be positive, but it would be larger if eco industries 
were to expand in the cohesion countries. 
The Nitrate Directive 
This directive was adopted in 1991, but is only now 
being implemented, illustrating the often long delay 
involved in water legislation. It lays down standards 
for the use of nitrogen in farming and, therefore, has 
clear implications for the agricultural sector and for 
rural communities. 
The key point is that there are various forms of nitro 
gen put into the soil, through chemical fertilisers, ani 
mal manure and natural deposition, which comes out 
in crops and livestock, but it also leaks into water bod 
ies or is emitted into the atmosphere. Problems arise 
when the loading of nitrogen exceeds the 'absorptive 
capacity.' 
The Nitrate Directive affects cohesion in at least two 
major ways. First, the imposition of application stan 
dards, notably for nitrogen from animal manure, af 
fects livestock producers, particularly high intensity 
ones. In Ireland and Greece, where nitrogen is close 
to the EU average, the increased cost implied by the 
directive is likely to be modest. In Spain and Portugal, 
where farming is less intensive, the effects could even 
be positive, with anecdotal evidence of such activi 
ties as pig farming being transferred there from the 
most intensive producing countries, like the 
Netherlands. 
At the same time, there is evidence that the codes of 
good agricultural practice which are part of the direc 
tive can lead to substantial cost savings through 
better nitrogen management. Although the efficiency 
of nitrogen use could be improved throughout the EU, 
the largest potential gains appear to be in the Medi 
terranean, where there are wide variations in nitrogen 
use between farms even of similar types. 
Overall policy effects 
In sum, environmental legislation is on balance more 
likely to have positive than negative effects on 
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regional cohesion. The same, however, may not be 
the case for social cohesion, which might, therefore, 
justify accompanying measures being taken: 
  at the national level, the cohesion countries are 
likely to share significantly in the benefits of envi 
ronmental improvements (including the quality of 
life which might attract business investment) and, 
though the costs of implementing legislation 
might in a number of cases be higher than else 
where, these will be met to a large extent by the 
Cohesion Fund; 
at the regional level, some less prosperous areas 
benefit most from environmental improvements, 
for example those in inner cities from wastewater 
treatment, and often have the cost of these paid 
by central government or the Cohesion Fund; 
at sectoral level, there will be cost increases for 
some sectors, though in most cases limited in re 
lation to production costs. In a few cases, these 
will fall disproportionately on the less prosperous 
regions, rural areas being a notable example. 
These will bear the cost of the Nitrate directive, re 
flecting the true cost of the activities carried out 
there. The main effects, however, will be on agri 
cultural areas in the more prosperous Member 
States and rural areas in Spain and Portugal are 
actually likely to benefit. A move towards full re 
covery of costs of water supply is likely to fall 
heavily on agricultural users and on households 
in remote communities, although again because 
they will start to pay the true cost of their activities; 
Environmental protection measures, however, tend to 
benefit employment. The gains are significant, even if 
they are modest in relation to the overall need for jobs 
in the EU. For example: 
  implementing EU waste legislation is likely to 
boost employment in the cohesion countries by 
up to 35,000 in the next five years and by 50,000 
in applicant countries when they fully implement 
the acquis; 
  the Urban and Waste Water Treatment Directive 
may create up to 200,000 jobs in construction 
and some in manufacturing, though to the extent 
that more prosperous regions tend to have bigger 
eco industries, they are likely to gain most. 
The above conclusions are somewhat tentative be 
cause of the limited data available at present. The in 
tention is to rectify this in time for the next Cohesion 
Report. 
at the social level, costs in a number of cases 
may, initially at least, fall disproportionately on 
poorer people and those living in remote areas, 
the shift from taxpayers to households in respect 
of the Water Framework Directive being a notable 
instance. 
1 European Commission (2000) "Bringing our needs and responsibilities together   integrating environmental issues with economic 
policy". 
2 European Environmental Agency (1998) 'Europe's environment: the second assessment'. 
3 Ecofys, National Technical University of Athens, AEA Technologies (2001 forthcoming), 'Economic evaluation of sector objectives 
for climate change'. 
4 European Commission (2000) op. cit. 
5 This hierarchy was already established in Directive 75/442/EEC on waste management, as amended by directive 91/156/EEC. 
6 Club Espahol de los residuos (2000), 'The Impact of Community Environmental Waste Policies on Economic and Social Cohesion'. 
7 WRc (2000) 'The Impact of Community Environment Water Policies on Economic and Social Cohesion'. 
8 The final effect is likely to be less than this because of displacement effects. 
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98 11.7 Research and Development policy 
The European Union is increasingly becoming a 
knowledge based economy and society. The devel 
opment of knowledge has a direct effect on competi 
tiveness and employment, as well as on the way 
society functions in general. 
Although the importance of knowledge was explicitly 
recognised at the European Summit in Lisbon in Feb 
ruary 2000, research in Europe displays contrasting 
features. There are unquestionable strengths, but 
also evident weaknesses, as reflected in a trade defi 
cit in high tech products of over EUR 20 billion. This, 
in turn, reflects a number of underlying factors   a 
lower level of expenditure on R&D in the EU (1.8% of 
GDP) than in the US (2.8%) and Japan (2.9%), a less 
dynamic environment for innovation and a relatively 
fragmented research system (divided between 15 
Member States). 
Accordingly, the European Commission has con 
cluded that a genuine 'European Research Area' 
needs to be created to improve the situation.
1 
The regional dimension of 
the European Research Area 
According to the Commission, to establish a Euro 
pean Research Area, Member States need to con 
sider policies on finance, human resources, the 
relationship between the public and private sectors, 
the creation of a common reference framework and 
values, and regional aspects. On the last issue, the 
Commission pointed to the importance of studying 
and putting in place the conditions for a 'real 
territorialisation' of research policies or adapting 
these 'to the geographical socio economic context.'
2 
It has, therefore, invited policy makers at all levels to 
consider both the challenge posed to regions by the 
European Research Area and how they can contrib 
ute to its achievement. 
Action at the regional level 
Regional and local authorities already support re 
search, technological development and innovation. It 
is estimated that the finance they provide amounts 
annually to almost 1
1/2 times the total appropriation of 
the EU Framework Programme (EUR 4.5 billion com 
pared with EUR 3 billion), over 90% of which is allo 
cated on a regional basis.
3 
The authorities concerned are best placed to form the 
links with companies necessary for innovation and, 
therefore, the generation of economic wealth and em 
ployment. Creating networks of knowledge, clusters 
of companies, linking the scientific system to the 
needs of industry and services are all easier to organ 
ise at local and regional level. 
Regional authorities are also well placed to review 
best practice and to identify other regions with which 
they can fruitfully cooperate, which may be relatively 
distant ones, such as those which form the network of 
the 'four regional engines for growth', Baden 
Wurttemberg, the Rhone Alps, Lombardia and 
Cataluha, or neighbouring areas, such as Brussels, 
Flanders, Kent, Wallonia and Nord Pas de Calais. 
Such cooperation can help strengthen regional 
capacity for research and innovation by facilitating 
specialisation and complementary action and en 
couraging the rapid dissemination of knowledge. 
By pursuing their own interests, therefore, regional 
authorities can increase the momentum towards the 
establishment of a European Research Area as well 
as ensuring its effectiveness and consistency. 
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The establishment of a European Research Area, 
however, is not confined to the most central and com 
petitive regions. The instruments available   the 
Framework Programme, the Structural Funds and ac 
tion at national and regional level   should be used to 
gether in a more coherent way, each according to its 
objectives, in order to enable all regions to participate 
fully in the area. 
Networking and encouraging 
regional specialisation 
The Commission Communication on Guidelines for 
EU Research Activities (2002 2006), adopted in Oc 
tober 2000, indicates how regions are intended to be 
involved in the European Research Area and sets out 
a number of Community objectives in five major ar 
eas: research activities, innovation and SMEs, infra 
structure, human resources and the relationship 
between science, society and citizens.
4 It indicates 
three horizontal aspects which need to be taken into 
account in this regard: the overall coherence of Euro 
pean cooperation over science and technology, the 
international dimension of projects and the regional 
aspect. It also emphasises the importance of carrying 
out measures which encourage the full use of re 
gional potential, through networking and exploiting 
geographical features or areas of economic 
specialisation. 
Member States indicated their perception of the re 
gional dimension of European Research Policy in the 
resolution of the Research Council in November: 
'The Council of the European Union:... emphasises 
the importance of promoting the scientific and tech-
nological performance of all the regions of the Mem-
ber States and participating countries, including the 
cross-border dimension, both within the European 
Research Area, in future framework programmes and 
in other relevant community initiatives.' 
In this regard, the following aspects, which are con 
sidered in turn below, are of some importance: 
  the learning effects of being part of European 
RTD consortia and networks; 
  the mobility of researchers as a mechanism for 
the tacit exchange of knowledge; 
  the policy learning effect of RTD activities. 
Shared cost RTD projects in the 
Fourth Framework Programme 
The most important mechanism for EU funding of RTD 
is the 'shared cost actions' in the Framework 
Programmes, which are project based contracts be 
tween the Commission and the participants. Since 
the latter generally consist of organisations from a 
number of Member States, this enables knowledge 
and ideas to be shared and new know how and tech 
nology to be developed jointly. The participation of 
representatives from cohesion countries and Objec 
tive 1 regions, therefore, is a way of improving the 
knowledge flow into these areas. 
A detailed analysis of the regional impact of RTD pol 
icy has not been possible because data on the geo 
graphical distribution of expenditure from the Fourth 
Framework Programme (FP4) are not published. 
Some national data exist, but not for all countries and 
regions, and they are not based on official European 
statistics but on national surveys. The following analy 
sis concentrates on numbers participating and other 
available indicators. 
Relating participation figures to indicators of national 
RTD capability, such as the number of RTD personnel 
in a country, indicates that the cohesion countries are 
performing well, with Greece, Ireland and Portugal in 
leading positions. Closer examination, however, 
shows participation being heavily concentrated in the 
capital city areas. On the other hand, this concentra 
tion seems to be diminishing, with other regions in 
these countries accounting for a growing share of 
participation. 
Participation and the number of projects from Objec 
tive 1 regions and cohesion countries increased over 
the second half of the 1990s. The number of projects 
with at least one partner from an Objective 1 region 
rose from 27% in 1994 to 41% in 1998. The total num 
ber of participations (ie the number of occurrences of 
participation in projects) from Objective 1 regions in 
FP4 has gone up from 1,705 in 1995 to 4,067 in 1998, 
although in relation to the overall number of 
participations, it declined slightly from 16% in 1995 to 
just over 15% in 1998. Examination of the evidence 
shows that there is a positive relationship between the 
extent to which organisations from a particular region 
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participated in the Framework Programme and RTD 
capability indicators, such as R&D expenditure and 
number of R&D personnel. 
Encouragement of SMEs to participate in the Frame 
work Programme was successful in increasing their 
share of total participation in FP4. However, a lack of 
official statistics on the type of participants at NUTS2I 
regional level means that it is not possible to verify 
whether this had a positive impact on Objective 1 re 
gions. Nevertheless, the user survey, carried out as 
part of the Five Year Assessment of European RTD 
programmes (1995 1999), suggests that in Ireland 
and Spain, representation of SMEs was higher than 
the EU average. 
Since 1994, the Central European Countries (CECs), 
Russia and the Newly Independent States have been 
covered by the INCO COPERNICUS programme. 
(INCO's contribution to the CECs countries in FP4 
amounted to a total of ECU 78.3 million.) The need to 
strengthen links with the established RTD sector in 
the candidate countries is important for safeguarding 
and strengthening their scientific and technological 
potential and INCO has provided a sound foundation, 
support and guidance for them, though industry par 
ticipation was low. 
Participation in FP4 was important in increasing co 
operation between EU Member States. In the 8 years, 
1987 to 1995, there were 150,000 instances of coop 
eration between large companies, SMEs, universities 
and public or private research centres as a result of 
EU RTD activities. After 1995, under FP4, the number 
of instances of cooperation increased significantly, to 
113,990 in 1996 and 78,300 in 1998, the variation re 
flecting the implementation cycle. 
Such collaboration in RTD is one of the most direct 
ways in which knowledge, both tacit and codified, is 
transferred between organisations in different Euro 
pean countries. Accordingly, any increase in instances 
of cooperation involving organisations in the cohesion 
countries helps to reduce disparities across the EU in 
access to know how. Over the course of the Fourth 
Framework Programme, cooperation links have varied 
from one year to the next without showing any distinct 
trend. Overall, links between the four cohesion coun 
tries and the other 11 Member States accounted on av 
erage for 22.2% of the total created annually, which is a 
good indication of the stimulative effect of the Frame 
work Programme on disadvantaged regions (Table 8). 
Table 8 Links created by FP4 between 
the cohesion countries and other EU 
Member States, 1995 1998 
% total 
1995  1996  1997  1998 
Greece  4.5  6.6  5.5  6.2 
Spain  6.1  12.1  11.5  10.2 
Ireland  2.2  3.3  2.8  3.2 
Portugal  2.5  3.9  4.0  4.0 
At the same time, it appears that organisations from 
cohesion countries participating in projects tend, in 
general, to gain more from this than those from else 
where. The user survey of participants in FP4 indi 
cates that participants from Greece, Spain and 
Portugal were more positive than average, or about 
the same as the average, as regards the impact on 
their scientific and technological standing, competi 
tive position, productivity and employment. On the 
other hand, participants from Ireland were, in gen 
eral, less satisfied than average with the impact on 
them, including in relation to their scientific and tech 
nological standing. 
Mobility underpinning RTD capability 
The European Commission Programme, 'Improving 
the human potential and the socio economic knowl 
edge base,' is aimed at increasing the mobility of re 
searchers throughout the EU. According to several 
studies, the cohesion countries are well represented 
in programmes, such as the Training and Mobility of 
Researchers (TMR) under FP4, and have a relatively 
large proportion of their researchers receiving fellow 
ships to work in 'centres of excellence' in other Mem 
ber States. The UK is by far the most popular host 
country, followed by France, and the opportunity for 
young researchers to gain experience in research or 
ganisations best suited to developing their careers is 
an important aspect of policy. 
In any assessment of the effect of mobility and cohe 
sion, two considerations need to be taken into 
account: 
  the possibility of increasing the mobility of re 
searchers in the EU should not reinforce the 'brain 
drain' from less developed to core RTD regions. 
Given a general shortage of skills in many parts of 
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Europe and the increased competition for highly 
qualified researchers, this problem is likely to be 
come more acute. The Return Grants scheme 
which helps researchers from less favoured re 
gions return home is a response to this problem, 
although only some 6% of TMR fellows from less 
favoured regions are eligible for the scheme and 
make use of it. The effect on the movement of re 
searchers between EU regions of programmes 
like TMR has, however, yet to be studied; 
  studies of RTD expenditure from the Structural 
Funds indicate that there is not necessarily a link 
between an increase in RTD resources and per 
sonnel in Objective 1 regions and the innovative 
capacity of businesses situated there. The gap 
between public RTD activities and the needs of 
firms is particularly wide in these regions. Im 
proving the international career prospects of 
young researchers is unlikely in itself to increase 
the 'absorptive capacity' of a region in the 
short term. 
As noted above, there is a positive association be 
tween the rate of participation in EU RTD projects and 
the RTD capacity of a region, as measured, for exam 
ple, by the number of R&D personnel in the popula 
tion. This suggests that a long term strategy of 
investing in people will increase the capacity to col 
laborate in international research and technology 
projects. Efforts should, therefore, be made in cohe 
sion countries and lagging regions to develop good 
career possibilities for researchers as a means of 
combating the brain drain. 
Recent shifts in RTD policy 
The Fifth Framework Programme (FP5), represents 
the continuation of a shift in focus from a policy ori 
ented exclusively towards technology to one that in 
cludes innovation as a key concept. In essence, 
previous Framework Programmes prioritised areas of 
science and technology where Europe needed to 
strengthen its capability, whereas FP5 started from a 
statement of the most pressing societal problems 
which science and technology could help solve. Nev 
ertheless, the Five Year Assessment Panel that eval 
uated the first phase of FP5 concluded that more 
attention could be paid to social and economic 
aspects. 
In principle, the way that the goals of FP5 are formu 
lated allows more consideration to be given to the dis 
tribution of knowledge, to building 'absorption 
capacity' and not just to knowledge creation. 
A horizontal programme for 'Promotion of Innovation 
and Encouragement of SME participation' has wid 
ened the target group to include not only high tech 
performers, but also companies for which initial entry 
into the Framework Programme is difficult. The aim is 
to reduce obstacles to innovation for companies in 
less favoured regions and in more traditional sectors. 
At the same time, the provision of information to po 
tential applicants, through Innovation Relay Centres, 
National Contact Points, more transparent Info Packs 
and so on, has been improved to reach a larger audi 
ence. While excellence in science and technology is 
still the main criterion for participation in FP5, there 
are parts of the programme which enable partici 
pants to achieve such a level over time. 
The candidate countries in Central Europe have 
been granted full access to FP5, which should enable 
them to continue their links with the science and tech 
nology community in the EU and which should help 
overcome the technology gap that exists between 
them and the leading European countries. 
Policy learning effects 
from EU RTD Initiatives 
The EU has played a major role in disseminating 
good practice in RTD policy by helping to create a 
'European Research, Technology, Development and 
Innovation Community,' where decision makers, re 
searchers, and other interested parties can commu 
nicate and work together, in both formal and informal 
ways, in official advisory committees, specific RTD 
programmes and policy exchange initiatives. By as 
sisting in this, and through its influence on policy for 
mulation and implementation, EU policy has 
indirectly contributed to closing the RTD and innova 
tion gap between Member States and regions, and, 
by changing the culture, it has, in some respects, im 
proved the policy planning process. 
Moreover, initiatives such as, in particular, the Re 
gional Technology Plans (RTP), the Regional Innova 
tion Strategies (RIS), the Regional Innovation and 
Technology Transfer Strategies and Infrastructures 
(RITTS) and Trans Regional Innovation Projects, 
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jointly set up by DG Regional Policy and DG Enter 
prise, have helped put innovation high on the policy 
agenda in over 100 regions. These projects have 
stimulated the establishment of ongoing and 
long lasting processes in these regions and have, 
therefore, prepared the ground for further decentrali 
sation of RTD policies to the regional level. Fine tun 
ing of the planning of RTD policy and the deployment 
of the Structural Funds for this purpose has been inte 
gral to the success. 
Overall, EU RTD policy has adopted an approach ori 
ented more towards innovation than technological 
excellence as such, better addressing the deficien 
cies of less favoured regions as a result. The regional 
dimension of RTD policy has come to be featured ex 
plicitly in the Initiative Towards a European Research 
Area'. An improvement in the interaction between the 
deployment of the Structural Funds and RTD policy is 
important to accelerating the 'catching up' of lagging 
regions. 
Conclusion: progress in increasing 
the contribution of EU RTD policy 
to social and economic cohesion 
EU RTD policy has increased its support for those in 
volved in research and technology in the cohesion 
countries, less favoured regions and candidate coun 
tries. The absence of statistics on funding prevents 
quantification of the extent to which funding has been 
directed towards the latter. The increased number of 
projects with participation from Objective 1 regions, 
however, and the relatively favourable position of re 
search fellows from cohesion countries in the Euro 
pean Human Mobility schemes point towards a 
positive contribution towards reducing regional dis 
parities. Moreover, various measures have helped 
improve the effectiveness of policies relating to inno 
vation in a number of disadvantaged regions. 
The Structural Funds can provide the necessary sup 
port for firms and research institutes in the latter to 
participate on equal terms in future RTD 
programmes. Moreover, the conditions for a genuine 
'territorialisation' of research policies (ie adapting 
these better to the geographical, social and eco 
nomic context) need to be studied and put in place. 
This could open up new opportunities for policies at 
all levels to be better integrated into regional or inter 
regional development programmes and for the syner 
gies between them to be strengthened. 
The candidate countries have gained from the experi 
ence under the INCO programme of developing and 
managing RTD consortia and establishing partner 
ships with EU organisations as well as from being in 
troduced to the art of writing EU RTD proposals. They 
are likely to gain further from full membership of FP5, 
although most countries lack the overall capability to 
participate extensively. Up until now, it has been 
mainly scientific institutes which have taken part in 
RTD projects and higher levels of business sector 
participation remains to be achieved. Positive effects 
on competitiveness and economic cohesion will, 
therefore, take longer to emerge than in the present 
Objective 1 regions. 
1 Towards a European Research Area', COM(2000)6, 18 January 2000. 
2 Such a study was launched in December 2000: 'Involving the regions in the European Research Area: refining the territorial 
conditions to optimise the creation and the transfer of knowledge in Europe' Price Waterhouse Coopers. 
3 'Role of the local and regional authorities in the field of research, technological development and innovation', October 2000, 
Bannock Consulting Ltd. 
4 'Making the European Research Area a reality: guidelines for European Union Research activities (2002 2006)', COM(2000)612, 4 
October 2000. 
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Transport Policy in the context 
of regional development 
The Common Transport Policy has made a positive 
contribution to the success of the Union in the past 
decade. The provision of high quality transport ser 
vices and infrastructure is an essential pre requisite 
for ensuring that all regions share in the prosperity 
that the Single Market is creating. The opening up of 
markets has reduced prices and made distances 
shrink to the benefit of peripheral areas. It has also, 
however, led to a greater volume of traffic, which is 
now recognised as having negative consequences 
for congestion, dependency on oil and the 
environment. 
Traffic growth has been greater in the cohesion coun 
tries than in the rest of the Union, due mainly to road 
passenger transport increasing at twice the rate else 
where as car use catches up. The Community has 
invested substantially in infrastructure, where 'trans 
port funds' (the Trans European Network TEN  
transport budget line) have been used in conjunction 
with the Structural Funds, to give a major boost to the 
provision of infrastructure in the regions. The revision 
of the Common Transport Policy now underway seeks 
to improve the quality of transport as much as the ser 
vices provided. 
The Common Transport Policy 
through the 1990s 
There were many achievements between 1992 and 
2000. The supply of transport services, notably by 
road and air, increased significantly as prices fell in 
real terms. In road transport, outmoded restrictions 
were removed completely in 1998. The opening up of 
air transport markets increased the number of flights 
and lowered their cost. The main areas in which prog 
ress was made were: 
  the interconnection of national networks, particu 
larly through the development of the trans Euro 
pean transport network, which has substantially 
improved links within the cohesion countries and 
between these and the Union. The completion of 
the high speed rail network will improve links be 
tween many regions. In addition, the new ISPA 
fund has been set up to finance infrastructure 
projects in the candidate countries; 
  the removal of bureaucratic controls and the 
technical harmonisation of transport equipment, 
which has reduced costs through economies of 
scale and removed technical barriers to interna 
tional operations; 
  'interoperability' of rail networks, developed first 
for high speed trains in 1996, which is about to be 
extended generally. 
However, there have also been negative aspects. In 
particular, congestion in urban areas and along main 
international routes has increased dramatically over 
the past decade as road traffic has grown. 
Sustainable transport 
During the 1990s, the issue of sustainability has 
gained importance. Under Article 6 of the Treaty, en 
vironmental considerations have to be integrated into 
the definition and implementation of Community poli 
cies and activities to ensure development is sustain 
able. The concept of sustainability includes not only 
environmental concerns but also economic and so 
cial considerations. While environmental issues are 
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important they have to be balanced against competi 
tiveness and social welfare. 
Above all, transport should be safe. Road safety lev 
els remain unacceptable, with 42,000 killed on the 
EU's roads every year. It is of particular concern that 
the situation in the cohesion countries is worse than 
elsewhere. While they have 17% of EU population, 
they account for 26% of fatal road accidents, sug 
gesting that road improvements have not been 
matched by gains in safety. Maritime safety is also ca 
pable of improvement. 
Progress has been made in environmental protec 
tion, notably in air quality. Community directives will 
reduce air pollution by 70% by 2010 thanks to techni 
cal improvements in fuels and vehicles, though some 
emissions remain a problem. Technical measures at 
European level are not a complete answer and local 
measures need to be taken to reduce urban emis 
sions. New infrastructure can also help, as in the case 
of the Athens metro, which is expected to reduce car 
use substantially. Transport accounted for 28% of 
C02 emissions in 1998. The EU Kyoto objective of re 
ducing greenhouse gas emissions by 8% by 
2008 2012 is far from being met and requires, among 
other changes, a shift from road to other modes of 
transport. 
To achieve such a shift was one of the aims of the 
1992 White Paper. Despite significant growth in short 
sea shipping, however, the potential of environmen 
tally friendly modes of freight transport, such as in 
land waterways and rail, has yet to be realised. 
There is a clear need to update Community policy 
and to propose new measures and priorities to im 
prove the overall efficiency of the transport system. 
The 1992 White Paper identified an inherent risk of the 
transport system becoming unbalanced and unsus 
tainable and this in effect has happened. The revised 
policy has to tackle the challenge. 
The trans European transport network 
There were major efforts in the 1990s to upgrade 
transport systems in the assisted regions and cohe 
sion countries to levels more similar to those else 
where in the EU. Since the mid 1990s, investment has 
increased and projects started in the early 1990s, 
such as the Madrid Seville high speed train or large 
sections of the Pathe motorway, have been 
completed. 
In sea transport, the dominance of the northern ports 
has been challenged by large growth in container 
traffic in the Mediterranean, as a result of the new port 
of Gioia Tauro and investment in Algeciras and 
elsewhere. 
Public private partnerships have brought stricter con 
trol of the risks taken and of the work carried out. 
Spata airport in Greece and the Vasco da Gama 
bridge in Portugal are good examples. The creation 
of special project authorities in the public sector has 
also served to improve accountability and efficiency. 
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Access to reasonably priced 
energy essential for cohesion 
In addition to liberalisation of markets, the major as 
pect of EU policy is support for improvements in the 
distribution network, to increase the availability of 
supply in peripheral regions, in particular. EU finance 
has, therefore, contributed to the construction of 
high tension electricity lines and of gas pipelines as 
part of the trans European Networks, to increase the 
possibility of trade in energy between Member States 
and to provide access to natural gas to regions where 
this energy source does not exist. Accordingly, as 
sistance has been provided under the REGEN and 
INTERREG II programmes to help improve infrastruc 
ture in Greece, Spain, Portugal and southern Italy in 
order to increase the chances of consumers there 
benefiting from a single market. 
These measures are aimed at reducing regional dis 
parities in access to energy and prices. The estab 
lishment of a single market in energy should further 
help in this respect, by stimulating more trade and 
competition, especially in peripheral regions where 
monopoly suppliers tend to be more prevalent, and 
so pushing down prices. 
The reduction in prices brought about could benefit 
the cohesion countries disproportionately, since their 
energy use in relation to GDP, though it has fallen in 
recent years, remains above that in the rest of the Un 
ion. This is specifically the case for Greece and Portu 
gal, where consumption relative to GDP is some 40% 
above the EU average, reflecting the composition of 
economic activity, though to a major extent inefficien 
cies in the use of energy. Nevertheless, the economic 
development of these countries in particular, involv 
ing, as it is likely to, increased industrialisation, will al 
most certainly necessitate increased energy 
consumption and, therefore, stands to be assisted by 
lower prices. At the same time, it is important for envi 
ronmental reasons, in particular, that any reductions 
in price which occur do not lessen efforts to improve 
energy efficiency. 
The scale of the effect of moving to a single energy 
market on the energy price differences, which at 
present exist across the Union is, however, hard to 
predict, especially since taxes of one kind or another 
(excise duties, value added tax) represent a signifi 
cant, but highly variable, component of the price of 
fuel in all countries. 
The net reduction in energy prices from the establish 
ment of a single market should benefit most consum 
ers, including many poor households. There is no 
certainty, however, that prices will come down for ev 
eryone. In particular, those living in more remote com 
munities, especially islands, where the cost of 
providing supply is relatively high, will not necessarily 
benefit from lower prices and might even see prices 
increase as these come to reflect more closely the 
true costs of provision. Increased competition, in it 
self, is unlikely to help much in this respect. Accord 
ingly, the case for the incorporation of universal 
service provision guarantees in legislation, to ensure 
that everyone has access to affordable fuel, is a com 
pelling one. Without such provision, there is a danger 
that a single market could lead to a widening of dis 
parities in society and damage social cohesion. 
Increasing security of supply 
The EU's dependence on imports of energy is set to 
increase in future years as North Sea reserves begin 
to run down. Dependence on imports varies greatly 
between Member States, as do the measures 
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adopted (mainly regulatory ones) to minimise the 
risks involved in this. Such dependence does not 
have any direct implications for cohesion as such, so 
long as supplies are maintained and prices are rela 
tively stable. However, the differential vulnerability to 
external shocks, such as an increase in world oil 
prices or the suspension of supply, is a potentially im 
portant source of disadvantage and, therefore, a pos 
sible factor in the decisions of businesses of where to 
locate, especially during periods of global instability. 
In general, each Member State is responsible for 
safeguarding its own supplies (a common feature is 
that all member countries of the International Energy 
Agency continue to respect the norm of maintaining 
emergency stocks at a level equivalent to 90 days of 
net imports of petroleum). This may mean, to some 
extent, trading off lower prices for increased security 
and, therefore, overriding the market or imposing a 
fiscal and regulatory framework, which explicitly in 
corporates security considerations as well as those 
relating to the long term availability of supply, within 
which the market can operate. Accordingly, the main 
long term guarantee of security is to have access to 
multiple sources of supply, which can be achieved by 
diversifying both the sources of energy used and their 
origin. 
For coal, supply is already extremely diversified. 
Apart from domestic mining (which is heavily subsi 
dised), there are many exporting countries, in Central 
Europe, North and South America, South Africa and 
so on. For petroleum, although there is an efficient, 
well established world market, there is a high degree 
of dependence on countries in the Middle East, and 
this is likely to increase further in future years. For nat 
ural gas, there are two major sources apart from the 
North Sea   Russia and North Africa. 
Indeed, securing access to supplies is particularly 
strategic in respect of natural gas, which is likely to 
become an increasingly important source of energy 
in future years, not only in the generation of electricity 
  almost all investment in generating plants world 
wide in recent years has been in gas fired stations  
but also as a possible replacement fuel for petrol in 
vehicles. 
Accordingly, Structural Funds support for investment 
in natural gas networks in the cohesion countries is vi 
tal not just for increasing their diversity of supply, but 
also in preparing them for the future. 
Environmental considerations 
The pursuit of a path of economic development which 
is environmentally sustainable in the long term is a 
central objective of policy and one which conditions 
the structural measures taken in the EU to assist re 
gional convergence. This gives rise to a potential 
conflict between the pursuit of cost competitiveness  
ie ensuring that production costs are not out of line 
with those elsewhere in the Union   and following a 
path best suited to achieving sustainable economic 
development. Accordingly, it suggests that there are 
mutual gains to be made, particularly in the 
long term, from the adoption of a common policy on 
tackling the ecological damage caused by energy 
use, including in respect of fiscal measures. 
At the same time, the EU continues to assist Member 
States in the pursuit of environmental objectives, 
through the ALTENER programme to encourage the 
development of renewable energy sources, SAVE, to 
promote more efficient use of energy, and PCCE, to 
support the co generation of electricity. Moreover, 
the European programme for diversification and en 
ergy saving, which is aimed at stimulating interna 
tional cooperation, is part of the 5
th Framework 
Programme for science and technology. 
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Building on the Commission's existing policies for 
SMEs, innovation and industrial competitiveness, en 
terprise policy has recently undergone a process of 
refocusing and reformulation in response to the chal 
lenges posed by the knowledge based economy and 
the need to adaptto global economic developments. 
The starting point for this new policy was set by the 
Lisbon Economic Council in March, 2000, which fixed 
the goal for the EU 'to become the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-driven economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion' 
and identified enterprise and entrepreneurship as 
key to achieving this. 
Enterprise policy in the Union is founded on three 
main aims,
1 each of which gives rise to a set of spe 
cific measures as described below: 
  encouraging entrepreneurial activity: the mea 
sures under this head, which are especially impor 
tant for lagging regions, are aimed, in particular, at 
improving the access of SMEs to finance, in coop 
eration with the European Investment Bank and 
the European Investment Fund. They also focus on 
developing a range of business support services, 
creating a regulatory and administrative environ 
ment favourable to enterprise development, offer 
ing entrepreneurial advice and encouraging the 
development of skills and motivation, which ac 
cordingly increase the attractiveness of regions to 
investors. These elements have been developed 
under the Multiannual Programme for Enterprise 
and Entrepreneurship (2001 2005);
2 
  creating an environment which is supportive to in 
novation and change: measures under this head 
seek, in particular, to encourage benchmarking 
and the exchange of good practice between 
countries, regions and businesses across the Un 
ion. They also help to remove obstacles to innova 
tion and growth, provide support to innovation 
projects and promote the development of the ser 
vice sector. They are being implemented through 
the recently adopted Communication 'Innovation 
in a knowledge based economy' and the First Ac 
tion Plan for Innovation in Europe;
3 
  to ensure that businesses have access to mar 
kets: measures under this head are being pur 
sued through continued efforts to consolidate the 
Internal Market, ensuring access to global mar 
kets, the dissemination of voluntary standards 
and the promotion of e commerce and new distri 
bution networks. The reduction in the problems 
created by distance will, of course, be of particu 
lar importance to firms in peripheral regions. 
The new enterprise policy has no specific spatial di 
mension but, nevertheless, addresses some of the 
most relevant obstacles to cohesion and regional de 
velopment. Many of the new enterprises policy priorities 
have parallels in the regional policies implemented 
through the Structural Funds. In this respect, it can work 
in parallel with regional policy to create synergy to ad 
vance economic and social cohesion. In particular, it is 
aimed at removing the whole range of barriers to market 
entry, which are often particularly prevalent in lagging 
regions. In the short term, at least, it is expected that 
their removal will release latent enterprise potential and 
so help to reduce regional disparities. In addition, the 
establishment of an enterprise and innovation 'score 
board' will accelerate the diffusion of business best 
practice between both Member States and regions. 
While the precise impact of the new enterprise policy on 
economic and social cohesion (and, in particular, its ef 
fect on the development of the lagging regions) is 
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difficult to quantify, it can potentially play a significant 
role in reducing regional disparities. 
In addition, the wide range of measures which are 
planned can have a positive effect on the ability of firms in 
lagging regions to compete in the global market place: 
  measures such as benchmarking, peer reviews 
and joint action with Member States will enable 
policy makers and businesses across the EU to 
identify best practices and, in turn, to implement 
them. Programmes for encouraging the dissemi 
nation of innovation and best practice are likely to 
benefit lagging regions, in particular, and to 
gether with the development of business centres 
and technology parks, help them to exploit the 
opportunities offered in the new economy; 
  policies designed specifically for SMEs, which are 
important for employment creation and regional de 
velopment, to help them compete on a more equal 
footing with larger firms; the establishment of infor 
mation and advice centres, such as the Eurolnfo 
Centres (EICs) and the European Business and In 
novation Centres, to offer support to enterprises 
across the EU. The EICs, by virtue of their close as 
sociation with local businesses, their understand 
ing of the local institutional environment and their 
links throughout the Union, play an important role in 
building relationships between firms in different re 
gions and help them solve practical problems. In 
addition, the Europartenariat programme encour 
ages SMEs in lagging regions to form business 
links with companies elsewhere, so enabling them 
to import technological and business know how. 
Many of the new enterprise policies have parallels in 
the regional policies implemented through the Struc 
tural Funds, and a core chapter of the Guidelines for 
Structural Funds programmes
4 was devoted to estab 
lishing priorities for enterprise support similar to the 
new enterprise policy. 
SMEs 
Enterprise policy is particularly focused on SMEs, 
which are an important part of the European econ 
omy. SMEs are the predominant type of firm in the EU 
and they are particularly important in lagging regions, 
where the small family business is prevalent, particu 
larly in traditional sectors. The first multiannual 
programme for SMEs was therefore aimed at the de 
velopment of SMEs in assisted regions. 
In 1998, SMEs accounted for 99.8% of the 19.4 million 
non primary sector private enterprises in the EU. Their 
average turnover was around EUR 500,000. In the two 
years, 1996 to 1998, the total number of SMEs in the EU 
is estimated to have increased by 4% and the number 
of people employed by 2% (from 73.2 million to 74.6 
million), the same as in the economy as a whole. 
Access to finance 
Initiatives have also been undertaken to improve the 
availability of finance to SMEs through risk capital 
funds, the SME guarantee facility and small business 
loans for ICT projects. Most of these are implemented 
through the European Investment Funds. Since 1998, 
Spain, for example, has received 15% of the total 
amount allocated under the SME guarantee facility, 
which has gone to 672 firms. Other programmes, like 
the Joint European Venture (JEV), have also helped 
create new businesses in lagging regions, particularly 
in areas of new technology, almost 20% of the projects 
financed under the programme being implemented in 
Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
Policy on tourism 
Europe is the main tourist destination in the world. In a 
number of regions, particularly assisted ones in the 
south and in mountainous areas, tourism is a major 
source of employment and has a substantial effect on 
economic development. It is also an activity domi 
nated by SMEs, some 6.5% of the total turnover of 
firms of this size being generated in this sector. 
In the EU as a whole, it accounts for 5.5% of GDP and 
6% of jobs. In many parts of the EU, the figures are 
much higher. In Spain, for example, tourism accounts 
for 10.5% of GDP and 9.5% of employment. 
Tourism is likely to be a major source of job creation 
over the coming years, particularly in lagging and pe 
ripheral regions, and measures to support the sector 
could have an important effect on the development of 
these. According to the report of a High Level Group on 
Tourism and Employment set up by the Commission, 
there is an opportunity for creating around 3 million new 
jobs in tourism in the EU over the next decade, but cer 
tain conditions have to be met to realise this. 
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Regional aspects of Innovation Policy 
Two action lines which foster the regional dimension of 
RTD and innovation policies have been developed un 
der the Innovation programme: the Regional Innovation 
Measures and the network of Innovation Relay Centres. 
The Regional Innovation Measures action line has sup 
ported three generations of projects since 1994. RITTS 
(Regional Innovation and Technology Transfer Strat 
egies) projects were launched in 70 regions in parallel 
with Regional Innovation Strategies (RIS), under the for 
mer Article 10 of the ERDF, in 30 regions. The aim of the 
projects is to help regions develop a strategy which en 
courages firms, mainly SMEs, to be more technol 
ogy oriented and innovative. The approach is a new 
one, which moves away from the promotion of individ 
ual, mainly supply led RTD measures, the concern be 
ing not so much to enlarge the scientific and 
technological capacity of regions perse, but to improve 
the institutional, RTD and innovation environment in 
which firms operate. The scheme is based on a bot 
tom up approach, starting from the needs of enter 
prises in regions in terms of innovation support, 
technologies and business advice, and is aimed at es 
tablishing long lasting regional structures and pro 
cesses. As such, it is designed to strengthen 
cooperation among all relevant parties (including en 
couraging public private partnership), create consen 
sus, identify strategic regional priorities and direct 
resources towards these. 
The positive effects of the RITTS programme include: 
  the development for the first time in many regions in 
cohesion countries of an innovation policy as a result 
of the scheme and the strengthening of the innovation 
system in others; 
  the creation of an awareness of the importance of in 
novation to economic growth; 
  the mobilisation of institutions, businesses and indi 
viduals at the regional level; 
  the introduction of a much needed move towards 
strategic thinking for innovation oriented regional de 
velopment; 
  helping to develop a broader concept for innovation, 
different from mere technology transfer, and to put 
this higher on the policy agenda; 
  a greater focus of public expenditure at regional level 
on business needs and an increase in public funding 
for innovation in many regions; 
  providing the means and incentives to create a dia 
logue in fragmented regions (in a geographical, insti 
tutional and cultural sense); 
  the creation of 'innovation communities' of different 
organisations and individuals in regions whose aim is 
to develop innovation as a driving force for regional 
growth; 
  helping regions clarify the scope of infrastructure to 
support innovation and develop measures to rational 
ise and better define it, as well as to increase its visi 
bility. 
The Innovation Relay Centre network consists of 67 
main nodes (and a large number of sub nodes) in 30 
European countries (including the EEA, CECs, Cyprus, 
Switzerland and Israel), organised on a regional basis. 
The main aim of the centres is to help local industries 
specify their new technology needs and identify which 
of their technologies are suitable for transfer to other re 
gions or sectors. 
Both networks focus specifically on the needs of less 
advanced regions, which are not only fully integrated 
into all the activities but also receive specific support in 
terms of advice, exchange of experience and access to 
good practice in other parts of Europe, especially in the 
most advanced areas. 
Commission of the European Communities (2000) Towards Enterprise Europe'. Work Programme for Enterprise Policy 2000 2005. 
Enterprise DG. SEC (2000) 771. 
Commission of the European Communities (2000) 'Challenges for enterprise policy in the knowledge driven economy'. Proposal for 
a Council decision on a Multiannual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship (2001 2005). COM (2000) 256. Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities: Luxembourg. 
COM (2000) 567 of 20 September 2000. 
The Structural Funds and their coordination with the Cohesion Fund: Guidelines for programmes in the period 2000 2006  
COM (1999) 344 of 1 July 1999. 
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A geographically concentrated sector 
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), initiated in 1970, 
has four main elements: conservation of stocks, 
structural measures, organisation of markets and in 
ternational agreements with third countries. Overall, 
fishing remains an important sector in the EU econ 
omy, accounting for around 0.20% of GDP in 1997 (as 
against 0.25% in 1990) and 0.4% of employment (the 
same as in 1990). 
Fishing is concentrated in coastal and peripheral 
areas, which are often disadvantaged. In 1997, 70% 
of fishermen and 60% of those employed in the fisher 
ies sector as a whole lived in Objective 1 regions. In 
Greece, Spain and Portugal, the sector accounted for 
just over 1 % of employment. 
Because of this concentration, any CFP measure 
which strengthens the competitiveness of the sector 
tends to contribute to social and economic cohesion. 
Areas dependent on fishing 
and changes in the scale of dependency 
Given the concentration of the industry, the Edin 
burgh European Council (December 1992) officially 
recognised the existence of Areas Dependent on 
Fishing (ADFs) and the need to give them special at 
tention.
1 In terms of NUTS 3 regions, 34 ADFs (13 of 
which were in Greece and 11 in Spain) had, in 1997, a 
rate of dependency on the sector of between 3% and 
15% (see Table A.30 in Annex). At more detailed 
NUTS 4 or NUTS 5 regional level, dependency is 
higher, with around 30 ADFs (excluding Greece) 
having a rate of between 20% and 60%. 
The overall dependency of the Union on fishing, in 
terms of catches, declined only slightly between 1990 
and 1997, the reduction being compensated by an in 
creased dependency on fish farming. On the other 
hand, the map of areas dependent on fishing has 
changed considerably, with Spain (Galicia and the 
southern Atlantic regions, in particular) showing the 
most marked reduction. Dependency also declined 
in Italy (north east) and France (Bretagne), while it in 
creased, most especially, in Greece, as well as in 
Scotland (Peterhead, Western Isles, Shetlands), Por 
tugal (Madeira, Algarve) and Ireland (Galway). Ac 
cordingly, the regions in which dependency has risen 
are those where development is lagging behind. 
The social and economic effects of the CFP 
Conservation of stocks 
In line with the principle of relative stability, fishing 
quotas are divided equally among Member States 
and have, therefore, no effect on cohesion. Conser 
vation measures, however, are accompanied by spe 
cial provisions in favour of fishing communities in 
ADFs: local fishermen who have traditionally fished in 
coastal waters of another country can continue to fish 
within the 12 mile limit, usually accessible only to 
local vessels. 
Fishing effort 
Between 1990 and 1997, employment in fishing de 
clined by 19% in the EU (from 313,000 to 252,000). 
The fall was the result of measures taken to conserve 
stock and reduce the extent of over fishing which fol 
lowed the multiannual guidance programmes 
(MAGP) and the action taken under the FIFG   Finan 
cial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (structural 
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section)   to modernise the fishing fleet. In the 
long term, however, the adjustment of the fishing ef 
fort to available reserves and the restructuring of the 
sector are likely to arrest the decline. 
Processing 
Jobs in the processing sector declined by 10% over 
the period (from 107,000 to 96,000). This reflects both 
the decline in fishing and the concentration of busi 
nesses worldwide (only 50% of processing involves 
fish caught in the EU). It conceals, however, consid 
erable differences between regions. In Greece, em 
ployment in processing increased by 200% and in 
Italy overall, by 21 %, while it fell by almost 5% in Spain 
and the southern part of Italy. Support from the FIFG 
for the modernisation of businesses and the growth in 
fish farming have, therefore, enabled the number of 
jobs in Objective 1 regions to be maintained or 
increased. 
Fish farming 
The significant growth in fish farming, supported by 
the FIFG (and locally by the PESCA Initiative), has 
been translated into a substantial increase in both 
output and employment. Between 1990 and 1997, 
production in the EU (excluding Austria, Finland and 
Sweden) rose by 54% in cash terms (being valued at 
EUR 2 billion in 1997) and by 23% in volume terms 
(from 880,000 to 1,080,000 tons), some 85% of this 
rise taking place in Objective 1 regions (70% in 
Greece, southern Italy and Scotland alone). Employ 
ment in fish farming (excluding processing) in 
creased by 20% (from 47,000 to 57,000), the only part 
of the fisheries sector in which there has been net job 
creation. Some 70% of job growth in the Union has oc 
curred in Spain, Greece and Portugal. Fish farming 
has, therefore, developed largely in disadvantaged 
Objective 1 ADFs and, accordingly, has had a posi 
tive effect on social and economic cohesion. 
any form of unfair competition between Member 
States. It includes three components which are fa 
vourable to social and economic cohesion: 
a) production aids enable producers to become 
more competitive as regards processing and dis 
tribution, which are much more concentrated and 
organised, and have a positive effect on social 
cohesion; 
b) the principle of 'regional adjustment coefficients' 
enables Community withdrawal prices in any 
given region to be varied according to market 
conditions or distance from major marketing cen 
tres, which is therefore favourable to regional co 
hesion; 
c) as part of the POSEI programme for ultra 
peripheral areas, a scheme has been established 
(under Council Regulation 1587/98) to compen 
sate for the extra costs of selling certain products, 
arising from their remoteness, in Agores, Madeira 
and Canarias and the French Departments of 
Guyane and Reunion. 
International fishing agreements 
with third countries 
Evaluation undertaken in 1999 of the effects of inter 
national agreements with countries outside the EU in 
dicates that they are important for the Union because 
they generate value added (direct and indirect) of 
EUR 944 million and 40,000 jobs (half of which for 
seamen). Agreements with countries in the south 
(mainly Africa), which represent 75% of the 
value added resulting from agreements, mostly ben 
efit Spain (80%) and Portugal (7%), especially the 
ADFs in the Canarias, Andalusia, Pays basco, 
Galicia, Sesimbra and Olhao, and accordingly have a 
positive effect on cohesion. 
Common organisation of markets 
The COM, a means of regulation through supporting 
prices and direct intervention, is aimed at preventing 
An ADFls an area (a region or local area of employment) where the contribution of the fisheries sector to the economy, in terms of 
employment or value added, is so important that problems in the sector or the decline of fishing have serious social and economic 
consequences both directly and indirectly. Dependence is analysed in the text in terms of employment, though the same 
conclusions would be reached if it were measured in terms of value added, since this has changed in a similar way over time. 
114 Part III — The EU Budget and the contribution of structural 
policies to economic and social cohesion 
111.1 The EU Budget and economic and social cohesion 117 
111.2 The contribution of structural policies to economic and social 
cohesion: results and prospects 121 
115 Part III —The EU Budget and the contribution of structural policies to economic and social cohesion 
116 111 1 The EU Budget and economic and social cohesion 
The objective of strengthening economic and social 
cohesion is mentioned explicitly in Article 2 of the 
Treaty and as the first objective of the Union. More 
specifically, Article 158 states that cohesion is a pre 
condition for harmonious development in the EU: 'in 
order to promote its overall harmonious development, 
the Community shall develop and pursue its actions 
leading to the strengthening of its economic and so-
cial cohesion.' This article, moreover, goes on to 
stress that fostering cohesion requires that 'the Com-
munity shall aim at reducing disparities between the 
levels of development of the various regions and the 
backwardness of the least favoured regions or is-
lands, including rural areas.' 
The Treaty, by making explicit the aim of reducing 
disparities in economic development, implicitly re 
quires that EU policies, and cohesion measures in 
particular, should influence factor endowment and 
resource allocation and, in turn, promote economic 
growth. More specifically, cohesion policies are 
aimed at increasing investment to achieve higher 
growth and are not specifically concerned either with 
expanding consumption directly or with redistribution 
of income. This differs fundamentally from national 
cohesion policies which are in part aimed at transfer 
ring income to the poorest areas.
1 
The EU Budget is a key instrument for enhancing eco 
nomic and social cohesion. First, even though part of 
expenditure is not directed explicitly towards this ob 
jective, most of it is. 
Secondly, it is recognised in the Treaty that contribu 
tions to the Budget must take account of the differen 
tial ability to pay and that measures need to be taken 
to ameliorate the adverse situation of the less wealthy 
Member States. 
Member States which are less well off, therefore, tend 
to emerge as net recipients from the Budget
2 (Graph 
21).Such an aggregate measure may, however, be 
misleading since only part of overall EU expenditure 
(included in the data plotted in graph), is explicitly of a 
cohesion nature. Although the cohesion countries are 
net beneficiaries from the Budget, there is not neces 
sarily a negative relationship between budgetary po 
sitions and levels of GNP across Member States, 
since expenditure includes that devoted to purposes 
other than cohesion. 
Types of EU expenditure and cohesion 
The EU Budget contains no stabilisation function as 
such. Nevertheless, according to 1999 data, 23.3% 
of expenditure was on to allocative objectives, 71.4% 
on redistributive ones and the remainder on 
administration. 
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Allocative expenditure is intended to alter the market 
allocation of goods and/or services, either to correct 
market failure or to improve the market outcome. Ex 
amples of the former are expenditure on research, 
trans European networks and the environment, while 
expenditure on the CAP is an example of the latter. 
Expenditure for correcting market failure is not re 
lated to the prosperity of the countries in which it is 
made and, therefore, does not directly impinge on co 
hesion (see Graph 22, which shows the absence of 
any correlation between GNP and Internal Market 
expenditure). 
Allocative expenditure aimed at improving the free 
market outcome poses more difficulties. In the case 
of the CAP, for example, it is intended to support 
prices at a level which gives a fair income to farmers. 
The cost of this depends on the gap between market 
prices and support prices, while farmers' income de 
pends only on the level of the latter. 
However, an important part of the CAP takes the form 
of direct income support to farmers and is, therefore, 
redistributive in nature. CAP support in total is, ac 
cordingly, mildly negatively correlated with income 
(Graph 23) mainly because of the income support 
component (Graph 24). 
EU redistributive expenditure 
Redistributive expenditure is the main instrument of 
cohesion policy. This was boosted by the Delors I and 
II packages, which first institutionalised structural 
spending and its programming and then expanded 
the amount and established the Cohesion Fund. The 
Financial Perspectives 2000 to 2006 put structural ex 
penditure at the centre of the enlargement strategy, 
allocating around 80% of the total funds for the new 
Member States to this. 
As noted above, the key objective of EU redistributive 
policy is to reduce regional differences in the level of 
development through fostering investment. The aim, 
therefore, is to improve the structural endowment of 
less prosperous regions or where development 
needs are greatest. This is pursued through the 
Structural Funds and many other EU policies which 
are directed at improving the level of infrastructure, 
education and scientific research in the regions in 
question. 
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The emphasis on growth and invest 
ment explains the importance at 
tached to the principle of additionality, 
under which Community transfers may 
not lead to a reduction in the structural 
expenditure financed by Member 
States themselves. In other words, EU 
structural aid must be additional to and 
supplement national investment. 
The present system of structural ex 
penditure can then be thought of as a 
rules based system in which spending 
for convergence is tied to specific pro 
jects and to explicit financial and other 
parameters. 
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An important aspect of EU structural 
expenditure is multilateral monitoring 
under which both recipient Member 
States and the EU, through the Commission, agree on 
the Community Support Framework (CSF) and its im 
plementation. One rationale for this is to ensure that 
convergence aid is used as intended, so providing 
reassurance to EU taxpayers. The involvement of re 
cipient Member States is for reasons of subsidiarity, 
in that they are acknowledged to be in the best posi 
tion to propose projects and to judge the appropriate 
ness of expenditure. 
Structural expenditure increased over the two pro 
gramming periods, 1988 to 1993 and 1994 to 1999, 
but is due to decline in the period 2000 to 2006 
(Graph 25, in which funds going to the acceding 
Member States are shown separately).
3 There is a 
clear inverse relationship between structural expen 
diture and the relative prosperity of Member States, 
but it is not entirely systematic (Graph 26). 
Whilst the largest part of the Structural Funds is allo 
cated on a regional basis, the Guidance section of the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (EAGGF) and the Cohesion Fund are allocated 
to Member States. The limited importance of the latter 
in relation to the former (the EAGGF Guidance and 
Cohesion Fund account for about 23% of total struc 
tural expenditure) can mean that Member States with 
similar GDP per head have different access to funds, 
as in the case of Sweden and Italy, for example. In It 
aly, therefore, there are six regions (accounting for 
some 33% of the population) eligible for Objective 1 
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 
funds, while in Sweden, only a small proportion of the 
population is similarly covered (under 6%). 
As noted above, however, direct income support to 
farmers under the CAP is different from other EU 
redistributive expenditure, in that it is aimed at redis 
tributing income between people rather than at fos 
tering investment in particular regions. Indeed, the 
more the CAP moves away from price support to 
wards income support, the more it becomes a means 
of interpersonal redistribution, with no direct intention 
of reducing regional disparities in growth potential. 
The European Commission has suggested that at 
least part of this income support could be co fi 
nanced by Member States (see European 
26 GNP and structural expenditure, 1999 
Structural expenditure (EUR per head) 
80 90 100 
GNP per head (PPS, EU15=100) 
120 
119 111.1 The EU Budget and economic and social cohesion 
Commission 1998), but this so far has failed to gain 
unanimous support. 
EU Budget revenue 
The EU Budget is financed by the EU's own re 
sources, ie custom duties, agricultural and sugar lev 
ies, VAT resources and those related to GNP. In 
recent years, GNP resources have increased in im 
portance, while VAT resources and the other sources 
have declined (Graph 27). With the new Own Re 
sources Decision, which will come into force on 1 Jan 
uary, 2002, this trend will be further reinforced. 
Unlike in the case of national budgets, where pro 
gressive taxation plays an important redistributive 
role, in the EU budget, contributions are proportional 
to the capacity to pay measured by nominal GNP at 
current exchange rates. Redistributive objectives, as 
noted above, are, therefore, pursued through expen 
diture alone. 
The importance of VAT resources to revenue, how 
ever, is liable to produce regressive effects. To cor 
rect for this, the 1988 Own Resources Decision 
capped the VAT base of all Member States to 55% of 
27 Composition of EU own resources, 1985 2006 
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GNP, while the 1994 Decision limited it for Member 
States with GNP per head below 90% of the EU aver 
age (the cohesion countries) to 50% and reduced it 
progressively for others to 50% by 1999. The 1994 
Decision also progressively reduced the maximum 
call rate of VAT from 1.4% in 1995 to 1% by 1999. The 
March 1999 Berlin European Council and the new 
Own Resources Decision further reduced the maxi 
mum VAT call rate to 0.75% in 2002 and 2003 and to 
0.5% from 2004 on. 
The increased importance given to GNP resources in 
future years will reduce the regressive nature of the 
system substantially, so effectively nullifying an issue 
which could have become potentially contentious 
with enlargement and the very low levels of GNP per 
head in many of the acceding countries. 
Cohesion and budgetary balances 
The balance between contributions to the EU Budget 
and receipts from it is not a policy objective in itself. 
Nevertheless, with contributions to the Budget being 
largely proportional to GNP, expenditure is crucial to 
determining the configuration of balances. Indeed, 
whatever their limitations, the latter largely mirror the 
policy priorities of the Union. The data are consistent 
with cohesion expenditure being inversely related to 
regional GDP per head and with the cohesion coun 
tries being net beneficiaries of the EU Budget. How 
ever, a proper analysis of the contribution of the EU 
budget to fostering economic and social cohesion 
needs to take account of the diverse and heteroge 
neous nature of EU expenditure. 
1 Economic literature is nearly unanimous on the positive and direct relationship between income inequality and social policy. For the 
most recent findings in Europe see, for example, K. Caminada and K. Goudswaard (2000). 
2 This can be measured in a number of ways none of which is superior to others, see Financing the European Union, Report on the 
Operation of the Own Resources System, Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement 2/98, especially Annex 3. 
3 The data on EU 15 and enlargement related structural expenditure are from the 'Interinstitutional Agreement between the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 6 May 1999 on Budgetary Discipline and Improvement of the Budgetary Procedure', 
Annex I and Annex II. 
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social cohesion: results and prospects 
Since their creation, the Structural Funds and the Co 
hesion Fund have represented the main instruments of 
social and economic cohesion policy, which is a prior 
ity objective of the Union. These are aimed at strength 
ening the structural factors which determine 
competitiveness, and therefore the growth potential of 
less advantaged regions. 
Over 10 years have passed since the reform of the 
Structural Funds in 1988. A first evaluation of the results 
was presented in the First Report on Economic and So 
cial Cohesion. This showed the progress made in 
terms of convergence and cohesion and the contribu 
tion of structural policies to the attainment of these ob 
jectives. The report had also suggested possible ways 
of improving the effectiveness of structural policies and 
these were integrated into the new regulatory frame 
work. 
The Berlin Council (March 1999) confirmed the will to 
continue pursuing this political priority, made even 
more necessary by future enlargement, because of the 
substantial differences in the level of development. 
Given the scale of the financial transfers involved, it is 
important to assess the effectiveness of the policies 
pursued in reducing regional disparities and increas 
ing economic convergence. 
At the same time, the system for managing the Struc 
tural Funds has become more decentralised, with a 
clearer division of responsibilities and, as a result, the 
creation of stronger instruments for monitoring, control 
and evaluation. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first exam 
ines the scale of the effort made to improve economic 
and social cohesion; the second assesses the results 
achieved over the period 1994 to 1999; the third at 
tempts to draw lessons from the establishment of the 
new method of programming for the period 2000 to 
2006; the fourth section considers the different financial 
instruments created to assist the enlargement process. 
The financial effort 
to improve cohesion 
The macroeconomic aspect 
of structural support 
Community intervention in support of cohesion involves 
a significant financial dimension. The Structural and 
Cohesion Funds together account for over a third of the 
budget for Community policies (Graph 28). 
This financial effort is significant in macroeconomic 
terms, especially in Objective 1 regions (Table 9). Over 
28 Change in the scale of the Structural Funds, 
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Table 9 Economic effects of the Structural and Cohesion Funds 
Greece  Ireland  Spain  Portugal  EUR4 
% GDP 
1989 93  2.6  2.5  0.7  3.0  1.4 
1994 99  3.0  1.9  1.5  3.3  2.0 
2000 06  2.8  0.6  1.3  2.9  1.6 
% Gross fixed capital formation 
1989 93  11.8  15.0  2.9  12.4  5.5 
1994 99  14.6  9.6  6.7  14.2  8.9 
2000 06  12.3  2.6  5.5  11.4  6.9 
Structural and Cohesion Funds: commitment data  up to 1999;  forecasts for 2000-2006 
Source: European  Commission, estimates based  on Eurostat data and projections for 2000-2006 
the period 1994 to 1999, Community funding in Portu 
gal amounted to 3.3% of GDP, in Greece, 3.5% and in 
Ireland, 2.4%, all three countries consisting entirely of 
Objective 1 regions. In the other countries with Objec 
tive 1 regions, the figure varied between 0.2% of GDP 
(Germany) and 1.5% (Spain). Community support of in 
vestment was even greater, accounting for almost 15% 
of total investment in Greece, around 14% in Portugal, 
10% in Ireland and 6% in Spain. The implication is that, 
without Community transfers, economic growth, to 
which investment is a major contributor, would have 
been less in the cohesion countries. Transfers will, 
however, decline in scale over the period 2000 to 2006, 
particularly in Ireland. 
Consolidation of financial concentration 
in Objective 1 areas 
2000 2006 (around EUR 136 billion) will go to 
Objective 1 regions compared to 68% in 1994 1999 
(including Community Initiatives). This financial con 
centration will enable the average intensity of aid per 
inhabitant each year in Objective 1 regions to be 
maintained at the same level as in 1999 (Table 10). 
These regions will also receive funding from the Com 
munity Initiatives. 
The use of an objective method for distributing over 
97% of the Structural Fund allocations between Mem 
ber States has made it possible to maintain the con 
centration of finance in the less prosperous countries 
and regions. Accordingly, the less prosperous coun 
tries receive more aid per head (Graphs 29 and 30) 
and 60% of the Funds go to regions which, together, 
account for 20% of EU GDP (Graphs 31 and 32). 
Community structural policies have the effect of 
transferring budgetary resources towards regions 
where development is lagging. The scale of interven 
tion in the cohesion countries is therefore consider 
ably larger than in the rest of the Union. Almost 70% of 
total allocations for the Structural Funds for the period 
Increased geographical concentration 
One of the priorities of Agenda 2000 was to increase 
the geographical concentration of support in the most 
disadvantaged areas of the Union, as well as provid 
ing temporary support for regions where Community 
Table 10 Expenditure by Objective in successive 
(average EUR per head per year at 1999 prices) 
periods, excluding phasing   out 
1989 93  1994 99  2000 06 
Objective 1  123  187  220 
  highest  (IRL) 253  (IRL) 262  (P) 348 
  lowest 
Objective 2 
(D)62 
21 
(B)95 
46 
(S) 104 
41 
Objective 3  10  12 
Cohesion Fund  41  40 
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aid is set to come to an end. In 2006, Objectives 1 and 
2 will cover 41 % of EU population, a proportion close 
to the Commission's proposal in Agenda 2000, which 
was for a maximum figure of between 35% and 40%. 
This is the highest degree of geographical concentra 
tion achieved since the reform of the Structural Funds 
in 1988 (Table 11). 
The increased geographical concentration is the re 
sult of the strict application of the eligibility criterion 
for Objective 1 and the introduction of ceilings on eli 
gible population, decided by the Commission, for 
each Member State as regards Objective 2. 
Objective 1 
For Objective 1 regions, the strict application of the 
75% of average EU GDP threshold, except for north 
ern regions in Sweden and Finland which were 
eligible for Objective 6 in the period 1995 to 1999, led 
to a coverage rate of 22.2% of EU population (as 
against 24.6% in 1999). There is some continuity with 
the earlier period, except for the regions eligible for 
transitory support and the UK, for which the coverage 
rate has been increased by almost half (see Table 
A.31 for the support provided by country in the two 
programming periods). 
Objective 2 
For Objective 2 areas, the coverage rate was re 
duced to 18% of EU population (from 25% in 1999 for 
Objectives 2 and 5b together). Within the population 
ceilings decided by the Commission,
1 Member 
States had considerable room for manoeuvre in 
drawing up the list of eligible regions, while comply 
ing with the obligation to ensure that at least 50% of 
the population concerned fulfilled the so called 
31 Allocations of Structural Funds and GDP by 
Member State, 1994 99 
Z 40 
20 40 60 80 
Annual average allocations (cumulative %) 
100 
32 Allocations of Structural Funds and GDP by 
Member State, 2000 06 
20 40 60 80 
Annual average allocations (cumulative %) 
100 
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Table 11 Coverage rate of Structural 
Funds, 1993 2006 
% total population 
1993  1999 2006 
Objective 1  21.7  24.6 22.2 
Objective 2  16.8  16.4 18.2 
Objective 5b  5.0  8.8 
Total  43.5  49.8 41.3 
'Community' criteria. The areas adopted by the Com 
mission, on the basis of Member State proposals, 
cover 47% of the total population eligible for Objec 
tive 2 and consists of the priority areas defined ac 
cording to the Community criteria.
2 (See Table A.32 
for the support provided by country in the two pro 
gramming periods.) 
Predominance of industrial and urban areas 
Following the Commission decisions in 1999 and 
2000, the distribution between the four types of area 
will be very similar to that indicatively agreed by the 
Council: industrial areas eligible for Objective 2 will 
account for 8.5% EU population, rural areas, for 5.2%, 
urban areas, for 1.9%, areas dependent on fishing, 
for 0.3% and mixed areas, for 2.1%. 
At the EU level, the share of rural areas in Objective 2 
will therefore be slightly higher than indicated in the 
regulations. In addition to the measures implemented 
under the rural development policy supported by the 
EAGGF Guarantee section, Member States have 
judged it useful and necessary to make the more vul 
nerable rural regions eligible for a wider range of sup 
port measures from the ERDF and the ESF. 
Although urban areas in decline appear to be un 
der represented, this is not the case, since they are 
also included among industrial areas. The same is 
true of the areas dependent on fishing, since in order 
to be able to implement policies for restructuring in ar 
eas of sufficient size, a number of Member States 
have included some ports in areas eligible for assis 
tance under rural or industrial criteria. 
The distribution between different types of area varies 
markedly between Member States. Urban areas are 
relatively important in Belgium, the Netherlands, Lux 
embourg and the UK, while higher priority is given to 
rural areas in Denmark, Sweden, France, Italy and 
Austria, and industrial areas predominate in Germany 
and Spain. In Finland, the distribution is similar to the 
EU average pattern. 
Territorial continuity and fragmentation 
Few areas not covered by either Objective 2 or Ob 
jective 5b during the period 1994 to 1999 were pro 
posed by Member States for eligibility under any of 
the Objectives, these being estimated to have a pop 
ulation of around 9.4 million, only 16% of that eligible 
for Objective 2 for the period 2000 to 2006. This conti 
nuity of eligible areas suggests that Member States 
considered the results achieved up until then were 
not sufficient to justify ending EU support, even if ac 
companied by transitional assistance. 
The general statement needs, however, to be quali 
fied. Four Member States (Germany, Belgium, Fin 
land and the Netherlands) have in fact modified the 
choice of areas for support significantly as compared 
with the 1994 to 1999 period, mainly to take advan 
tage of the urban dimension of the new Objective 2. 
The intervention of the Structural Funds in urban ar 
eas in difficulty should create the economic condi 
tions for a reduction in crime and complement 
specific policies for combating and preventing crime. 
In addition, a considerable degree of fragmentation 
of eligible areas is evident, reflecting Member States' 
attempts to maximise the overall coverage of Objec 
tive 2. This could make it more difficult to implement a 
policy of restructuring, given that it multiplies prob 
lems of distinguishing between different areas and so 
complicates the management of programmes. Such 
a fragmentation gives rise to the risk of diluting the ef 
fects of Community intervention. 
Limited coherence with the maps 
of State regional aids 
In the Commission's view, both Community and na 
tional intervention should be concentrated in areas 
most in difficulty so as to provide the means for their 
restructuring. Accordingly, it had recommended im 
proving the coherence between the map of State re 
gional aids and that of areas eligible for Objective 1 
and 2 support. 
In 1997, the Commission also adopted a 'Communi 
cation on the links between regional and competition 
policy',
3 in which it proposed a number of measures 
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Table 12 Coherence between areas eligible for Structural Funds and eligible for 
regional State aid 
% EU population 
Regions eligible for 
Structural Funds 
Regions not eligible for 
Structural Funds 
Total 
1994 99 2000 06  1994 99 2000 06  1994 99 2000 06 
Areas eligible for 
regional State aid 
44.0 35.6  2.7 6.7  46.7 42.3 
Areas not eligible for 
regional State aid 
6.6 5.8  46.7 51.9  53.3 57.7 
Total  50.6 41.4  49.4 58.6  100 100 
Period 2000-2006: estimates based on a geographical comparison at NUTS5 level 
Sources: Eurostat, DG Comp, calculations DG REGIO 
to improve the consistency between the list of areas 
eligible for national regional aid and the list of Objec 
tive 1 and 2 regions. Many of the proposals formu 
lated in this Communication have been implemented: 
The Commission aligned the duration of the re 
gional aid maps on that of the Objective 1 and 2 
maps. Both lists now cover the same period, 
namely 2000 to 2006. 
The 1997 Guidelines on national regional aid and 
the new Structural Funds regulation gave Mem 
ber States greater flexibility in proposing Article 
87(3)(c) and Objective 2 regions. In its Communi 
cation on the links between regional and competi 
tion policy, the Commission invited Member 
States to use this flexibility to ensure greater con 
sistency between the two lists. In order to facili 
tate this process, the Guidelines provided that 
areas eligible under the Structural Funds may 
qualify for the Article 87(3)(c) derogation. 
The criteria for eligibility under Objective 1 and 
Article 87(3)(a) of the Treaty (aid to promote the 
economic development of lagging regions) were 
harmonised, except for the former Objective 6 re 
gions in Finland and Sweden. Some of these low 
population density areas were granted Objective 
1 status in spite of the fact that they did have a per 
capita GDP which was higher than 75% of the EU 
average. In order to ensure full consistency be 
tween the Objective 1 map and the regional aid 
map, all low population density areas with a GDP 
per head exceeding 75% of the EU average have 
been granted Article 87(3)(c) status (aid to facili 
tate the development of certain economic activi 
ties or areas). 
In effect, in relation to Objective 2, the new Structural 
Funds regulation adopted by the Council did not in 
clude this requirement for greater coherence with the 
areas which benefit from derogations under Article 
87(3)(c). 
A comparison between the Objective 1 and 2 maps 
and the regional aid maps for the period 2000 to 2006 
shows that the geographical coherence between the 
two has improved slightly compared to the situation in 
the period 1994 to 1999 in all Member States, except 
for Belgium (where there was perfect coherence in 
the earlier period) and the UK (where, together with 
Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy, 
the lack of coherence remains marked) (Tables 12, 
Table 13 Population in regions eligible for Structural Funds but not for regional 
State aid 
% total population in each country 
B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A  P FIN S UK EU15 
1994 99 
2000 06 
0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 8.9 9.6 0.0 7.5 6.4 10.4 
3.4 0.1 2.3 0.0 4.3 8.8 0.0 7.0 0.3 8.2 
5.9 
3.9 
0.0 12.6 8.7 9.0 6.6 
0.0 12.0 7.4 9.8 5.8 
Period 2000-2006: estimates based on a geographical comparison at NUTS5 level 
Sources: Eurostat, DG Comp, calculations DG REGIO 
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13 and, in Annex, Table A.33). The responsibility for 
this rests with the Member States. This could threaten 
the restructuring of problem areas eligible for Objec 
tive 2, since they might not enjoy a significantly higher 
level of support than those areas not covered by the 
Structural Funds but entitled to State aids. 
Thematic concentration: 
the preponderance of 
spending on infrastructure 
Concentration of expenditure on particular policy ar 
eas is aimed at ensuring that the priorities defined in 
the programmes reflect both the factors underlying 
economic growth and the EU's political priorities.
4 
There is almost universal consensus among econo 
mists on the types of action which are likely to initiate a 
process of endogenous and sustainable growth. 
Community structural measures, however, are selec 
tive, complementary to those of Member States and 
not claimed to be solutions which are generally 
applicable. 
For Objective 1 regions, the priority areas from a co 
hesion perspective, there have been some changes 
in the distribution of the funds between the three ma 
jor areas of intervention   infrastructure, human re 
sources and productive investment (Table 14). 
The share of spending on infrastructure has been in 
creased for the period 2000 2006, to around 34% of 
the total (as against under 30% between 1994 and 
1999), half of which is for transport networks, with 
high concentration of investment in the cohesion 
countries because of existing needs. If the Cohesion 
Fund is also taken into account, infrastructure repre 
sents more than 40% of total investment allocated to 
Objective 1 regions. 
Table 14 Structural Funds by broad 
area of intervention under Objective 1 
% total 
1989 1993 1994 1999 2000 2006 
Infrastructure 
Human 
resources 
Productive 
environment 
Other 
35.2 29.8 34.3 
29.6 24.5 23.9 
33.6 41.0 34.8 
1.6 4.7 7.0 
Source: European Commission 
While the share of expenditure allocated to invest 
ment in human resources (around 24%) is due to de 
cline slightly, higher priority is given to active labour 
market policies and to strengthening education sys 
tems (especially in Italy and Portugal). 
The share of expenditure on productive investment 
(around 35%) has been reduced markedly, particu 
larly in the cohesion countries and Italy, because of a 
decline in direct aid to industry as stricter rules are 
applied. 
More specifically, Structural Funds play a major role 
in supporting environmental protection, which ac 
counts for over 10% of the total allocated for Objec 
tive 1. They are also directed towards improving 
access to peripheral regions and developing training 
and research activities, which are essential to the In 
formation Society and which, because of national 
budget constraints, could not be fully carried out with 
out Community support. In Greece, for example, in 
vestment in major transport networks in the 7 years of 
the present programming period will be 1
1/2 times 
larger than in the preceding period. 
In addition to the financial aspects, a number of quali 
tative changes are also evident in the new program 
ming period, such as increased support for the 
information society and for sustainable development, 
two major components of present regional policy. 
These issues are analysed in more detail below. 
Additional support for national efforts 
Over the period 1989 to 1993, overall public structural 
expenditure in Objective 1 regions amounted to 1.3% 
of EU GDP, or to an average of EUR 92 billion. The 
Structural Funds accounted for around 15% of this. 
Over the period 1994 to 1999, structural expenditure 
in these regions declined to EUR 82 billion, a reduc 
tion of 12% compared with the previous period, de 
spite an increase in spending from the Structural 
Funds of EUR 2 billion a year, or of 15%. The overall 
reduction is explained, on the one hand, by the 
privatisation of public enterprises in Italy and Portu 
gal, in particular, and, on the other, by a reduction of 
almost half in German expenditure in the new Lander, 
in order to bring it down to a level comparable to that 
in other Member States. 
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The scale of public expenditure in support of develop 
ment in Objective 1 regions varies considerably be 
tween Member States, though data need to be 
interpreted with caution. As well as Sweden, where 
spending (EUR 6,000 per head) is well above that in 
other Member States, Germany increased expenditure 
substantially over the period 1989 to 1993 in the new 
Lander to EUR 41 billion, or EUR 2,500 per head, 2
1/2 
times the average level in the Union. In Greece and 
Portugal, spending was much higher in relation to their 
economic potential than elsewhere, at 5 7% of GDP, 
while in other Member States (Germany, Spain, Italy 
and Ireland), the figure was 3% of GDP or less. By con 
trast, in France, expenditure on structural measures in 
Objective 1 regions in the 1994 to 1999 period 
amounted to only 0.2% of GDP (EUR 2.3 billion), which 
still represented EUR 890 per head in the regions con 
cerned. The same total amount was spent in Ireland, 
which meant expenditure per head over the country as 
a whole of EUR 650. 
Member State forecasts for the period 2000 to 2006, 
show a rise in average structural expenditure a year 
of 9%, to around EUR 90 billion. This increase is nec 
essary, if the level of public support for the catch 
ing up process in lagging region is to be maintained, 
though it appears to vary considerably between 
Member States. In addition to Ireland, where a pro 
jected doubling of expenditure is explained by the 
low level in the preceding period, an increase of 30% 
is expected in Greece and a rise above the EU aver 
age in Italy. In Germany, the forecast is for a reduction 
in structural expenditure of 9% in the new Lander, for 
the same reason as in the previous period. 
These forecasts, however, imply an overall reduction 
in structural expenditure relative to GDP over the 
present programming period, except in a few Mem 
ber States (Greece, Ireland and Italy), despite favour 
able economic prospects up to 2006. 
The Cohesion Fund: improved balance 
between transport and the environment 
A total amount of EUR 15 billion (at 1992 prices) were 
allocated by the Edinburgh European Council to the 
Cohesion Fund for the period 1993 to 1999 for the 
Member States where GDP per head was below 90% 
of the Community average. For the period 2000 to 
2006, the Berlin European Council allocated EUR 18 
billion (at 1999 prices) to the Fund and decided that 
eligibility should be re examined halfway through the 
period in the light of the outturn for GDP. 
In terms of the distribution of funds between areas of 
investment, it should be noted that a slightly larger 
share of expenditure went to environment than to 
transport over the period 1993 to 1999, even if in 
Greece the transport share was a little higher (Table 
15). Within environment, there was a significant in 
crease in investment in waste water facilities in order 
to meet the obligations imposed by Community Di 
rectives, and within transport, increased importance 
was given to investment in railways.
5 
Table 15 Cohesion Fund: resources 
committed by area of intervention, 
1993 1999 
Transport  Environment  Total 
% total  % total  EURmn 
Greece  51.2  48.8  2998 
Spain  49.7  50.3  9251 
Ireland  50.0  50.0  1495 
Portugal  48.1  51.9  3005 
Total  49.7  50.3  16761 
Source: European Commission 
The European Investment Bank: 
active support for regional development 
The main means by which the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) assists regional development is through 
loans for individual projects. These amounted to over 
EUR 66 billion over the period 1994 to 1999, or 77% of 
the total of such loans in the Union (Table A.34). Most 
of them, 83%, went to the financing of infrastructure 
projects, in transport, telecommunications and en 
ergy, which, in most cases, formed part of major net 
works of European interest, which together 
accounted for around 86% of all loans for 
infrastructure. 
Loans for individual projects expanded by over 25% 
between 1994 and 1999. The main growth, however, 
occurred in global loans (loans to financial institutions 
for small and medium scale projects), which 
amounted to EUR 20 billion over the period as whole, 
accounting for around 30% of total EIB lending, and 
which more than doubled in terms of the annual 
amount between the two years. These went mainly to 
financing productive activities, in industry in 
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particular, though also to helping to fund smaller 
scale infrastructure projects. 
The complementarity between global loans and 
those for individual projects, which stems from the ca 
pacity to adapt to the specific characteristics of differ 
ent projects and managers in different sectors and 
regions, has been a strong point in the ElB's ability to 
support regional development. 
The ElB's total lending for projects relating to regional 
development was significantly higher in the period 
1994 to 1999 than in the preceding programming pe 
riod, annual loans being almost 50% greater (Table 
16). Although this increase was smaller than that re 
corded by the Structural and Cohesion Funds as a 
whole, it still demonstrates a growing commitment by 
the Bank to projects for strengthening cohesion and 
regional development. The increase was most 
marked for projects in Objective 2 and 5b areas 
(lending rising by 71 %), especially for those aimed at 
offsetting industrial decline and containing 
unemployment. 
increasing accessibility and energy supply. In addi 
tion, growing attention will be focused on the 
competitiveness of firms in the context of the 'Innova 
tion 2000' Initiative. Viewing regional development 
more widely, the same orientation of policy will also 
apply to the candidate countries. 
Assessing the effects of 
Community intervention (1994 99) 
The aim here is to assess the results of structural poli 
cies over the last programming period. This, how 
ever, is inevitably still a preliminary exercise since 
some of measures will not be completed before the 
end of 2001 and the results of the ex-post evaluations 
will not be available before this date. The analysis fo 
cuses on the extent to which appropriations for Com 
munity intervention have actually been spent, the 
results achieved both in total and by Objective, the 
value added of Community initiatives and the effi 
ciency of the procedures. 
The EIB plans to collaborate more closely with the 
Commission over the period 2000 to 2006, in order to 
make the most of the potential complementarity be 
tween its activities and Community structural aid. It 
will, in particular, continue to support the creation and 
development of productive activities in the more dis 
advantaged regions, not only by helping to finance 
these directly, but also by supporting the services 
necessary for their development, as well as improve 
ments in infrastructure, especially those aimed at 
Budget implementation 
Information on the implementation of the budget for 
the period 1994 to 1999 gives an indication of the 
progress achieved, even though a number of 
programmes have not yet been completed, since 
payment can be extended up to December 2001 (see 
Table A.35). Up to the end of 1999, the results appear 
to be satisfactory, in the sense that appropriations 
Table 16 EIB lending, 1989 1993 and 1994 1999 
1989 1993  1994 1999  Change 
EURmn  % 
Regional development 
  total period  47.1  85.4  81.0 
  annual average, of which  9.4  14.2  51.0 
  Objectives 1 and 6  5.0  6.4  27.0 
  Objectives 2 and 5b  3.4  5.8  71.0 
Structural and Cohesion Funds 
  total period  70.0  166.7  138.0 
  annual average, of which  14.0  27.8  100.0 
  Objectives 1 and 6  8.8  15.8  80.0 
  Objectives 2 and 5b  1.7  3.7  117.0 
Lending consists of signed individual loans and current global loans 
Source: EIB and European Commission 
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amounted to 99% of total support available and pay 
ments to 75%. It is the latter, it should be noted, rather 
than appropriations as such which provides a better 
guide to the actual implementation of programmes on 
the ground. Taking the Member States with Objective 
1 regions together, with almost all appropriations 
committed   as statutorily required   overall commit 
ments are in line with the growth of expenditure as 
budgeted in 1994 in the Community Support Frame 
works (CSFs), Single Programming Documents 
(SPDs) and related programmes. As regards the pay 
ment of appropriations, some Member States among 
the main beneficiaries of the Funds (Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland, Germany) were well above the EU average at 
the end of 1999 (78%), while France, Italy, the Nether 
lands and the UK lagged most significantly behind (at 
only 67%). 
The monitoring systems established in Member 
States have, however, enabled start up problems 
and implementation difficulties to be identified and 
followed and the measures involved to be repro 
grammed in agreement with the Member States 
concerned. 
For the other Objectives, implementation is variable. 
In the case of Objective 2, a number of programmes, 
which were only adopted at the end of 1997 or in 
1998, could not be satisfactorily implemented in 1999 
and, as a result, overall payments were relatively low 
(60% of the total funds available). Moreover, some 
3% of total appropriations for the period (EUR 477.5 
million) could not be carried out and, therefore, had to 
be returned to the Community Budget. 
For Objectives 3 and 4, cumulative appropriations 
were committed in full. Payments amounted to 80% of 
total funds available for Objective 3, but to only 69% 
for Objective 4, because of delays in the UK and Italy 
as well as the innovative nature of a number of 
measures. 
In the case of the agriculture part of Objective 5a, the 
rate at which appropriations were actually imple 
mented, as reflected in payments, was below that for 
other Objectives, while for the fishing part, it proved 
possible to make good the delays experienced in ear 
lier years, so all appropriations were committed and 
payments amounted to 73% of total funds available. 
For Objective 5b, there have been persistent delays 
in payments in a number of Member States, due to 
complicated implementation procedures (Italy) and 
the unsatisfactory functioning of regional partnership 
(Belgium). 
For Objective 6, which relates to only two Member 
States, the situation is very different. Although total 
appropriations have been committed, payments 
amounted to only 65% of the funds available in Fin 
land and 54% in Sweden, but this reflects the fact that 
programmes were not adopted until 1995 when they 
joined the Union. 
The above levels of payment   and, therefore, as 
noted above, the actual implementation of structural 
measures   are, in general, satisfactory, especially 
for Objective 1 and Objective 3 programmes, and are 
broadly in line with the rates foreseen in the provisions 
for the various types of assistance. 
In the case of the Cohesion Fund, around 92% of ap 
propriations for the period 1993 99 were matched by 
payments by the end of 1999. Nevertheless, the im 
plementation of projects in 1999 varied considerably 
from Portugal (85%), at one extreme, to Greece 
(65%), at the other. 
Trends in eligible regions 
Analysis of trends in eligible regions reveals an en 
couraging performance by Objective 1 regions as a 
whole, but this is less marked for Objectives 2 and 5b 
regions. 
There was some convergence of GDP per head in 
Objective 1 regions towards the EU average, the 
level, in PPS terms, in these areas taken together in 
creasing from 63% of the average in 1988 to 70% in 
1998, which means that the gap was reduced by a 
sixth (Graph 33). This, however, conceals significant 
differences between regions. Some regions have 
caught up considerably, especially the new German 
Lander (where GDP per head increased from 37% of 
the EU average in 1991 to 68% in 1995) and Ireland 
(where it rose from 64% to 102%), as well as Lisbon, 
Northern Ireland, Burgenland and Flevoland, where 
GDP increased from below to above the threshold of 
75% of EU GDP over the period. Other regions have 
experienced little growth or even a decline in GDP per 
head: in Greece, Central Macedonia (from 63% of the 
EU average to 60%), Ipeiros (unchanged at 43%), 
Sterea Ellada (from 72% to 64%), Peloponnese (from 
58% to 57%), in Italy, the Mezzogiorno as a whole 
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(from 69% to 68%) and in the UK, Merseyside (from 
80% to 75%) and Highlands and Islands (from 83% to 
76%). 
On the other hand, unemployment in Objective 1 re 
gions remains high (16.6% in 1999 as against 9.2% 
for the EU as a whole), although along with the EU av 
erage rate, it has declined over the past three years 
(Graph 34). In a number of regions, unemployment is 
still well above the EU average, especially the Objec 
tive 1 regions in Spain (19.3% in 1999, though down 
from 27% in 1994), the French DOMs (32%), Italy 
(22.4%) and the new German Lander (16.7%). 
For regions in receipt of assistance under Objectives 
2 and 5b over the period 1994 to 1999, in which em 
ployment was relatively dependent on industry and 
agriculture, unemployment remained relatively low 
and stable in the latter, while in Objective 2 areas, it 
declined by more than the EU average between 1995 
and 1999 (by 2.2 percentage points as against 1.3 
points). Even though the rate is still slightly higher 
than EU average, the experience in both these and 
Objective 5b regions suggests that Community assis 
tance has been beneficial. 
Objective 1: Catching up and modernisation 
These high levels of unemployment go hand in hand 
with low rates of labour force participation, because 
of scarce job opportunities and insufficient rates of 
job creation, even in periods of economic recovery, 
which means that the gap with the rest of the Union in 
terms of employment rates (the proportion of work 
ing age population in work) is even wider. 
The level of productivity in Objective 1 regions has 
changed comparatively little relative to that in the rest 
of the EU, GDP per person employed increasing from 
64% of the EU average in 1988 to 67% in 1998. Never 
theless, there were substantial increases in Ireland 
and the new German Lander. 
In general, the performance of regions is closely 
bound up with the general economic context in which 
they are developing. The example of Ireland demon 
strates what can be achieved with a favourable com 
bination of structural intervention and a sound and 
stable macroeconomic policy. 
Structural support for Objective 1 regions lies at the 
heart of cohesion policy in the Union. Accordingly, it is 
essential to assess its effects as rigorously as possible. 
There has been significant convergence of GDP per 
head in Objective 1 regions over the past 10 years, but 
this in itself does not necessarily signify that the policy 
has been effective. Nevertheless, it is possible to dem 
onstrate that Community assistance has had positive 
and long lasting effects in both increasing economic 
growth and strengthening underlying structural factors 
which determine competitiveness and, therefore, fu 
ture potential growth. 
Macroeconomic impact: significant 
effects on growth, less on employment 
Structural assistance has had significant effects in 
boosting economic growth in the countries and re 
gions for which analysis is possible. Over the period 
1994 to 1999, the gap in GDP per head has been 
closed considerably in a number of countries. In 
33 Objective 1 regions: GDP per head (PPS), 
1988 98 
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Ireland, Portugal and Spain, annual GDP growth over 
the these five years was well above the EU average 
(almost 1 percentage point above in the latter two and 
6
1/2 points above in Ireland). Investment growth was 
also higher, laying the basis for growth in the longer 
term. 
Transfers from the Structural Funds added directly to 
demand and economic activity, but more importantly, 
since they were concentrated on investment in both 
physical and human capital, they were aimed at in 
creasing growth potential in the medium and 
long term. 
Recent evaluations of the Community Support Frame 
works (CSFs) in the last two programming periods indi 
cate that the estimated effect on growth was highest in 
Greece and Portugal, where the level of GDP rose by 
9.9% and 8.5%, respectively, over and above what 
would have been expected in the absence of assis 
tance (Table 17). The estimates for Ireland (3.7% 
higher) and Spain (3.1%) are lower, but still significant. 
Increased growth resulted in lower unemployment, 
particularly in Greece, though also in higher productiv 
ity growth in the manufacturing sector. 
The estimates of the 'supply side' effects on growth 
are of the same order as the direct effects on demand 
and become predominant in the longer term as the 
strengthening of productive potential boosts output. 
Improvements in competitiveness 
Although structural policies are ultimately judged in 
terms of their effect in narrowing regional disparities 
in GDP per head and employment, it is their impact on 
the underlying factors which determine economic de 
velopment which is a prime consideration. Substan 
tial progress has been achieved in improving basic 
Source: ESRI, estimates based on the HERMIN model (2000) 
infrastructure in weaker regions, but imbalances 
persist in RTD, access to know how, the Information 
Society and continuing training, and the quality of the 
environment. The Structural and Cohesion Funds 
make a significant contribution to correct these 
disparities. 
Transport infrastructure - improving accessibility 
An efficient transport system is essential to regional 
development. Investment in improving the system, 
however, needs to take account of the balance be 
tween different modes of transport (road versus rail) 
and the potential effect on the environment. 
Transport accounts for over half of total investment in 
infrastructure. Investment in improving the transport 
network in the cohesion countries and southern Italy 
over the period 1994 99 amounted to over EUR 40 bil 
lion, a third of which went to Spain. This was largely 
concentrated on roads (around 56%), while just un 
der a quarter of expenditure went on railways (around 
23%). In Spain and Ireland, roads accounted for a 
larger proportion of investment than elsewhere (73% 
and 68%, respectively) (Graphs 35 and 36, where ex 
penditure includes financing from the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds and EIB lending for regional devel 
opment, and Table A.36). 
This investment served to reduce disparities in trans 
port between these countries and the rest of the EU 
significantly, especially in respect of roads and the 
standard of the rail network (high speed trains, elec 
trification and double track). As a result, accessibility 
was improved through reductions in travel time, by 
around 20% on average in Spain (largely through im 
proving the road network) and 70% in respect of rail 
freight in Portugal (Table 18), and better links were 
established between the least prosperous areas and 
Table 17 Effect of Community structural intervention on GDP and unemployment, 
1989 99 
(% of non-intervention estimate) 
Greece  Ireland  Portugal  Spain 
GDP  Unemp. rate  GDP  Unemp. rate  GDP Unemp. rate  GDP  Unemp. rate 
1989  4.1   3.2  2.2   1.4  5.8  3.6  0.8   0.5 
1993  4.1   2.9  3.2   1.0  7.4  4.1  1.5   0.8 
1999  9.9   6.2  3.7   0.4  8.5  4.0  3.1   1.6 
2006  7.3   3.2  2.8  0.4  7.8  2.8  3.4   1.7 
2010  2.4  0.4  2.0  0.5  3.1  0.1  1.3   0.4 
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35  Breakdown of expenditure on transport 
infrastructure (EUR 1994 million), 1994 1999 
Other/Mixed ports 
modes 2% 4% 
36 Breakdown of expenditure on transport 
infrastructure (EUR 1994 million), 1994 99 
Ireland 
11% 
other parts of the country and, indeed, of Europe (eg 
through motorways in Spain). In addition, access to 
ultra peripheral areas (French DOMs) was improved 
through the construction or upgrading of airports. 
In many cases, use of the Structural Funds gave rise 
to private sector investment and the establishment of 
public private partnerships (as, for example, in the 
construction and management of roads in Portugal, 
the port of Gioia Tauro in Italy and Spata airport and 
the Rion Antirion bridge in Greece). In addition, the 
construction of infrastructure financed partly with ELI 
assistance resulted in net job creation of around 
900,000 persons a year (in full time equivalent terms), 
mainly in Objective 1 regions. 
The Cohesion Funds have made a significant contri 
bution to transport improvements through financing 
projects included in national and regional economic 
development programmes, most of which involved a 
specific assessment of the environmental impact. As 
a result, they have reinforced beneficial effects of 
ERDF intervention and helped to reduce regional dis 
parities further. According to a recent study (carried 
out by the London School of Economics in 1997),
6 
they have increased employment and private invest 
ment significantly in recipient regions, with large 
spillover effects in neighbouring ones. The estimated 
effect of 9 projects in Spain, with a total investment of 
EUR 2.5 billion, was to add around 0.6% to both GDP 
and employment in the medium term (equivalent to 
some 75,000 jobs). 
However, the need for investment in infrastructure re 
mains. Analysis carried out for the European Spatial 
Development Perspective indicates that while invest 
ment in peripheral regions has improved accessibil 
ity, it has been accompanied by similar investment in 
neighbouring regions and more central ones (in rail 
networks, for example), which can counteract any rel 
ative gain. The overall effect of such investment, 
moreover, depends on what other measures are 
Table 18 Estimated saving in travel time due to Structural and Cohesion Fund 
investment, 1994 99 
Greece Spain Ireland Portugal Italy (Obj.1) 
Road  20 30% 10 20% 10 15% 20% 34% 87% 
(190 mn for three (for 5 main roads) 
main routes) 
Rail  Around 10%   20 40% et 73% 14% 
(1hour35mn (for freight (increase 
for Athens  to Spain) in speed of 10kph) 
Thessaloniki) 
Other  50% 10% 
(Athens metro) (with the UK) 
Source: Oscar and Faber, Thematic evaluation on the impact of Structural and Cohesion Funds transport (2000) 
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taken to stimulate economic activity in the regions 
concerned. 
Supporting SMEs: critical 
to regional competitiveness 
Supporting SMEs is a priority of EU policy since they 
are a vital source of competitiveness and job cre 
ation, especially in Objective 1 regions. The Struc 
tural Funds provide support in a variety of ways, 
including through services (information, training and 
guidance, in particular) and help in financial engi 
neering as well as through financial assistance. Over 
the period 1994 to 1999, an estimated EUR 14 billion 
(14.5% of total funds for Objective 1) went to these 
kinds of measure (see Tables A.38 and A.39). Over 
500,000 firms (16% of the total in eligible regions) 
were assisted through direct aids (over a third of total, 
finance) and other measures.
7 
Evidence, in the form of an EU wide evaluation, 
based on surveys and case studies, suggests that 
the Structural Funds had a significant effect on SMEs 
over the last programming period. In the absence of 
Community support, it is estimated that 70% of invest 
ment projects would have either not taken place at all, 
or been smaller in scale or postponed and that assis 
tance contributed to creating more than 300,000 
additional jobs, even after taking account of 'dead 
weight' and substitution effects. The evidence also 
emphasises the potential of financial engineering 
schemes as an intsrument of intervention, even 
though they might take a long time to be established 
in regions where financial services are weak. 
EU support of SMEs has demonstrated a specific 
added value in many respects. First, it has added to 
the funds available at national level. Secondly, co fi 
nanced measures have often addressed the struc 
tural problems SMEs face, in particular, by providing 
business services (eg in respect of innovation and 
technology) and introducing new practices (eg finan 
cial engineering). Thirdly, in a number of countries, it 
has enabled SMEs to become an 'instrument' for re 
gional development and procedures for selecting 
and implementing projects to be improved. 
On the other hand, the evidence indicates that assis 
tance has been concentrated mainly on providing 
grants rather than loans and risk capital, which might 
improve the sustainability and cost effectiveness of 
schemes. It also indicates a need to improve the 
targeting of assistance, in particular, through the cre 
ation of specialist intermediaries in the private sector, 
preferably organised on a decentralised 'one stop 
shop' basis. Experience demonstrates that these 
tend to make schemes more accessible and provide 
quicker appraisal and better delivery of SME projects 
by integrating direct aid and services. 
Research, Technological Development 
and Innovation (RTDI): a strengthening 
of regional capacity 
As noted in Chapter 1, the gap in RTDI between the 
most developed and the least developed regions is 
much wider than in income per head. The concentra 
tion of these activities in the more dynamic regions is 
a key aspect of the 'virtuous circle' as regards growth, 
competitiveness and employment. By contrast, less 
dynamic regions have a scientific and technological 
system which is still afflicted by structural problems, 
by low RTDI expenditure; excessive concentration on 
Government research rather than on stimulating pri 
vate sector demand for innovation; inadequate re 
sources to maintain the existing infrastructure; strong 
dependence on external (Community) sources of fi 
nance and excessive concentration of research ac 
tivities in and around capital cities (Lisbon, Athens 
and Dublin). 
According to an evaluation of 52 Objective 1 and 6 re 
gions for the period 1994 to 1999, structural interven 
tion seems to have had beneficial effects, especially 
on infrastructure. In Greece, for example, the effect 
was particularly significant in Crete, where universi 
ties and research centres were strengthened, and in 
Central Macedonia, through closer cooperation be 
tween local industry (chemicals and textiles) and 
Government research centres. 
In broader terms, when assessing the effect of the 
Structural Funds, it is important to distinguish be 
tween different types of region, defined by their po 
tential for innovation, as measured by the extent of 
cooperation between research institutions and busi 
nesses. In these terms, most Objective 1 regions are 
below the highest level and around a third can be de 
scribed as 'technological deserts.' The performance 
of regions, however, is affected by the national fea 
tures of the country in which they are located as well 
as by the growth rate and other factors. The position 
from which they start affects their development path, 
especially as regards the weakest regions. Regional 
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differences in performance indicate that the policies 
implemented have been successful in some cases 
(Lisbon and Ireland) and failed in others (Attiki), while 
yet other regions seem to have developed independ 
ently of their innovative capacity (in particular, tourist 
regions like the Canary islands) (Table 19). 
At the same time, the effect in Objective 1 regions 
cannot be limited to the expansion of the research 
base, even if it is natural to focus on this because of 
the scale of the technology gap. In a number of Mem 
ber States and regions, increased effort has been de 
voted to strengthening human capital by increasing 
the number of qualified researchers and giving 
greater importance to the establishment of networks 
between industry and universities, technology trans 
fer and support for the demands of business. 
Accordingly, in Ireland, after the mid term review, in 
creased attention was focused on company research 
and development as well as on the training of re 
searchers. Co financed measures have served to in 
crease the amount of RTD in industry significantly, 
more than 400 firms being assisted, many of which 
had not undertaken RTD before, and 300 firms partic 
ipating in research training. Increased industrial 
awareness, therefore, has helped to strengthen the 
relationship between public research and the private 
sector. 
A further example is the CDTI (Centre for Industrial 
Technological Development), which was set up in 
Spain to support technological development in firms 
in Objective 1 regions by providing funds which are 
reimbursable if projects are successful. The 243 pro 
jects approved have involved investment in RTD of 
EUR 240 million and 1,622 full time researchers. 
From the 108 projects completed, around 74% of the 
funds provided will be reimbursed. 
Furthermore, effort still needs to be made to increase 
the efficiency with which funds are used and man 
aged. The most innovative measures have frequently 
been insufficiently exploited because of the relative 
complexity of the procedures for implementing them, 
as well as, on occasion, difficulties in finding projects 
of sufficient quality to justify financing. This may have 
contributed to reducing the efficiency and effect of 
the Structural Funds. In addition, there is still inade 
quate follow up and evaluation of projects. These 
problems apart, the implementation of genuinely in 
novative measures can be useful for addressing the 
difficulties noted above; but they need to be based on 
active partnership between public and private sec 
tors and entail an appropriate division of responsibil 
ity between the Union, Member States and regions.
8 
RIS: a proactive innovation approach 
The Commission has also helped to develop the inno 
vative capacity of regions through a number of pilot 
actions. Since 1994, 32 regions have received funds 
under Article 10 of the ERDF for developing RIS pro 
jects (regional innovation strategies).
9 These involve 
private public partnership and are intended as a re 
sponse to the need of businesses, specifically SMEs, 
to innovate. Over the past 5 years, over 5000 SMEs 
have undergone technology audits and/or interviews. 
Hundreds of RDTI organisations have been con 
sulted in the process offormulating strategies and im 
plementing action plans. 
RIS has produced significant results in the form of the 
creation of new regional partnerships and joint work 
ing methods, the strengthening of the innovative 
Table 19 Objective 1 regions: relationship between technological potential and growth 
High 'institutional density' 
regions 
Intermediate regions  Technological deserts' 
Converging regions 
Intermediate regions 
Diverging regions 
Ireland, Lisbon and Tago valley, 
Norte, Crete 
Central Macedonia, Hainaut, 
Castilla Y Leon, Northern Ireland 
Merseyside, Attiki 
Centra (P), Murcia, 
Castilla La Mancha, Cantabria, 
Andalucia, Flevoland 
Corsica, Galicia, Sardegna, 
Puglia, Campania, Abruzzo 
Eastern Macedonia and 
Thrace,Epirus, Thessaly, 
Western Greece, Asturias 
Algarve, Alentejo, Canarias, 
Extremadura 
Southern Aegean, Calabria, 
Basilicata 
Highlands and Islands, Western 
Macedonia, Sterea Ellas, 
Peloponese, Northern Aegean, 
Ionian Islands, Sicilia, Molise 
Source: CIRCA, Thematic evaluation on Research, technological development and innovation and Structural Funds in Objectives 1 
and 6 regions, 1999 
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process and the launching of new innovation projects 
within firms. For example, in Castilla y Leon, almost 
800 firms took part in a series of meetings to decide 
the type of RIS to be implemented. A total amount of 
EUR 447 million was committed for the first four years 
of implementation (1997 to 2000), increasing techno 
logical expenditure in the region from 0.8% of GDP in 
1997 to 1% in 2000. 
These initiatives has been succeeded by a new gen 
eration of projects, RIS+. The Commission has also 
developed a database (RINNO   Regional Innovation 
Observatory) to list and describe all public incentives 
for innovation in EU regions so as to encourage the 
transfer of innovation. 
The information society: focus on 
telecommunication infrastructure 
The potential of the Information Society for improving 
regional competitiveness and social cohesion is re 
cognised by the Structural Funds. The rapid diffusion 
of information and telecommunication technologies 
opens up new development opportunities for the less 
advantaged regions, in particular, by facilitating a 
more efficient location of investment, given the differ 
ences in costs and access to markets. Regions can 
also benefit from these technologies by exploiting 
their own areas of specialisation and attracting new, 
higher valued added activities. Moreover, since 
these can be located outside urban areas, they are a 
means of helping to achieve more balanced develop 
ment across the EU. 
The proportion of the Structural Funds devoted to in 
vestment in telecommunications is relatively small, at 
only around 2% of the total spending, 1.5% on infra 
structure and 0.3% on stimulating the demand for ser 
vices and applications.
10 The focus has, therefore, 
been on improving the basic system and narrowing 
disparities between peripheral regions and the rest of 
the Union through the digitalisation of networks and 
improving the quality of service. 
Technological change and the liberalisation of tele 
communication markets are driving factors towards a 
more coherent and integrated approach, aimed at 
furthering the development of the Information Soci 
ety, especially as most investment in the sector is 
highly profitable. The Structural Funds need, there 
fore, to be focused on stimulating demand, develop 
ing new skills, raising the awareness of all those 
involved and implementing new high value added 
applications while giving strategic priority to regional 
balance.
11 
RISI: a catalyst for regional development 
Through its integrated approach, the RISI
12 has had a 
major effect in boosting the creation of specialised 
know how and jobs in the regions. In Nord Pas de 
Calais it has been a catalyst for the development of 
new skills and know how, new activities and an enter 
prise culture. This is recognised by virtually all those 
involved in regional development and is reflected 
in the integration of various information technology 
measures (distance learning and training, business 
development, health care, cultural activities, 
cyber centres, public services, websites and trans 
port) into the regional programmes. 
Human resources: helping people into work and 
strengthening education and training systems 
In the main countries with Objective 1 regions, struc 
tural policies have helped to strengthen active labour 
market measures, education and training systems 
and the links between training and job placement. 
The focus has been on integrating training with other 
types of action, giving increased importance to dis 
advantaged groups and targeting assistance on 
these, adjusting training to the needs of the labour 
market, adopting a 'customer oriented' approach 
and improving the quality of training. Examples of ac 
tions include support for qualification and accredita 
tion systems, developing technical teaching in upper 
secondary and higher education, improving infra 
structure, providing continuing training to teachers 
and trainers and trying to reduce the rate of school 
drop out. 
Overall, the ESF has been a catalyst in modernising 
education and labour market policies in different 
countries. ESF co funded activities, and the need to 
comply with the administrative requirements for re 
ceipt of funds, have helped to encourage the devel 
opment of mechanisms for the better planning of 
policies, better coordination and improved relations 
between the institutions involved. As a result, a single, 
standard reference framework emerged between the 
fund giving agencies and the regions, which facili 
tated the dissemination of techniques for implement 
ing social and economic policy. Best practices 
identified by evaluators include greater transparency 
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in policy implementation, a strengthening of the ca 
pacity to manage at local and regional level and 
closer links between public policy and labour market 
needs. 
In Spain, part of the added value of the ESF was seen 
as providing support for the reform of technical sec 
ondary education (by, for example, developing work 
experience modules, introducing guidance and ad 
vice systems and taking responsibility for disadvan 
taged students). The rationale for ESF intervention 
and the scope of this remain relevant, given that a mi 
nority of students undertake technical secondary ed 
ucation and the amount of expenditure allocated to it 
is still relatively small. 
In Portugal, the ESF helped improve the educational 
system by widening the range of paths which stu 
dents could follow and by giving priority to quality. 
The training of teachers and trainers, both in primary 
and secondary education (49.3% of teachers) and at 
university level (grants for postgraduate courses) ap 
pears to be one of the major contributions of the 
programme. Widening the range of educational and 
training paths seems to have strengthened links be 
tween secondary education and labour market needs 
and improved career guidance arrangements in 
schools. Indeed, the support given to the training of 
'medium level' technicians created an alternative to 
traditional general education and provided skills 
which were directly applicable on the labour market. 
In Italy, the ESF has enabled the quality of technical 
streams to be improved, through the gradual intro 
duction of training for teachers (50% of all vocational 
education teachers were covered), work experience 
modules (30% of the total length of courses) and new 
training methods and programmes. 
Environment: a key role in developing 
water supply infrastructure 
In the case of environmental measures, the effects of 
structural intervention in the cohesion countries and 
the Mezzogiorno need to be distinguished from those 
in other parts of the Union. 
In the cohesion countries, the proportion of house 
holds connected to drinkable water supply and main 
drainage is still much lower than elsewhere in the EU. 
This not only reduces the quality of life of the people 
concerned, but also has a damaging effect on the 
potential for economic development, and on tourism, 
in particular. 
Many regions in the Mediterranean suffer from a 
shortage of water, especially in the Mezzogiorno, 
where only 26% of the population is connected to 
drinkable water supply throughout the year. Main 
drainage is also inadequate, while in urban areas, en 
vironmental conditions are usually very poor, and not 
enough is done to make people more aware of the is 
sues involved and of the need to manage the environ 
ment effectively. 
These problems have adverse effects on the econ 
omy, as well as society, and conflict with the aim of 
pursuing a sustainable development path. Neverthe 
less, outside large cities, and except in a few areas of 
Spain and Ireland, the low level of industrial develop 
ment means that toxic gas emissions tend to be less 
of a problem than generally in northern European 
countries. 
In the north of the EU   in the new German Lander, in 
particular   the main problems stem from industrialis 
ation, which has left a legacy of soil contamination, 
pollution and urban degradation. This had a damag 
ing effect on the image of many regions with tradi 
tional industries and reduces their capacity to attract 
investment from outside. In rural areas   in the Nether 
lands and Ireland, in particular however, agriculture 
is a major source of pollution. 
During the period 1994 to 1999, environmental invest 
ment financed from the Structural Funds amounted to 
over EUR 9 billion, around 9% of the total funds for 
Objective 1. Over the same period, 20% of EIB loans 
went to environmental projects, totalling EUR 1 billion 
in the cohesion countries and almost EUR 3 billion 
elsewhere in the Union (mainly in the UK on water 
treatment projects). 
In the cohesion countries, the Structural Funds 
played a major role in improving water supply and 
distribution systems as well as those for waste water 
treatment. In Greece, the number of urban areas con 
nected to main drainage almost doubled between 
1993 and 1999, increasing the population covered to 
over 70%. In Ireland, the proportion covered rose 
from 44% in 1991 to 80% in 1999. In Portugal, the 
population connected to drinkable water supply rose 
from 61 % in 1989 to 95% in 1999 and that connected 
to main drainage from 55% in 1990 to 90% in 1999. 
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The Funds also helped to increase water supply in re 
gions with a serious shortage. In Italy, for example, 
supply was expanded by over a third over the pro 
gramming period. 
In the case of the Cohesion Fund, ex-post evaluation 
of a representative sample of environmental projects 
generally indicated satisfactory results, though a 
number of problems were identified in respect of the 
management of water reserves. In particular, it ap 
peared often to be difficult for small scale projects to 
improve supply and become self financing. The most 
significant environmental benefits were identified in 
respect of water supply projects, in particular those 
concerned with better management of reserves (pro 
jects in Sevilla and Lough Mask in Ireland, for exam 
ple). In areas severely affected by drought, 
moreover, water loss was considerably reduced in a 
number of cases. 
Beyond the immediate effects on the quality of life, es 
pecially of those living in the less developed parts of 
the Union, the investment has also given rise to wider 
benefits: 
  significant progress in the extent of compliance 
with Community directives: for example, in 1999, 
Ireland attained the standards imposed by the di 
rective on drinking water; 
  a reduction in potential constraints on the devel 
opment of agriculture, industry and tourism; 
  growing awareness of the need for integrated en 
vironmental policies (Greece). 
intervention. It is evident that the authorities in Mem 
ber States responsible for structural policies regard 
eligibility for assistance from the Structural Funds as 
being much more important than simply the addi 
tional finance that it provides, since it opens the way 
for them to give national support to activities in the re 
gions concerned and to obtain loans from the EIB. 
The volume of State regional aids is, therefore, larger 
than transfers from the Structural Funds, while the 
scale of EIB loans is expanding significantly. 
The increase in regional partnerships made it possi 
ble to redirect Community funds towards productive 
investment and measures aimed directly at employ 
ment creation. Around half of structural assistance 
was spent directly or indirectly on support of the pro 
ductive sector, and in particular SMEs (Graph 37). 
During the last programming period (1997 to 1999), 
employment became more visible as an objective 
both in the formulation of policies and in the quantifi 
cation of results. However, despite progress made, 
evaluation of the employment effects carried out in 
the Member States is still not fully comparable be 
cause of differences in coverage and methods of cal 
culation as well as in the nature of the intervention 
itself. For example, the number of jobs created or 
maintained per million Euros invested varies approxi 
mately from 13 to 57 for the period 1994 to 1996 and 
from 17 to 68 for 1997 to 1999 (see Table A.42). 
A number of estimations carried out, particularly in 
the UK SPDs, indicate that the real effects of 
programmes on employment are reduced signifi 
cantly if account is taken of 'deadweight' effects (ie 
The areas in which it was possible to verify that im 
provements had been made   and much remains to 
be done   consist mainly of municipal waste treat 
ment, the designation and management of protected 
natural areas, the implementation of specific means 
for controlling air pollution (Greece) and the degrada 
tion of rivers, from intensification of agricultural activ 
ity (Ireland) and from a low level of water flow in 
industrial areas (Portugal). 
Objective 2: strategic progress, but a limited 
leverage effect from Community support 
For Objective 2 regions, quantitative evaluation is 
more difficult, though it is possible, for specific mea 
sures, to identify the leverage effect of Community 
37 Distribution of Structural Funds by broad 
target area in Objective 2 regions, 1989 93, 
1994 96 and 1997 99 
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the effects which would have taken place even in the 
absence of intervention) and 'substitution' effects 
(when jobs created are at the expense of existing 
ones). This means, for example, that if these effects 
amount to 30%, three out of every ten Euros spent 
have no net effect on employment. 
Less assistance went to infrastructure than in the 
past, while programmes to create alternative activi 
ties and to strengthen the productive environment in 
areas with serious problems of restructuring gave rise 
to uneven results, even if in some cases a real recov 
ery in their economic potential seems to have 
occurred. 
Technology transfer centres, adapted to the needs of 
local business, have been set up to disseminate 
know how to SMEs, as in some French areas under 
going restructuring, such as Aquitaine, where these 
centres are likely to have long term effects on their 
behaviour and capacity to adjust to change. 
The environment is an increasing cause for concern 
in most regions, which has led to a wide range of pro 
tection and improvement measures, including clean 
ing up industrial wastelands but also, as in the case of 
the most innovative programmes (in Berlin, South 
Wales and East Midlands in the UK) changing pro 
duction methods, the transfer of know how, training 
and the adoption of clean technologies. 
In addition to strategic advances in programming, 
Community intervention has had beneficial effects 
through the delivery system adopted, which, over the 
decade, progressively improved.
13 These include the 
creation of active and diversified partnership, the 
adoption of more rigorous means of selecting pro 
jects and the establishment of computerised monitor 
ing systems. The effectiveness of programmes, 
however, was often limited, because, in particular, of 
the relative dispersion of the funds over small and 
fragmented areas. 
Objective 3: improved targeting of 
the young and the long term unemployed 
The influence of Community action in helping young 
people, the long term unemployed and those at risk 
of social exclusion to enter the labour market is limited 
by the relatively small scale of expenditure compared 
with national spending on employment measures. 
This means that national priorities have tended to 
determine the focus of programmes. In addition, the 
broad scope of activities covered by Objective 3 has 
made it difficult to concentrate Community support 
solely on targeted measures. 
According to the evaluations carried out,
14 ESF mea 
sures had two kinds of effect, according to whether 
they were addressed to direct beneficiaries (ie peo 
ple) or systems (changes in public intervention). 
In the case of transfers to direct beneficiaries, the ESF 
helped to improve the employability of those in re 
ceipt, as measured by placement rates, or the pro 
portion who subsequently found a job. In the case of 
other kinds of measure not directly targeted at em 
ployment, the indicators used include the proportion 
of participants obtaining a qualification or having a 
spell of work experience. Over the period 1994 to 
1999, overall placement rates have increased, re 
flecting above all improved labour market conditions. 
Placement rates ranging from 30% to 80% are re 
ported by evaluators, depending on the country, the 
target group and the type of measure. Where there 
was a causal link between participation in a co fi 
nanced measure and finding a job, 25 50% of place 
ments seem to be directly attributable to the ESF. 
The effectiveness of co financed measures appears 
to increase when they are concentrated on groups 
with the greatest difficulty of finding employment. Par 
ticipation in active labour market measures, there 
fore, seems significantly to raise the chances of the 
unemployed in older age groups (in the Netherlands 
and the UK), the long term unemployed (in Ireland) 
and those with relatively few qualifications (in Italy) to 
obtain a job, while it appears to have only a marginal 
effect in respect of the young. The results also vali 
dated the programme guidelines on 'pathways to in 
tegration', which emphasise the importance of 
following a 'pathway' approach to helping people find 
employment. Measures combining training with ad 
vice, support and work experience, accordingly, 
seem to have more effect on employment than those 
not doing so. Support for employment appears to 
have a particularly large effect. Increasing the in 
volvement of the most disadvantaged groups in ESF 
measures, therefore, could potentially both help to 
achieve greater social cohesion and improve the 
overall effectiveness of the Structural Funds. 
In the UK, evaluation showed that the most efficient 
measures are employment subsidies and job search 
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assistance. Analysis of those completing integrated 
programmes suggested that the largest net effect 
was on older men, whose chances of finding a job 
was increased by most. Although an integrated ap 
proach is more costly, it is justified by its greater 
effectiveness. 
In the Netherlands, placement rates were generally 
high because of favourable labour market conditions. 
The net effect of ESF measures, however was gener 
ally relatively small, except for the most disadvan 
taged participants, for whom placement rates were 
highest. The net placement rate in respect of training 
programmes was 33% for the least qualified and 25% 
for those over 40, while for others it was virtually zero 
on average. 
In Italy, the placement rate of those who had com 
pleted a training programme was 51% as against 
28% for a control group who had not followed such a 
programme, a difference of 23 percentage points, 
which, moreover, was increased to 43 percentage 
points once the different characteristics of the two 
groups were taken into account. Indeed, participa 
tion in a training programme seems to be the most im 
portant factor determining a person's chances of 
finding employment (according to regression analy 
sis), ahead of the sex of the person (men being more 
likely to find a job than women) and the level of 
education. 
Targeting assistance on the most vulnerable groups 
has generally remained relatively limited in respect of 
Objective 3: beneficiary groups in ESF programmes 
were characterised by a high proportion of young, the 
relatively highly qualified and those unemployed for 
less than a year, with disproportionately more men 
than women. 
Countries can be divided into two groups. The first 
consists of those with large areas covered by Objec 
tive 1, where Objective 3 programmes aimed at com 
bating social exclusion accounted for less than 10% 
of total ESF funding. The second group includes other 
Member States, in which the figure was between 20% 
and 307o. In the first group, measures tended to be 
targeted on specific groups, such as people with dis 
abilities and ethnic minorities, in the second, exclu 
sion was more broadly defined and more general 
integration policies were funded. 
Overall, the ESF continued mainly to finance training 
measures over the period 1994 to 1999. The pro 
gramming, however, allowed for some diversification, 
to include employment support, enterprise training, 
counselling and job search guidance, and measures 
within the education system to ease the transition 
from education to employment. 
Evaluators stressed the qualitative improvement in 
systems and the ESF contribution to innovative poli 
cies. Although small in financial terms, Objective 3 
has helped diversify policies for tackling unemploy 
ment. In some Member States, innovation was an ex 
plicit objective of programmes, through developing 
partnerships. The Objective 3 evaluation for Finland, 
for example, found that the ESF helped develop the 
capacity for local and regional cooperation, target the 
groups who were hardest to reach and strengthen in 
dividualised approaches to the provision of support. 
In other countries, the ' pathway to employment' ap 
proach sought to generalise the principle of an inte 
grated approach across all employment policies. 
Finally, it has been possible, by supporting specific 
groups, to include people who are usually excluded 
from the ambit of policy. 
Objective 4: concentration 
on the training needs of SMEs 
During the period 1994 to 1999, Objective 4 
programmes, which were aimed at helping workers 
cope with industrial change, were altered signifi 
cantly, as the underlying principles were re inter 
preted and co financed policies were modified. 
Absorption problems, which were evident between 
1994 and 1996, were overcome in the subsequent 
period, through a softening of the selection criteria 
and the application of less stringent requirements for 
co financing in terms of the target group or type of 
training. 
There are two groups targeted by Objective 4 mea 
sures, SMEs and workers at risk of job loss. Substan 
tial efforts were made over the period to increase 
concentration on SMEs, but within these, training was 
mainly addressed to managers and highly qualified 
workers, rather than those with the highest risk of be 
coming unemployed. 
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Evaluation of programmes has identified three types 
of effect   on firms, on employees and on training 
systems. 
In the case of firms, the main effect was on changing 
attitudes towards continuing training and the kind of 
schemes carried out, in terms of the amount of train 
ing given, its quality, nature and relevance to indus 
trial change as well as the number of employees 
covered. 
In the case of employees, the effects were examined 
in terms of job improvement (or reduced risk of redun 
dancy) and employability, as reflected in more and/or 
higher qualifications. At this stage, however, few eval 
uations have been completed because of the delay in 
the launch of Objective 4 and, consequently, the sig 
nificant number of projects which are still ongoing. 
Those available suggest, in some cases, that firms 
benefited more than employees and, in others, that 
benefits were divided between greater competitive 
ness of firms and improved qualifications of some 
categories of employees. 
The ESF also had an important effect in improving 
training systems, through structuring the continuing 
training offered, widening the provision of continuing 
training in SMEs and encouraging the development 
of better systems of labour market analysis 
Although Objective 4 as such has not been included 
in the 2000 to 2006 period, several of the underlying 
principles have been incorporated as part of the pri 
ority given to lifelong learning in the new Objective 3, 
such as the inclusion of preventative measures in 
training programmes, the need to focus on employ 
ees at risk and mobilisation of SMEs. 
Objective 5a and 5b: agricultural 
structures and rural development 
Community policy on rural development emerged in 
the mid 1980s from two broad concerns   a desire, on 
the one hand, to reduce regional disparities and im 
prove cohesion across the Union by supporting dis 
advantaged areas and, on the other, to limit the 
negative effects on rural areas of the reform of the 
CAP. The policy consisted mainly of an attempt to 
support the economic activities carried out in the 
weakest areas, which necessitated formulating a 
prior analysis of the factors underlying development 
and of the processes which need to be set in motion, 
so as to identify both the weaknesses and potential 
strengths of particular regions. Such an analysis is 
essential to the formulation of a policy which builds 
upon local potential. 
The factors determining the economic growth of rural 
areas are both many and wide ranging: the endow 
ment of factors of production and the comparative 
advantage which these imply, the distance to main 
markets, the potential for economies of scale and ag 
glomeration, the capacity for organisation and inno 
vation, and the availability of support services and 
infrastructure. Both the measures adopted and the 
network of actors involved in their implementation 
need to be flexible enough to respond to local needs, 
since there is no guarantee that measures carried out 
according to a sectoral or individual logic will be 
coherent. 
Unfortunately, regions sometimes opted for the easi 
est approach, pursuing measures which were insuffi 
ciently targeted or simply continuing with those 
already in place, failing to strengthen the means of 
coordinating the activities of the different entities in 
volved or tailor measures to local conditions. A num 
ber of French regions reduced the application of 
certain measures on a territorial basis, and made 
them components of overall programmes. 
In Objective 5b areas, unemployment has risen mar 
ginally since 1995, but it is still much lower than the 
EU average. There is some evidence of net employ 
ment growth in manufacturing industries dominated 
by SMEs, especially   but not only   those linked to 
the rural economy, as well as in other sectors. Signifi 
cant diversification of economic activity away from 
agriculture is underway, which was the main objec 
tive of the policy. 
Measures to improve infrastructure (eg sanitation, 
electrification, drinking water) and services (living 
conditions, above all) have generally been success 
ful, though the recipients of support have typically 
been local authorities, for which the matching na 
tional contribution has not posed a difficulty. On the 
other hand, involving the private sector and private fi 
nance has proved more difficult, possibly because of 
the lack of a framework for potential investors, and, in 
some regions, a weak structure of local organisation 
(in terms of, for example, support networks or interac 
tion between groups) or uncertain economic pros 
pects. Rural areas, with sparse population and 
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access difficulties, can find it more difficult than cities 
to achieve a sufficient level of demand or offer the full 
range of services needed to compete at the Euro 
pean level. 
Under performance is, in some cases, explained by 
the measures adopted not being tailored to local 
needs or by the availability of more favourable finan 
cial support under other public programmes.
15 It is 
also clear that existing firms benefited more from in 
tervention than newly created ones. 
Environmental considerations are included in re 
gional development strategies to varying degrees, 
the scale of measures adopted being linked to the 
richness of the natural and physical heritage to pro 
tect and the seriousness of any environmental degra 
dation suffered. Policies in this area, however, are 
complicated by the involvement of a range of inter 
ested parties concerned with differing policy 
priorities. 
While there were few projects aimed at protecting 
flora and fauna or exploiting the natural heritage for 
tourism, there was a relatively large number of pro 
jects for managing household   and in come cases in 
dustrial   waste. In the case of tourism, financial 
initiatives have been dispersed and the evaluations 
suggest that in future they should be organised 
around centres and networks of activity. 
Similarly, the work involved in the renovation of vil 
lages, an item included in most programmes, could 
be carried out in a more rational way, the heritage (in 
terms of buildings, culture and architecture) better 
exploited and the projects better integrated with tour 
ist activities. 
FIFG: restructuring the fishing sector 
The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG), with a budget of EUR 2.6 billion over the pe 
riod 1994 to 1999, was responsible for funding the fol 
lowing types of activity: reduction in the fishing fleet 
and its modernisation (50% of the budget), process 
ing and marketing of products (25%), the develop 
ment of fish farming (10%), the development of 
fishing ports (7%), product promotion (3%) and social 
and economic measures (subsidies for ceasing ac 
tivity, support for early retirement) (5%). This expendi 
ture was carried out in part under Objective 5a, but for 
the most part under Objective 1. 
With the inclusion of the FIFG in the Structural Funds 
in 1994, economic and social cohesion became one 
of the major concerns of fisheries policy. Over the 
programming period, the cohesion countries were al 
located 56% of all FIFG funds, 42% going to Spain, by 
far the largest recipient. 
Substantial reductions in the fishing fleet were 
achieved, especially in Portugal and Spain (Table 
20), Community support for these activities exceed 
ing that for construction and modernisation by 60% 
and for construction alone by 2 2
1/2 times (taking ac 
count of capacity as well as the number of ships). 
The 'mixed' enterprises established with third coun 
tries enabled fishing capacity to be exported and 
jobs to be maintained or created in areas dependent 
on fishing (ADFs). By the end of 1998, 152 projects 
had been undertaken and these were directly re 
sponsible for 2,400 jobs being maintained or created 
and indirectly for another 3,000, mainly in Spain and 
Portugal (which accounted for 55% and 22% of the 
projects, respectively). 
The processing of products was the driving force be 
hind this and is the second most important area of 
FIFG intervention (accounting for a planned EUR 610 
million). The modernisation of the industry has been 
supported by substantial FIFG investment in techno 
logically innovative firms, improvement of sanitary 
conditions and the development of certain products. 
Moreover, there has been strong interest in measures 
of this kind from potential recipients of support and by 
the end of 1997,12 of the 31 projects had been repro 
grammed in this direction. FIFG support has helped 
to limit the employment losses associated with re 
structuring (see also section 11.11 in the present re 
port). By the end of 1997, after only 3 years of FIFG 
support, the projects financed had created 1,200 
jobs in 6 Member States (Denmark, Germany, Spain, 
Ireland, Finland and the UK), 350 of these in Ireland, 
Table 20 Effects of FIFG measures, 
1994 99 
FIFG  National  No. of  Change in 
payments  payments  ships  power 
of fleet 
(EUR mn)  (EUR mn)  (projects)  (kW) 
Adjustment  481  267  4090    700,000 
(withdrawal) 
Construction  191  50  1820  + 270,000 
Modernisation  103  32  6830   
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220 in Northern Ireland and 50 in Scotland, and pre 
vented another 360 from being lost (250 of these in 
Spain). By end 1998, 2,870 projects had been 
launched, 760 of them in Spain. 
Although only 10% of the FIFG budget was allocated 
to fish farming over the Union as a whole, the figure 
was markedly higher in some countries (30% in Ire 
land, 24% in Greece). Initially, it proved difficult to in 
terest many of the potential participants in such 
programmes, because of low fish prices and the strict 
environmental standards applied in project selection. 
Nevertheless, FIFG support has helped to develop a 
productive structure and to assist a recovery in em 
ployment in the sector, especially in the Objective 1 
regions (see elsewhere in this report). By the end of 
1998, 2,580 projects has been established, 550 of 
them in Spain and 150 in Greece. 
The Structural Funds other than the FIFG   the ERDF 
and the ESF, in particular   financed port develop 
ment projects and fishery research, as well as voca 
tional training in Objective 1 regions. 
Objective 6: improving accessibility 
and job creation 
The accession of Finland and Sweden to the EU in 
1995 significantly enlarged the land area and intro 
duced a new type of sparsely populated region   the 
new Objective 6   with extremely low population den 
sity, peripheral location, a general tendency for popu 
lation to decline, small markets and long distances 
between towns and villages. 
Evaluations show that the strategic choices made in 
the Objective 6 programmes strongly reflected Com 
munity priorities and that favourable results were 
achieved in terms of employment creation in particu 
lar, where the targets set were met in the regions con 
cerned in both countries. These were to increase the 
number of jobs in private services and manufacturing 
by 17,500 in Finland and by 9,500 in Sweden. 
Community Initiatives: institutional 
rather than economic value added 
The rationale for Community Initiatives, in general, is 
to tackle the problems or issues facing the EU as a 
whole, which can best be addressed through coordi 
nated action between Member States. They are com 
plementary to other programmes co financed by the 
Structural Funds and negotiated on a regional or na 
tional basis. Between 1994 and 1999, there were 13 
such Initiatives, with a Community contribution of 
nearly EUR 14 billion, representing around 9% of the 
entire Structural Funds allocation. 
Community Initiatives cover a diverse range of 
themes, but have certain features in common. Four 
aspects, in particular, contribute to their added value 
as compared with other Structural Funds measures: 
  they encourage transnational, cross border and 
interregional cooperation; 
  they increase involvement of people on the 
ground (because of their 'bottom up' approach); 
  they stimulate innovation and the incorporation of 
the lessons learnt into regional, national and Eu 
ropean policies; 
  they help to diversify economic activity in areas 
affected by declining industries. 
Transnational, cross-border and 
interregional cooperation 
Transnational cooperation has been a feature of 
most Community Initiatives (Adapt, Employment, 
INTERREG II, Leader, Peace, Pesca, Regis II, SMEs), 
the aim being to promote the concept of national, re 
gional, local and sectoral partners working together 
with their counterparts in other Member States. Under 
the Employment and Adapt Initiatives, for example, 
all projects involved participants from more than one 
Member State, while INTERREG entailed cooperation 
between regions in different countries. 
While the benefits are difficult to quantify, those who 
have participated in transnational exchanges tend to 
acquire a greater appreciation of the European Union 
and of other societies and cultures. In institutional 
terms, added value is evident in the sustainable Eu 
ropean networks which have been established and 
which will continue the exchange of experience and 
transfer of best practice in the future, a form of coop 
eration which would be unlikely to develop to the 
same extent without Community support. 
Leader, Pesca, Regis and SMEs emphasised the ex 
change of good practice and the establishment of 
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networks between Member States. Leader promoted 
networks and more formal transnational cooperation 
through its European Observatory. The SMEs Initia 
tive had a fund of EUR 25 million to finance three 
types of transnational activity: tourism and the in 
ternet, international buyers' exhibitions and the ex 
change of experience and good practice under the 
Reacte project. 
Cross border cooperation is concerned with the de 
velopment of local and regional economies which 
share common borders. INTERREG II has promoted 
economic and social cooperation between regions 
particularly disadvantaged because of their border 
location and has also helped the applicant countries 
to prepare for accession through cooperation 
programmes with EU regions, many of them involving 
the transfer of know how. Cross border cooperation 
was also a major feature of the special Peace 
programme, agreed in 1994 to support the peace 
process in Northern Ireland, through assisting pro 
jects operating across the border with the South, as 
well as those aimed at encouraging reconciliation be 
tween the two communities in the province. 
The mid term evaluations of INTERREG II indicate 
different levels of cooperation: 
  At its most basic, cross border cooperation in 
volves the enhancement of physical links, 
whether in the form of roads, rail, sea ports or air 
ports. Such projects have predominated in 
INTERREG II programmes in the southern Mem 
ber States (Spain and Portugal, in particular), but 
a lack of real involvement by local and regional 
authorities was noted in the evaluations. 
  More intensive cooperation is evident in the de 
velopment of networks and partnerships between 
organisations and institutions situated relatively 
close to each other, but which, since they are 
separated by a border, focus on other parts of 
their region or country instead. Mid term evalua 
tions of INTERREG II programmes between 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany 
show cooperation becoming more intensive be 
tween INTERREG I (1992 to 1995) and 
INTERREG II (1995 to 2001). 
  The Scandinavian countries have a long history of 
cooperation and INTERREG II has built on this by 
forging even stronger links in certain areas of 
regional policy, while also extending 
programmes to include the applicant countries. 
The mid term evaluation of INTERREG IIA be 
tween Denmark and Sweden (Oresund) identi 
fied the development of new networks, the 
promotion of new initiatives and improved part 
nership as major benefits from the programme. It 
concluded that it had created a 'neutral platform' 
for the development of cooperation between Co 
penhagen and Malmo. According to the evalua 
tion of the INTERREG IIC Baltic Sea programme, 
cooperation with the accession countries has 
been hampered by the different funding mecha 
nisms and procedures involved in INTERREG, 
PHARE and TACIS, and these issues need to be 
addressed in the 2000 to 2006 period. 
On the basis of these evaluations, a Commission Re 
port on INTERREG (January 2000) concluded that 
border regions, particularly in southern Europe often 
lack experience of cooperation. Centralised adminis 
trative bodies inadequate acquaintance with each 
other and a lack of mutual trust make the creation of 
lasting cross border institutions difficult, as in the 
case of efforts at cooperation generally. As a result, 
the involvement of local and regional entities and of 
the social partners remains limited, and in some 
cases projects have not been genuinely 
cross border. 
So far as human resource development is concerned, 
the EU wide evaluations of Employment and Adapt 
found problems in the establishment of transnational 
partnership between projects, especially in the early 
phases. Problems identified included responding to 
different selection criteria and time scales in different 
Member States and the difficulty of finding partners 
with projects which had a sufficiently common sub 
ject matter to make working together meaningful. 
These findings, which are equally relevant for 
INTERREG and other Community Initiatives, under 
line the need for greater efforts to develop the basis 
for transnational and cross border cooperation in the 
future. 
Area-based or 'bottom-up' approach 
Several of the Community Initiatives focus explicitly 
on local areas, in recognition of the fact that national 
or regional responses are sometimes too generalised 
to tackle the particular needs of a locality and that 
those who live and work there are often best placed to 
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develop appropriate measures. INTERREG II, Leader 
and Urban all followed this area based approach, 
which led to capacity building, greater local auton 
omy and enhanced targeting of action, as well as a 
greater ability to concentrate on areas of particular 
need. The latter is a particularly valuable aspect of the 
Urban Initiative, which puts emphasis on involving 
residents in decisions on the design and develop 
ment of programmes. 
Both Urban and Leader also emphasise the need for 
integrated responses to area based problems. Ur 
ban covers a wide range of projects combining re 
newal of obsolete infrastructure with measures 
designed to stimulate the economy and employment. 
Leader, whose acronym refers to 'links between ac 
tions for the development of the rural economy,' ex 
plicitly attempts to ensure that measures and 
projects, whether in the same sector or different sec 
tors, are properly coordinated and integrated. At its 
most effective, this means adopting a comprehensive 
view of intervention, involving all the relevant aspects 
(economic, social, cultural and environmental) and 
endeavouring to implement as many multi sectoral 
measures as possible. 
Sometimes termed a 'bottom up approach,' this is 
one of the most important aspects of the added value 
of the Community Initiatives and has been incorpo 
rated into mainstream programmes for the 2000 to 
2006 period, in the increased emphasis on local de 
velopment in the Structural Funds regulations. It has 
also been strengthened as a key feature of the four 
new Community Initiatives. 
Innovation and mainstreaming 
The support of innovative approaches, often devel 
oped on a transnational basis, was at the heart of sev 
eral of the Community Initiatives (Adapt, 
Employment, Leader, SMEs), which encouraged the 
design of new approaches and the testing of their im 
plementation. The EU wide evaluation of Employ 
ment (2000) identified three different forms of 
innovation, process oriented, goal oriented and con 
text oriented, and found that all three were an aspect 
of most projects, with a particular emphasis on pro 
cess oriented innovation, while the development of 
new 'pathways to integration' was a theme running 
through many projects. The Adapt evaluation (2000) 
concluded that most projects were innovative 'to 
some degree,' but few were 'highly innovative.' Both 
evaluations recommended that future Initiatives 
should predefine areas and forms of innovation at the 
outset. 
Linked to innovation is the concept of 
'mainstreaming,' or the notion that the lessons learnt 
from the Community Initiatives should feed into re 
gional, national or European policies as appropriate. 
This was a particular priority for the human resource 
Initiatives, Employment and Adapt, as well as Leader 
and some of the sectoral Community Initiatives. The 
evaluation of Employment identified two forms of 
mainstreaming: 
  dissemination, where the project itself communi 
cates the results through documentation, semi 
nars, meetings and websites, usually to other 
projects; 
  transfer, where the project engages with pol 
icy makers at different levels to provide a means 
of feeding the results into regional, national and 
European policies. 
The evaluation of Adapt found more evidence of hori 
zontal than vertical mainstreaming, which is poten 
tially more important but also more difficultto achieve. 
The strategies for bringing this about were generally 
weak in Member States, reflecting the complexity of 
the process of transferring experience gained 
through bottom up action to national policy and un 
derlining the need to develop appropriate mecha 
nisms in the Initiatives and mainstream programmes 
in the 2000 to 2006 period. 
Diversification 
A group of Community Initiatives was aimed at sup 
porting diversification in areas with an over reliance 
on particular industries in decline, specifically, the 
defence industry, fishing, coal mining, the steel in 
dustry and textiles in the case of Konver, Pesca, 
Rechar II, Resider II and Retex, respectively, while 
Leader and Regis II had a similar aim. The timeframe 
for most of these Initiatives was limited in order to in 
duce timely responses to the particular problems 
concerned. 
More generally, many of the Community Initiatives 
have led to those living in areas where projects have 
been implemented developing a clearer understand 
ing of the concept of 'Europe', as they see tangible 
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benefits from the projects supported and possibly 
come into contact with people in other parts of the EU. 
Through the Initiatives, they have, therefore, gained a 
greater awareness of the Structural Funds and of the 
meaning of economic and social cohesion. This con 
trasts with many mainstream measures supported by 
the Structural Funds, for which, according to the eval 
uations carried out, people usually do not know that 
the EU is a major source of finance. 
While the Community Initiatives appear to have had 
significant positive effects in the 1994 to 1999 period, 
evaluations have highlighted a number of deficien 
cies. Chief among them is the large number of Initia 
tives with overlapping aims and separate systems of 
administration. From the standpoint of local, regional 
and national authorities, as well as the Commission, a 
clearer and more streamlined approach would en 
hance effectiveness. 
Added value of Community regional policy 
The value added of Community involvement in re 
gional development is not only related to the expendi 
ture incurred as such. Benefits also stem from the 
method of implementation developed in the 1988 re 
form of the Structural Funds, which was revised in 
each subsequent programming period. Some as 
pects of the method were discussed in the first Cohe 
sion Report and so the focus here is on key elements 
of the 1994 to 1999 period. 
Programming: a more strategic approach 
but with over-complex procedures 
Programming and management based on partner 
ship are cornerstones of the 1988 reform of the Struc 
tural Funds. The extent to which administrative 
authorities have adapted to this has varied markedly 
between Objectives, countries and regions. 
In Objective 1 regions, the programme based ap 
proach adopted made it possible to learn from expe 
rience, which benefited those responsible for 
implementing measures on the ground. 
Given the broad range of measures involved and ad 
ministrative weaknesses   often a major factor behind 
lagging economic development   in many cases, the 
process proved to be difficult and failed to produce 
the expected results. 
In Objective 2 and 5b areas, the methods were assim 
ilated more quickly, although some authorities ex 
pressed concern about the burden imposed in 
relation to the resources allocated. In the case of Ob 
jective 3 and 4 measures, according to some Mem 
ber States, these were more difficult to plan because 
the need for them depended on labour market condi 
tions which were determined exogenously. 
Finally, Objective 5a measures remained outside the 
programming process, because transfers continued 
to be based on reimbursing Member States for part of 
the expenditure incurred under existing support sys 
tems (apart from measures for the processing and 
marketing of agricultural, forestry and fishery 
products). 
The multi annual planning process encouraged par 
ticipants to adopt a 'strategic' approach, resulting in 
better selection and greater coherence of co fi 
nanced projects. This change, however, has not yet 
produced all the results expected because there was 
often a failure to quantify programme objectives suffi 
ciently and, therefore, some difficulty in evaluating 
them with any precision. 
During the mid term review of Objective 1 and 6 
programmes, the Commission called for greater sup 
port of measures for increasing employment and 
there is concrete evidence of the willingness to ad 
dress this issue: in Spain, Greece and, most espe 
cially, Italy, territorial employment pacts, for example, 
were integrated into general programmes.
16 
Nevertheless, it should also be noted that approval 
procedures for Community Support Frameworks, for 
programmes and their modification have often 
proved excessively onerous in administrative terms, 
particularly for smaller programmes, which is hard to 
justify from an efficiency perspective. 
The simplification that has already been put into prac 
tice and the application of the new regulations should 
allow greater flexibility in implementing procedures. 
Partnership: an important aspect 
but still limited in practice 
Partnership is the key to the implementation of struc 
tural policies, the aim being to ensure that all those in 
volved in the preparation, implementation and 
evaluation of Community measures cooperate 
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effectively. The application of the principle requires a 
clear definition of the respective tasks of each partner 
and the deployment of appropriate methods and in 
struments. The partnership approach has to balance 
the limits of coordination, the adoption of a global vi 
sion and the potential economies of scale realisable 
at a central level against the best understanding of lo 
cal needs and the synergy and complementarity that 
can be achieved at a decentralised level. 
The principle has been developed over the years in 
different ways: 
  a range of vertical partnerships involving local 
and regional participants has been established to 
implement regional programmes; 
  the social partners have been involved in human 
resource programmes and measures; 
  cross border cooperation programmes have en 
abled new structures of partnership to be estab 
lished to the benefit of peripheral regions in the 
Union; 
  innovative policies for local and rural develop 
ment, the territorial employment pacts, in particu 
lar, have given rise to 'micro partnerships', 
according a major role to those involved at the lo 
cal level; 
  other forms, such as informal, horizontal and 
transnational partnerships for exchanging expe 
rience between cities, regions and rural areas, of 
ten in different countries, have recently begun to 
be created. 
These different forms of partnership have become a 
permanent means of exchanging information and 
experience. 
The implementation of the Structural Funds, more 
over, has pushed regions to define objectives and to 
use their financial resources effectively. According to 
a recent evaluation,
17 the introduction of the partner 
ship approach has encouraged the priorities of all the 
participants as a whole to be considered and recon 
ciled, so resulting in more coherent policies, as well 
as the identification of a set of objectives which is 
shared by all those involved. 
The monitoring committees have proved to be effec 
tive means of agreeing on how to tackle problems 
and how best to modify programmes in this regard, 
even in Member States where decentralisation is 
least developed, because a pragmatic approach has 
enabled regional actors to be involved in the monitor 
ing process. 
The decentralisation of responsibility for implementa 
tion, however, has highlighted the technical and man 
agerial limitations of regional and local authorities. In 
some Member States, there were serious delays in 
undertaking programmes managed at the regional 
level as compared with those managed centrally, ne 
cessitating significant budget reallocations. In this re 
gard, Member States have not made sufficient use of 
the technical assistance, which should have accom 
panied decentralisation and enabled some of the 
problems encountered to be resolved. 
In spite of Commission efforts, the participation of the 
social partners in the planning and monitoring of 
programmes was often unsatisfactory. They were not 
well represented on monitoring committees (except 
in respect of Objectives 3 and 4) and were not kept 
fully informed of developments. 
Finally, experience indicates that there has been 
some confusion of roles and responsibilities in the or 
ganisation of tasks in cases where programmes were 
jointly managed, which suggests that responsibility 
needs to be defined in a more efficient and transpar 
ent way. 
Management and financial flows: complex 
and often poorly transparent systems 
Financial management systems were tried out during 
the first programming period and were then reformed 
with the aim of increasing flexibility. 
Because of the cooperation between the Member 
States and the Commission and the vigilence of the 
Court of Auditors, there were relatively few cases of 
irregularity and fraud. 
Nevertheless, the financial system governing the dis 
bursement of Community funds in the Member States 
is often complex and varies between the different 
sources of funding. As a result, there were often 
lengthy delays in making payments in respect of 
many programmes, creating uncertainty among 
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recipients and so reducing their economic impact. In 
deed, even though delays may not actually have 
occured, the possibility was enough to make it diffi 
cult for those concerned to plan ahead. 
The mid term evaluations emphasised that the finan 
cial system in place made it difficult to apply the co fi 
nancing principle in a transparent way and that most 
Member States regarded Community support as re 
imbursement of expenditure already incurred. 
The improvement of financial arrangements is one of 
the keys to improving the effectiveness of Community 
action. 
Monitoring and evaluation: significant 
advances need to be consolidated 
Two main factors stimulated the development of mon 
itoring and evaluation from 1988 on. On the one hand, 
the new regulations encouraged Member States to 
do more in this respect, while, on the other, because 
of budgetary constraints, they became increasingly 
concerned to ensure the efficient implementation of 
programmes. 
Since 1994, a series of measures has been intro 
duced by the Commission to improve monitoring and 
evaluation procedures. In the first place, data on so 
cial and economic disparities between regions have 
been improved to make it easier to analyse progress 
in reducing them. Secondly, specialised evaluation 
units were established in the Commission to coordi 
nate evaluation activities. Thirdly, the MEANS 
programme (Methods for evaluating action of a struc 
tural nature) was launched with the aim of creating a 
'culture of evaluation' across the Union and facilitat 
ing exchange of experience between Member 
States. 
For their part, Member States   in the south of the Un 
ion as well as the north   have progressively devel 
oped more effective monitoring systems, which, in 
the best cases, were based on quantified objectives, 
well defined indicators and better information. Na 
tional authorities, therefore, have increasingly estab 
lished a more effective structure of evaluation with 
coherent guidelines, while regional authorities have 
in many cases set up their own evaluation systems in 
response. 
While the benefits of an effective monitoring and eval 
uation system are widely recognised   for improving 
policy making and transparency as well as for their 
own sake   the systems in place are not used in prac 
tice as fully and effectively as they might be. They are 
often not comprehensive and, in many cases, they 
are limited to financial indicators, which means that 
the evaluations carried out cannot be fully integrated 
into the decision making process. 
Leverage effects: an unbalanced 
mix of loans and subsidies 
Support from the Structural Funds has been crucial to 
economic development in Member States with 
relatively limited budgets. It increased the level of 
investment possible and so gave an added impetus 
to growth, which in turn enabled private capital to 
be mobilised. Over the 1994 to 1999 period, this 
leverage effect was reinforced through a strengthen 
ing of the link between structural transfers and loans. 
In Greece, for example, around 29% of the finance 
for the overall investment undertaken came from 
private capital, though the figure was lower in 
many other parts of the Union. To maximise the in 
vestment achieved in the future will require loans and 
transfers to be combined in a way which is both judi 
cious and manages public financial resources 
effectively. 
Outlook for the new programming 
period, 2000 2006 
The new programming period opens up new chal 
lenges. It should be possible to achieve renewed 
progress towards convergence and higher rates of 
growth in the less prosperous parts of the Union be 
cause of a more favourable outlook for the EU econ 
omy as a whole and a more efficient combination of 
Member State and Community structural policies. 
This will not happen to the fullest extent possible un 
less investment is allocated to priority areas where 
the impact is greatest. Moreover, the effectiveness of 
intervention is heavily dependent on respecting the 
implementation and management conditions which 
have been jointly established with the Member 
States. 
The two main conclusions to be drawn from model 
simulations of economic developments over the new 
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Convergence, cohesion and growth: impact of 
As for the preceding period, the macroeconomic ef 
fects of the Community Support Frameworks have been 
assessed using several different econometric models 
(Table A.43). The simulations
18 were carried out for total 
(public) expenditure (Structural Funds plus national 
co financing), which are assumed to cease after 2006 in 
order to identify the supply side effects on the recipient 
economies . 
Using the Hermin model, the estimated effect is to in 
crease real GDP in 2006 by around 6% in Greece and 
Portugal and by 2.4% in Spain as compared with the sit 
uation without intervention. The effect is relatively mod 
est in Ireland (1.8%), where the Structural Funds only 
account for under 10% of total public expenditure. 
The CSF will increase investment by much more, espe 
cially in Portugal (by 23%) and Greece (14%), which will 
add to effective demand via multiplier effects and, over 
time, also tend to increase productivity, through im 
proved infrastructure and human capital as well as the 
use of more modern, and therefore efficient, plant and 
equipment. The effect on employment is likely to be sig 
nificant, but will tend to decline after 2006, because of 
higher productivity. 
Inflation is likely to be increased to varying extents. In 
Greece, average prices are estimated to be pushed up 
by most (4%), though the inflation rate will then decline. 
In Ireland, the investment foreseen in the National De 
velopment Plan could raise inflation at the beginning of 
the period because of very tight labour market condi 
tions and pressure on the construction industry. The 
CSF, however, adds very little to the pressure on prices 
and any effects are unlikely to extend beyond 2006. 
programming period are, first, that structural policies 
can create the conditions for higher economic growth 
without increased inflation and, second, that through 
this, they can increase employment and, therefore, 
reduce structural unemployment (see Box). 
Coherence of national and 
Community priorities 
Strategic guidelines
19 for the 2000 to 2006 period 
have been adopted to achieve an optimal and more 
targeted use of Community resources. Priorities and 
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In general, the QUEST II model suggests that the effects 
will be more modest in Spain, Ireland, Portugal and 
Greece, especially on GDP, than estimated by other 
models, largely because of the inclusion of 'agents' ex 
pectations', or the effect of anticipatory behaviour, 
which tends to lead to interest rates and the exchange 
rate adjusting to offset some of the expansion in 
investment. 
The principal effect is higher growth, which is estimated 
to continue beyond the programming period as a result 
of investment strengthening the supply side, or the pro 
ductive potential of the economy. The added growth in 
GDP averages between 1 1.5% a year for Greece and 
Portugal, 0.8% for Spain and 0.5% for Ireland. The rela 
tively small multiplier in Ireland and Portugal reflects the 
openness of the two economies, which means that a 
large part of the increased demand goes to imports, as 
well as the assumed 'crowding out' effects on the pri 
vate sector of higher public investment. 
Significant effects are also estimated for other large 
Member States which are major recipients of structural 
assistance. The first analysis of the macroeconomic ef 
fects in the new German Lander, using the Hermin 
model, suggests an increase in GDP of 4% during the 
programming period, and 1.5% after, and added in 
vestment of around 6%. In addition, productivity is likely 
to be boosted in manufacturing. 
In the Mezzogiorno, the second largest recipient of 
Structural Funds assistance, models developed by the 
Italian authorities suggest growth above the EU aver 
age by 2004, while other models estimate that this is 
likely only by the end of the programming period, and 
then only if there were radical changes in economic be 
haviour and the efficiency of public investment. 
strategic objectives have been established by the 
Member States after consultation with the 
Commission. 
Ex-ante evaluations initiated by Member States 
helped, in most cases, improve the coherence and 
quality of plans, notably by relating priorities and ob 
jectives more closely to the analysis of social and 
economic problems. The Commission, moreover, en 
couraged Member States to concentrate more re 
sources on priorities and high impact measures, 
making Community intervention more visible and 
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Under Objective 1, the Community guidelines imply a 
significant adaptation of regional development strat 
egies over the programming period. 
Transport: towards a better balance 
Transport is a major priority in the new programming 
period (accounting for around 19% of the Structural 
Funds allocation   Table A.36 in Annex). The balance 
between different modes of transport has been 
shifted towards rail from road. For example, under the 
CSF in Portugal, the number of passengers travelling 
by rail is planned to increase by 600,000 in 7 years 
(from 3.8 to 4.4 million a year), as well as the metro link 
between Lisbon and the airport being completed. 
The plan envisages a doubling of investment in rail in 
terms of Euros per head (from EUR 193.6 in 1996 to 
EUR 373 in 2006), while spending on road improve 
ments will remain unchanged. 
Under the CSF in Greece, at least 650 km of double 
track railway lines are planned to be electrified in or 
der to complete the trans European Network by 2006 
and new metro lines will be constructed in 
Thessaloniki and Athens, signalling a shift towards 
more environmentally friendly forms of transport. In 
due course, 26% of journeys in Athens will be made 
by metro. 
In Objective 1 regions in Spain, new high speed train 
routes are planned, doubling the length of track from 
623 km to 1140 km in 2006. 
In Germany, very few infrastructure projects were fi 
nanced in the previous period, other than those 
aimed at supporting productive activity, such as 
roads linking industrial sites or ports. Over the 2000 to 
2006 period, in contrast, investment of EUR 1.5 billion 
is planned for German Objective 1 regions, around a 
third on rail projects. 
Upgrading road and motorway networks, neverthe 
less, remains a priority in the cohesion countries, 
given their present state and the need to make up de 
ficiencies in respect of the trans European networks. 
The need to ensure sustainable development was al 
ready a priority during the previous programming pe 
riod, all infrastructure and transport projects being 
subject to environmental assessment. The orientation 
of the CSF for the present period makes clear that this 
will be continued, as reflected in the choice of 
strategic objectives, such as limiting cross city traffic, 
the extension of public transport and the construction 
of high speed rail links. 
Reduction in direct support for firms 
A marked reduction is planned in the share of trans 
fers going to direct support of firms, particularly in the 
cohesion countries and Italy, as a result of stricter 
regulation of state aids and the recognition of the sig 
nificance of deadweight losses from these. Ireland is 
the most extreme case, with the Structural Funds pro 
viding no direct aid to industry (except for research 
and innovation programmes). In Italy, the national aid 
scheme to support industry (Law 488) has been re 
vised to tailor assistance better to the specific sec 
toral and territorial features of firms in the 
Mezzogiorno. 
Increased efforts to promote 
innovation and human capital 
Total funds allocated to research, technological de 
velopment and innovation (RTDI) are planned to re 
main unchanged, at around 3.5% of total Structural 
Funds expenditure, except in Italy and Ireland, where 
the shares have risen to 8% and 10%, respectively. 
This, however, conceals a relative decline in invest 
ment in infrastructure and research projects and a 
shift towards a more open approach to innovation 
and collaboration between research institutes and 
industry. 
In the Member States where the RTDI shortfall is 
greatest, a shift in the orientation of policy is most evi 
dent, in the form of: 
  improved links between RTD and the needs of 
firms, through measures to transfer innovation 
and technology; this could lead, for example, to 
an increase in private RTD in Spain (to 45% of the 
total in 2006 as against 35% in 2000); 
  an increase of employment in the RTD sectors, of 
40% in Greece, and to 0.5% of the total in Portugal 
and Objective 1 regions in Spain; 
  increased involvement in international networks 
(a 50% increase in scientific publications with 
Portuguese involvement, for example). 
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The Information Society: a strategic 
reorientation towards demand 
Investment in telecommunications will be substan 
tially reduced in the new programming period, due to 
privatisation and competition between providers. 
Most effort is aimed at services and applications in 
support of SMEs (e commerce) and the public sector 
(health and education), which represents a signifi 
cant change in regional policy. Accordingly, the 
Structural Funds are making a major contribution to 
the development of an e Europe. Support of telecom 
munication infrastructure is generally limited to the 
most isolated areas, where the return does not justify 
private investment. Member States have set relatively 
ambitious targets under their CSFs, including: 
  providing Internet access for schools (the propor 
tion of schools in Greece connected to the 
Internet increasing from 5% in 2000 to 100% in 
2006) and the population at large (the proportion 
connected in Spain being planned to rise from 
5% in 1998 to 25% in 2006); 
  a wider spread of electronic commerce in SMEs 
(to 15% of SMEs in Greece in 2006 from 1% in 
2000). 
Human resources: link to the 
European Employment Strategy 
Investment in human resources plays a strategic role 
in Community policies for economic and social cohe 
sion, accounting for 30% of the Structural Funds in the 
new programming period, the same as in the previ 
ous one. The objectives are twofold: to help realise 
the human resource potential of the Union and so 
contribute to economic development in Member 
States and regions and to allow everyone equal ac 
cess to the labour market. The European Employment 
Strategy has encouraged policies on employment, 
the labour market and the fight against social exclu 
sion to be integrated and the new programmes have 
a similar aim together with that of promoting policy 
convergence across the EU. 
Over the next 6 years, the ESF will provide around 
EUR 60 billion to support the European Employment 
Strategy (EES), in addition to Member States' own fi 
nancing of labour market policies, a contribution of 
some 9% to total expenditure in this area. Other Struc 
tural Funds will also play an important role in 
supporting the EES, but the ESF is the main financial 
means at the EU level of pursuing the strategy. 
The programmes for 2000 to 2006 reveal a strong link 
between the ESF and the EES, most obviously in the 
greater focus on the preventive action, in the form of 
support for those most at risk of becoming long term 
unemployed. In addition, future ESF programmes will 
have a firmer commitment to gender equality, social 
inclusion and wider access to information and com 
munication technologies to combat what might be 
termed 'the digital divide'. In most Member States, the 
ESF has been extended beyond a narrow focus on 
training to wider support of measures designed to im 
prove the effectiveness and responsiveness of labour 
market policy. For some countries, the ESF 'policy 
frame of reference'
20 has also provided a useful basis 
for securing a coherent approach to the various poli 
cies under the three Objectives of the Structural 
Funds and to the various groups involved. 
A preliminary review of the ESF support for Objectives 
1 and 3
21 under the 4 pillars of the EES indicates that 
between 2000 and 2006: 
  around 60% of funds will go towards improving 
the employability of the work force, to co financ 
ing active labour market policies and measures to 
promote social inclusion and support lifelong 
learning. Objective 1 regions, in particular, will 
use ESF support to modernise their public em 
ployment services to improve the functioning of 
labour markets; 
  some 12% of funds will go to support the develop 
ment of entrepreneurial skills, helping business 
start ups and establishing networks of entrepre 
neurs to help maximise the benefits of support; 
  around 20% of funds will go to supporting adapt 
ability in the workplace, much of it to promoting 
continuing training of the work force. There will 
also be a sharper focus on the specific needs of 
SMEs than previously; 
  around 6% of funds will go to supporting equal 
opportunities for women, the fourth pillar of the 
EES, much of it to helping the development of ef 
fective child care measures. ESF support for 
equal opportunities, however, will far exceed this 
figure. 
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Greater integration of environmental aspects 
The environment is increasingly recognised as a key 
aspect of cohesion policy. In line with the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the Commission guidelines emphasise the im 
portance of incorporating the concept of sustainable 
development in the new structural programmes. The 
new regulation explicitly includes a requirement to 
carry out an environmental evaluation, which in 
cludes an environmental impact assessment, compli 
ance with Community legislation on the environment 
and the involvement of environmental authorities in 
the preparation and implementation of programmes. 
Member States and regions are becoming increas 
ingly proactive in both the conception and implemen 
tation of environmental aspects in regional 
development programmes, including carrying out 
ex-ante evaluations of the situation in eligible regions 
and of the impact of proposed measures and estab 
lishing appropriate criteria for follow up. 
More generally, the Structural Funds seem increas 
ingly to provide a favourable means of implementing 
EU environmental policy. For example, respect of the 
HABITAT directives, concerning the protection of nat 
ural sites, was set as an essential condition for ac 
cepting plans and programmes. 
Taking account of equal opportunities 
Securing equality of opportunity between men and 
women has been given new emphasis by its inclusion 
as one of the Community tasks set out in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The regulations for the Structural Funds 
for 2000 to 2006 reflect this by stipulating that there 
should be a greater consideration of equal opportuni 
ties in all policies and at all stages. 
In the 1994 to 1999 period, equal opportunities were 
mostly addressed through pilot projects or 
ring fenced allocations for positive action and, in 
general, they were viewed as an issue for the ESF 
alone. 
The 1999 regulation explicitly requires ex ante evalu 
ation of this dimension in all plans and Single Pro 
gramming Documents (SPDs). While the appraisals 
carried out by Member States were variable in quality, 
the fact that they were carried out at all represents an 
important first step. The evaluations undertaken in 
Finland, Germany and Wales are examples of good 
practice, while Italy has developed an innovative ap 
proach to examining direct and indirect benefits on 
men and women. 
Contribution of EAGGF Guarantee to 
rural development policy 
Twenty seven different measures were co financed 
by the EAGGF Guarantee as part of its contribution to 
rural development policy. On the basis of the 
programmes approved up to now by the Commis 
sion, the allocation from this fund go, in the main, to 
measures which are directly linked to the agricultural 
sector (see Table A.44). Less than 7% of allocations 
go on measures for economic diversification outside 
agriculture. 
Improving efficiency and 
the evolution of instruments 
The new regulations impose a programming system 
organised by Objective as before, but in a simplified 
and more flexible form, with stricter controls on 
additionality, more inclusive and responsible partner 
ship and greater focus upon results. 
Simplified and decentralised programming 
In the new programming period, negotiations have al 
ready taken place and, in most cases, agreement 
reached on the CSF, SPDs and Operational 
Programmes (OPs) for Objectives 1, 2 and 3, the 
guidelines have been adopted and the Community 
Initiatives (INTERREG III, Urban II, Equal, Leader II) 
and the new generation of innovative measures have 
been launched.
22 
In line with the new rules, the number of programmes 
has been greatly reduced, to around 400, from 1134 
in the previous period (including 524 Community Ini 
tiatives). In the few cases   mainly in Spain   where 
programmes were separated by Fund, the authorities 
established an integrated multi fund OP or SPD, al 
lowing positive synergy between the measures 
envisaged. 
Once the operational programmes have been ap 
proved by the Commission, Member States will pre 
pare complementary information, containing details 
of the measures, while leaving scope for more flexible 
management without infringing the regulations laid 
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down, notably in terms of quantifiable objectives and 
indicators for monitoring. 
Additionality: a means of increasing effectiveness 
Since 1989, the application of the additionality princi 
ple commits Member States to maintaining at least 
the same level of public expenditure on structural 
measures   excluding the EU contribution (Table 
A.45). The principle was defined in 1993 and the 1999 
reform simplified the procedures for verification. 
There are, however, exceptions, such as economic 
circumstances or exceptionally high expenditure in 
the past, which allow Member State to reduce 
expenditure. 
The preparation of the new CSF highlighted the in 
creased awareness of the roles of the various partici 
pants in the programming phase. In Italy, the 
authorities set up a broad consultative framework, 
bringing together local representatives (regional, 
provincial, communal), central Government Ministers 
(for employment, agriculture, environment and equal 
opportunities) and representatives from employers' 
organisations, trade unions and non governmental 
organisations. This led to the production of interim re 
ports, which formed the basis of the development 
plan for the Mezzogiomo. Such a broad structure of 
partnership and the need to consult with all members 
can, however, give rise to delays in the decision mak 
ing process. 
Additionality is assessed in respect of expenditure 
under each Objective. For the 2000 to 2006 period, 
the procedure has been simplified in two ways: 
  for Objectives 2 and 3, additionality is jointly veri 
fied on the basis of active labour market expendi 
ture across each Member States as a whole; 
  verification is carried out only three times, before 
adoption of programmes (ex-ante), at the 
mid point, and towards the end of the program 
ming period. 
Towards inclusive and responsible partnership 
Partnership has progressively been widened in suc 
cessive programming periods, from the inclusion of 
regional and local authorities in 1989 to 1993, and of 
the social partners in 1994 to 1999, to the planned in 
clusion of representatives from various groups (such 
as non governmental organisation, or the equal op 
portunities movement) in 2000 to 2006. 
This widening reflects the efficiency gains achieved 
in the last two programming periods (Table 21). 
In the 2000 to 2006 period, responsibility for manage 
ment has been determined according to the princi 
ples of decentralisation and subsidiarity. The 
counterpart to this is the need to improve transpar 
ency, especially for financial management, control of 
specific measures and project selection procedures. 
It is important to establish new procedures for sharing 
information to ensure that each participant can oper 
ate effectively and exercise their responsibility. In 
particular: 
  responsibilities need to be defined and divided 
between those involved in the programming, 
those managing the measures and those paying 
for them; 
information networks need to be set up to collect 
and transmit data for monitoring; 
the responsibility of all those involved needs to be 
increased to improve transparency of financial 
flows; 
Table 21 Programming of Structural Funds: the experience 
Process  Phase 1 (1989 93)  Phase 2(1994 99)  Phase 3 (2000 06) 
Preparation of plans  Exclusive  Reactive  Interactive 
Strategic guidance  Passive  Embryonic  More active 
Management  Split by Fund and  Integration/  Responsabilities/ 
organisation  fragmentation  transparency 
Partnership  Exclusive  Semi exclusive  Inclusive 
Monitoring and evaluation  Non systematic  Systematic  Integral 
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  scope for initiative needs to be widened to im 
prove operational efficiency and simplify 
procedures. 
Partnership and decentralisation (the corollary of the 
former) are the basic principles underlying a new ap 
proach to structural policy, which is more in line with 
the need for a new form of governance, in place of tra 
ditional management, to conceive and implement the 
programmes in question. 
Management focusing on results 
The new regulations emphasise the importance of 
monitoring and evaluation to increase the effective 
ness of structural policies. 
The aim of the Commission and the Member States 
is to ensure effective monitoring by defining quan 
titative objectives and appropriate indicators in re 
spect of approved programmes. The indicators are 
intended to measure the impact of the programme, 
both directly (the infrastructure constructed, the 
amount of training provided and so on) and indi 
rectly (the gains in efficiency, for example) as well 
as the wider economic and social effects (such as 
on employment).
23 Electronic information systems 
for the collection and processing of the relevant 
data are increasingly being established in Member 
States. 
The new regulations provide for financial manage 
ment procedures which are simpler, but more rig 
orous, with Member States taking primary 
responsibility for controlling expenditure, a task 
they will need to perform more strictly than before. 
In particular, a provision has been introduced for 
suspending a project automatically if the funds al 
located are not absorbed within two years. 
Regular and reliable evaluation of intervention can 
be regarded as evidence of transparency and effi 
ciency. Substantial progress has been made in this 
regard, especially in Member States where there 
was not much of an evaluation culture. On the one 
hand, the managing authorities have an essential 
responsibility for organising intermediate evalua 
tions and the (proactive) use of the results. On the 
other, the Commission is responsible for ex-post 
evaluations, identifying the results achieved and 
drawing lessons for the future. 
The introduction of the 'performance reserve' adds 
a new dimension to evaluation by giving an incen 
tive to achieve the objectives set beforehand for 
each measure. Even though the Commission's 
more demanding proposal was not accepted (to al 
locate 10% of funds to the reserve), Member States 
will, nevertheless, have to assign 4% of total Com 
munity funds (around EUR 5 billion) to programmes 
according to certain criteria, linked to the effi 
ciency of financial management and their effec 
tiveness. In implementing this provision, however, 
account will need to be taken of administrative and 
institutional features of Member States. 
The Commission has played an important role in 
establishing these new arrangements, through dis 
cussions and by defining the methodological 
guidelines. Though demanding and difficult to im 
plement, a system of management by results has 
become necessary to improve the transparency 
and effectiveness of policy. 
Preparing for enlargement: 
pre accession support 
Up until 1999, Community intervention in candidate 
countries was financed by the PHARE programme, in 
the case of the ten countries in Central Europe, and 
by the funds allocated to southern and eastern Medi 
terranean countries, in the case of Cyprus and Malta. 
Since the beginning of 2000, the funds for the former 
group have been increased through the creation of 
two new instruments, the Instrument for Structural 
Policies for Pre Accession (ISPA), in preparation for 
the Cohesion Fund, and the Special Accession 
Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(SAPARD). 
In 2000 2006, PHARE is providing some EUR 11 bil 
lion of co financing support for institution building, 
through 'twinning' and technical assistance, as well 
as for investment to help applicant countries in their 
efforts: 
  to strengthen their public administration and insti 
tutions so that they can function effectively inside 
the Union; 
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  to promote convergence with the European Com 
munity's extensive legislation and reduce the 
need for transition periods; 
  to further economic and social cohesion. 
The 'PHARE 2000 Review Strengthening prepara 
tions for Membership', approved by the Commis 
sion in October, 2000,
24 assessed whether 
PHARE's guidelines, as introduced in 1997, and 
updated in 1999, still meet candidate countries' 
needs and whether any further refinements are re 
quired. 
It takes into account the new context arising from 
the adoption of Agenda 2000 at the Berlin Euro 
pean Council, including the increase in the PHARE 
budget, and the progress achieved in the acces 
sion negotiations with the ten countries which are 
eligible for PHARE assistance from 2000. 
The review concluded that PHARE's current guide 
lines continue to address the main needs of the ap 
plicant countries. Accession led programming of 
PHARE should continue, based on Accession Part 
nerships, National programmes for the adoption of 
the acquis, regular reports and the negotiations 
process. PHARE's primary objective must remain 
institution building and promoting convergence 
with the Community's acquis communautaire, di 
rectly helping the countries to comply with the po 
litical, economic and acquis communautaire 
criteria set by the Copenhagen Council in 1993. 
But the review identified two challenges for PHARE 
in the period 2000 2006: 
1) Delivering on the past reforms. There should be a 
period of relative stability to consolidate the past 
reforms and to ensure their full benefit is ob 
tained. In addition, some of the 1997 reforms 
must be refined to respond to the constructive 
criticisms of the Court of Auditors and European 
Parliament. Moreover, efforts to increase the ab 
sorption capacity in the applicant countries must 
be further emphasised. 
2) Moving to the Structural Funds. The aim is to de 
vote about half the investment element of PHARE 
within national programmes to this objective, 
which is to: 
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PHARE's history   1989 to 2000 
The PHARE programme is one of the three pre ac 
cession instruments financed by the European 
Communities to assist the applicant countries of 
Central Europe in their preparation for joining the 
European Union. 
The PHARE programme has been providing sup 
port to the countries of Central Europe since 1989, 
helping them through a period of massive economic 
restructuring and political change. Following the 
1993 Copenhagen Council's invitation to Central 
European countries to apply for membership, 
PHARE support was reoriented and support for in 
frastructure investment was expanded markedly. 
However, PHARE's 'pre accession' focus was put in 
place only in 1997 in response to the Luxembourg 
European Council's launching of the present en 
largement process. PHARE funds now focus en 
tirely on the pre accession priorities highlighted in 
each country's Accession Partnership. Civil ser 
vants from Member States are now seconded 
through 'twinning' to assist their counterparts in pre 
paring for accession. In addition, PHARE's manage 
ment was integrated into the structure of 
government in applicant countries through the cre 
ation of the National Fund and a small number of im 
plementing agencies. 
These basic orientations were adjusted in 1999 to 
reflect the launch of SAPARD for agriculture and ru 
ral development and of ISPA for transport and envi 
ronment infrastructure. The principal adjustment 
was to redirect PHARE's funds to adressing the 
problem of economic and social cohesion. 
a) prepare for the implementation of Structural 
Funds in candidate countries by putting in 
place the necessary administrative and bud 
getary structures; 
b) allow these countries to benefit from a first 
generation of integrated regional develop 
ment programmes of an Objective 1 type, so 
contributing to their economic and social co 
hesion. 
The PHARE INTERREG programme 
Since 1995, following a European Parliament initia 
tive, PHARE, jointly with INTERREG, has also 111.2 The contribution of structural policies to economic and social cohesion: results and prospects 
financed cooperation programmes between border 
regions of the EU and the candidate countries, and 
between the candidate countries themselves, after 
the revision of the PHARE CBC regulation in 1998. 
On the basis of the new PHARE CBC Regulation and 
the new INTERREG guidelines, a Single Program 
ming Document, covering regions on both sides of 
the border and including joint cooperation priorities 
for the 2000 2006 period has been prepared for each 
eligible border. 
Further improvements towards better aligning 
PHARE CBC and INTERREG were included in the 
above mentioned Communication, notably to allow 
PHARE CBC to support projects similar in size to 
those under INTERREG (through a new 'mea 
sure by measure' approach to finance projects be 
tween EUR 50,000 and EUR 2 million from 2001). 
SAPARD 
SAPARD, with an annual budget of EUR 520 million, 
finances structural measures for agriculture, the pro 
cessing and marketing of products and rural devel 
opment (Table A.46). 
By decentralising management, this programme will 
give the future Members States an opportunity to gain 
valuable experience in applying procedures for man 
aging rural development programmes. On a broader 
front, the investment made at present will build skills 
which will be readily transferable to other Structural 
Table 22 Annual breakdown of pre accession funding, 2000 2006 
EUR mn at 1999 prices 
PHARE SAPARD  ISPA  Total 
Minimum Maximum Minimum  Maximum 
Bulgaria  100.0 52.1  83.2 124.8 235.3  276.9 
Czech Rep.  79.0 22.1 57.2 83.2 158.3  184.3 
Estonia  24.0 12.1 20.8 36.4  56.9  72.5 
Hungary  96.0 38.1 72.8 104.0 206.9  238.1 
Latvia  30.0 21.8  36.4 57.2  88.2  109.0 
Lithuania  42.0 29.8  41.6 62.4 113.4  134.2 
Poland  398.0 168.7  312.0 384.8  878.7  951.5 
Romania  242.0 150.6  208.0 270.4 600.6  663.0 
Slovakia  49.0 18.3 36.4 57.2 103.7  124.5 
Slovenia  25.0 6.3 10.4 20.8  41.7  52.1 
Total  1085.0 520.0  1040.0  2645.0 
PHARE total annual budget is EUR 1,577 million 
Source: European Commission 
Fund activities and to other areas of Community pol 
icy. It should, however, be emphasised that SAPARD 
can only make a limited contribution to meeting the 
challenges in rural areas. 
ISPA 
ISPA, with a budget of EUR 1,040 million a year, is 
aimed at enabling the candidate countries to meet 
Community environmental standards and at the con 
struction of trans European transport networks. Prior 
ity has been given, in the case of the environment, to 
drinking water supply, waste water treatment, waste 
management and reducing air pollution, in the case 
of transport, to projects which are environmen 
tally friendly and of wider Community interest, which 
accord with the priorities established by the Ministers' 
Conferences in Helsinki and Crete. 
Budgetary impact on cohesion 
The area of intervention of these three pre accession 
instruments is similar to that of the Structural and Co 
hesion Funds. In particular, the funds allocated under 
PHARE to 'institution building' go to a special 
programme for preparing countries for managing the 
Structural Funds, while ISPA and SAPARD perform 
the same task in respect of the Cohesion Fund and 
the structural part of the EAGGF. The projects fi 
nanced are similar to those eligible for support from 
the Structural and Cohesion Funds in Member States. 
155 III.2 The contribution of structural policies to economic and social cohesion: results and prospects 
The amounts committed represent a significant pro 
portion of the current investment by public authorities 
in the countries concerned (Table 22). 
Cyprus and Malta 
Cyprus and Malta have been associated with the Un 
ion since 1972 73 and have been in receipt of Com 
munity assistance under four successive financial 
agreements. These were replaced in December 1999 
by a single pre accession instrument with a budget of 
EUR 95 million for the period 2000 to 2004. 
In the current phase of pre accession, more aid has 
been made available than on previous such occa 
sions, with the aim of accelerating the adoption of the 
acquis communautaire. Despite being small, the 
funds committed are a means of helping countries 
prepare for the implementation of cohesion policies, 
required to reduce the significant regional disparities 
which exist. 
1 Commission Decision of 1 st July 1999. 
2 Eligibility criteria defined by Article 4 of the General Regulation 1260/99. 
3 Commission Communication to the Member States on regional policy and competition policy: strengthening their concentration and 
their coherence, OJEC C90 26.03.98. 
4 European Commission, 'Structural and Cohesion Funds, Guidelines for programmes in the period 2000 2006', COM (1999) 344 final 
5 European Commission, Report on the Cohesion Fund (1999). 
6 London School of Economics, The socio economic impact of projects financed by the Cohesion Fund, 1999. 
7 Over a third of SMEs in the Union (around 18 million) are located in areas eligible for Structural Funds assistance, of which 3 million 
are in Objective 1 regions. 
8 COM (1998)275, 'Reinforcing cohesion and competitiveness through research, technological development and innovation', 
Communication of the Commission 12.06.1998. 
9 RITTS (Regional strategies for innovation and technology transfer) have been financed under the Innovation Programme of the 4th 
Framework Programme. 
10 COM (97) 7, 'Economic and social cohesion and the information society', Commission Communication. 
11 European Commission, 'From telecommunications to the information society: evaluation criteria for the 2000 2006 programmes', 
Technical Document n° 2 , 1999. 
12 RISI (Regional information Society Initiatives) were financed under Article 10 of the ERDF and Article 6 of the ESF. 
13 European Policies Research Centre (EPRC), 'Objective 2: Experiences, lessons and policy implications', July 1999. 
14 European Commission, 'Conclusions of ESF final evaluations, 1999'. 
15 ENESAD, 'Synthesis of intermediate evaluations of Objective 5b in France', April 1998. 
16 European Commission, 'Mid term review of Objective 1 and 6 programmes   Better management through evaluation', 1997. 
17 Tavistock Institute, 'Thematic evaluation of the partnership principle', 1999. 
18 For Quest II: Roger, W. (1996) 'Macroeconomic evaluation of the effects of CSF with Quest II' (paper presented at the European 
Conference on evaluation methods for Structural Funds intervention, Berlin 2 3 Dec. 1996). For Hermin: Bradley, J. (2000) The 
impact of CSF on objective 1 countries   1989 2006' (study for the Regional Policy DG of the European Commission). The detailed 
results are presented in the Annex. 
19 European Commission, 'The Structural Funds and their coordination with the Cohesion Funds   Guidelines for the 2000 2006 
programmes', COM (1999) 344 Final. 
20 A document which sets out the context for support for employment and human resources development in each Member State. 
21 At the time of drafting full details on Objective 2 programmes were not available. 
22 The Commission has announced priorities for the four Initiatives and has decided the allocation of the overall amount (EUR 10.44 
billion or 5.3% of the total Structural Funds) between Member States. 
23 European Commission, 'Indicators for monitoring and evaluation', Working Document n° 3 , 1999. 
24 C(2000)3103. 
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Regional features in Turkey 
Since the Helsinki summit, Turkey has become the 13th 
candidate country for accession to the EU. 
Regional disparities 
According to OECD data, GDP per head in terms of PPS 
is only 33.4% of the EU average. Indeed, the difference 
in relation to the EU seems to have persisted for many 
years at around this level, going back at least to the be 
ginning of the 1950s, higher GDP growth than in the EU 
being offset by high population growth. Regional dis 
parities are associated with significant differences in 
geographical features and climatic conditions, though 
they also have their roots in the substantial migration 
flows which occurred during the troubled times at the 
end of the 19th century and first half of the 20th. 
The data available on GDP per head by province, of 
which there are 80 and which have been aggregated 
into 19 regions of approximately NUTS 2 size, illustrate 
the scale of disparities in 1997: 
  between east and west: two thirds of the population 
were concentrated in the west of the country in half 
the land area, accounting for 82% of national GDP, 
and with GDP per head 23% above the national aver 
age (41% of the EU average). In the east, GDP per 
head was 53% of the national average, much the 
same as 10 years earlier; 
  between coastal and inland regions: GDP per head in 
the four coastal regions as a whole accounting for 
55% of the population is 26% above the national aver 
age; 
  in two regions (Istanbul and Izmit), GDP per head was 
substantially above the national average (53% and 
70% higher, respectively), or around half the EU aver 
age; 
  in 7 regions (Aegean Sea, the southern coastal areas, 
Ankara), GDP per head was up to 50% above the na 
tional average, or between a third and a half of the EU 
average; 
  in 7 regions (around Anatolia, the Black Sea coastal 
areas), the level was between half and 100% of the 
national average, between 20% and 33% of the EU 
average; 
  in the remaining three regions, in eastern Anatolia, the 
level was between 20% and 50% of the national aver 
age, or only 7% to 16% of the EU average, lower than 
in any other regions in the candidate countries. 
Social disparities 
Employment 
In 1998, the official unemployment rate was estimated 
at 6.3% of the labour force, but this does not reflect the 
true situation given the absence of an unemployment 
benefit system and substantial under employment. Of 
the 20.5 million in civilian employment, 5.5 million were 
unpaid family workers, mostly women. While the activity 
rate of men was much the same as the EU average 
(79%), for women, it was considerably lower (29% as 
against 59%), particularly in urban areas (15%). Data on 
occupations suggest that women face considerable dif 
ficulties, or even discrimination, in finding a job in manu 
facturing or services. 
Education 
The rate of illiteracy is still significant (18% as against 
3% in Greece), even among young people in the work 
force and especially among women (24%). Participa 
tion in compulsory schooling is below 90% of the age 
group concerned, largely due to children working, 1 mil 
lion of those between 6 and 14 being in work, a third of 
them under 12. 
Structural policies 
Regional policy 
In contrast to the other candidate countries, Turkey in 
troduced a regional policy during the 1970s with an aid 
scheme for business. The provinces assisted ac 
counted for a third of the population and had an average 
level of GDP per head of 56% of the national average. 
The policy, however, has not produced significant re 
sults. Because of security problems during the 1990s, 
financial aid did not attract many firms to eastern re 
gions. Moreover, problems of lagging development 
were compounded by difficulties in the coal 
(Zonguldak) and the iron and steel (Karabuk) 
industries. 
Data on public investment, which is still substantial be 
cause of a large nationalised industry sector, indicate 
that support of disadvantaged areas was small. In 1997, 
total spending on investment amounted to around EUR 
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194 per head, of which some 40% went on regional 
measures. 
Social policy 
The macroeconomic adjustment underway will have 
lasting effects only if it is accompanied by a broad 
range of social reforms. Much needs to be done in re 
spect of employment legislation, equal opportunities, 
social protection, health care, education and humans 
rights. 
Social expenditures accounts for only 7% of GDP as 
compared with 25% in the European OECD countries, 
leaving a large part of the population without adequate 
protection. 
Employment 
There is no general unemployment compensation sys 
tem in Turkey. Under employment regulations and col 
lective agreements, dismissals give entitlement to a 
fixed payment proportional to the time spent in a job. 
However, 50% of employment is not declared and col 
lective agreements cover only 35% of those in officially 
declared jobs. There is no provision in employment leg 
islation against sex discrimination and, according to the 
1998 UNDP report on human development, discrimina 
tion is institutionalised and a structural feature of the la 
bour market. 
Health 
The current health care system is costly and not particu 
larly effective. In 1998, the deficit on expenditure 
amounted to 2.7% of GDP and accounted for a third of 
the total budget deficit. Access to health care is un 
equal, with rural areas being especially disadvantaged, 
expenditure on public health centres, mainly located in 
rural areas, declining from 7% to 3% of the total health 
budget between 1992 and 1996. 
Education 
Despite a relatively large number of children of school 
age, spending on primary and secondary education 
amounts to only 2.1% of GDP, against an OECD aver 
age of 3.4%. Expenditure per pupil in primary schools is 
only just over 20% of the OECD average, while in sec 
ondary schools it is only around 12%. For the poorest 
families, children are a significant source of income and 
there is no Government policy to encourage parents to 
send them to school. 
Conclusions 
In the context of preparing for accession, it is essential 
that Turkey develops regional and social policies capa 
ble of responding to needs and enabling it to participate 
in EU programmes for strengthening economic and so 
cial cohesion. 
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